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John C. Jamison, Dean June 29, 1987
804-253-4001
Mr. James C. Treadway 
Chairman
National Commission on Fraudulent Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Chairman Treadway:
This letter is to express my deep concern over the significantly expanded role 
that the Commission's preliminary report is asking board audit committees to 
assume. The first two sentences of Appendix K would seem to thrust greater and more 
specific responsibility and legal liability on independent audit committee members 
than those people presently bear as corporate directors. Moreover, the extension of 
this hyper-responsibility for the abolishment of any possibility of fraud in the 
management ranks and corporate financial and other records places the audit 
committee and independent directors as a group in a strong and continuing adviserial 
role vis a vis management. The independent directors might as well elect themselves 
to office and run the damn company! Or go private, if they wish to continue serving 
as directors.
My interest in this matter is not just academic, but as one who spent 21 years 
on "the Street" in corporate finance and who has served for the past 14 years as a 
director of four publicly-held companies (two continuing) and, from time-to-time, as 
a member or chairman of the audit committee of each. While I applaud the "leverage" 
given audit committees by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Managements' 
Responsibility for Financial Statements on behalf of the board, and of the board to 
achieve the most responsible practicable practices in financial reporting and 
ethical corporate conduct, as a conscientious board practitioner I reject the notion 
of the imposition of additional standards such as those set forth in the 
Commission's exposure draft report. As an academic, I am also appalled at the 
probable extraordinary expense that the Commission proposes to be incurred to insure 
against the last increment of the uninsurable.
Please substantially moderate and mittigate the Commission's charge to boards 
and their audit committees in your final report. I'm not in the habit of 
volunteering, but if my services would be considered at a ll useful in the process of 
issuing a final report which treats the audit committee function in proper context, 
I would be glad to do so.
Sincerely,
John C.  Jamison
JCJ:mgh
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INTERNATIONAL PLAZA ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS NEW JERSEY 07632
EXECUTIVE OFFICES
J u n e  2 9 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h in g t o n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  S i r s :
CPC I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n c .  a p p r e c i a t e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
c o m m e n t o n  t h e  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  —  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g .  We 
s u p p o r t  t h e  t h r u s t  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  i n  g e n e r a l  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
w e w i l l  c o n f i n e  o u r  c o m m e n ts  t o  t h o s e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  o f  t h e  
C o m m is s io n  w i t h  w h ic h  w e  h a v e  s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  c h a n g e  o r  o b ­
s e r v a t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c a l i t y  t h e r e o f .
C h a p t e r  Tw o R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y
M o s t  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h i s  C h a p t e r  
a r e  a l r e a d y  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r o c e d u r e  a t  C PC .
R e c o m m e n d a t io n :  T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u ld  a p p r o v e ,  i n
a d v a n c e ,  t h e  t y p e s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t a d v i s o r y  s e r ­
v i c e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  in d e p e n ­
d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m .
CPC I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n c .  i s  a  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  c o m p a n y .  B e ­
c a u s e  o f  t h i s  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m it te e  l i m i t s  
m a n a g e m e n t s e r v i c e s  b y  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  u n i t s  
t o  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  a u d i t  f e e  f o r  t h a t  u n i t  a n d  r e q u i r e s  a 
r e p o r t  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  e a c h  y e a r  t o  d e t e r m in e  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t 
s e r v i c e s  r e n d e r e d  t o  t h e  u n i t ,  t h e  c o s t s  o f  s u c h  s e r v i c e s  a n d  
t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  c o s t s  t o  a u d i t  f e e  f o r  t h e  u n i t .  We h a v e  
f o u n d  i t  i m p r a c t i c a b l e  t o  r e q u i r e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v a l  i n
2advance for the usual routine services to a unit. We, there­
fore, suggest that the recommendation should be changed to 
read: "The audit committee should approve, in advance, the
types and the extent of management advisory services that 
management plans to engage the company's independent public 
accountant to perform. Services outside the routine areas 
should be specifically preapproved by the Committee when the 
estimated cost exceeds a predetermined level established by the 
committee. The committee should annually review all management 
services performed by the company's independent public accoun­
tant."
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public 
release.
We believe that this is an impracticable recommendation.
If implemented, it would delay the public release of results. 
Since audit committees usually schedule meetings in conjunc­
tion with Board meetings, the delay between completion of the 
quarterly results by the Company and the review by the audit 
committee could result in a "leak" of the results. At CPC, 
the quarterly results are reviewed by our independent account­
ants before they are released to the public. We suggest that 
the second sentence of the recommendation should be changed to 
read: "This oversight should include either approving finan­
cial results prior to public release or determining that the 
independent public accountants have reviewed such results prior 
to public release."
Recommendation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations
should establish a body to guide companies on internal con­
trols.
We suggest that your recommendation, if implemented, would 
result in an academic exercise that would have little practical 
value. At CPC, each of our operating units throughout the 
world by necessity must have different systems of internal con­
trols. Methods of selling, local laws and practices, methods 
of production, etc. require internal control procedures that 
have been designed and tailored for that individual operating 
unit. We strongly recommend that the Commission delete this 
recommendation.
Chapter Three: Recommendations for the Independent
Public Accountant
We note that the Commission has not made a recommendation 
concerning the accounting firm's personnel that performs the 
audit. We suggest that this area is a major contributing 
factor in audit failures. Furthermore, the length of service
3o f  th e  p e r s o n n e l on  an  a u d i t  te a m  ra n g e s  f ro m  th o s e  w i t h  no 
e x p e r ie n c e  t o  th o s e  t h a t  h a v e  le s s  th a n  f i v e  y e a r s  e x p e r ie n c e  
b a s e d  on o u r  n o n - s c i e n t i f i c  s tu d y  o f  th e  q u e s t io n .  I n  any  
la r g e  e n t e r p r i s e  i t  ta k e s  a num be r o f  y e a r s  f o r  th e  a u d i t o r s  t o  
know  how th e  e n t e r p r i s e  o p e r a te s .  W it h o u t  some c o n t i n u i t y ,  
t h e r e  c o u ld  be  a f a i l u r e  t o  r e c o g n iz e  s o m e th in g  o f  a s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  n a t u r e .  I t  s h o u ld  be  n o te d  t h a t  m a n a g e rs  a s s ig n e d  t o  
s u p e r v is e  a u d i t s  u s u a l l y  a re  r e q u i r e d  t o  s u p e r v is e  o t h e r  a u d i t s  
a t  th e  same t im e .  I n  m any a c c o u n t in g  f i r m s ,  p e r s o n n e l a d ­
v a n c e d  t o  th e  m a n a g e r l e v e l  w i t h  o n ly  f o u r  o r  f i v e  y e a r s  
e x p e r ie n c e .  F u r t h e r ,  i n  some a c c o u n t in g  f i r m s  th e  r e v ie w  o f  
w o r k in g  p a p e rs  i s  th e  d u t y  o f  th e  m a n a g e r and  n o t  o f  th e  p a r t ­
n e r  i n  c h a rg e  o f  th e  e n g a g e m e n t so  t h a t  s e n io r  m anagem ent 
o v e r r i g h t  may be le s s  th a n  i n  d e p th .  We, t h e r e f o r e ,  s u g g e s t  
and  recom m end t h a t  th e  C o m m is s io n  r e v ie w  how a u d i t s  a r e  c o n ­
d u c te d  and  make re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  th e  a u d i t  te a m . 
T h is  m ig h t  ta k e  th e  fo rm  o f  a re c o m m e n d a t io n  t h a t  th e  a u d i t  
c o m m it te e  be  in fo r m e d  i n  a d v a n c e  o f  th e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  and  
e x p e r ie n c e  o f  th e  a u d i t  team  p e r s o n n e l a s s ig n e d  t o  th e  a u d i t .
We s h a l l  be  p le a s e d  t o  re s p o n d  t o  a n y  q u e s t io n s  t h a t  y o u  
h a ve  on  o u r  c o m m e n ts .
V e ry  T r u l y  Y o u rs
Konrad S ch la tte r  
Comptroller
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Gerald LewisCOMPTROLER OF FLORIDA Lawrence H. FuchsDEPUTY COMPTROLER
OFFICE OF COMPTROLLERDEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCESTATE OF FLORIDATALLAHASSEE32301
June 29, 1987
National Comision onFraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.Washington, D. C. 2006Gentlemen:We have reviewed your exposure draft of April, 1987 with great interest.Our agency has made criminal action a high priority in our enforce­ment efforts. We routinely work with criminal justice agencies, and members of cur staff serve as investigators and special prosecutors for state (district) attorneys when appropriate. This policy has ben in effect for several years and is showing increasing success. We support your conclusions regarding increased use of criminal sanctions.As the regulator of both the securities and banking industries in Florida we have pursued several enforcement actions involving the improper use of financial statements. In some cases the purported audits are simply fraudulently produced. There have been, however, significant instances where the client has used a properly prepared statement in furtherance of illegal activity.We would appreciate the inclusion of guidelines or requirements for an accounting professional to notify regulatory or other authorities when he or she becomes aware of improper use of a financial statement. An accountant/auditor would be one of the first to learn of such activity through confirmation calls from potential associates or customers of the client. This early warning would be invaluable to regulators and would allay suspicions of willing participation in the scheme.Thank you for the opportunity to review and coment upon your findings. Please contact us if we may be of further assistance.
UHF/ls
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T H O M P S O N ,  G R E E N S P O N  &  C O . ,  P .C .
C e rt if ie d  P u b lic  A ccoun tan ts
June 30, 1987
N a t io n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t 
F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P e n n sy lva n ia  Avenue, N.W.
W ash ing ton , D. C. 20006
G entlem en:
The members o f  th e  A cco u n tin g  and A u d it in g  P rocedures Committee o f  th e  
N o rth e rn  C hapte r o f  th e  V i r g in ia  S o c ie ty  o f  C e r t i f ie d  P u b lic  A ccou n tan ts  a re  
p le a se d  to  comment on th e  A p r i l ,  1987, exposure  d r a f t  o f  th e  R e p o rt o f  th e  
N a t io n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rt in g .
The Committee is  g e n e ra l ly  in  agreem ent w ith  th e  proposed R e p o rt, b u t we 
recommend th a t  th e  exposure  d r a f t  be re v is e d  to  r e f l e c t  th e  fo l lo w in g :
(1) We s u p p o rt s ig n i f i c a n t  re p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  A u d it in g  S tandards 
Board by know ledgeab le  persons who a re  n o t p r a c t ic in g  CPA 's, b u t 
we f in d  e xc e s s iv e  th e  recom m endation on page 55 th a t  h a l f  th e  
B o a rd 's  members be persons n o t engaged in  p u b l ic  a c c o u n tin g  
p r a c t ic e ;  a m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  members sh o u ld  be p re s e n t ly  
p r a c t ic in g  CPA's w ith  c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c a l  e x p e r ie n c e . A ls o ,  we do 
n o t b e l ie v e  th e  B o a rd 's  s iz e  sh o u ld  be reduced . Such p ro p o s a ls , 
ta ke n  to g e th e r ,  w ou ld  r i s k  th e  issuance  o f  s ta n d a rd s  t h a t  a re  
im p r a c t ic a l f o r  th e  c u r re n t  p ro fe s s io n a l a u d it in g  p r a c t ic e ,  as 
w e l l  as a p o te n t ia l  o v e r re p re s e n ta t io n  o f  CPA's fro m  la rg e  f irm s  
in  a Board o f  reduced s iz e .
(2) We b e lie v e  page 51 sh o u ld  be rew orded f o r  c l a r i t y  to  in d ic a te  
th a t  i t  i s  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  th e  CPA f i r m ,  n o t th e  c o n c u rr in g  
re v ie w  p a r tn e r ,  to  assu re  th e  ass ignm ent o f  a c o n c u rr in g  re v ie w  
p a r tn e r  who i s  a pee r o f  th e  p a r tn e r  whose engagement he i s  to  
re v ie w .
(3) W h ile  re c o g n iz in g  th e  im p o rta nce  o f  th e  system  o f  in t e r n a l  
a c c o u n tin g  c o n t r o l ,  we do n o t b e l ie v e  a d e s c r ip t io n  in  th e  
s ta n d a rd  a u d i t o r 's  r e p o r t ,  as recommended on page 52, o f  th e  
re v ie w  and e v a lu a t io n  o f  such system  w ou ld  be m e a n in g fu l t o  th e  
t y p ic a l  f in a n c ia l  s ta te m e n t u s e r .
3930 Walnut Street, Fairfax, Virginia 22030-4790 • (703) 385-8888
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
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P a g e  2
W e  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  o f f e r  t h e s e  c o m m e n t s ,  w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
v i e w s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  A u d i t i n g  P r o c e d u r e s  
C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  N o r t h e r n  C h a p t e r  o f  t h e  V i r g i n i a  S o c i e t y  o f  C e r t i f i e d  P u b l i c  
A c c o u n t a n t s .  T h e s e  c o m m e n t s  d o  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  a n  o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
S o c i e t y  a s  a  w h o l e .
V e r y  t r u l y  y o u r s ,
D a l e  H .  S t r i c k l e r ,  C h a i r m a n
A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  A u d i t i n g  P r o c e d u r e s  
C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  N o r t h e r n  C h a p t e r  
o f  t h e  V i r g i n i a  S o c i e t y  o f  
C e r t i f i e d  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s
D H S : H K B : c b
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233 B R O A D W A Y
N E W  YO R K . N.Y. 10279
212-553-2295
June 30, 1987
F .  W . W O O L W O R T H  C O .
W IL L IA M  K. L A V IN  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 
FINANCE
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sirs,
F.W. Woolworth Co. is a large, multinational retailer 
owned by over 55,000 shareholders holding over 65 million 
shares with a market value in excess of $3 billion. As 
chief financial officer of this company, I bear a tremendous 
fiduciary responsibility to these Woolworth shareholders 
which I, along with the rest of management, take very 
seriously.
It is because of the depth of my conviction to this 
responsibility that I have severe reservations about both 
the overall 'tone' of your report, as well as several of its 
recommendations. As would be expected of a blue-chip 
corporation such as ours, we already comply with a majority 
of your recommendations and therefore are in implicit 
agreement with them. The recommendations with which we do 
not concur, however, are those which denigrate management by 
transferring its responsibility either to the Board of 
Directors (via the Audit Committee), the internal auditors 
or the outside accountants. Such recommendations are an 
insult to those conscientious managers who will be deemed 
guilty of fraudulent financial reporting by reason of 
association, by office, with those who actually commit such 
crimes.
The specific recommendations to which I disagree, along 
with my reasons, are attached as an appendix to this letter. 
If you have any comments or need additional information, 
please contact me directly.
Sincerely yours
APPENDIX
Recommendation
The Commission endorses the concept of periodic 
external (peer) reviews of the internal audit function as a 
way to enhance their effectiveness.
Response
There are two problems with this recommendation.
First, an external review of the internal audit function is 
already in effect by virtue of the fact that our outside 
accountants utilize our internal audit staff and accordingly 
are continually reviewing their independence and competency 
in accordance with SAS 9. Second, a bona fide 'peer' review 
would need to be undertaken, in theory, by the internal 
auditors of other retailers. We have a serious problem with 
allowing the competition to have access to company records 
as sensitive as our internal audit workpapers.
Recommendation
The Commission feels that involvement by the internal 
auditors in preparing the financial statements at the 
consolidated level can help prevent and detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Response
The responsibility for preparing financial statements 
at the consolidated level belongs to management and 
involvement by the internal auditors at this level would 
improperly cast them in the role of management. While it 
would not be inappropriate for the internal auditors to 
examine the financial statements prepared by management, 
this would be redundant and unnecessary as such a function 
is already performed by the outside accountants. 
Furthermore, the outside accountants would be unwilling to 
relinquish this responsibility, given their legal liability 
for the accuracy of the financial statements.
Recommendation
Audit committees should be informed, vigilant and 
effective overseas of the financial reporting process and 
the company's internal controls.
Response
We take exception to this recommendation not because of 
what it is saying (the obvious), but because of what it is 
not saying. The ultimate responsibility for protecting
1 1 6 b
shareholder rights (be it through preventing fraudulent 
financial reporting or otherwise) lies with the Board of 
Directors itself, not with any of its committees. By 
requiring a committee to be "informed, vigilant and effec­
tive” , this recommendation is insinuating that higher 
standards be set for the Audit Committee than for the Board 
itself.
Recommendation
The audit committee should approve in advance the types 
and extent of management advisory services that management 
plans to engage the company's independent accountant to 
perform.
Response
There is no reason for the Audit Committee to perform 
the management function of approving in advance all normal, 
ongoing management advisory services, given that the Audit 
Committee has a clearly established policy designating which 
types of services are inappropriate. Under these 
circumstances, an ex-post facto review is adequate.
Recommendation
Audit committees should increase their oversight of the 
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include 
approving financial results prior to public release.
Response
Given the dramatic increase in insider-trading 
violations, convictions and impending lawsuits, there is no 
justification for management to withhold releasing quarterly 
results until the next Board meeting. For the capital 
markets to function in an orderly manner, financial 
information must be disseminated as soon as it becomes 
available. Accordingly, I am adamantly opposed to this 
recommendation.
L R 6 2 4 8 7
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T H E  M ID L A N D  C O M P A N Y
FIRST NATIONAL BANK BLDG.
C IN C IN N A T I, O H IO
June 30, 1987
National Commission on 
Fradulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washinton, D. C. 20006
Gentlemen:
Following are comments from the Audit Committee of The 
Midland Company regarding certain of the recommendations stated in 
your April, 1987 Exposure Draft under Sections IV, V, VI and VII.
Section IV
We agree with the following recommendations:
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee.
Informed, Vigilant and Effective Audit Committees.
Written Charter.
Resources and Authority.
Review of the Public Accountant's Independence.
We do not fully agree with the recommendation titled "Issue 
Related to Public Accountant's Independence". We realize that a 
material management advisory services contract could possibly 
influence some decisions in the financial process. However, 
routine and minor services should not necessarily be approved in 
advance. An Audit Committee that is properly performing its 
duties has already determined that top management and financial 
personnel have demonstrated their competence in these decisions.
Section V
We agree with the following recommendation:
Management Report.
We do not fully agree with the recommendation titled "Audit 
Committee Chairman's Letter": The inclusion of such a letter in
the annual report certainly has some merit. However, the fairly 
extensive detail recommended to be contained in such a letter 
seems to our Committee to be inordinately detailed. We would 
prefer a statement less lengthy and dealing only with significant, 
material matters and policies in a general manner.
National Commission Fradulent Financial Reporting 
June 30, 1987 
Page Two
Section VI
We agree with the following recommendation:
Seeking a Second Opinion.
We strongly disagree with the recommendation titled 
"Quarterly Reporting". As noted prior, an Audit Committee 
properly performing its duties has already determined the 
competence and reliability of the Company's top management, 
financial executives, Public Accountants and their roles in the 
proper functioning of internal controls. We feel that such 
reliances should be adequate for the company to issue quarterly 
statements without prior approval of the Audit Commitee.
Section VII
We agree with the recommendation in this section.
Our Committee and the management of The Midland Company wish 
to compliment your commission on its extensive study of a much 
needed matter.
Very truly yours
John R. Orther 
Chairman, Audit Committee
JRO/gms
118
T h e  Stantley Works
New Britain, Connecticut
J u n e  3 0 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A ve n u e  N .W .
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . 20006
G e n tle m e n :
We a p p r e c ia t e  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  com m ent o n  t h e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  o f  
y o u r  r e p o r t  w h ic h  i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  an  u n d e r s ta n d ­
in g  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  r o le s  v a r io u s  
p a r t i e s  p la y  i n  i t .  A n d , i t  w i l l  im p ro v e  t h e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  
th o s e  p a r t i e s  r e g a r d le s s  o f  w h e th e r  a l l  o f  t h e  new recom m enda­
t i o n s  a r e  im p le m e n te d .
I t  s u f f e r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  b y  a d d in g  m o re  l e v e l s  o f  r e v ie w  a n d  r e g u la ­
t i o n ,  m o s t o f  w h ic h  w i l l  n o t  i n h i b i t  t h e  p e r p e t r a t o r s  o f  f r a u d u ­
l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  b u t  w i l l  a d d  u n n e c e s s a ry  e x p e n s e  f o r  
m o s t c o m p a n ie s .
O u r p r i n c i p a l  c o n c e rn s  r e l a t e  t o :
o m a n d a to ry  p r e is s u a n c e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  a p p r o v a l  a nd  
in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t  r e v ie w  o f  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l  d a t a .  T h is  i s  e x p e n s iv e  a n d  s h o u ld  be  d on e  
o n ly  w hen an  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  b e l ie v e s  i t  n e c e s s a r y .
o t h e  i n c l u s i o n  i n  a n n u a l r e p o r t s  o f  e s s e n t i a l l y  b o i l e r ­
p l a t e  r e p o r t s  b y  m anagem ent a n d  t h e  c h a irm e n  o f  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m it te e s .  T h e re  w i l l  be  l i t t l e  e d u c a t io n a l  
v a lu e  a n d  th o s e  who w o u ld  u s e  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t s  w i l l  h a v e  no  q u a lm s  a b o u t  s ig n in g  th e m .
o d i s c lo s u r e  o f  m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t in g  o r  a u d i t i n g  is s u e s  
d is c u s s e d  w i t h  o l d  a n d  new a u d i t o r s  w hen t h e r e  i s  a 
c h a n g e  a n d  s e e k in g  s e c o n d  o p in io n s .  S u ch  d i s c lo s u r e  i s  
n o t  a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  a u d i t i n g  p r o f e s s io n  p o l i c i n g  
i t s e l f  w i t h ,  i f  n e e d e d , SEC e n fo r c e m e n t  h e lp .  S uch  
r e g u l a t i o n  i n h i b i t s  c o m p e t i t io n  a n d  c h a n g e  a n d  m akes 
g o o d  p r a c t i c e  a p p e a r  s u s p ic io u s .
t h e  e s t a b l is h m e n t  o f  y e t  a n o th e r  b o d y  t o  s e t  s ta n d a r d s ,  
t h i s  t im e  f o r  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l .  T h e s e  s ta n d a r d s  a r e  i n  
p la c e .  The  d i f f e r e n c e s  y o u  r e f e r  t o  c a n  b e s t  be  w o rk e d  
o u t  i n  p r a c t i c e .  A n d ,
o
- 2 -
o the requirement to, in essence, have 2 partners in
charge of each audit engagement. This will be a costly 
duplication of effort, which should be unnecessary in a 
well managed firm.
Your recommendations for emphasis on ethical values in business 
and accounting curricula and additional SEC enforcement remedies 
- punish the wrongdoers - are the way to go. Adding more levels 
of costly review and regulation is not the way to go.
Sincerely yours,
Spencer Gould 
Vice President
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1700 EAST PUTNAM AVENUE, P. O. BOX 819, OLD GREENWICH, CT 06870-0819
June 3 0 , 1987
American Brands, Inc.
ROBERT L PLANCHER 
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND 
CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER
N a t io n a l C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  Avenue, N.W.
W a sh in g to n , D. C. 20006
G en tlem en :
We have re a d  th e  e x p o su re  d r a f t  o f  yo u r r e p o r t  on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l  
R e p o r t in g .  You have done an e x c e l le n t  jo b  o f  p r e s e n t in g  a co m p re h e n s ive  
s e t  o f  f in d in g s  and recom m enda tio ns  to  g u id e  th o s e  o f  us con ce rn e d  a b o u t 
th e  q u a l i t y  o f  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .
The s in g le  e x c e p t io n  we f e e l  c o m p e lle d  to  ta k e  i s  w i th  re s p e c t to  yo u r 
recom m enda tio n  th a t  th e  A u d it  C om m ittee  a p p ro ve  f i n a n c ia l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  
to  p u b l ic  r e le a s e .  I t  i s  o u r o p in io n  t h a t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  i s  th e  
r e s p o n s ib l i t y  o f  a com pany 's  m anagem ent. The a p p ro v a l o f  F in a n c ia l  
S ta te m e n ts  a n d /o r  r e p o r ts  p r i o r  to  re le a s e  p la c e s  th e  a p p ro v e r in  th e  r o le  
o f  management as opposed to  i t s  p ro p e r  r o le  o f  an " o v e r s ig h t  c o m m it te e ."
In  a d d i t io n ,  c o o r d in a t in g  th e  re le a s e  o f  f i n a n c ia l  r e s u l t s  w ith  a w id e ly  
g e o g r a p h ic a l ly  d is p e rs e d  g ro u p  such as th e  A u d it  C om m ittee  c o u ld  le a d  to  
u n n e ce ssa ry  d e la y s .  In  o u r o p in io n ,  th e  o v e r s ig h t  r o le  o f  th e  Board o f  
D ir e c to r s  and i t s  A u d it  C om m ittee  i s  s a t i s f i e d  i f  f i n a n c ia l  r e s u l t s  a re  
re v ie w e d  w i t h in  a re a s o n a b le  t im e  a f t e r  re le a s e  o f  th e  q u a r t e r ly  r e p o r t .
We b e l ie v e  th e  b e s t in t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  co n ce rn e d  w ou ld  be b e s t se rv e d  i f  th e  
re q u ire m e n t f o r  A u d it  C om m ittee  re v ie w  o f  th e  q u a r t e r ly  f i n a n c ia l  r e s u l t s  
p r i o r  to  th e  r e le a s e  o f  th e  r e p o r t  i s  e l im in a te d  fro m  y o u r re co m m e n d a tio n s .
S in c e r e ly ,
R. L . P la n c h e r
S e n io r  V ic e  P re s id e n t  and
C h ie f  A c c o u n tin g  O f f ic e r
 
Eli L illy  and Com pany
Lilly Corporate Center 
Indianapolis. Indiana 46285
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Richard A. Warne 
Vice President
Accounting Development and General Auditor 
(317) 276-3769
J u n e  30 , 1987
M r .  Jam es C . T re a d w a y ,  J r . ,  C h a irm a n  
T h e  N a tio n a l C o m m iss ion  on  F r a u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e  
W a s h in g to n , DC 20006
D e a r M r .  T re a d w a y :
E li L i l l y  a n d  C o m p a n y  is  p le a s e d  to  le n d  i t s  s u p p o r t  to  th e  
E x p o s u re  D r a f t  R e p o r t  o f  th e  N a tio n a l C o m m iss ion  on  F r a u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l R e p o r t in g .  We a re  a F o r tu n e  500 c o m p a n y  w ith  sa les  
o f  $ 3 .7  b i l l io n  a n d  n e t  in com e  o f  $560 m il l io n .  We h a v e  
2 9 ,0 0 0  e m p lo ye e s  a n d  a b o u t  th e  same n u m b e r  o f  s h a re h o ld e rs .
I t  ha s  been  o u r  s ta te d  p o l ic y  t h a t  w e a re  d e d ic a te d  to  th e  
h ig h e s t  le v e ls  o f  e th ic s ,  i n t e g r i t y ,  a n d  e x c e lle n c e  in  
r e s e a rc h ,  m a n u fa c tu r in g ,  m a rk e t in g  a n d  a il o th e r  p h a s e s  o f  o u r  
o p e ra t io n s .  C le a r ly ,  in t e g r i t y  in  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  is  o n e  
o f  th e s e  a re a s .
O u r  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  c o m m is s io n 's  e f f o r t s  fo l lo w s  t h a t  o f  th e  
c o m m is s io n 's  s p o n s o r in g  o r g a n iz a t io n s  o f  w h ic h  w e h a v e  m a n y  
m e m b e rs : s ix  in  th e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  In te r n a l A u d i to r s  ( I I A ) ,  e ig h t
in  th e  N a tio n a l A s s o c ia t io n  o f  A c c o u n ta n ts  ( N A A ) ,  s ix  in  th e  
F in a n c ia l E x e c u t iv e s  In s t i t u te s  ( F E I ) ,  a n d  22 in  th e  A m e r ic a n  
I n s t i t u t e  o f  C e r t i f ie d  P u b lic  A c c o u n ta n ts  ( A IC P A ) .  I t  is  
e s p e c ia lly  n o te w o r th y  t h a t  th e s e  m e m b e rs h ip s  a re  p a id  b y  th e  
in d iv id u a ls  w h o  a re  th e  m e m b e rs , n o t  b y  th e  c o m p a n y . I am 
p e r s o n a lly  f o r t u n a te  to  s e rv e  on  th e  FEI c o m m itte e  on  c o rp o ra te  
r e p o r t in g .
B e ca u se  o f  m y in v o lv e m e n t w i th  th e  t h is  c o m m itte e , o u r  c o m p a n y  is  
a w a re  o f  th e  c o m m e n ta ry  i t  w i l l  be  p r o v id in g  to  th e  e x p o s u re  
d r a f t .  I w i l l  n o t  r e p e a t  t h a t  c o m m e n ta ry . N e e d le ss  to  s a y , 
w e a g re e  w ith  i t  a n d  th e  s u p p o r t  w h ic h  th e  c o m m itte e  on 
c o rp o ra te  r e p o r t in g  is  g iv in g  to  th e  c o m m is s io n 's  r e p o r t .
The National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Page 2
June 30, 1987
We are especially impressed with the commission's statements 
on page 27 of the Exposure Draft:
The public company has the initial and the final 
responsibility for its financial statements. Within 
the company lies the greatest potential for reducing 
fraudulent financial re p o rtin g ___
The Commission found that no company, regardless of size 
or line of business, is immune from the possibility that 
fraudulent financial reporting will occur; that 
possibility is inherent in doing business. The forces 
and opportunities that appeared in numerous SEC 
enforcement cases are present to some extent in all 
companies. The Commission also found that companies 
have a number of practices already in place to help 
them deal with these forces and opportunities. All 
companies would benefit from adopting similar practices 
to reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.
The above quote expresses the commission's view that 
fraudulent financial reporting begins in the company and that, 
therefore, the principle responsibility for its detection and 
prevention must rest in the company. We thus support 
particularly the commission's recommendation for the public 
companies to establish a "Tone at the Top", including a 
written code of conduct to "foster a strong ethical climate."
With this in mind, we note also the commission's 
recommendations related to the responsibilities of the chief 
accounting officer, the chief internal auditor and the audit 
committee. To our knowledge, however, no mandatory 
professional standards for financial officers exist as they do 
for the independent CPA firms who perform the audit. 
Therefore, we would like for the commission to consider the 
following:
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1. All chief financial officers, chief accounting officers 
and chief internal auditors should be encouraged to 
belong to a professional organization that has a 
professional code of conduct regarding standards of 
financial reporting or accounting performance by its 
members.
2. Professional financial and accounting organizations for 
persons in private industry should be encouraged to 
develop professional codes of conduct and enforce them.
The AICPA has such a code and enforces it. FEI, NAA, and IIA 
all have codes of conduct, but provisions for enforcement are 
not as well defined as in the AICPA.
The firs t point above is mentioned on pages 32 and 33 of the 
exposure draft. The second point may be more controversial, 
involving a recharacterization of the efforts of the 
organizations mentioned. Thus, we offer this suggestion in 
the hope that it may open a public discussion on its merits.
In our case, with the widespread membership we already have 
in such professional organizations, this encouragement would 
mainly serve to broaden to an industry-wide basis a principle 
we have traditionally endorsed.
We would be pleased to discuss this further with the commission 
should you so desire.
Sincerely,
R. A. Warne
RAW:rdt
cc: FEI Committee on Corporate Reporting
National Association of Accountants 
Institute of Internal Auditors
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J u n e  2 6 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on  F r a u d u le n t  
F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , N.W . 
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . 20006
D e a r S i r s ,
I  e n jo y e d  r e a d in g  th e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  on  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  
R e p o r t in g .  I  c o n s id e r  i t  an  h o n o r  t o  re s p o n d  t o  th e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t .
I  r e a l i z e  th e  d r a f t  was in te n d e d  f o r  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s ,  b u t  I  
im a g in e  a u d i t s  o f  n o n - p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  w o u ld  be  a f f e c t e d  o v e r  a 
p e r io d  o f  t im e  due  t o  a f i l t e r  dow n t r e n d  w h e n e v e r  t h e r e  a re  a n y  
c h a n g e s  t o  a s ta n d a r d  a u d i t o r s '  r e p o r t .  My c o n c e rn  i s  s h o u ld  t h e  
a u d i t s  o f  s m a l le r  b u s in e s s e s  e v e n t u a l l y  be  a f f e c t e d  w i l l  t h e  c l i e n t  
b e  a b le  t o  b e a r  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  a u d i t  fe e s  n e c e s s i t a t e d  t o  s u b s t a n t ia t e  
t h e  c h a n g e  i n  th e  a u d i t o r s  r e p o r t .
I  t h i n k  th e  s u g g e s te d  c o n t r o l s  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  a nd  e d u ­
c a t io n  a re  e x c e l l e n t .
V e ry  t r u l y  y o u r s ,
T h e re s a  M. D a i le y
12
D e l m a r v a
Power R o g e r  D .  C a m p b e l l  8 0 0  K i n g  S t r e e t  • P . O .  B o x  2 3 1
Senior V i c e  President &  W i l m i n g t o n ,  D E  1 9 8 9 9
Chi ef Financial Officer (302) 4 2 9 - 3 7 9 6
June 30, 1987
N ational Commission on Fraudulent F inanc ia l Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
Delmarva Power & L ig h t Company (Delmarva), an investor-owned p u b lic  u t i l i t y ,  
is  pleased to  submit i t s  comments on the recommendations o f the National 
Commission on Fraudulent F inanc ia l R eporting. Delmarva provides e le c t r ic  
se rv ice  throughout most o f  the Delmarva Peninsula which includes the e n tire  
S ta te  o f Delaware, and p o rtio n s  o f the Eastern Shore Counties o f Maryland and 
V irg in ia .  The Company a lso provides gas se rv ice  to  Northern Delaware.
Delmarva ge ne ra lly  agrees w ith  the proposed recommendations and commends the 
Commission fo r  i t s  approach to  the complex problem o f fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l 
re p o rt in g . The re p o rt presents a comprehensive understanding o f  the issues by 
addressing the ro le s  o f the p u b lic  company, the independent a u d ito r , the 
academic w orld , and re g u la to ry  agencies. Many o f the in te rn a l co n tro ls  
discussed in  the re p o rt are a lready app lied  by major p u b lic  companies.
As an e f fe c t iv e  business p o lic y , Delmarva accepts the re s p o n s ib il ity  fo r  the 
accuracy and in te g r i t y  o f the Company's f in a n c ia l re p o rtin g . The Company 
already complies in  substance w ith  the Commission's recommendations such as a 
strong system o f in te rn a l c o n tro ls  and an a u d it committee c o n s is tin g  e n t ire ly  
o f ou ts ide  d ire c to rs . To m ainta in  e f fe c t iv e  communication w ith  management, 
the D ire c to rs  o f the Company, in c lu d in g  a u d it committee members, are involved 
in  the monthly review  o f d e ta ile d  f in a n c ia l data. A lso , the Company m aintains 
a w e ll e s tab lished  in te rn a l a u d it department th a t reviews and appraises the 
adequacy o f accounting and opera ting  c o n tro ls  under g u id e lin es  which meet the 
recommendations o f the Commission.
Although many p o lic ie s  to  reduce the incidence o f fra u d u le n t re p o rtin g  e x is t  
in  the business community, Delmarva be lieves th a t the A u d itin g  Standards Board 
should c o n tin u a lly  m onitor and, when necessary, crea te  s tronger standards to  
improve the q u a lity  o f f in a n c ia l re p o rtin g . Most companies, in  con junction  
w ith  the independent a u d it ,  have measures in  place which reduce the 
p o s s ib i l i t ie s  o f fraud  o c c u rrin g , th e re fo re , Delmarva is  concerned th a t 
l im ite d  b e n e fits  w i l l  be a tta in e d  from a d d itio n a l costs generated by the 
supplemental te s ts  needed to  provide reasonable assurance o f fraud  d e te c tio n . 
A lso , in  re la t io n  to  the tim e lin e ss  o f i ssuing f in a n c ia l data , the increased 
o ve rs ig h t o f the q u a rte r ly  re p o rtin g  process by the a u d it committee may not be 
p ra c t ic a l.  The economic cons id e ra tio n  o f these issues needs to  be c la r i f ie d  
by the Commission so th a t the standards are v ia b le  fo r  a l l  companies.
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Delmarva believes that the accuracy and reliability of financial statements 
are important in today's economic environment and agrees with the Commission's 
recommendations for reducing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
However, special concern should be given to the cost/benefit relationship of 
the additional testing requirements so that the implementation of the 
Commission's recommendations can become a reality.
Delmarva appreciates the opportunity to submit comments on the Commission's 
recommendations.
Sincerely,
Roger D. Campbell
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B a r r y  W r i g h t  C o r p o r a t i o n
ONE NEWTON EXECUTIVE PARK 
NEWTON LOWER FALLS. MASSACHUSETTS 02162
P. NORMAN ROY
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
617-965 - 5800 
CABle: BARRYCORP 
te le x :  710-335 -7700
M r .  G . D e w e y  A r n o l d  
E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r  
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h in g t o n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  M r .  A r n o l d :
A s  a  m e m b e r o f  t h e  A d v i s o r y  B o a r d  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  
o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g ,  I  am p le a s e d  t o  h a v e  t h i s  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r e s e n t  m y c o m m e n ts  o n  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  o f  
t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n .
I n  g e n e r a l ,  I  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  C o m m is s io n s ' s  o b s e r v a t i o n s  a n d  
f i n d i n g s  a n d  h e a r t i l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t io n s .  B a r r y  W r i g h t  C o r p o r a t i o n  i s  a  m e m b e r o f  
t h e  F i n a n c i a l  E x e c u t i v e s  I n s t i t u t e ' s  C o m m it t e e  o n  C o r p o r a t e  
R e p o r t i n g  (CCR) a n d  w e  h a v e  c o m m e n te d  t o  t h a t  C o m m i t t e e ,  i n  
d e t a i l ,  o n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  i n  t h e  
C o m m is s io n 's  R e p o r t .  P le a s e  c o u n t  me a s  a n  e n t h u s i a s t i c  
s u p p o r t e r  o f  t h e i r  c o m m e n ts .  S o  a s  n o t  t o  d u p l i c a t e  t h e i r  
r e m a r k s ,  I  w i l l  o n l y  c o m m e n t u p o n  tw o  m a t t e r s  t h a t  I  f e e l  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t r o n g l y  a b o u t .
U n d e r  d a t e  o f  D e c e m b e r  1 3 ,  1 9 8 6 ,  I  p r e s e n t e d  c o m m e n ts  o n  t h e  
p r e l i m i n a r y  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h e  f i r s t  d r a f t  o f  A u d i t  C o m m it t e e  g u i d e l i n e s .  M y g e n e r a l  
t h o u g h t s  i n  t h a t  l e t t e r  s t i l l  a p p l y ,  b u t  I  w a n t  t o  
r e - e m p h a s iz e  m y p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  a n d  i t s  
A u d i t  C o m m it t e e  m u s t  c o n t i n u e  i n  a n  o v e r s i g h t  r o l e  a n d  n o t  
d r i f t  o r  m o v e  t o w a r d s  m a n a g e m e n t 's  f u n c t i o n s  -  t o  d o  s o ,  
d i l u t e s  t h e i r  v a l u e  a s  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  o v e r s i g h t  f u n c t i o n .  I  
a l s o  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  a l l o w  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  d e f i n e  t h e i r  o w n  d u t i e s  a n d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  b e  g u id e d  b y  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  C o m p a n y , 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  o t h e r  s p e c i f i c  a t t r i b u t e s  
o f  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  b u s i n e s s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  I  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  m a n d a t in g  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e v i e w  o f  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s  
p r i o r  t o  r e l e a s e ,  r e q u i r i n g  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n s  
o n  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  m a t t e r s ,  o r  i n c l u s i o n  o f  a  
s e p a r a t e  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  C h a ir m a n  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m it te e  i n  
t h e  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e .  I  u r g e  t h e  C o m m is s io n  t o  
r e c o n s i d e r  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  i n  t h e s e  m a t t e r s .
B arry  Wright C o rp o ra tio n
Mr. G. Dewey Arnold 
June 30, 1987 
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Barry Wright Corporation is a supporter of the concept of 
management reports in annual reports. We concur that these 
reports should acknowledge management's responsibilities for 
financial statements and internal controls, discuss how the 
responsibilities are fulfilled and provide management's 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls. We 
believe this communication should be a concise, positive 
communication to the stockholders and we concur with the 
CCR's comments as to redundancy, potential confusion and 
tone. Specifically, I believe the phrases identified by CCR 
should be deleted as recommended. Overall, I suggest the 
illustration contained in the final report be edited to be 
as concise as possible and trust that it will emerge as a 
positive communication of management's responsibility.
PNR/sah
Sincerely,
P U B L IC  O V E R S IG H T  B O A R D
SEC Practice Section •  AICPA
540 Madison Avenue •  New York 10022 •  (212) 486-2448
A.A. Sommer, Jr., Chairman •  Melvin R. Laird •  Robert K. Mautz •  Paul W. McCracken •  Arthur M. Wood •  •  Richard A. Stark, Legal Counsel
June 30, 1987
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20006
Dear Commissioners:
The Public Oversight Board is pleased to comment on the 
Commission's draft report entitled Report of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial R e p o r t i n g . While our 
paramount responsibility is to oversee the voluntary 
self-regulatory programs of the SEC Practice Section of the 
AICPA, we have a keen interest in all initiatives to improve 
the quality of audit practice and financial reporting.
We applaud the Commission's diligent and practical 
consideration of the complex issues of fraudulent financial 
reporting. We generally support all of the Commission's 
recommendations and appreciate the fact that the report 
incorporates the views we expressed in our meeting with the 
C o m m i s s i o n .
From its inception in 1978, the Board has had a unique 
opportunity to assess the effects of the self-regulatory 
programs of the SEC Practice Section on quality of audit 
practice. While the individual members of the Board may 
wish to submit personal comments on other aspects of the 
draft report, this commentary will be limited to those 
aspects of the report that directly or indirectly bear on 
the accounting profession's self-regulatory program: 
• Improving Audit Quality
• Concurring Partner Review
• Peer Review
• Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession 
• Role of the Audit Committee vis-a-vis 
Management Advisory Services by Auditors
IMPROVING AUDIT QUALITY
Our Board agrees that elimination of fraudulent financial 
reporting requires concerted action of all parties involved 
in the financial reporting process and that the roles of the 
reporting entity and the audit committee are crucial. The 
auditing profession also has an important role to play, and, 
in our view, has not thus far accepted the degree of 
responsibility that it should have for requiring that the 
scope of an audit be expanded to detect instances of 
fraudulent financial reporting not accompanied by collusive 
acts of management and/or employees.
123a
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We are pleased to note the profession's current initiatives 
in this regard. Adoption of the revisions to auditing 
standards currently being proposed by the Auditing Standards 
Board will require auditors to expand the scope of the audit 
to increase the likelihood of detecting major errors and 
irregularities and to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
c l i e n t ’s internal controls.
CONCURRING PARTNER REVIEW
The Board believes that review of an audit engagement by a 
partner in addition to the engagement partner can provide a 
firm with significant additional assurance that its 
engagements are performed in all material respects in 
accordance with professional standards. It should be noted, 
however, that concurring partner review is now required only 
for audits of SEC registrants performed by firms that are 
members of the SEC Practice Section. Neither generally 
accepted auditing standards nor quality control standards 
require that audits be subjected to concurring partner 
review. Moreover, the concurring partner review membership 
requirement has only recently been strengthened by the SEC 
Practice Section —  in large part at our urging —  to 
require that certain workpapers as well as the audit report 
and financial statements be subjected to review by the 
second partner. The effectiveness of the implementation of 
the expanded requirement will be first tested in peer 
reviews conducted in 1987.
A meeting in May 1987 with representatives of the Section's 
Peer Review and Special Investigations Committees disclosed 
differences among CPA firms as to additional assurance that 
a concurring partner review can and should provide and the 
responsibility that the concurring reviewer is or should be 
assigned. We were advised that such differences exist even 
among the large national firms and that very few firms 
charge a concurring reviewer with the responsibility for 
doing a sufficiently comprehensive review so as to provide 
the firm with additional assurance that the audit was 
conducted in a manner that would reasonably ensure detection 
of fraudulent financial reporting.
The Board is concerned about the differences that exist 
regarding the degree of assurance that a concurring partner 
review should provide. We are aware, however, of the 
difficulty of specifying procedures that all firms should 
require of their concurring review partners in view of the 
widely varying methods firms use in documenting the results 
of auditing procedures performed.
The Board believes the Commission's recommendations 
regarding concurring review have merit and should be 
required to be applied by all auditing firms, at minimum to 
audits of clients of public companies or of clients in 
high-risk industries. The Commission might well consider
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re c o m m e n d in g  t h a t  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S ta n d a r d s  B o a rd  i n c o r p o r a t e  
c o n c u r r i n g  p a r t n e r  r e v ie w  a s  p a r t  o f  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
s t a n d a r d s  o r ,  a t  m in im u m , i s s u e  g u id a n c e  a s  t o  w h e n  a n  a u d i t  
e n g a g e m e n t s h o u ld  b e  s u b je c t e d  t o  c o n c u r r i n g  r e v ie w .
PEER REVIEW
P e e r  r e v ie w ,  t h e  k e y s t o n e  o f  t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n ' s  
s e l f - r e g u l a t o r y  p r o g r a m ,  h a s  u n d e n ia b ly  im p r o v e d  t h e  q u a l i t y  
o f  a u d i t  p r a c t i c e  a n d  i s  t h e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  m e a n s  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n  t o  im p r o v e  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  
s e r v i c e  t h a t  i t s  m e m b e rs  p r o v i d e .
T h e  S e c t i o n  h a s  r e v i s e d  i t s  p e e r  r e v ie w  p r o g r a m  w h e n e v e r  
e x p e r i e n c e  i n d i c a t e d  t h e  n e e d  f o r  o r  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
im p r o v e m e n t .  One s u c h  r e c e n t  r e v i s i o n  w i l l  c a u s e  r e v ie w e r s  
t o  ( a )  o b t a i n  a  l i s t  o f  SEC e n g a g e m e n ts  a c c e p te d  s in c e  t h e  
l a s t  p e e r  r e v ie w  w h e r e ,  a s  r e p o r t e d  i n  a F o rm  8 - K  o r  s i m i l a r  
p u b l i c  f i l i n g ,  t h e  f o r m e r  a u d i t o r  r e s ig n e d  o r  t h e r e  w as a 
d is a g r e e m e n t  o n  a  r e p o r t i n g  m a t t e r  b e tw e e n  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  
t h e  a u d i t o r ,  a n d  ( b )  a s c e r t a i n  w h e th e r  t h e  f i r m  r e n d e r e d  a n  
o p i n i o n  o n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p te d  a c c o u n t i n g  
p r i n c i p l e s  p r i o r  t o  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  r e g i s t r a n t  a s  a n  a u d i t  
c l i e n t  a n d ,  i f  s o ,  w h e th e r  s u c h  o p i n i o n  w as i s s u e d  i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  f i r m ' s  p r o c e d u r e s .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  p e e r  r e v ie w e r s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e v ie w  c u r r e n t  
a n d  p r i o r  p e r i o d  w o r k p a p e r s  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
e v a l u a t e  w h e th e r  a n y  m a t t e r s  w h ic h  le d  t o  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
p r e d e c e s s o r  a u d i t o r  o r  w h ic h  w e re  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  
d is a g r e e m e n t  b e tw e e n  t h e  p r e d e c e s s o r  a u d i t o r  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t 
w e re  h a n d le d  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  b y  t h e  s u c c e s s o r  a u d i t o r .  We 
b e l i e v e  t h e s e  p r o c e d u r e s  w i l l  b e  e f f e c t i v e  i n  d e t e c t i n g  
s i t u a t i o n s  w h e re  t h e  s u c c e s s o r  a u d i t o r  a c c o m m o d a te d  " a n  
o p i n i o n  s h o p p e r . "  We a r e  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  c o m p l ia n c e  w i t h  t h e  
r e c e n t l y  a d o p te d  a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d  r e g a r d i n g  o p i n i o n  
s h o p p in g  c a n  b e  a d e q u a t e l y  t e s t e d  i n  t h e  p e e r  r e v ie w  
p r o c e s s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  we d o  n o t  c o n s id e r  i t  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  
p e e r  r e v ie w e r s  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e v ie w  a l l  new  c l i e n t  
e n g a g e m e n ts .
REG U LATIO N OF THE P U B L IC  ACCOUNTING PROFESSIO N
O u r B o a rd  s t r o n g l y  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  w o u ld  
b e  b e s t  s e r v e d  i f  a l l  a u d i t o r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  o f  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n ie s ,  w e re  r e q u i r e d  t o  u n d e r g o  p e e r  r e v ie w  p e r i o d i c a l l y  
a n d  t o  m ake  t h o s e  im p r o v e m e n ts  i n  t h e i r  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
s y s te m s  c o n s id e r e d  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o v id e  r e a s o n a b le  a s s u r a n c e  
o f  c o m p ly in g  w i t h  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  i n  p e r f o r m in g  
a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  a u d i t i n g  e n g a g e m e n ts .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  we 
e n d o r s e  t h e  c u r r e n t  p r o p o s a l  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  a n d  E x c h a n g e  
C o m m is s io n  t h a t  e a c h  r e g i s t r a n t ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  be  
a u d i t e d  b y  a n  a u d i t o r  t h a t  b e lo n g s  t o  a p e e r  r e v ie w  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  a c c e p t a b le  t o  t h e  SEC. O u r  B o a rd  s u p p o r t s  
d e n i a l  o f  a n  a u d i t o r ' s  r i g h t  t o  c e r t i f y  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s
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filed with the Commission if his/her firm has a material 
quality control deficiency and refuses to take corrective 
a c t i o n .
However, we are concerned that the peer review program of 
the SEC Practice Section, which has functioned exceedingly 
well as an initiative of the profession and is subject to 
effective oversight by our Board and the SEC, might be less 
effective if the rigid rules in the SEC's proposal were 
adopted and strictly enforced. Our Board believes the SEC's 
present relationship with the SEC Practice Section is 
consistent with the notion of self-regulation which your 
Commission embraces and the SEC has publicly supported. 
Moreover, the present approach will continue to assure the 
high degree of cooperation by firms that the Board believes 
is essential for the operation of an effective peer review 
program. The SEC should not have the right to exercise line 
authority over any peer review organization; its role should 
be one of active oversight. As your Commission recommends, 
we fully agree that "...the SEC should continue to monitor 
and maintain liaisons with the public accounting 
profession's quality assurance program."
We have expressed these views to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. A copy of our letter to the Commission is 
attached for your consideration.
ROLE OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE VIS-A-VIS 
MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES BY AUDITORS
In November 1986, our Board published results of a survey it 
authorized a professional research organization to conduct 
entitled, Public Perceptions of Management Advisory Services 
Performed by CPA Firms for Audit C l i e n t s . While no instance 
of impaired auditor independence or objectivity attributable 
to the rendition of advisory services has ever come to our 
attention, the Board authorized the research study because 
it is concerned that the continuous expansion of consulting 
services by CPA firms may be perceived as impairing auditor 
independence and thus could adversely affect the value of 
the audit function over time.
The survey indicated that key public groups perceive certain 
types of MAS as impairing auditor objectivity and 
independence. In distributing the research report, the 
Board noted that the survey was not authorized or intended 
to be used as a basis for POB action. It was intended to be 
used by the profession to decide what action, if any, the 
profession should take to change the perceptions of various 
groups which either use audited financial statements or have 
a high interest and concern with them. The Board is pleased 
to note that the SEC Practice Section has formed a task 
force to consider the implications of the perceptions 
reported in the Board's survey.
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We a l s o  i n te n d  t o  s u g g e s t  i n o u r  u p co m in g  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  t h a t  
t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  r e s e a r c h  r e p o r t  b e  u s e d  b y  
f i r m s  in  d e v e l o p i n g  p o l i c i e s  f o r  t h e  r e n d i t i o n  o f  a d v i s o r y  
s e r v i c e s  an d t o  c o m p a n ie s  in  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e s e  m a t t e r s .  In  
t h a t  r e g a r d ,  we s u p p o r t  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a tio n  t h a t  
an  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  s h o u ld  a d o p t  a p o l i c y  o f  r e v i e w i n g  
m a n a g e m e n t 's  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  f a c t o r s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
in d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  a u d i t o r  an d a p p r o v i n g  in  
a d v a n c e  t h e  t y p e s  an d  e x t e n t  o f  m an agem ent a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  
t h a t  m anagem ent p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  th e  c o m p a n y 's  a u d i t i n g  f ir m  
t o  p e r f o r m .
 * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Our B o a rd  com m ends t h e  C o m m iss io n  f o r  i t s  t h o r o u g h  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  an d  c a u s e s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  an d  i t s  m e a n in g f u l  r e c o m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  
e l i m i n a t i n g ,  o r  a t  minimum s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e d u c i n g ,  t h e  
i n c i d e n c e  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  We s h a l l  b e  
p l e a s e d  t o  m eet w i t h  t h e  C o m m iss io n  t o  c l a r i f y  a n y  o f  t h e  
m a t t e r s  d i s c u s s e d  in  t h i s  l e t t e r .
V e r y  t r u l y  y o u r s ,
A. A . Som m er, J r  
C h a irm a n
E n c lo s u r e
c c : P h i l i p  B . C h en ok
J oh n  D. A b e r n a t h y ,  I I I  
J e r r y  D. S u l l i v a n
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD 123e
SEC Practice Section • AICPA--------------
540 Madison Avenue • New York 10022 • (212) 486-2448
A.A . Sommer. Jr.. Chairman •  Melvin R. Laird •  Robert K. Mautz •  Paul W. McCracken •  Arthur M. Wood •  •  Richard A  Stark, Legal Counsel
June 29, 1987
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Washington, DC 20549
Re: File S7-13-87
C o m m i s s i o n e r s :
The Public Oversight Board is pleased to comment on the Commission's 
proposed amendments to its rules that would require that financial 
statements included in filings with the C o m mission be certified by 
an independent accountant who has undergone a peer review of his/her 
accounting and auditing practice within the last three y e a r s .
Since its inception in 1978, our Board has had the unique 
opportunity of assessing the effects and effectiveness of the peer 
review process by virtue of monitoring the s e 1 f -r e g u la t o ry program 
of the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. We have, in each of our eight annual reports, 
u n e q u ivocally stated that the peer review process has improved the 
quality of audit practice of the Section's m ember firms.
Peer review is the most effective means avail a b l e  to a profession to 
improve and maintain the quality of service that its members 
provide. Our extensive involvement with the program of the SEC 
Practice Section has convinced us that it works and works well at 
reasonable cost. SECPS member firms of all sizes, from the largest 
to the smallest, have concluded that peer review has a positive 
cost/benefit relationship and have h eartily endorsed the program.
Thus, our Board strongly believes that the public interest would be 
best served if all auditors, especially those of public companies, 
were required to undergo peer review p e r i o d i c a l l y  and to make the 
improvements in their quality control systems that a qualified peer 
reviewer considered necessary for the firm to have reasonable 
assurance of complying with professional standards in performing 
accounting and auditing engagements. We have consistently urged 
members of the profession to make this commitment voluntarily. We 
had hoped that the recent proposal of the AIC P A  Board of Directors 
and Council would be adopted, which for practical purposes would 
have caused virtually all firms with public clients to join the SEC 
Practice Section and thus would have h elped accomplish this goal. 
Although the proposal received a 61-percent favorable vote, we were 
disappointed that it did not obtain the two-thirds margin necessary 
for a d o p t i o n .
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Our Board unequivocally endorses the objective of the Commission's 
mandatory peer review proposal, namely, "to enhance the quality of 
audits of Commission registrants." However, we are concerned that 
the SECPS program, which has functioned exceedingly well as an 
initiative of the profession subject to oversight by our Board and 
your staff, might be less effective if some of the rigid rules in 
the proposal were adopted and literally enforced.
Our major concerns relate to:
• The role of the SEC
• The need for confidentiality
• The setting of peer review standards
• The review of contested audits
The Role of the SEC
The public accounting profession is effectively regulated at three 
distinct levels -- by firms, by the profession, and by government. 
While the objective of each level is to assure reliable financial 
reporting, each achieves its objective in a different way.
While we applaud the objective of the SEC's current proposal, we 
believe the proposal should be revised so that it will not 
materially alter the present relationship between the accounting 
profession's peer regulators and government regulators, a 
relationship which has in the past decade developed and matured, we 
believe, in a manner satisfactory to everyone involved.
We therefore urge the Commission to make clear that the Commission's 
relationship to a qualifying peer review organization (PRO) will 
be to test the effectiveness of the PRO 'S system of peer review, 
including the role of its oversight body. Thus, each PRO should be 
allowed the same degree of autonomy that the SEC Practice Section 
now enjoys. Experience with the SEC Practice Section's program 
shows that the SEC does not need to have access to all peer reviews 
administered by the PRO or to the complete set of workpapers 
prepared by peer reviewers, as the proposal suggests. The 
Commission has been able to satisfy itself as to the effectiveness 
of the SECPS's peer review program by inspecting selected workpapers 
of fewer than 25 percent of the reviews performed in recent years. 
Indeed, the SEC's discussion of the proposed rules acknowledges that 
"the private sector approach currently embodied in the SECPS and POB 
structure has proved both effective and efficient."
The background section of the proposal states: "Just as the
Commission's previous conclusions concerning the efficacy of the 
SECPS's program have been reached without the review of all peer 
review workpapers, it would usually not be necessary for the 
Commission to review all peer review workpapers to judge the 
efficacy of a PRO'S program or its compliance with the Commission's 
requirements." The proposed rules, however, establish the 
Commission's right to access all peer review workpapers but fail to 
support why that ever would be necessary for the SEC to satisfy 
itself that the program of a PRO is functioning properly.
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The Board urges the Commission to extend to all PROs the principle 
of testing the system that has worked so well with its oversight of 
the peer review program of the SECPS. Moreover, rather than the 
rigid structure proposed in the rules, the Board suggests that the 
Commission enter into a memorandum of understanding with each 
qualifying PRO, which should be available for public scrutiny, with 
provisions similar to those included in the October 15, 1982 
Memorandum of Understanding among the SEC, SECPS, and the P O B . Such 
a document should contain provisions similar to those in that 
memorandum, such as:
• Establishment of the SEC's right to inspect selected peer 
review workpapers of firms auditing SEC registrants and the 
workpapers of the oversight body.
• Formalization of the timing of availability of workpapers and 
r e p o r t s .
• Provision for confidentiality of certain data, such as names 
of SEC registrants, personnel and offices of reviewed firms, 
e t c .
The Board agrees that a PRO should report immediately to the Office 
of the Chief Accountant whenever a reviewed firm has a material 
quality control deficiency and refuses to take corrective action. 
Based on our oversight of the SECPS peer review program, we are 
confident that this will rarely, if ever, be necessary. Over the 
ten years during which the AICPA program has been in existence, only 
one firm refused to take the corrective action considered necessary 
by the Section for the firm to have reasonable assurance of 
complying with professional standards when performing accounting and 
auditing engagements; that firm was expelled. However, should such a 
situation eventuate in the future, the Board believes that denial of 
the right of that auditor to certify financial statements filed with 
the Commission would be appropriate.
The Board believes the SEC's relationship with the program of the
SEC Practice Section is consistent with the notion of
self-regulation which the SEC has publicly supported. Moreover,
such an approach is the only one that is likely to assure the high
degree of voluntary cooperation of firms that the Board believes is
essential for the operation of an effective peer review program by a
PRO.
The Need for Confidentiality
We believe one of the major reasons that the peer review and special 
review programs of the SECPS are effective is because they have 
evolved into programs that strike a proper balance between 
protection of the public and the rights and obligations of the 
member firms. The confidential relationship auditors have with 
their clients is essential for an effective audit process; such a 
relationship is also essential for an effective peer review process.
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The SECPS's peer review process works well because it protects this 
confidentiality. Peer review workpapers made available to the staff 
of the Office of the Chief Accountant do not identify SEC 
registrants (or even the nonpublic clients), offices of multi-office 
firms, individuals within firms except by title or position, or 
firms that audit fewer than ten SEC registrants. If these features 
are not retained, we sincerely believe the peer review process would 
be considerably less effective; the reviewed firms would be less 
candid in responding to questions posed by the peer reviewers, and 
peer reviewers would be less inclined to document detailed findings 
in peer review workpapers. Both these elements are essential for 
effective monitoring of the program by the PRO'S peer review 
committee, its oversight board, and the staff of the SEC.
The Setting of Peer Review Standards
If the proposal is adopted in its present form, the SEC would 
establish peer review standards that PROs would be expected to 
follow. However, we believe that the Commission should look to the 
private sector to establish quality control and peer review 
standards, in much the same way as the Commission looks to the 
private sector to establish accounting and auditing standards. 
Moreover, a relatively high degree of flexibility is needed if rules 
are to be promptly adapted to a changing environment; such 
flexibility is more easily attainable if standards are set by a PRO 
than through the rule-making procedures of the Commission.
The standards for performing and reporting the results of peer 
reviews are not static. The standards of the SECPS have been 
repeatedly revised as experience has indicated the need for or the 
possibility of improvement. At times, standards were revised solely 
at the initiative of the Section, at other times at the urging of 
the Board or the SEC.
The setting of standards or rules by the SEC would materially alter 
the environment and stifle the profession's initiative to make 
changes. Therefore, we urge the Commission not to publish peer 
review rules, but instead (a) to publish guidance for a PRO to 
follow in setting standards it expects its reviewers and members to 
follow, and (b) to require a PRO in order to be recognized as a 
qualifying PRO to establish and enforce peer review standards that 
are acceptable to the Commission.
If the SEC adopts rules as proposed, the Commission would have line 
responsibility and control over each PRO and its board. We do not 
believe that this would be in the best interests of the profession, 
the public, or the SEC. We do not believe that appointments of 
members of a PRO'S oversight board should require SEC's concurrence. 
If this were done, the board would not be perceived as independent 
but rather would be seen as an arm of the Commission. Such a 
perception could adversely affect the working relationships that a 
board needs to perform its oversight role effectively. Such a 
change would be in sharp contrast to the efficient and effectively 
operative self-regulatory process that the Commission has found to 
be wholly satisfactory over the years in dealing with the SEC 
Practice Section and our Board.
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We s t r o n g l y  b e l i e v e  a b o a r d  s h o u ld  b e  t r u l y  in d e p e n d e n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  b o t h  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n  a n d  t h e  C o m m is s io n  i f  i t  i s  t o  b e  e f f e c t i v e  
a n d  h a v e  c r e d i b i l i t y .
T h e  R e v ie w  o f  C o n te s te d  A u d i t s
A p e e r  r e v ie w e r  i s  c h a r g e d  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  r e v ie w in g  e a c h  
e n g a g e m e n t s e l e c t e d  f o r  r e v ie w  i n  s u f f i c i e n t  d e p th  t o  b e  a b le  t o  
c o n c lu d e  w h e th e r  t h e  e n g a g e m e n t  w a s  o r  w a s  n o t  p e r f o r m e d  i n  a l l  
m a t e r i a l  r e s p e c t s  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s .  I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  l a r g e l y  a t  o u r  u r g i n g ,  p e e r  r e v ie w  te a m s  o f  t h e  SEC 
P r a c t i c e  S e c t i o n  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o n s id e r  a l l  l i t i g a t i o n ,  
p r o c e e d in g s ,  o r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  SEC r e g i s t r a n t s  i n i t i a t e d  
s in c e  t h e  f i r m ' s  p r i o r  p e e r  r e v ie w  i n  s e t t i n g  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h a t  
f i r m ' s  p e e r  r e v ie w  - -  i n  d e c i d i n g  w h ic h  o f f i c e s ,  a u d i t  a r e a s ,  
c l i e n t s  i n  s p e c i f i e d  i n d u s t r i e s ,  a n d  e n g a g e m e n t p e r s o n n e l  a r e  t o  be  
s u b j e c t e d  t o  r e v ie w .
H o w e v e r ,  w h i l e  we b e l i e v e  i t  i s  e n t i r e l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  t h a t  p e e r  
r e v ie w  te a m s  ju d g e  e a c h  e n g a g e m e n t  r e v ie w e d  a s  t o  w h e th e r  i t  w as  
p e r f o r m e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  we b e l i e v e  i t  
i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  r e q u i r e  s u c h  ju d g m e n t  t o  b e  m ade c o n c e r n in g  t h e  
p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  a n  a u d i t  t h a t  i s  b e in g  l i t i g a t e d .  T h e  j u d i c i a l  
p r o c e s s ,  w h ic h  h a s  a c c e s s  t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t  f a c t s  t h r o u g h  i t s  s u b p o e n a  
p o w e r s  a n d  s a f e g u a r d s  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  b o t h  p l a i n t i f f  a n d  d e f e n d a n t ,  i s  
t h e  o n l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  fo r u m  w h e re  c o n t e s t e d  a u d i t s  s h o u ld  be  
r e s o l v e d .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  o f  a f i r m  t o  d e n y  
f u l l  a c c e s s  t o  c o n t e s t e d  a u d i t s ,  t o  e i t h e r  a p e e r  r e v ie w e r  o r  a 
s p e c i a l  i n v e s t i g a t o r  o u t s i d e  t h e  j u d i c i a l  p r o c e s s ,  i s  r e a s o n a b le  i n  
t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  in s u r a n c e  c r i s i s ,  t h e  l i t i g i o u s  c l i m a t e ,  t h e  h ig h  
c o s t  i n  t e r m s  o f  t im e  a n d  m o n e y  i n  d e f e n d in g  o n e s e l f  i n  a c o u r t  
t r i a l  o r  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o c e e d in g ,  a n d  t h e  m a g n i tu d e  o f  m o n e ta r y  
d a m a g e s  a g a in s t  a u d i t o r s  a w a rd e d  b y  som e ju d g e s  a n d  j u r i e s .
N e v e r t h e le s s ,  o u r  B o a rd  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  a  PRO s h o u ld  h a v e  a p r o g r a m  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c o n t e s t e d  a u d i t s .  We 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  s h o u ld  b e  a  s e p a r a t e  s u p p le m e n t a l  p r o g r a m  a n d  n o t  
a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  p e e r  r e v ie w  p r o g r a m .  T h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
c o n t e s t e d  a u d i t s  b y  a PRO i n  a s p e c i a l  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  p r o c e s s  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  p e e r  r e v ie w  p r o c e s s  h a s  s e v e r a l  a d v a n ta g e s :
•  Q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  d e f i c i e n c i e s  t h a t  m ay b e  i n f e r r e d  f r o m  
a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  c o n t e s t e d  a u d i t s  w o u ld  r e c e i v e  im m e d ia te  
a t t e n t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  b e  d e f e r r e d  u n t i l  t h a t  f i r m ' s  n e x t  p e e r  
r e v ie w ,  w h ic h  c o u ld  i n  som e c a s e s  b e  i n  e x c e s s  o f  tw o  y e a r s  
l a t e r .
•  A s t a n d i n g  c o m m it t e e  o f  h i g h l y  e x p e r ie n c e d  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  i s  
m o re  l i k e l y  t o  b e  o b j e c t i v e  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  q u a l i t y  
c o n t r o l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n s  m ade i n  l i t i g a t i o n  
t h a n  a  r e v ie w  te a m  t h a t  m ay h a v e  p r e v i o u s l y  o p in e d  o n  t h e  
q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l s  o f  t h e  f i r m .  •
•  A s t a n d in g  c o m m it t e e  t h a t  r e v ie w s  a l l  c o n t e s t e d  a u d i t s  o f  
a l l  m em ber f i r m s  b e lo n g in g  t o  a PRO i s  b e t t e r  a b le  t o  a s s e s s
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whether professional standards should be reevaluated or 
whether professional guidance in the application of 
standards is adequate.
The objective of the special review program of a PRO should not be 
to determine whether a contested audit has or has not been performed 
in accordance with professional standards. Consequently, we believe 
that those charged with the responsibility for the special 
investigative program should not and need not have access to the 
full set of workpapers of contested audits. We support the concept 
that "special investigators," when appropriate, should be expected 
to request and be given access to documentation that will permit 
them to make a judgment quickly and efficiently as to whether a 
firm's quality control system is appropriately designed and is being 
complied with.
We recognize, however, that in rare cases, where the potential 
monetary damages are relatively large, a firm may not want to risk 
granting access to even a portion of the workpapers prepared during 
the course of performing a contested audit. In such cases, it is 
expected that refusal by a firm to grant access to the requested 
documentation will materially increase the likelihood that the 
special investigators may need to order a special review in order to 
gain the requisite assurance that the firm's quality control system 
provides it with reasonable assurance of complying with professional 
standards in the performance of future engagements.
The Board believes that the four-phased approach for the operation 
of the special investigative or review process recently recommended 
by the SECPS Task Force on SIC Methodology and adopted in April 1987 
by the Section is an appropriate model for the special review 
process of a PRO. We recommend that the SEC require each qualifying 
PRO to have a similar process.
In conclusion, we strongly favor mandatory peer review for an 
auditor of an SEC registrant rather than proxy statement disclosure 
by the registrant as to whether its auditor has subjected his/her 
quality control system to peer review. Should the Commission decide 
not to require auditors of SEC registrants to belong to a PRO 
acceptable to the Commission, the Board would support such a 
disclosure requirement.
**********
We shall be pleased to meet with the Commission to clarify any of 
the matters discussed in this letter.
Very truly yours,
A. A. Sommer, Jr. 
Chairman
B. D. Johnson 
Vice President and 
Controller
Post Office Box 26666 
One James Ri ver Plaza 
Richmond, Virginia 21261 
804-771-3520
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F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
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D e a r S i r s :
RE: Comm ents o n  A p r i l  1987 E x p o s u re  D r a f t
The  V i r g i n i a  E l e c t r i c  a n d  P ow er Company ( t h e  Com pany) h a s  
r e v ie w e d  t h e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  
C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .
G e n e r a l ly ,  t h e  Company a g re e s  w i t h  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  o b s e r v a t io n s  
and  c o n c lu s io n s  r e g a r d in g  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  p r e v e n t io n  and  
d e t e c t io n  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  how t h a t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  s h o u ld  be  s h a re d  b y  t h e  v a r io u s  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .
W ith  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  C o m m is s io n ’ s re c o m m e n d a t io n s ,  t h e  Company 
o f f e r s  no  s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a ls  f o r  e n h a n c e m e n t o r  r e v i s i o n  e x c e p t  
f o r  t h a t  r e q u i r i n g  a r e v ie w  o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  b y  
th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  o f  t h e  b o a rd  o f  d i r e c t o r s  b e f o r e  r e le a s e  t o  
th e  p u b l i c .  T he  Company b e l ie v e s  t h a t  s u c h  a r e q u i r e m e n t  w o u ld  
p ro v e  t o  be  cum bersom e d u e  t o  t im e  c o n s t r a in t s  im p o s e d  b y  f i l i n g  
s c h e d u le s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  Com pany b e l ie v e s  t h a t  s u c h  a 
r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  u n n e c e s s a ry  i f  a l l  o t h e r  C o m m is s io n  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  a r e  im p le m e n te d .  S u b je c t  t o  t h e  a fo r e m e n t io n e d  
e x c e p t io n ,  t h e  Company s u p p o r ts  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  
w h ic h  a p p e a r  t o  b e  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  r e a s o n a b le .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  m any 
o f  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  com pany r e p r e s e n t  s o u n d  
b u s in e s s  p r a c t i c e s  w h ic h  th e  Com pany c u r r e n t l y  f o l l o w s .
The Company a p p r e c ia t e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  com m ent on  th e  
E x p o s u re  D r a f t  a n d  i s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a n y  f u r t h e r  C o m m is s io n  
d e l i b e r a t i o n s .
R e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b m it t e d ,
B. D. Jo h n so n
S e i d m a n
&
S e i d m a n
B D O
15 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10023 (212) 765-7500, TLX 661 903
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N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N . W.
W a s h in g t o n ,  D . C . 2 0 0 0 6
R e : E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  -  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l
C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
G e n t le m e n :
We w e lc o m e  t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r e s e n t  o u r  v ie w s  
o n  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t .
The c a u s e s  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a r e  
c e r t a i n l y  h i g h l y  c o m p le x  and  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  b y  th e  
v a g a r ie s  o f  human n a t u r e .  A c c o r d in g ly ,  l i k e  a n y  o t h e r  c r im e s  
i n v o l v i n g  p e r s o n a l  f r a i l t y ,  i t s  c o m p le te  p r e v e n t io n  w i l l  n o t  
be  p o s s ib le .  H o w e v e r, t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  " m u l t i - d im e n s io n a l "  
a p p ro a c h  i n  d e a l in g  w i t h  t h e  p ro b le m  r e p r e s e n t s  a m a jo r  s te p  
i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  an  e n v ir o n m e n t  t o  re d u c e  t h e  in c id e n c e  o f  
f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  we 
a p p la u d  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  e f f o r t s .
H o w e v e r, we h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n c e rn s  i n  th e  
f o l l o w i n g  a re a s  w i t h  e i t h e r  t h e  to n e  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  
v ie w s  o r  th e  s p e c i f i c  u n d e r ly in g  re c o m m e n d a t io n s :
C r e a t i n g  a n  u n b r i d g e a b l e  e x p e c t a t i o n  g a p
. E f f e c t s  o n  s m a l l  b u s in e s s
. SEC m a n d a te d  p e e r  r e v i e w
. A d v a n c e  a p p r o v a l  o f  m a n a g e m e n t a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  t o  b e  
p e r f o r m e d  b y  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s
. R e s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d
. A d d i t i o n a l  SEC E n f o r c e m e n t  R e m e d ie s
C R E A T IN G  AN U N B R ID G E A B LE  E X P E C T A T IO N  GAP
A s  w e p r e v i o u s l y  m e n t io n e d ,  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g ,  l i k e  a n y  o t h e r  c r i m e ,  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  o c c u r  t o
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some degree, regardless of even the most sophisticated 
prevention techniques. Character failures cannot be 
legislated away. There is a danger that legislative bodies, 
the courts and the general public may perceive the 
Commission's report as a permanent solution to the problem, 
rather than as a means to sensitize people about the causes 
of fraudulent financial reporting and to recommend practical 
means to mitigate the problem. As such, when fraudulent 
financial reporting occurs, those having oversight responsi­
bility for financial reports may be inappropriately taken to 
task, even when the fraud may have been virtually impossible 
to prevent or detect (e.g. certain types of collusive fraud). 
Admittedly, this type of expectation gap exists to a degree 
even in today's environment. Also, we realize the Commission 
does not view its recommendations as a panacea. But, unless 
the Commission clearly and positively states in its Report 
the inherent limitations of its recommendations, we are 
concerned that this gap will surely widen.
EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS
The Commission recognizes "that smaller, newly 
public companies...may experience significant short-term 
implementation costs" and "that the resources to implement 
its recommendations in smaller public companies...may not 
always be available". We agree with those conclusions. 
However, the Commission also states it believes that only 
rarely will a company, even a smaller one, be unable to 
implement "the letter of a recommendation". In those cases, 
the Commission urges companies to adopt procedures to 
respond instead to the spirit of the recommendation. In our 
view, the Commission thus has drawn overly restrictive para­
meters in applying its recommendations to smaller public 
companies. This would increase the costs of doing business 
for these companies, which runs counter to SEC efforts to 
reduce such costs. There are certain recommendations that 
are highly impractical or simply unnecessary for such 
companies, as follows:
. Public companies should maintain an effective internal 
audit function staffed with an adequate number of 
qualified personnel appropriate to the size and the 
nature of the company.
Although a strong internal audit function can provide a 
powerful tool in combating fraud in larger companies, 
establishing such a function in smaller companies may 
be an unnecessary cost. Many smaller public companies 
have effective managerial controls, whereby top 
management essentially has its fingers on the pulse of
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daily operations. To create an extra layer of controls 
in such companies would be redundant. Perhaps the 
Commission recognized these circumstances with its 
phrase "appropriate to the size and the nature of the 
company", but it is not clear to us whether this 
qualifying language is intended to exempt smaller 
companies with effective managerial controls.
The board of directors of all public companies should 
be required by SEC rules to establish audit committees 
comprised solely of independent directors.
The Commission states that it "recognizes the 
difficulties today in encouraging a sufficient number 
of qualified persons to serve as independent directors, 
particularly in small, newly public companies". The 
inability of many smaller companies to obtain director 
liability insurance has made it not merely difficult, 
but impossible, for those companies to attract 
qualified, independent directors. However, the 
Commission would have the SEC grant exceptions to the 
general rule "only in the most unusual cases". We 
believe that in view of the common problem shared by 
many smaller public companies in this area, exceptions 
for those companies should be more realistically and 
more readily granted.
All public companies should be required by the SEC to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders 
management reports signed by the chief executive 
officer and chief accounting officer. The management 
report should acknowledge management's responsibilities 
for the financial statements and internal control, 
discuss how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and 
provide management's assessment of the effectiveness of 
the company's internal controls.
We agree that the responsibilities of financial 
statement preparers need to be better communicated to 
the users of those statements. Most of the items 
called for in this recommendation should serve that 
purpose. However, the guidance and example of a 
management report included in Appendix L is geared to 
the larger public company with a relatively sophis­
ticated internal control system. As discussed earlier, 
though, many smaller companies rely on effective 
managerial controls in lieu of complex systems.
Although the example indicates that actual management 
reports should be tailored to fit each company, we 
believe guidance should be provided for those smaller
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companies in order to avoid the inference that their 
existing systems are unacceptable.
. The Auditing Standards Board also should provide
explicit guidance to address the situation where, as a 
result of his knowledge of the company's internal 
accounting controls, the independent public accountant 
disagrees with management's assessment as stated in the 
proposed management report.
This recommendation may have a costly side effect, 
particularly for smaller companies. As the Report 
recognizes, an in-depth study and evaluation of 
internal controls is not necessary on all audits. For 
efficiency or other reasons, auditors may decide not to 
rely on the internal control system to reduce their 
tests. This is especially common on audits of smaller 
companies. However, if the independent auditor becomes 
responsible for publicly reporting situations where, 
based on his knowledge of his client's internal control 
system, he disagrees with management's assessment of 
the system, there is likely to be a substantial increase 
in the amount of internal control reviews performed by 
auditors in order for them to have a more complete 
foundation for evaluating management's assessment. In 
other words, many auditors may feel uncomfortable in 
allowing a properly limited study of the internal 
control system to serve as the basis for determining 
the appropriateness of management's assessment. This 
may occur even though the auditor's obligation to 
report would be limited to his knowledge of the 
internal control system, which does not require a 
detailed study. To overcome that natural discomfort, 
the auditor may perform a complete review of the system 
even though it is not economically warranted in the 
circumstances. This unnecessary burden will fall 
disproportionately on smaller companies. Accordingly, 
we suggest deletion of this recommendation.
SEC MANDATED PEER REVIEW
We agree that all public accounting firms that 
audit public companies should be members of a professional 
organization that has peer review and independent oversight 
functions, such as those specified by the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms. This would 
improve the professional quality of public company audits 
and would demonstrate the accounting profession's commitment 
to protect the public interest. However, we strongly 
believe that the authority to establish such requirement is 
best left to the profession, not to the SEC. The Commission
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recognizes that the accounting profession has been extremely 
effective over the years in regulating the performance of 
its practitioners in response to an ever-changing business 
environment. In keeping with this quality control commit­
ment, the AICPA recently has attempted, albeit unsuccess­
fully, to amend its rules to require its members which audit 
public companies to join the SEC Practice Section. The 
accounting profession should be permitted to attempt 
alternative means to achieve its objective before turning 
that task over to the SEC. Although the contemplated 
oversight role of the SEC in relation to any professional 
organization established to comply with this recommendation 
may be similar to its present role with respect to the SECPS, 
the profession would relinquish a significant element in its 
ability to regulate itself. This transfer of authority can 
only serve to erode the underpinnings of self-esteem which 
have served the profession so well over the years. Moreover, 
it may also be perceived as a significant step towards 
government regulation of the profession, which the 
Commission and we believe is "of doubtful merit".
ADVANCE APPROVAL OF MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES 
TO BE PERFORMED BY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
We strongly disagree with certain views, both 
implicit and explicit, expressed in this recommendation. As 
the Commission states, "none of the studies [it reviewed] 
indicated any actual case where independence was com­
promised" . Furthermore, the two recent studies cited by the 
Commission indicated a concern with only "certain management 
advisory services". In view of this persuasive evidence, we 
believe that, at most, audit committees need only focus their 
attention on whether those "certain" services, if any are to 
be performed, might impair their auditors' objectivity and 
independence in the particular circumstances. Requiring the 
audit committee to approve all management advisory services 
to be performed by the auditors may, in fact, cause some 
audit committees to be overly concerned about any type of 
such services to be performed by the auditors, and thereby 
may result in the companies' using other organizations to 
perform those services, even if their consequent effective­
ness is not as great. To taint all auditor-performed 
management services with the stigma of being subject to 
audit committee scrutiny is neither necessary nor desirable, 
especially in view of the significant benefits to be derived 
from applying the auditor's knowledge of his client's 
business in performing such services.
The text underlying the recommendation mentions 
the following two other considerations with which we take 
issue:
125e
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. In deciding on whether to use the auditor to perform 
management advisory services, the Commission would have 
the audit committee consider, among other things, "the 
amount of management advisory services relative to the 
audit fee". We are puzzled by this cautionary note. 
There is no discussion in the Report of the reason for 
its inclusion. Moreover, we are unaware of any evidence 
that management advisory services exceeding a specified 
percentage of the audit fee would impair the auditor's 
independence. In the absence of any rationale for 
considering this information, we urge its deletion from 
the recommendation. This would avoid misleading 
inferences being drawn about the effect the magnitude 
of management advisory services might have on 
independence.
. The Commission also states its belief that it is 
important for the audit committee to consider the 
relationship of total fees (presumably relating to 
management advisory services) paid to the auditor 
compared with the gross revenues of his firm and the 
office performing the audit. The intent of this 
guidance is unclear. In one sense, it seems to deal 
with consideration of the relationship of management 
advisory services fees for a particular audit engage­
ment compared with gross firm and office revenues. If 
this is the Commission's intent, the basis for such 
consideration is not apparent. Moreover, we are 
unaware of any evidence where independence was deemed 
to have been impaired based on management advisory 
services for a client exceeding a specified percentage 
of firm or office revenues. In addition, any such test 
would be biased in favor of large accounting firms and 
large offices within those firms. It assumes that a 
large management consulting engagement in relation to 
the firm or one of its offices might compromise the 
objectivity of the auditors. In our view, this is an 
invalid assumption.
In another sense, the guidance is similar to the 
"global" premise that apparently was behind Accounting 
Series Release No. 264; that is, significant management 
advisory services fees earned by an accounting firm may 
impair its perceived independence on all audits, even 
those for which there were no such services. Although 
statistics regarding the relative firm-wide percentages 
for MAS and other services are provided annually to the 
SEC Practice Section by its members, the rule requiring 
such information does not raise the spectre of impaired 
independence as does the Commission's cautionary note.
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ASR No. 264 has been withdrawn and we urge the 
Commission to do likewise for this part of its 
recommendation.
RESTRUCTURING THE AUDITING STANDARDS BOARD
We strongly disagree with the recommendation that 
half of the Auditing Standards Board should be comprised of 
persons who are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public 
practice. Our views are based on both conceptual and 
practical considerations.
From a conceptual viewpoint, the accounting 
profession should be viewed as a profession and, con­
sequently, should be allowed to govern itself. The 
Commission provides as examples of likely outside members 
persons who come from companies which purchase audit 
services, investors, financial analysts, and creditors who 
use financial services. Would one then expect to see 
medical standards established by knowledgeable patients, or 
lawyers' policies governed by knowledgeable defendants 
simply because they use those services? Surely not. This 
conclusion should apply equally to the Auditing Standards 
Board.
From a practical viewpoint, non-practitioners are 
not likely to have the necessary "hands on" experience to 
best deal with the many implications of auditing standards. 
To reduce the size of the Auditing Standards Board, and to 
require half of its members to come from outside of the 
accounting profession would almost assuredly erode the 
quality of that body, detracting from, rather than 
enhancing, its value to the public. Sectors outside of the 
accounting profession currently provide input to the 
Auditing Standards Board, both before and during the public 
exposure process. That communications channel, together 
with the long history of the Board in responding to changes 
in the business environment, should provide sufficient 
comfort that financial statement users are well served by 
the existing auditing standards setting framework.
ADDITIONAL SEC ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES
We have significant reservations concerning three 
of the additional proposed enforcement remedies:
. Giving the SEC the authority to impose fines
. Empowering the SEC to issue cease and desist orders
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. Punishing accounting firms for failing to remedy
reported deficiencies in their quality control programs
Our fundamental concerns with these recommendations 
are as follows:
. Assigning to the SEC the authority for the additional 
enforcement activities seems to be an automatic, easy 
approach that does not recognize that such remedies may 
fit more appropriately within the operating structure 
of other organizations.
While the SEC may be the obvious enforcement arm in any 
remedial program because of its highly visible role in 
the financial reporting process, other agencies or 
regulatory bodies may better serve this function. For 
example, we feel that any remedial action against a CPA 
firm that fails to correct a deficiency determined on 
its peer review should appropriately be taken by t he 
organization administering such peer review process.
(As we previously indicated in this letter, we strongly 
believe that the peer review process is best left under 
the control of the accounting profession). The peer 
review program of the SEC Practice Section has demon­
strated its ability to improve the quality controls of 
its members and no additional threat of punishment is 
necessary to achieve this goal.
. The recommendations would empower the SEC to levy fines 
or take other actions without establishing probable 
cause or ensuring the rights of the subject parties to 
a fair investigative hearing, due process or appropriate 
appellate procedures.
Careful consideration must be given to supplementing 
the SEC's arsenal of enforcement remedies. It must be 
remembered that the SEC's administrative processes do 
not afford an accused much opportunity to be heard 
before proceedings or an action are commenced and that 
the administrative proceedings are controlled by the 
SEC and provide for little appellate review.
In any event, we feel the proposed enforcement 
measures are unnecessary. The SEC already has substantial 
power to punish wrongdoers. We believe giving it the power 
to impose fines as well, or to obtain cease and desist 
orders, is giving it more power than is desirable. While it 
is true that fines may be levied by securities organizations 
such as the New York Stock Exchange, these are member 
organizations with little other police power over their
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members. The powers and authority of the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission are likewise more limited than those of 
the SEC. In addition, as to cease and desist orders, in 
egregious situations, the SEC or subject U.S. Attorney can 
obtain a temporary restraining order and an injunction.
* * *
In addition to the aforementioned concerns, we 
have comments regarding the following recommendations:
. Public discussion of the nature of material accounting 
or auditing issues discussed with a company's old and 
new auditors during the three years prior to a change 
in auditors.
The "opinion shopping" abuses apparently intended to be 
curbed by this recommendation are currently addressed 
by SEC rules for Form 8-K covering disagreements with 
auditors. Accordingly, this procedure would appear to 
be unnecessary. Moreover, mere discussion of an issue, 
particularly one which occurred up to three years ago, 
is not relevant to opinion shopping concerns unless it 
involves a reportable disagreement as defined by the 
SEC. Therefore, any disclosure of these discussions 
may give the financial statement user a misleading 
impression of the seriousness of the matters discussed 
and may even de-sensitize the user to abusive opinion 
shopping situations. In addition, such disclosure may 
have a chilling effect on those cases where registrants 
legitimately seek a second opinion.
• The Auditing Standards Board should revise the
auditor's report to describe the extent to which the 
auditor has reviewed and evaluated the internal 
accounting control system.
We do not understand the reasoning behind the portion 
of the recommendation which calls for the auditor's 
report to indicate that auditing standards require the 
auditor to communicate to management and the board of 
directors (or the audit committee) any significant 
material weaknesses coming to his attention. Any such 
disclosures without indicating whether there was, in 
fact, a material weakness would be pointless to the 
financial statement user. In that regard, we would 
oppose any requirement for public disclosure of 
material weaknesses in those circumstances for two 
reasons: (1) the type of report to be rendered in those
circumstances is complex and, therefore, would probably
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add little or may even detract from the user's under­
standing of the auditor's role and (2) in the face of 
public reporting, auditors may decide to perform an 
in-depth review of the internal accounting control 
system even though it is not cost-beneficial, thereby 
adding to audit cost. In any event, the adjective 
"significant" when modifying "material weakness" seems 
redundant unless that three word term is a new concept, 
in which case it should be explained.
*  *  *
In summary, we applaud the Commission's proposal 
as a meaningful effort to combat fraudulent financial 
reporting. We would hope, however, that the final Report 
will caution its readers about the inherent limitations of 
any fraud reduction program in order to avoid creating a new 
expectation gap. In addition, we are concerned about the 
impact of certain recommendations on smaller public companies 
and on the operations of the accounting profession and the 
structure of its Auditing Standards Board.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with 
you at your convenience. Please contact us if you have any 
questions concerning our comments.
Very truly yours,
SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN
By
Wayne  A. Kolins 
National Director of 
Accounting, Auditing 
and SEC Practice
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June 30, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.Washington, D. C. 20006
Re: Exposure Draft - Report of the National __Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Gentlemen:
We welcome this opportunity to present our views on the Exposure Draft.
The c a u s e s  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a re  
c e r t a i n l y  h i g h l y  c o m p le x  and  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  b y  th e  
v a g a r ie s  o f  human n a t u r e .  A c c o r d in g ly ,  l i k e  a n y  o t h e r  c r im e s  
i n v o l v i n g  p e r s o n a l  f r a i l t y ,  i t s  c o m p le te  p r e v e n t io n  w i l l  n o t  
be  p o s s ib le .  H o w e v e r, t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  " m u l t i - d im e n s io n a l "  
a p p ro a c h  i n  d e a l in g  w i t h  th e  p ro b le m  r e p r e s e n t s  a m a jo r  s te p  
i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  an  e n v ir o n m e n t  t o  re d u c e  t h e  in c id e n c e  o f  
f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  we 
a p p la u d  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  e f f o r t s .
H o w e v e r, we h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n c e rn s  i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  a re a s  w i t h  e i t h e r  th e  to n e  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  
v ie w s  o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  u n d e r ly in g  re c o m m e n d a t io n s :
. Creating an unbridgeable expectation gap
. Effects on small business
. SEC mandated peer review
. Advance approval of management advisory services to be performed by the independent auditors
. Restructuring the Auditing Standards Board
. Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
CREATING AN UNBRIDGEABLE EXPECTATION GAP
As we previously mentioned, fraudulent financial reporting, like any other crime, will continue to occur to
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some degree, regardless of even the most sophisticated 
prevention techniques. Character failures cannot be 
legislated away. There is a danger that legislative bodies, 
the courts and the general public may perceive the 
Commission's report as a permanent solution to the problem, 
rather than as a means to sensitize people about the causes 
of fraudulent financial reporting and to recommend practical 
means to mitigate the problem. As such, when fraudulent 
financial reporting occurs, those having oversight responsi­
bility for financial reports may be inappropriately taken to 
task, even when the fraud may have been virtually impossible 
to prevent or detect (e.g. certain types of collusive fraud). 
Admittedly, this type of expectation gap exists to a degree 
even in today's environment. Also, we realize the Commission 
does not view its recommendations as a panacea. But, unless 
the Commission clearly and positively states in its Report 
the inherent limitations of its recommendations, we are 
concerned that this gap will surely widen.
EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS
The Commission recognizes "that smaller, newly 
public companies...may experience significant short-term 
implementation costs" and "that the resources to implement 
its recommendations in smaller public companies...may not 
always be available". We agree with those conclusions. 
However, the Commission also states it believes that only 
rarely will a company, even a smaller one, be unable to 
implement "the letter of a recommendation". In those cases, 
the Commission urges companies to adopt procedures to 
respond instead to the spirit of the recommendation. In our 
view, the Commission thus has drawn overly restrictive para­
meters in applying its recommendations to smaller public 
companies. This would increase the costs of doing business 
for these companies, which runs counter to SEC efforts to 
reduce such costs. There are certain recommendations that 
are highly impractical or simply unnecessary for such 
companies, as follows:
. Public companies should maintain an effective internal 
audit function staffed with an adequate number of 
qualified personnel appropriate to the size and the 
nature of the company.
Although a strong internal audit function can provide a 
powerful tool in combating fraud in larger companies, 
establishing such a function in smaller companies may 
be an unnecessary cost. Many smaller public companies 
have effective managerial controls, whereby top 
management essentially has its fingers on the pulse of
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daily operations. To create an extra layer of controls 
in such companies would be redundant. Perhaps the 
Commission recognized these circumstances with its 
phrase "appropriate to the size and the nature of the 
company", but it is not clear to us whether this 
qualifying language is intended to exempt smaller 
companies with effective managerial controls.
The board of directors of all public companies should 
be required by SEC rules to establish audit committees 
comprised solely of independent directors.
The Commission states that it "recognizes the 
difficulties today in encouraging a sufficient number 
of qualified persons to serve as independent directors, 
particularly in small, newly public companies". The 
inability of many smaller companies to obtain director 
liability insurance has made it not merely difficult, 
but impossible, for those companies to attract 
qualified, independent directors. However, the 
Commission would have the SEC grant exceptions to the 
general rule "only in the most unusual cases". We 
believe that in view of the common problem shared by 
many smaller public companies in this area, exceptions 
for those companies should be more realistically and 
more readily granted.
All public companies should be required by the SEC to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders 
management reports signed by the chief executive 
officer and chief accounting officer. The management 
report should acknowledge management's responsibilities 
for the financial statements and internal control, 
discuss how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and 
provide management's assessment of the effectiveness of 
the company's internal controls.
We agree that the responsibilities of financial 
statement preparers need to be better communicated to 
the users of those statements. Most of the items 
called for in this recommendation should serve that 
purpose. However, the guidance and example of a 
management report included in Appendix L is geared to 
the larger public company with a relatively sophis­
ticated internal control system. As discussed earlier, 
though, many smaller companies rely on effective 
managerial controls in lieu of complex systems.
Although the example indicates that actual management 
reports should be tailored to fit each company, we 
believe guidance should be provided for those smaller
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companies in order to avoid the inference that their 
existing systems are unacceptable.
. The Auditing Standards Board also should provide
explicit guidance to address the situation where, as a 
result of his knowledge of the company's internal 
accounting controls, the independent public accountant 
disagrees with management's assessment as stated in the 
proposed management report.
This recommendation may have a costly side effect, 
particularly for smaller companies. As the Report 
recognizes, an in-depth study and evaluation of 
internal controls is not necessary on all audits. For 
efficiency or other reasons, auditors may decide not to 
rely on the internal control system to reduce their 
tests. This is especially common on audits of smaller 
companies. However, if the independent auditor becomes 
responsible for publicly reporting situations where, 
based on his knowledge of his client’s internal control 
system, he disagrees with management's assessment of 
the system, there is likely to be a substantial increase 
in the amount of internal control reviews performed by 
auditors in order for them to have a more complete 
foundation for evaluating management's assessment. In 
other words, many auditors may feel uncomfortable in 
allowing a properly limited study of the internal 
control system to serve as the basis for determining 
the appropriateness of management's assessment. This 
may occur even though the auditor's obligation to 
report would be limited to his knowledge of the 
internal control system, which does not require a 
detailed study. To overcome that natural discomfort, 
the auditor may perform a complete review of the system 
even though it is not economically warranted in the 
circumstances. This unnecessary burden will fall 
disproportionately on smaller companies. Accordingly, 
we suggest deletion of this recommendation.
SEC MANDATED PEER REVIEW
We agree that all public accounting firms that 
audit public companies should be members of a professional 
organization that has peer review and independent oversight 
functions, such as those specified by the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms. This would 
improve the professional quality of public company audits 
and would demonstrate the accounting profession's commitment 
to protect the public interest. However, we strongly 
believe that the authority to establish such requirement is 
best left to the profession, not to the SEC. The Commission
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recognizes that the accounting profession has been extremely 
effective over the years in regulating the performance of  
its practitioners in response to an ever-changing business 
environment. In keeping with this quality control commit­
ment, the AICPA recently has attempted, albeit unsuccess­
fully, to amend its rules to require its members which audit 
public companies to join the SEC Practice Section. The 
accounting profession should be permitted to attempt 
alternative means to achieve its objective before turning 
that task over to the SEC. Although the contemplated 
oversight role of the SEC in relation to any professional 
organization established to comply with this recommendation 
may be similar to its present role with respect to the SECPS, 
the profession would relinquish a significant element in its 
ability to regulate itself. This transfer of authority can 
only serve to erode the underpinnings of self-esteem which 
have served the profession so well over the years. Moreover, 
it may also be perceived as a significant step towards 
government regulation of the profession, which the 
Commission and we believe is "of doubtful merit".
ADVANCE APPROVAL OF MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES 
TO BE PERFORMED BY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
We strongly disagree with certain views, both 
implicit and explicit, expressed in this recommendation. As 
the Commission states, "none of the studies [it reviewed] 
indicated any actual case where independence was com­
promised". Furthermore, the two recent studies cited by the 
Commission indicated a concern with only "certain management 
advisory services". In view of this persuasive evidence, we 
believe that, at most, audit committees need only focus their 
attention on whether those "certain" services, if any are to 
be performed, might impair their auditors' objectivity and 
independence in the particular circumstances. Requiring the 
audit committee to approve all management advisory services 
to be performed by the auditors may, in fact, cause some 
audit committees to be overly concerned about any type of 
such services to be performed by the auditors, and thereby 
may result in the companies' using other organizations to 
perform those services, even if their consequent effective­
ness is not as great. To taint all auditor-performed 
management services with the stigma of being subject to 
audit committee scrutiny is neither necessary nor desirable, 
especially in view of the significant benefits to be derived 
from applying the auditor's knowledge of his client's 
business in performing such services.
The text underlying the recommendation mentions 
the following two other considerations with which we take 
issue:
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. In deciding on whether to use the auditor to perform 
management advisory services, the Commission would have 
the audit committee consider, among other things, "the 
amount of management advisory services relative to the 
audit fee". We are puzzled by this cautionary note. 
There is no discussion in the Report of the reason for 
its inclusion. Moreover, we are unaware of any evidence 
that management advisory services exceeding a specified 
percentage of the audit fee would impair the auditor's 
independence. In the absence of any rationale for 
considering this information, we urge its deletion from 
the recommendation. This would avoid misleading 
inferences being drawn about the effect the magnitude 
of management advisory services might have on 
independence.
. The Commission also states its belief that it is 
important for the audit committee to consider the 
relationship of total fees (presumably relating to 
management advisory services) paid to the auditor 
compared with the gross revenues of his firm and the 
office performing the audit. The intent of this 
guidance is unclear. In one sense, it seems to deal 
with consideration of the relationship of management 
advisory services fees for a particular audit engage­
ment compared with gross firm and office revenues. If 
this is the Commission's intent, the basis for such 
consideration is not apparent. Moreover, we are 
unaware of any evidence where independence was deemed 
to have been impaired based on management advisory 
services for a client exceeding a specified percentage 
of firm or office revenues. In addition, any such test 
would be biased in favor of large accounting firms and 
large offices within those firms. It assumes that a 
large management consulting engagement in relation to 
the firm or one of its offices might compromise the 
objectivity of the auditors. In our view, this is an 
invalid assumption.
In another sense, the guidance is similar to the 
"global" premise that apparently was behind Accounting 
Series Release No. 264; that is, significant management 
advisory services fees earned by an accounting firm may 
impair its perceived independence on all audits, even 
those for which there were no such services. Although 
statistics regarding the relative firm-wide percentages 
for MAS and other services are provided annually to the 
SEC Practice Section by its members, the rule requiring 
such information does not raise the spectre of impaired 
independence as does the Commission's cautionary note.
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ASR No. 264 has been withdrawn and we urge the 
Commission to do likewise for this part of its 
recommendation.
RESTRUCTURING THE AUDITING STANDARDS BOARD
We strongly disagree with the recommendation that 
half of the Auditing Standards Board should be comprised of 
persons who are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public 
practice. Our views are based on both conceptual and 
practical considerations.
From a conceptual viewpoint, the accounting 
profession should be viewed as a profession and, con­
sequently, should be allowed to govern itself. The 
Commission provides as examples of likely outside members 
persons who come from companies which purchase audit 
services, investors, financial analysts, and creditors who 
use financial services. Would one then expect to see 
medical standards established by knowledgeable patients, or 
lawyers' policies governed by knowledgeable defendants 
simply because they use those services? Surely not. This 
conclusion should apply equally to the Auditing Standards 
Board.
From a practical viewpoint, non-practitioners are 
not likely to have the necessary "hands on" experience to 
best deal with the many implications of auditing standards. 
To reduce the size of the Auditing Standards Board, and to 
require half of its members to come from outside of the 
accounting profession would almost assuredly erode the 
quality of that body, detracting from, rather than 
enhancing, its value to the public. Sectors outside of the 
accounting profession currently provide input to the 
Auditing Standards Board, both before and during the public 
exposure process. That communications channel, together 
with the long history of the Board in responding to changes 
in the business environment, should provide sufficient 
comfort that financial statement users are well served by 
the existing auditing standards setting framework.
ADDITIONAL SEC ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES
We have significant reservations concerning three 
of the additional proposed enforcement remedies:
. Giving the SEC the authority to impose fines
. Empowering the SEC to issue cease and desist orders
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. Punishing accounting firms for failing to remedy
reported deficiencies in their quality control programs
Our fundamental concerns with these recommendations 
are as follows:
. Assigning to the SEC the authority for the additional 
enforcement activities seems to be an automatic, easy 
approach that does not recognize that such remedies may 
fit more appropriately within the operating structure 
of other organizations.
While the SEC may be the obvious enforcement arm in any 
remedial program because of its highly visible role in 
the financial reporting process, other agencies or 
regulatory bodies may better serve this function. For 
example, we feel that any remedial action against a CPA 
firm that fails to correct a deficiency determined on 
its peer review should appropriately be taken by the 
organization administering such peer review process.
(As we previously indicated in this letter, we strongly 
believe that the peer review process is best left under 
the control of the accounting profession). The peer 
review program of the SEC Practice Section has demon­
strated its ability to improve the quality controls of 
its members and no additional threat of punishment is 
necessary to achieve this goal.
. The recommendations would empower the SEC to levy fines 
or take other actions without establishing probable 
cause or ensuring the rights of the subject parties to 
a fair investigative hearing, due process or appropriate 
appellate procedures.
Careful consideration must be given to supplementing 
the SEC' s arsenal of enforcement remedies. It must be 
remembered that the SEC's administrative processes do 
not afford an accused much opportunity to be heard 
before proceedings or an action are commenced and that 
the administrative proceedings are controlled by the 
SEC and provide for little appellate review.
In any event, we feel the proposed enforcement 
measures are unnecessary. The SEC already has substantial 
power to punish wrongdoers. We believe giving it the power 
to impose fines as well, or to obtain cease and desist 
orders, is giving it more power than is desirable. While it 
is true that fines may be levied by securities organizations 
such as the New York Stock Exchange, these are member 
organizations with little other police power over their
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members. The powers and authority of the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission are likewise more limited than those of 
the SEC. In addition, as to cease and desist orders, in 
egregious situations, the SEC or subject U.S. Attorney can 
obtain a temporary restraining order and an injunction.
* * *
In addition to the aforementioned concerns, we 
have comments regarding the following recommendations:
. Public discussion of the nature of material accounting 
or auditing issues discussed with a company’s old and 
new auditors during the three years prior to a change 
in auditors.
The "opinion shopping" abuses apparently intended to be 
curbed by this recommendation are currently addressed 
by SEC rules for Form 8-K covering disagreements with 
auditors. Accordingly, this procedure would appear to 
be unnecessary. Moreover, mere discussion of an issue, 
particularly one which occurred up to three years ago, 
is not relevant to opinion shopping concerns unless it 
involves a reportable disagreement as defined by the 
SEC. Therefore, any disclosure of these discussions 
may give the financial statement user a misleading 
impression of the seriousness of the matters discussed 
and may even de-sensitize the user to abusive opinion 
shopping situations. In addition, such disclosure may 
have a chilling effect on those cases where registrants 
legitimately seek a second opinion.
. The Auditing Standards Board should revise the
auditor's report to describe the extent to which the 
auditor has reviewed and evaluated the internal 
accounting control system.
We do not understand the reasoning behind the portion 
of the recommendation which calls for the auditor's 
report to indicate that auditing standards require the 
auditor to communicate to management and the board of 
directors (or the audit committee) any significant 
material weaknesses coming to his attention. Any such 
disclosures without indicating whether there was, in 
fact, a material weakness would be pointless to the 
financial statement user. In that regard, we would 
oppose any requirement for public disclosure of 
material weaknesses in those circumstances for two 
reasons: (1) the type of report to be rendered in those 
circumstances is complex and, therefore, would probably
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add little or may even detract from the user's under­
standing of the auditor's role and (2) in the face of 
public reporting, auditors may decide to perform an 
in-depth review of the internal accounting control 
system even though it is not cost-beneficial, thereby 
adding to audit cost. In any event, the adjective 
"significant" when modifying "material weakness" seems 
redundant unless that three word term is a new concept, 
in which case it should be explained.
*  *  *
In summary, we applaud the Commission's proposal 
as a meaningful effort to combat fraudulent financial 
reporting. We would hope, however, that the final Report 
will caution its readers about the inherent limitations of 
any fraud reduction program in order to avoid creating a new 
expectation gap. In addition, we are concerned about the 
impact of certain recommendations on smaller public companies 
and on the operations of the accounting profession and the 
structure of its Auditing Standards Board.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with 
you at your convenience. Please contact us if you have any 
questions concerning our comments.
Very truly yours,
SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN
By  
Wayne A. Kolins 
National Director of 
Accounting, Auditing 
and SEC Practice
p r i M a r k
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Primark Corporation 
8251 Greensboro Drive 
Suite 700
McLean, Virginia 22102 
(703) 790-7600
June 30, 1987
M r. James C . T re a d w a y , J r .
C hairm an
N a tiona l Commission on F ra u d u le n t 
F inanc ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P e n nsy lvan ia  A ve n u e , N .W .
W ash ing ton , D . C . 20006
Dear M r. T readw ay :
P rim a rk  C o rp o ra tio n  app rec ia tes  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  exp ress  its  comments 
co n ce rn in g  th e  E xposure  D ra f t  o f th e  R e p o rt o f th e  N a tiona l Commission 
on F ra u d u le n t F inanc ia l R e p o rtin g  ( th e  R e p o r t) .  P r im a rk , w ith  revenue  
o f $1.5 b ill io n  fo r  the  y e a r ended December 31, 1986, and assets a t 
December 31, 1986, o f $1.5 b i l l io n ,  is  th e  p a re n t com pany o f M ich igan 
C onso lida ted  Gas Com pany, a n a tu ra l gas tra n sm iss io n , s to rage  and 
d is tr ib u t io n  com pany s e rv in g  o v e r one m illio n  custom ers in  M ich igan ; The 
A v ia tio n  G ro u p , In c . ,  an a v ia tio n  com pany s e rv in g  the  a ir  f r e ig h t  
in d u s t r y ;  H o sp ita l S a te llite  N e tw o rk , I n c . ,  a n a tio na l te lecom m unications 
com pany s e rv in g  the  h ea lthca re  in d u s t r y ;  and  P rim a rk  F inanc ia l 
S e rv ices , In c . ,  th e  p a re n t com pany o f su b s id ia rie s  in  le a s in g , in su ra n ce  
and m ortgage b a n k in g  in d u s tr ie s .
P rim a rk  s u p p o rts  th e  a c t iv it ie s  and conclus ions o f the  N a tiona l 
Commission on F ra u d u le n t F inanc ia l R e p o rtin g  ( th e  Commission) and 
com plim ents th e  Commission on th e  e x te n s ive  re se a rch  p e rfo rm e d  and 
s u b s ta n tiv e  conclus ions reached . P rim a rk  agrees th a t the  p r im a ry  
re s p o n s ib ility  f o r  re lia b le  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  res ides w ith  the  re p o r t in g  
com pany. F u r th e r ,  the  in d e p e n d e n t p u b lic  accou n ta n t and re g u la to ry  
agencies p ro v id e  necessary  assurances and co n tro ls  to  the  f in a n c ia l 
re p o r t in g  p rocess .
In  re v ie w in g  the  Commission’s R e p o rt, P rim a rk  notes th a t th e  s ig n if ic a n t 
fa c to rs  necessa ry  fo r  th e  p re v e n tio n  and d e tec tion  o f fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l 
re p o r t in g  have been add ressed  b y  the  Commission's recom m endations, 
s p e c if ic a lly ,  th e  s tre n g th  and  in te g r i ty  o f com pany management and 
in te rn a l a cco u n tin g  c o n tro ls , the  q u a li ty  o f th e  a u d it  p rocess , the  
resources and  en forcem ent too ls ava ilab le  to  th e  S e cu ritie s  and  Exchange 
Commission (S E C ), and  the  q u a li ty  o f educa tion  and  c o n tin u in g  
e du ca tion . In  a d d it io n , the  Commission h ig h lig h te d  seve ra l p roposa ls
M r .  J a m e s  C .  T r e a d w a y ,  J r .
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
P a g e  2
w h i c h  w o u l d  e x p a n d  o r  c h a n g e  e x i s t i n g  r e p o r t s  s u b m i t t e d  t o  
s h a r e h o l d e r s .  W h i l e  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  m a y  p r o v i d e  s o m e  b e n e f i t ,  t h e
a d d i t i o n  o f  r e p o r t s  a n d  a s s u r a n c e s  t o  t h e  f i n a l  p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  
p r o c e s s  a p p e a r s  t o  p l a y  a  s e c o n d a r y  r o l e  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  f a i r  a n d  a c c u r a t e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s .  T h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  i m p a c t  a r e  t h o s e  t h a t  a d d r e s s  e d u c a t i o n  o f  c o r p o r a t e  
m a n a g e r s  a n d  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  a d h e r e n c e  t o  c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r o l s ,  a n d  
t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  t o o l s .
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  T H E  P U B L I C  C O M P A N Y
R e p o r t i n g  o n  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  t o  S h a r e h o l d e r s
A l t h o u g h  P r i m a r k  a g r e e s  t h a t  t h e  p r i m a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c c u r a t e  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  l i e s  w i t h  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  e n t i t y ,  w e  a r e  u n s u r e  a s  t o  
t h e  a m o u n t  o f  b e n e f i t  t o  b e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  a  l e t t e r  i n  t h e  
a n n u a l  r e p o r t  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  a n d  
c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r .  U n d e r  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  t h i s  l e t t e r  w o u l d  
a d d r e s s  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s , h o w  t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w e r e  f u l f i l l e d  a n d  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  r e p o r t  w o u l d  t e n d  t o  d i s t r a c t  t h e  r e a d e r  
a n d  r e d u c e  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  p l a c e d  o n  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  r e p o r t .  T h e  a u d i t o r ' s  
r e p o r t  i s  a n d  s h o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  d o c u m e n t s  
i n  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t .  I t  i s  t h i s  r e p o r t  t h a t  p r o v i d e s  t h e  d e f i n i t i v e  
s t a t e m e n t  a s  t o  t h e  f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  p r e s e n t e d .  A n  
a d d i t i o n a l  s t a t e m e n t  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  w o u l d  o n l y  d e t r a c t  f r o m  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  
c o n c l u s i o n s .
A n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  
a c c o m p l i s h  t h e  s a m e  o b j e c t i v e s  w i t h o u t  d e t r a c t i n g  f r o m  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  
r e p o r t ,  w o u l d  b e  t o  i n c l u d e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  f r o m  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  t h e  
n o t e s  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  T h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  w o u l d  t h e n  b e  
s u b j e c t  t o  r e v i e w  d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  a u d i t .  A p p r o p r i a t e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  w o u l d  i n c l u d e :
1 .  A  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  
a r e  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  m a n a g e m e n t .
2 .  A  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  p r o v i d e d  t h e  a u d i t o r s  w i t h  a l l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p e r f o r m  t h e  a u d i t .
3 .  M a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s .
A l t h o u g h  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s  i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  l i m i t a t i o n s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  m a i n  f o c u s  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  m u s t  b e  
t h e  f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  p r e s e n t e d .  A n y  a s s e s s m e n t  a s  t o  t h e  
a d e q u a c y  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  m u s t  b e  p r e s e n t e d  a s  s e c o n d a r y  o r  
s u p p l e m e n t a r y  i n f o r m a t i o n .  T h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  w i t h i n  
t h e  a u d i t e d  n o t e s  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  i s  o n e  m e t h o d  o f  m e e t i n g
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t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n .  S e c o n d ,  a b s o l u t e  a s s u r a n c e s  a r e  n o t  p o s s i b l e .  T h e  
e x a m p l e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  r e p o r t  p r o v i d e d  i n  A p p e n d i x  L  o f  t h e  r e p o r t  
i n c l u d e s  t h e  a s s u r a n c e ,  " T h e  s t a t e m e n t s .  . . a r e  n o t  m i s s t a t e d  d u e  t o  
m a t e r i a l  f r a u d  o r  e r r o r . "  T h i s  s t a t e m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  q u a l i f i e d  i n  t h e  s a m e  
w a y  a s  t h e  o t h e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  r e p o r t ,  i . e .  t o  s t a t e  
t h a t  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  m a d e  t o  t h e  b e s t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  k n o w l e d g e  
a n d  b e l i e f .  T h e s e  d i s c l o s u r e s  s h o u l d  a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  a  f u l l  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  
e n t i r e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  i s  g e n e r a l l y  n o t  p e r f o r m e d  o n  a n  a n n u a l  
b a s i s .
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  C h a i r m a n ' s  L e t t e r
W e  b e l i e v e  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w i l l  d o  l i t t l e  t o  p r o v i d e  a d d i t i o n a l  b e n e f i t  
t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s .  A s  n o t e d  i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  s u g g e s t e d  c o n t e n t s  o f  t h e  C h a i r m a n ' s  L e t t e r  
r e p l i c a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a l r e a d y  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  p r o x y  s t a t e m e n t .  T h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  s p e c i f i c  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  w i l l ,  i n  m a n y  
c a s e s ,  c o n s i s t  p r i m a r i l y  o f  a  l i s t i n g  o f  r o u t i n e  c o m m i t t e e  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  
w i l l  n o t  v a r y  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f r o m  y e a r  t o  y e a r .  I n t e r e s t e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
a l w a y s  h a v e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  a s k  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e ' s  s p e c i f i c  a c t i v i t y  a t  t h e  a n n u a l  m e e t i n g .
S e e k i n g  a  S e c o n d  O p i n i o n
R e g a r d i n g  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  r e l a t e d  t o  s e e k i n g  a  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n ,  w e  c o n c u r  
w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  a d v i s e  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  w h e n  i t  s e e k s  a  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n  o n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  
i s s u e .  P r i m a r k  b e l i e v e s  t h i s  w o u l d  b e  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  y e t  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  
c o n t r o l  o n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  o p i n i o n  s h o p p i n g .  F u r t h e r ,  P r i m a r k  b e l i e v e s  
t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  s e e k i n g  a  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n  f r o m  a n  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m ,  
o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  p r e s e n t  a u d i t o r s ,  s h o u l d  b e  s t r o n g l y  
d i s c o u r a g e d  o r  d i s a l l o w e d  u n l e s s  e n c o u r a g e d  b y  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t i n g  
f i r m  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  q u e s t i o n .
P r i m a r k ,  h o w e v e r ,  d i s a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l  i n  t h e  n e x t  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t ,  w h e n  a  c o m p a n y  c h a n g e s  a u d i t o r s ,  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
a n y  m a t e r i a l  i s s u e  d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  a u d i t o r s  f o r  a  t h r e e - y e a r  p e r i o d  
p r e c e d i n g  t h e  c h a n g e  b e  d i s c l o s e d .  A l t h o u g h  P r i m a r k  c o n c u r s  w i t h  t h e  
i n t e n t  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s s u e s  m u s t  b e  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i n  o r d e r  f o r  i t  t o  a c c o m p l i s h  i t s  
o b j e c t i v e  w i t h o u t  c a u s i n g  u n d u e  c o s t .  F i r s t ,  a  c o m p a n y  n o r m a l l y  
d i s c u s s e s  a  g r e a t  n u m b e r  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  i s s u e s  w i t h  i t s  c u r r e n t  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t ,  i n c l u d i n g  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  n e w  o r  p r o p o s e d  
a c c o u n t i n g  m e t h o d s  w h e r e  n o  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  e x i s t .  A  d i s t i n c t i o n  s h o u l d  
b e  m a d e  i n  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  b e t w e e n  r o u t i n e  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s , m i n o r  c h a n g e s  t o  a c c o u n t i n g  p r a c t i c e s  o r  t h e  
a d o p t i o n s  o f  n e w  F A S B  S t a t e m e n t s  a n d  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
c h a n g e  t o  a n  a c c o u n t i n g  m e t h o d  w h e r e  a  d i s a g r e e m e n t  e x i s t s .  W i t h o u t  
t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  a  c o m p a n y  m a y  h e s i t a t e  t o  d i s c u s s  a n y  a c c o u n t i n g  i s s u e  
w i t h  i t s  a u d i t o r  u n l e s s  a b s o l u t e l y  n e c e s s a r y .  T h i s  c o u l d  c r e a t e  a n  
a d v e r s a r i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  r e d u c e  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  a u d i t .  T h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  c o u l d  b e  i m p r o v e d  b y  d e f i n i n g  m o r e  c l e a r l y  t h e  i s s u e s  t o
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b e  d i s c l o s e d .  S e c o n d ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  p o l i c i e s  a n d  m a t e r i a l  
c h a n g e s  t o  e x i s t i n g  a c c o u n t i n g  p o l i c i e s  a r e  d i s c l o s e d  u n d e r  p r e s e n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  r u l e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  s h o u l d  p r e s c r i b e  t h e  
s p e c i f i c  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  a n y  m a t e r i a l  c h a n g e  i n  a c c o u n t i n g  p o l i c y  a f t e r  a  
c h a n g e  i n  a u d i t o r s  h a s  t a k e n  p l a c e .  T h i r d ,  a l t h o u g h  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  
n e w  a u d i t o r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  a n  a u d i t  e n g a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  
s u b j e c t  t o  m o r e  d i s c l o s u r e  t h a n  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  t h e  c u r r e n t  a u d i t o r s ,  
s o m e  e x c e p t i o n  m u s t  b e  m a d e  f o r  r o u t i n e  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  a  c o m p a n y ’s  
a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s .
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g
W h i l e  P r i m a r k  c o n c u r s  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v e  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  r e l e a s e ,  w e  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  s h o u l d  b e  e n c o u r a g e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e q u i r e d .  T h e  
f i n a n c i a l  o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  
p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  u l t i m a t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  t h e  f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  c a n  b e  a s c r i b e d  t o  t h e  B o a r d  o f  
D i r e c t o r s ,  t h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  g e n e r a l l y  d e l e g a t e d  t o  m a n a g e m e n t .  H o w e v e r ,  
p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  d i r e c t o r s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  a c t u a l  r e v i e w ,  
w h i c h  m a y  b e  u s e d  b y  t h e  d i r e c t o r s  t o  o b t a i n  a s s u r a n c e s  a s  t o  t h e  
a c c u r a c y  o f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s .  O n e  s u c h  p r o c e d u r e  w o u l d  b e  a  " c o m f o r t  
l e t t e r ”  f r o m  t h e  a u d i t o r s  t o  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  a t t e s t i n g  t o  t h e  
f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s .  T h e  t i m e  f r a m e  f o r  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  
q u a r t e r l y  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  v e r y  t i g h t  f o r  m o s t  c o m p a n i e s ,  t h u s  t h e  
s h a r e h o l d e r ' s  n e e d  f o r  t i m e l y  i n f o r m a t i o n  m u s t  b e  w e i g h e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
p e r c e i v e d  n e e d  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t e  r e v i e w s  o f  q u a r t e r l y  i n f o r m a t i o n .
S e t t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  f o r  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l
P r i m a r k  a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  a n  
i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  b o d y  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  d e v e l o p  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  c o n c e p t s  
a n d  g u i d e l i n e s .  F u r t h e r ,  P r i m a r k  b e l i e v e s  t h i s  b o d y  s h o u l d  b e  
c o m p r i s e d  m a i n l y  o f  c o r p o r a t e  m a n a g e r s , i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  a n d  o t h e r s  
p r i m a r i l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  a n d  o n g o i n g  r e v i e w  o f  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  D u e  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m s  a n d  t h e  
v a r i a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  c o m p a n i e s ,  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t h i s  b o d y  w o u l d  b e  m o s t  
e f f e c t i v e  i f  i t  i s  i n  t h e  f o r m a t  o f  g u i d e l i n e s  a n d  u n d e r l y i n g  c o n c e p t s  a s  
o p p o s e d  t o  f o r m a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o r  r e g u l a t i o n s .
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  T H E  I N D E P E N D E N T  P U B L I C  A C C O U N T A N T
R e c o g n i z i n g  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  D e t e c t i n g  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  a n  a u d i t ,  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  s h o u l d  ( 1 )  t a k e  a f f i r m a t i v e  s t e p s  t o  a s s e s s  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  ( 2 )  d e s i g n  t e s t s  t o  
p r o v i d e  r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e  o f  t h e  d e t e c t i o n  o f  s u c h  r e p o r t i n g .  
P r i m a r k  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t o r  h a s  a l w a y s  h a d  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  
d e t e c t  m a t e r i a l  m i s s t a t e m e n t s  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s , r e g a r d l e s s  o f  
t h e  c a u s e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  P r i m a r k  a g r e e s  s t r o n g l y  w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  p r o p o s a l ,  
t h a t  t h e  a u d i t o r  a s s e s s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g
M r .  J a m e s  C .  T r e a d w a y ,  J r .
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
P a g e  5
a n d  a p p l y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s k e p t i c i s m  t o  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  
t h e  c o n t r o l  e n v i r o n m e n t .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h e  a u d i t o r  h a s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  i t s  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  
f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  w e  d o  n o t  
b e l i e v e  t h e r e  i s  a  n e e d  t o  a d o p t  a d d i t i o n a l  a u d i t  p r o c e d u r e s  i f  c u r r e n t  
p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  p r e s e n t  w h i c h  m a y  b e  u s e d  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e .  M a n y  a u d i t  
p r o c e d u r e s  c u r r e n t l y  p e r f o r m e d ,  a l t h o u g h  n o t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e s i g n e d  t o  
t e s t  f o r  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g ,  m a y  i n  f a c t  b e  a d e q u a t e  f o r  t h a t  p u r p o s e .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  a u d i t o r  m u s t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  h i s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  t h e  c o s t s  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  
b e n e f i t s  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  m a t e r i a l  
m i s s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  w h e n  p l a n n i n g  t h e  a u d i t  t e s t s  t o  b e  
p e r f o r m e d .
C o m m u n i c a t i n g  t h e  A u d i t o r ’s  R o l e
P r i m a r k  a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  s t a n d a r d  r e p o r t  s t a t e  
t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  p r o v i d e s  r e a s o n a b l e  b u t  n o t  a b s o l u t e  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  t h e  
a u d i t e d  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  f r e e  f r o m  m a t e r i a l  m i s s t a t e m e n t s . 
A l t h o u g h  t h i s  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  i s  p r o b a b l y  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  m o s t  r e a d e r s  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  t h e  c o s t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o p o s a l  a r e  m i n i m a l  
a n d  s o m e  b e n e f i t  w i l l  b e  d e r i v e d .
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  P r i m a r k  d i s a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  h i s / h e r  r e v i e w  o f  
t h e  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l .  T h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  a  d i s c u s s i o n
o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  i n  t h e  a u d i t  o p i n i o n  w o u l d  d i s t r a c t  t h e  r e a d e r  f r o m
t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h a t  o p i n i o n .  T h e  a u d i t o r  i s  n o t  i s s u i n g  a n  o p i n i o n  o f  
t h e  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s , a n d  t h e  r e a d e r  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  i s  p l a c i n g  r e l i a n c e  o n  t h e  a u d i t o r  a n d  h i s / h e r  o p i n i o n  a s  t o  
t h e  f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  p r e s e n t e d ,  n o t  o n  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  
r e v i e w  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  A s  w i t h  a n y  o t h e r  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  
t h e  r e v i e w  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  j u d g e m e n t  a n d
w i l l  v a r y  f r o m  a u d i t  t o  a u d i t .  F o r  t h e  a u d i t o r  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h i s  o r  a n y
o t h e r  s i n g l e  p r o c e d u r e  i n  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  r e p o r t  w o u l d  c r e a t e  u n d u e  
c o n f u s i o n  a n d  c o u l d  m i s l e a d  t h e  p u b l i c  t o  b e l i e v e  t h i s  a u d i t  p r o c e d u r e  i s  
m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  a u d i t  t h a n  t h o s e  p r o c e d u r e s  n o t  
h i g h l i g h t e d .  A n y  v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r d i n g  o f  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  b e t w e e n  
c o m p a n i e s  w o u l d  c a u s e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n f u s i o n  a n d  c o u l d  c a u s e  t h e  r e a d e r  t o  
m a k e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  a s s u m p t i o n s  a s  t o  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  
b a s e d  o n  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  r e v i e w  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  o p i n i o n .
T h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  a  n o t e  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a d d r e s s i n g  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  
c o n t r o l s ,  a s  d i s c u s s e d  o n  p a g e  t w o  o f  o u r  r e s p o n s e ,  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  
s a t i s f y  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s a l .  A s  t h i s  n o t e  w o u l d  b e  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  a u d i t e d  b a s i c  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s , t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  n e e d  t o  
r e p e a t  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  i n  t h e  a u d i t o r ’s  o p i n i o n .
M r .  J a m e s  C .  T r e a d w a y ,  J r .
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
P a g e  6
R e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  b e  
r e o r g a n i z e d  t o  i n c l u d e  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  p e r s o n s  w h o  a r e  a f f e c t e d  b y  
a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  b u t  w h o  a r e  n o t  c e r t i f i e d  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  i n  p u b l i c  
p r a c t i c e .  P r i m a r k  f i r m l y  s u p p o r t s  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  a n d  b e l i e v e s  t h i s  a c t i o n  
w o u l d  p r o v i d e  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  w i t h  i m p o r t a n t  a d d i t i o n a l  
i n s i g h t s  a n d  v i e w p o i n t s .
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  T H E  S E C  A N D  O T H E R S  T O  I M P R O V E  T H E  
R E G U L A T O R Y  A N D  L E G A L  E N V I R O N M E N T
A d d i t i o n a l  S E C  E n f o r c e m e n t  R e m e d i e s ,  I n c r e a s e d  C r i m i n a l  P r o s e c u t i o n  a n d  
S E C  R e s o u r c e s
P r i m a r k  b e l i e v e s  t h e  S E C  p l a y s  a  c r i t i c a l  r o l e  i n  p r e v e n t i n g ,  d e t e c t i n g  
a n d  d e t e r r i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  T h e r e f o r e ,  P r i m a r k  
s t r o n g l y  b e l i e v e s  t h e  S E C  s h o u l d  b e  p r o v i d e d  w i t h  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  
a u t h o r i t y  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a c c o m p l i s h  t h i s  t a s k  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ’s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  i n  t h i s  a r e a  w o u l d  p r o v i d e  t h e  S E C  w i t h  
i m p o r t a n t  a n d  n e c e s s a r y  e n f o r c e m e n t  t o o l s .
R e c o n s i d e r i n g  C o r p o r a t e  I n d e m n i f i c a t i o n
P r i m a r k  s u p p o r t s  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e  S E C  r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  
p o s i t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t o r s  f o r  l i a b i l i t i e s  
t h a t  a r i s e  u n d e r  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  A c t  o f  1 9 3 3 .  P r i m a r k  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  
q u a l i f i e d ,  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  d i r e c t o r s  a r e  a  c r i t i c a l  c o m p o n e n t  o f  f a i r  a n d  
a c c u r a t e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  l i a b i l i t y  c r i s i s  a n d  
t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  o b t a i n i n g  d i r e c t o r s '  a n d  o f f i c e r s '  i n s u r a n c e  m a y  
s e v e r e l y  r e d u c e  t h e  p o o l  o f  q u a l i f i e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l i n g  t o  s e r v e  a s  
c o r p o r a t e  d i r e c t o r s .  T h e  i n a b i l i t y  t o  l o c a t e  a n d  r e t a i n  q u a l i f i e d  d i r e c t o r s  
w i l l  h a v e  a  s e r i o u s ,  n e g a t i v e  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a  
c o r p o r a t i o n  r e c e i v e s .
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  E D U C A T I O N
C o n t i n u i n g  P r o f e s s i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n
P r i m a r k  s u p p o r t s  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  c o n t i n u i n g  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  
a n d  c o r p o r a t e  a c c o u n t a n t s  s h o u l d  b e  e n c o u r a g e d  t o  s t u d y  t h e  c a u s e s  a n d  
r i s k s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A l t h o u g h  w e  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  s u c h  
c o u r s e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  q u a l i t y  c o u r s e s  o n  t h i s  
t o p i c  s h o u l d  b e  p r e p a r e d  a n d  p r e s e n t e d ,  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  s h o u l d  b e  
e n c o u r a g e d  t o  i n c l u d e  s u c h  c o u r s e s  i n  t h e i r  c o n t i n u i n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
e d u c a t i o n .
M r .  J a m e s  C .  T r e a d w a y ,  J r .
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
P a g e  7
C O N C L U S I O N
P r i m a r k  s u p p o r t s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  p r o p o s e d  b y  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  w e  s u p p o r t  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t ,  b u t  b e l i e v e  t h o s e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  
s h o u l d  b e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  n o t e s  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a s  a n  i n t e g r a l  
p a r t  o f  t h o s e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  a  s e p a r a t e  l e t t e r .  S i n c e  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  w i l l  b e  a d d r e s s e d  i n d i r e c t l y  
b y  t h e  a u d i t  o p i n i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  n e e d  f o r  t h e  a u d i t o r  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  
e x t e n t  o f  t h e  r e v i e w  o f  t h e s e  c o n t r o l s  i n  t h e  a u d i t  o p i n i o n .  F u r t h e r ,  
P r i m a r k  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  s e e k i n g  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n s  f r o m  a n  
a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  p r e s e n t  a u d i t o r s  s h o u l d  b e  
p r o h i b i t e d  o r  s t r o n g l y  d i s c o u r a g e d .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a n  a d v e r s a r i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  a  c o m p a n y  a n d  i t s  
a u d i t o r s , o n l y  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  n e w  a u d i t o r s  o r  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  
c u r r e n t  a u d i t o r s  o n  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  m a t t e r s  s h o u l d  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  
d i s c l o s u r e .  D i s c u s s i o n s  o f  r o u t i n e  m a t t e r s  s h o u l d  b e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
e x c l u d e d  f r o m  d i s c l o s u r e .  R e g a r d i n g  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
d e t e c t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h i s  i s ,  a n d  
a l w a y s  h a s  b e e n ,  a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  r o l e .  A d d i t i o n a l  a u d i t  
t e s t s  s h o u l d  b e  d e s i g n e d  t o  d e t e c t  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g  o n l y  w h e r e  t h e  
a u d i t o r  b e l i e v e s  n o r m a l  a u d i t  p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t .
I n  s u m m a r y ,  a n y  u n d e r l y i n g  p r o b l e m s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  
w i l l  b e  c u r e d  p r i m a r i l y  b y  e d u c a t i o n  o f  c o r p o r a t e  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t s ,  a d h e r e n c e  t o  c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r o l s ,  a n d  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  S E C  
e n f o r c e m e n t  r e m e d i e s .  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  b y  c o r p o r a t e  m a n a g e m e n t  w i l l  d o  
l i t t l e  t o  p r e v e n t  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g .  R a t h e r ,  a d d i t i o n a l  r e p o r t s  a n d  
a s s u r a n c e s  w i l l  o n l y  d i s t r a c t  t h e  r e a d e r  f r o m  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  a u d i t  
o p i n i o n .
A g a i n ,  P r i m a r k  c o m p l i m e n t s  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  t h e  t h o r o u g h n e s s  a n d  t h e  
q u a l i t y  o f  i t s  c o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , a n d  a p p r e c i a t e s  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o m m e n t  o n  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  W e  w o u l d  b e  p l e a s e d  t o  
d i s c u s s  o u r  p o s i t i o n  f u r t h e r  a t  y o u r  c o n v e n i e n c e .
S i n c e r e l y ,
L E E  S .  B R U B A K E R
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t ,  C o r p o r a t e  A u d i t
S T E P H E N  H .  C U R R A N  
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  C o n t r o l l e r
S H C : L S B  : D J C / t l g
A r t h u r  A n d e r s e n  8 c C o .
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R e : E x p o s u re  D r a f t ,  A p r i l  1 9 8 7 ,
R e p o r t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  
on  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g
D e a r M r . T re a d w a y :
I  am w r i t i n g  t o  y o u  a s  C h a irm a n  o f  th e  P u b l i c  
R e v ie w  B o a rd  o f  A r t h u r  A n d e rs e n  & C o. O u r B o a rd ,  w h ic h  
was c r e a te d  i n  1 9 7 4 , h a s  b e e n  c o n c e rn e d  d u r in g  th e  p a s t  
d e ca d e  w i t h  m any o f  th e  is s u e s  c o v e re d  i n  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  
d r a f t  r e p o r t .  A ls o ,  we h a v e  f o l lo w e d  th e  w o rk  o f  th e  
C o m m is s io n  w i t h  g r e a t  i n t e r e s t ,  and  h a v e  r e v ie w e d  th e  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  s e t  f o r t h  i n  th e  d r a f t  r e p o r t .
We t h o u g h t  t h a t  i t  m ig h t  be  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  th e  
m em bers o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  a n d  y o u r  s t a f f  t o  p r o v id e  y o u  
w i t h  e x c e r p t s  f ro m  o u r  r e c e n t  r e p o r t s  t h a t  b e a r  on  y o u r  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s .  T h e se  e x c e r p t s  a re  s e t  f o r t h  i n  th e  
A p p e n d ix  e n c lo s e d  w i t h  my l e t t e r .  As y o u  w i l l  s e e ,  i n  
m o s t c a s e s  o u r  o b s e r v a t io n s  a nd  c o n c lu s io n s  s u p p o r t  o r  
a re  f u l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  y o u r  re c o m m e n d a t io n s .
I n  a t  l e a s t  one  a r e a ,  h o w e v e r ,  we h a v e  re a c h e d  
a d i f f e r e n t  c o n c lu s io n ;  t h i s  i s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  
p e r fo rm a n c e  b y  an  a u d i t i n g  f i r m  o f  m anagem ent a d v is o r y
services. Your draft recommendation suggests that audit 
committees "should approve in advance the types and the 
extent of management advisory services that management 
plans to engage the company's independent public accountant 
to perform". The idea behind this recommendation and 
the explanatory text (pp. 38-39) appears to be that the 
performance of management advisory services for compensation 
by an accounting firm could somehow threaten the firm's 
independence as auditor of the company's financial 
statements.
Our Board has devoted considerable time and 
attention to this issue during the past several years.
We agree that the audit committee should be fully informed 
with respect to all relationships a company may have with 
an independent public accountant. In our view, however, 
any requirement that particular management advisory service 
engagements "be approved in advance" would place an accounting 
firm at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other providers 
of such services. Audit committees meet on a fixed schedule, 
and managements might tend to eliminate their auditors 
from consideration for MAS work rather than schedule 
special committee meetings to carry out the Commission's 
draft recommendation. We believe there is no reason from 
the standpoint of the public interest why such a disadvantage 
should be imposed.
As we concluded in our 1985 report (excerpts 
from which are set forth in the attached appendix), we 
know of no basis for the proposition that compensation 
for consulting work compromises the independence of an 
audit firm. The notion implicit in this proposition is 
that the receipt of fees for management advisory services —  
or the desire to continue receiving such fees in the future —  
would somehow undermine the independence of the firm 
performing the audit. But if earning profits in the form 
of fees for management advisory services were enough to 
taint the independence of an accounting firm, then by 
the same reasoning profits in the form of fees for audit 
services would also taint the independence of the firm.
We disagree with the proposition that earning fees for 
professional services impairs the independence —  either 
in fact or appearance —  of the auditing firm.
M o re o v e r, a m an datory s e p a r a t io n  o f  th e  a u d it  
and management a d v is o r y  s e r v i c e s  p r a c t i c e  w ould  te n d  to  
d e p r iv e  a u d it o r s  o f  th e  s p e c i a l i z e d  sy ste m s e x p e r t i s e  
th e y  need in  o r d e r  t o  p e rfo rm  h ig h  q u a l i t y  a u d i t s  o f  
co m p le x , c o m p u te r iz e d  b u s in e s s  e n t e r p r i s e s .  Such 
s e p a r a t io n  w ould  a l s o  be c o n t r a r y  t o  th e  C o m m issio n 's  
own em p h asis on th e  n eed  f o r  im proved a c c o u n t in g  syste m s 
and i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  w h ic h , in  o u r v ie w , a c c o u n t in g  f ir m s  
a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  w e l l  q u a l i f i e d  to  p r o v id e .
F or th e s e  r e a s o n s ,  we b e l i e v e  th e  C o m m issio n 's  
d r a f t  recom m en dation s sh o u ld  be amended by s u b s t i t u t i n g  
f o r  th e  "ap p ro v ed  in  a d v a n ce "  r e q u ir e m e n t, a p r o v is o  t h a t  
th e  a u d it  com m ittee  sh o u ld  be f u l l y  in fo rm e d  w ith  r e s p e c t  
to  th e  t y p e s  and e x t e n t  o f  a l l  s e r v i c e s  p erfo rm e d  f o r  
th e  company b y  i t s  in d e p e n d e n t p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t . A l e s s  
d e s i r a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  w ould be t o  i n s e r t  " a n n u a lly "  b e fo r e  
th e  w ords "a p p ro v ed  in  a d v a n ce "  in  o r d e r  t o  make i t  c l e a r  
t h a t  th e  a u d it  com m ittee  sh o u ld  n o t be r e q u ir e d  to  a p p ro v e  
in  a d va n ce  e a ch  p a r t i c u l a r  engagem ent f o r  management a d v is o r y  
s e r v i c e s .
In  p o i n t in g  o u t  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  b etw een  o u r 
c o n c lu s io n s  and y o u r  d r a f t  recom m endation  a s  we u n d e rsta n d  
i t ,  I  do n o t mean t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  we a r e  n o t s u p p o r t iv e  
o f  th e  C o m m issio n 's  work o r  i t s  d r a f t  recom m en dation s 
a s  a w h o le . In d e e d , we b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  a n a l y s i s  and 
p r o p o s a ls  s e t  f o r t h  in  th e  d r a f t  r e p o r t  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  
v e r y  g o o d , and we commend th e  Com m ission and i t s  s t a f f  
f o r  th e  c a r e  and th o u g h t t h a t  h ave o b v io u s ly  gone in t o  
th e  p r e p a r a t io n  o f  th e  d r a f t .
We lo o k  fo rw a rd  to  r e v ie w in g  th e  f i n a l  Com m ission 
r e p o r t  when i t  i s  r e le a s e d  l a t e r  t h i s  y e a r .
S i n c e r e l y  y o u r s ,
D onald  P . J a co b s
C h airm an , P u b l ic  R eview  Board
A rth u r  A n d ersen  & C o.
A tta ch m e n ts
APPENDIX
EXCERPTS FROM RECENT REPORTS OF THE PUBLIC 
REVIEW BOARD OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO.
General Observation On The Work Of The National 
Commission On Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Public Review Board Report, 1986:
The Board also favorably notes the work of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, chaired 
by former SEC Commissioner Treadway. Its fundamental 
charge is "to analyze the whys and wherefores of, and 
propose solutions to, fraudulent financial reporting." 
While it is not scheduled to issue a preliminary report 
until early next year, a recent speech by its Chairman 
indicates the Commission will propose a wide-range of 
far-reaching recommendations that deal with such matters 
as the responsibilities of corporate management, the role 
of audit committees, internal controls and the internal 
audit function, independent public accountants and 
regulatory and law enforcement activities. These 
proposals, together with significant initiatives recently 
taken by the AICPA Auditing Standards Board and SEC 
Practice Section, should go far to assure the Congress 
and the public that the issues of fraudulent financial 
reporting are receiving the priority attention from the 
professional and business community that they deserve.
Recommendations With Respect To Responsibility 
of Management For Financial Reporting And 
With Respect To Mandatory Audit Committees
Public Review Board Report, 1985:
We urge the POB to do what it can to help underscore the 
primary responsibility of corporate managements for the
accuracy of their companies' financial statements, and 
to expand and upgrade the roles of the internal auditors 
and audit committees of corporate boards. Board audit 
committees, as elected representatives of the shareholders, 
are an important element of the overall monitoring of 
corporate activity, and should be encouraged to play an 
increasingly active role in assuring the quality of the 
financial reporting process and in overseeing the work 
of both the internal and the external auditors.
Recommendation With Respect To Prohibition 
Or Limitations On Performance 
_____ Of Management Advisory Services_____
Public Review Board Report, 1985:
Suggestions have been made —  before the Dingell Committee 
and elsewhere -- that perhaps auditor independence would 
be enhanced if accounting firms were prohibited from 
performing nonaudit consulting work for audit clients. 
These suggestions have been made off and on for years.
We continue to believe that they are unfounded, and that 
the adoption of such proposals would actually weaken the 
ability of accounting organizations to perform efficient, 
tough-minded audits. (See our previous reports —  1975, 
1979 and 1983.) The implicit premise of such suggestions 
is that receiving compensation for professional services 
undermines the independence of the professional performing 
the service.
Ultimately, the question is one of fact. And we know 
of no factual basis for the proposition that compensation 
for tax or consulting work compromises the independence 
of the audit firm. A recent study (funded with a grant 
by Arthur Andersen) entitled The Scope of CPA Services 
by Professor Gary Previts of Case Western Reserve analyzes 
the history of the concept of independence and scope of 
practice, and reports the results of studies which failed 
to disclose any situations where audit findings were 
compromised by the performance of nonattest services to 
the same client.
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On the other side of the ledger, a mandatory separation 
of the attest and nonattest practices would tend to deprive 
auditors of the specialized tax and systems expertise 
they need in order to perform high-quality audits of 
complex, highly computerized business enterprises. We 
therefore continue to recommend that accounting firms 
not be precluded —  or discouraged —  from performing 
tax and management information consulting services for 
audit clients. However, we would be concerned with respect 
to the performance of certain kinds of consulting services 
which go well beyond management and financial information 
systems and have little or nothing to do with accounting 
or handling of data.
Recommendation With Respect To Seeking A 
Second Opinion On Accounting Principles
Public Review Board Report, 1985:
Our third recommendation deals with "shopping" for 
accounting principles —  i.e., offering audit work to 
any firm that will give the company the opinion it wants, 
regardless of the merits -- a subject also of concern 
to the Dingell Committee. The SEC has recently proposed 
to deal with "opinion shopping" by, among other things, 
extending its existing requirements where changes in 
accountants occur to require the disclosure of situations 
where the company has asked for an opinion on an accounting 
issue from accountants other than its current auditor.
This kind of disclosure would help alert the SEC and the 
public to possible situations involving "opinion shopping."
Arthur Andersen has itself taken steps to resist attempts 
by companies which hold out their audits to pressure 
accounting firms into agreeing with their views on 
significant matters of accounting principle. Mr.
Kullberg gave an excellent speech on the subject to the 
Chicago Chapter of the Financial Executives Institute 
on January 17, 1985, in which he stated "auditors should 
not be confronted with the choice of 'caving in' or 
dismissal or having to continue in a strained relationship 
because a client, sometimes after going to several 
competitors, finally finds one who will accede to what
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Vthe company wants.” Copies were widely disseminated 
throughout the firm. Furthermore, the firm's Code of 
Professional Conduct specifically notes that "we discourage 
any entity that is simply 'shopping for accounting principles' 
by offering its audit to any firm that will give it the 
answer it wants regardless of its merits." Also, a recent 
organizational bulletin summarizes the policies and procedures 
in this area, making clear that engagements to consult 
on a matter of accounting principle with the client of 
another accounting firm can be accepted only with approval 
of the office managing partner, and only after informing 
the company that Andersen partners will consult with the 
incumbent auditing firm regarding the facts and other 
relevant matters. Opinions resulting from such engagements 
are normally set forth in writing.
We concur wholeheartedly in Arthur Andersen's steps and 
the SEC's recent initiative (although one can disagree 
with the details of particular alternative solutions 
advanced). Ultimately, it is up to the auditor to stick 
to its principles and be willing to lose a client, if 
necessary, where disagreements over principles are involved. 
The fact of such disagreement does not, of course, mean 
the client is automatically wrong —  much less that it 
is dishonest or fraudulent. But such disagreements are 
yellow "caution lights" which should trigger additional 
alertness on the part of successor auditors, the SEC and 
the public. The steps taken by Andersen and the SEC 
proposals would help put the spotlight on situations 
where such extra caution is required.
Recommendation With Respect To Improving Fraud 
Detection Capabilities And Audit Quality
Public Review Board Report, 1985:
[Chairman] Wood [of the Public Oversight Board on May 
15, 1985] called on the profession to rethink its traditional 
position that audits cannot be designed, and are not likely, 
to detect management fraud; and he outlined a number of 
suggested improvements in response to Congressional and 
other criticism. We commend the POB and Chairman Wood 
for their initiative, and believe that the suggestions 
Wood has made are worthy of serious consideration by the 
profession.
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We have already noted Arthur Andersen's own efforts to 
assess the causes of litigation, to identify the factors 
that contribute to audit failure, and to tailor audits 
to suit those particular cases where special risks may 
be present. At the profession-wide level, the AICPA 
recently joined with other groups in cosponsoring The 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 
to be chaired by former SEC Commissioner James Treadway.
One area into which the Commission will look is the proper 
role of independent auditors in detecting fraud.
So, our first —  and primary —  recommendation to Arthur 
Andersen (and to the profession) is to continue the efforts 
already underway to see if there are better ways to do 
what the public obviously expects auditors to do: discover
management fraud, and provide an "early warning" for serious 
impending financial failure of their clients.
*  *  *  *  *
[Arthur Andersen & Co.] has attempted to assess the risks 
that can arise in all phases of audit work, and to develop 
a methodology for identifying high-risk clients and dealing 
with the audits of such clients. We find particularly 
commendable the willingness to examine basic assumptions 
as to the causes of litigation —  one of which has been 
that such causes are external to the organization and 
largely unmanageable.
Also commendable is the willingness to reexamine the gap 
between what auditors are both required to do and capable 
of doing, on the one hand, and what the public believes 
they can do and would like them to do, on the other. In 
the past, most accountants have adhered to the position 
that the fault lies primarily with the public's failure 
to understand the limitations on the auditor's responsibility 
to detect fraud. Another possibility, of course, is that 
the limitations themselves may be unrealistic, and that 
auditors should assume -- or have already been compelled 
to assume (by virtue of litigation) —  greater responsibility 
for detection of fraud. Arthur Andersen's effort to 
reconsider these issues is an important step in the 
containment of audit risks.
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The preliminary results of the task force's work confirms 
the importance of points we have previously urged. One 
is that Arthur Andersen must exercise greater sophistication 
in its acceptance of client engagements. And it must 
instill in its partners and managers the belief that 
forgoing an apparently valuable piece of business for 
a high-risk client is not necessarily a catastrophe. A 
second is that greater involvement by partners at the 
front end of audits is essential —  especially in the 
areas of risk assessment and determination of the scope 
of the work in light of the adequacy of the client's 
internal controls and inherenet business risks.
Public Review Board Report, 1986:
We urged Arthur Andersen, and the profession generally, 
to look for better ways to discover management frauds 
and to provide "early warnings" of the impending failure 
of audit clients.
Recommendation With Respect 
To Communicating Auditor's Role
Public Review Board Report, 1985:
Our second recommendation is related to the first. To 
the extent that auditors will never be able to detect 
all management frauds (at least not without engaging in 
widely expanded and costly special "fraud audits"), or 
to guarantee the future viability and success of the 
company, then the auditor's report should make such 
limitations clear.
*  *  *  *  *
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We believe that now may be the time to change the present 
standardized report form to enable the auditor to state 
plainly that the audit is not designed to detect all 
management frauds or to guarantee the future success of 
the audited company, and should not be relied upon by 
the reader to do so. If such a disclaimer were included 
as a matter of course in all audit reports, the value 
of particular reports would not be significantly diminished. 
In any event, if the disclaimer merely states what is 
a fact, then we see more harm in masking than in proclaiming 
that fact.
* * * * *
We have frequently referred to the apparent gap between 
how auditors understand and articulate their responsibilities 
and how the public perceives those responsibilities. Part 
of the answer lies in improving the public's understanding 
of what auditors do —  and do not do. As we have suggested 
above, the time may have come to include a clear and emphatic 
disclaimer in the standard auditor's report: "We do not
warrant against management misconduct or insure against 
business risk."
Public Review Board Report, 1986:
We also urged the profession to communicate more clearly 
and forcefully to investors and the public the inherent 
limitations on their ability to detect all fraud, or to 
guarantee against all financial reversals. In sum we 
urged that the "perception gap" be closed —  or at least 
substantially narrowed -- by bringing closer together 
the reality of what auditors can do, and the public 
impression of what they do.
The article [written by Mr. Robert Mednick, an Arthur 
Andersen & Co. partner] also emphasized that auditors 
must also make clearer the "role and limitations of the 
audit process." One way to do this would be to require 
a "supplementary explanation of the audit and auditor's 
report along with any published auditor's report" in order 
to "inform the reader about the limitations of an audit" 
without changing the report language itself. This latter 
suggestion tracks a suggestion we made in our 1985 Report.
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Recommendation With Respect To Improving 
The Regulatory And Legal Environment
Public Review Board Report, 1986:
The Board has considered carefully this proposed legislation 
in light of the auditor's existing responsibility for 
the detection and reporting of management fraud. The 
auditor, when he knows or suspects an illegal or fraudulent 
act, has a clear responsibility today, under existing 
professional requirements, to bring this information to 
the attention of management and the audit committee of 
the board of directors. Our understanding is that in 
the vast majority of cases, remedial action to resolve 
the issue is currently taken by corporate managements 
and boards. Where violations of criminal or civil statutes 
have occurred, the responsibility for reporting such cases 
to the regulatory and law enforcement authorities rests 
squarely with corporate boards and corporate management. 
Where the auditor does not believe that satisfactory 
action has been taken by corporate management, the 
auditor has the responsibility to qualify the audit 
report and/or resign from the engagement; and either of 
these actions triggers a form of reporting to appropriate 
authorities as to the reason for such action.
  *  *  *  *
In our judgment, the Wyden bill would unnecessarily and 
unfairly impose tremendous costs and impossible burdens 
on the accounting profession. Very serious practical 
difficulties would be engendered by placing the auditor 
in a law enforcement role. Among other things, it would 
require a knowledge of law far beyond an auditor's knowledge 
and expertise. The disputes which would be generated 
would benefit only the legal profession. Furthermore, 
the extra auditing and legal costs created by the bill 
would ultimately be passed on to consumers and the public 
generally. We continue to believe that professional self- 
regulation and the present discipline required on managements 
and Boards of Directors, are a far better solution than 
the one advanced by Congressmen Dingell and Wyden.
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* * * * *
We reiterate our view that the existing self-regulatory 
approach is working, and we recommend against the proposal 
advanced by some for a new, statutorily-created, regulatory 
body.
Recommendation With Respect To Mandatory Peer Review
Public Review Board Report, 1986:
In our judgment, the DH&S peer reviews have been probing 
and tough. These reviews provide a high level of overall 
comfort that Arthur Andersen's quality control policies 
and practices are working well.
* * * * *
We would, however, strongly urge the SEC to adopt a rule 
establishing, as a criterion of eligibility to practice 
before the Commission, a requirement that auditors become 
members of the AICPA SEC Practice Section with its peer 
review program and independent oversight function. Such 
a requirement would provide even greater leverage to the 
SEC Practice Section and the POB in establishing the 
highest standards for the practice of public accounting 
in the U.S.
Recommendation With Respect To Tort Reform And 
Implications of Liability On Audit Quality
Public Review Board Report, 1984:
We continue to be concerned about the costs and burdens 
imposed on accountants generally by the growing amount 
of civil litigation —  costs which inevitably must be
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imposed on the public through higher auditing fees and 
"defensive" auditing. As we indicated in our report last 
year, we are particularly concerned about the burdens 
created by the misuse of statutes such as the Federal 
anti-racketeering statute ("RICO"), which provides treble 
damages for victims of racketeering activities. We are 
pleased that the AICPA has given high priority to seeking 
legislative modification of the RICO statute.
Beyond this specific issue, the Board believes that other 
steps should be taken in order to reduce litigation 
burdens. One step would be to require plaintiffs in 
these suits to bear the litigation costs if they lose.
The heavy litigation costs involved are undoubtedly a 
factor in the willingness of accounting firms to settle 
cases out of court —  a result which may create a false 
impression on the part of some people that fault is being 
admitted.
But the broader problem is the need to create a better 
understanding of the role of the auditor, what he attests 
to and what he does not. For example, a business failure 
or a bankruptcy automatically suggests to some people 
that the auditor was at fault —  that the auditor should 
have forewarned stockholders and the public. In the view 
of our Board, this basic lack of understanding by the 
public is a problem which demands the attention of the 
entire accounting profession, the Public Oversight Board 
and outside Audit Committees, alike. It is also a challenge 
to a responsible financial press to assure that the issue 
is placed in proper perspective.
Public Review Board Report, 1985:
There are no easy answers —  or even easy questions —  
in the area of litigation. The fact that there are many 
lawsuits and settlements involving accounting firms may 
be attributable in large part to the uncertainties in 
legal standards and the risks of submitting complicated 
cases to relatively unsophisticated juries. Accountants 
can clearly improve their chances of not being sued, or 
of prevailing (or negotiating favorable settlements), 
by exercising great care in accepting engagements and
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in planning and conducting audits. However, it is difficult 
to resist the conclusion that the litigation deck is unfairly- 
stacked against defendant accounting firms by the treble 
damage provisions of the federal antiracketeering statute 
("RICO"), the use of juries to resolve complicated issues 
of fact and to apply imprecise legal standards and concepts, 
and the inability of successful defendants to recover 
their litigation costs from unsuccessful plaintiffs.
Public Review Board Report, 1986:
The American civil liability system should not be used 
as a device to spread the costs of accidents or losses 
throughout the economy generally, as a sort of no-fault 
social insurance program. And, in particular, accountants 
should not be used as "deep pockets" to make good economic 
losses incurred by investors as a result of business 
downturns, swings in the financial markets, or managerial 
inefficiency. Plaintiffs should have a right to recover 
from accountants and others were there is true fault which 
causes real economic damage, but not otherwise.
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Division of Bank Supervision
J u ly  2, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t 
F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P e n n sy lva n ia  Avenue, N.W.
W ash ington, D.C. 20006
Gentlem en:
The D iv is io n  o f  Bank S u p e rv is io n  o f  th e  Federa l D e p o s it In su ra n ce  C o rp o ra tio n  
a p p re c ia te s  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  comment on th e  exposure d r a f t  o f  th e  R eport o f  
th e  N a tio n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  (C om m iss ion).
Fraud and in s id e r  abuse have caused a r a p id ly  r is in g  and h ig h ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  
d o l la r  amount o f  lo sse s  to  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t io n s  in  re c e n t ye a rs  and, in  
some cases , have even caused f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n  f a i lu r e s .  Such abuse is  
f r e q u e n t ly  accompanied by f ra u d u le n t  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  Thus, as re g u la to rs ,  
we to o  have been s e a rc h in g  f o r  methods to  stem t h is  t id e  o f  lo s s e s , and want 
to  commend th e  Commission f o r  i t s  e f f o r t s  in  t h is  Exposure D ra f t  to  respond to  
t h is  c o s t ly  p rob lem . We su p p o rt th e  th r u s t  o f  th e  recom m endations and b e lie v e  
t h a t ,  i f  ado p te d , th e y  w i l l  h e lp  a l le v ia te  t h is  p rob lem . We have, however, 
se ve ra l su g g e s tio n s  w hich we w ish  to  propose f o r  y o u r c o n s id e ra t io n .
A lth o u g h  th e  Commission in d ic a te d  th a t  i t s  o th e r  recom m endations were n o t 
in te n d e d  to  focu s  on n o n p u b lic  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  th e  re p o r t  s ta te s  in  
th e  " A c c o u n ta b i l i t y "  paragraph  o f  i t s  "M a jo r G u id in g  C o n c lu s io n s " s e c tio n  th a t :
"When a company ra is e s  funds from  th e  p u b l ic ,  th a t  company assumes an 
o b l ig a t io n  o f  p u b lic  t r u s t  and a commensurate le v e l o f  a c c o u n ta b i l i t y  to  
th e  p u b l ic .  . . . One o f  th e  most fundam enta l o b l ig a t io n s  o f  th e  p u b lic  
company is  th e  f u l l  and f a i r  p u b lic  d is c lo s u re  o f  c o rp o ra te  in fo rm a t io n ,  
in c lu d in g  f in a n c ia l  r e s u l t s . "
The s o l i c i t a t i o n  o f  d e p o s its  from  th e  p u b lic  by a bank may w e ll be cons ide re d  
" r a is in g  funds from  th e  p u b l ic , "  and a c c e p tin g  d e p o s its  c e r t a in ly  in v o lv e s  "an 
o b l ig a t io n  o f  p u b lic  t r u s t . "  On th a t  b a s is ,  th e  le v e l o f  a c c o u n ta b i l i t y  to  
th e  p u b lic  f o r  fe d e r a l ly - in s u r e d  banks may w e ll be such th a t  th e  argum ent can 
be made th a t  banks shou ld  be s u b je c t  to  some degree o f  p u b lic  d is c lo s u re  and 
to  c e r ta in  o th e r  re q u ire m e n ts  r e la t in g  to  th e  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  process th a t  
a re  a p p lic a b le  to  p u b lic  com panies.
For t h is  reason and in  v iew  o f  th e  la rg e  d o l la r  amount o f  lo sse s  to  f in a n c ia l  
i n s t i t u t io n s  from  fra u d  ( re p o r te d  by th e  FBI a t  $1.1 b i l l i o n  in  1986, up 30 
p e rc e n t from  $841 m i l l io n  in  1985), we b e lie v e  th e  Commission shou ld  expand i t s  
focu s  to  make recom m endations f o r  a l l  f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s  as w e ll as p u b lic
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companies. Any s p e c if ic  recommendations fo r  f in a n c ia l in s t i t u t io n s ,  both la rge  
and s m a ll, would be g re a t ly  a p p re c ia te d . W ith regard to  p u b lic  d is c lo s u re  by 
banks, on June 17, 1987, the  FDIC's Board o f  D ire c to rs  approved the  issuance 
fo r  p u b lic  comment o f  a proposed ru le  th a t  would re q u ire  FD IC -insured s ta te -  
cha rte re d  banks th a t  are no t members o f  the Federal Reserve System to  p rov ide  
bas ic  in fo rm a tio n  about themselves to  sha reho lde rs , borrow ers, d e p o s ito rs , and 
o the rs  to  whom they  o f fe r  banking s e rv ic e s . We have enclosed a copy o f  th is  
proposal fo r  your in fo rm a tio n .
The Commission's recommendations appear to  im p ly  th a t  a l l  p u b l ic ly  held 
companies are a u d ited  and need an a u d it  com m ittee. Please be advised th a t ,  in  
connection  w ith  t h e i r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  a d m in is te r and en fo rce  the r e g is t r a t io n  
and re p o r t in g  p ro v is io n s  o f  the  S e c u r it ie s  Exchange Act o f  1934 fo r  banks, the 
th re e  fe d e ra l banking re g u la to rs  have no re g u la t io n  o r  requ irem en t a t the 
p resen t tim e th a t  p u b l ic ly  he ld banks must o b ta in  an annual a u d it  by an 
independent p u b lic  accoun tan t. Many such banks v o lu n ta r i ly  choose to  o b ta in  
an annual a u d it ,  and both the  FDIC and ano ther o f  the banking agencies are 
c o n s id e rin g  re v is in g  t h e i r  re g u la t io n s  to  re q u ire  a u d its  o f  the p u b lic ly -h e ld  
banks they  su p e rv ise .
One o f  the  Commission's s p e c if ic  recommendations fo r  the  banking re g u la to rs  is  
to  p rov id e  f o r  the  exchange o f  in fo rm a tio n  between re g u la to ry  examiners and 
independent p u b lic  accoun tan ts . The re p o r t suggests th a t  the  f in a n c ia l 
in s t i t u t io n  g ive  i t s  accountant access to  the exam ination re p o r t  and th a t  the 
accountant g iv e  the  bank re g u la to rs  access to  the  management le t t e r  and the 
bank 's  response to  i t .  We have p re v io u s ly  in form ed the  accoun ting  p ro fe ss io n  
and the  banking in d u s try  o f  our p o l ic y  th a t  a bank's a u d ito rs  may rev iew  the 
bank's copy o f  our exam ination re p o r ts .  In  our expe rience , banks th a t  engage 
independent a u d ito rs  g e n e ra lly  do pe rm it them access to  the  exam ination re p o r t.  
In  a d d it io n ,  our examiners no rm a lly  rev iew  management le t t e r s  d u rin g  examina­
t io n s  o f  banks th a t  are aud ited  and some banks send copies o f  the  management 
le t t e r  to  the  a p p ro p ria te  FDIC Regional O ff ic e  upon re c e ip t  o f  the  le t t e r .
S ince banks have no FDIC-imposed a u d it  requ irem ent a t p re se n t, these exchanges 
o f  in fo rm a tio n  are p u re ly  v o lu n ta ry .
We concur w ith  the  Commission's recommendation th a t  increased c r im in a l 
p ro se cu tio n  should be made a h ig h e r p r io r i t y .  However, i t  appears from our 
experience th a t  p ro se cu tio n  fo r  in d iv id u a ls  is  a f a r  more e f fe c t iv e  d e te rre n t 
than p ro se cu tio n  o f  co rp o ra te  e n t i t ie s .  We suggest th a t  the  wording o f  the 
recommendation be expanded to  r e f le c t  th is  idea .
We a p p re c ia te  the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  respond to  you r in v i t a t io n  to  comment. We 
would be pleased to  fu r th e r  d iscuss our p o s it io n  on these issues a t a fu tu re  
date should the  need a r is e .
Enclosure
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J o i n t  N e w s  R e l e a s e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  C o m p t r o l l e r  o f  t h e  C u r r e n c y
F e d e r a l  D e p o s i t  I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE PR-113-87 (6-17-87)
FDIC AND OCC PROPOSE RULES FOR BANK DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
The Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) sent to the Federal Register today
proposed rules on public disclosure of certain financial information about insured 
state nonmember banks, national banks and FDIC-insured thrifts. The separate 
proposals were developed jointly by the two agencies.
Each proposal would require annual disclosure statements that, at a minimum, 
would contain certain financial information currently found in Reports of 
Condition and Income (call reports). In addition, depository institutions could 
voluntarily include a narrative section in which management could discuss items it 
considers important in assessing the institution’s condition.
While neither proposal includes a blanket requirement for disclosure of 
administrative enforcement actions, the two regulators may require disclosure of 
such actions on a case-by-case basis.
Under the proposals, a notice would be posted in an institution’s lobby
stating the availability of the disclosure statement. An institution could
satisfy the disclosure requirements by using its call report schedules in place of 
a separate statement.
The FDIC and the OCC believe the annual public disclosure statement will make 
public information on depository institutions more readily available to investors, 
depositors and the general public on a timely basis and, at the same time, not 
impose an unacceptable burden on the depository institutions.
The comment period for the proposals will be 60 days from the date of 
publication in the Federal Register. A copy of the FDIC’s proposal is attached.
# # #
Distribution: Insured State Nonmember Banks (Commercial and Mutual)
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 350
Disclosure of Financial and Other Information
by
FDIC Insured State Nonmember Banks
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC") is proposing
a new regulation that would require state-chartered FDIC insured commercial 
and savings banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System ("insured 
state nonmember banks") to provide basic information about themselves to 
shareholders, borrowers, depositors and others to whom they offer banking 
services. A disclosure statement would be required by February 15, or March 1 
for banks with foreign offices, each year and would include pertinent 
financial data for the previous two years and, at the option of the bank, a 
management discussion and analysis section.
DATES: Comments on the proposal must be received by (Insert date 60 days
after publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER).
ADDRESS: Send comments to Hoyle L. Robinson, Executive Secretary, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20429. 
Comments may be hand delivered to Room 6108 on business days between 8:30 a.m. 
and 5:00 p.m. Comments may also be inspected in Room 6108 between 8:30 a.m. 
and 5:00 p.m. on business days.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William P. Carley or Robert F. Storch,
Planning and Program Development Specialists, Division of Bank Supervision, 
FDIC, (202) 898-6903.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
P u r p o s e
Uninterrupted banking services are indispensable to the sustained economic 
growth of, and avoidance of losses by, many depositors, borrowers and other 
bank customers. The crucial reliance that these individuals and institutions 
place on the banks with which they establish a relationship and the banks' 
willingness to accept this responsibility create a reasonable expectation for 
banks to provide, and customers to rightfully anticipate, periodic information 
suitable for determining whether that important relationship should be 
established or continued. Additionally, the availability of financial and 
related information on a greater number of individual banks will strengthen 
the FDIC's bank safety and soundness goals by increasing public knowledge 
about and confidence in sound banks and the Nation's banking system.
Accordingly, the FDIC is proposing that an insured state nonmember bank make 
basic information about itself publicly available.
C o n t e n t s
The proposal's substantive provisions would require that a bank make available 
minimum information that it can readily and easily compile. Required 
information would be comparable to those schedules of the respective bank's 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income ("Call Reports") filed for the 
preceding two year-ends with the FDIC that display the bank's balance sheet, 
income statement, past due and nonaccrual loans and leases, changes in equity 
capital or net worth, and loan charge-offs and recoveries. Also, the proposal 
suggests that a bank add a narrative description of those events to which 
management believes readers will attach significance. The proposal points out 
that in some instances administrative orders issued by the FDIC could require 
that the annual disclosure statements include a description of the facts 
pertaining to administrative enforcement actions taken against the respective 
banks or related parties.
For purposes of complying with the proposal's financial data provisions, a 
bank could elect to provide copies of pertinent parts of its Call Reports 
rather than preparing separate comparable tabulations. Also, a bank could 
elect to furnish comparable, data taken from financial statements prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Banks with a class 
of securities registered in accordance with the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 could use the annual report required pursuant to regulations under that 
Act to satisfy the financial data and narrative discussion provisions of the 
proposal.
As to the narrative section, the proposal suggests that management might 
consider, but is not limited to, information pertaining to the financial data, 
mergers and acquisitions, the existence of or underlying facts relating to 
enforcement actions, business plans, and material changes in balance sheet and 
income statement items. The proposal also states that, on a case-by-case 
basis, an FDIC order resulting from an administrative enforcement action may 
contain provisions requiring the respective bank to include in its annual 
disclosure statement a description of the administrative action.
In regard to timing and frequency, the proposal would require that disclosure 
statements be made available annually by February 15 by banks whose Call 
Reports are due within 30 days after the previous year-end and by March 1 by 
those whose Call Reports, as a consequence of the bank having more than one 
foreign office, are due within 45 after the year-end. Because of their 
proximity to the due dates for year-end Call Reports, the February 15 and 
March 1 dates provide for timely public availability and at the same time hold 
preparation burdens to a minimal level by allowing data recently compiled for 
other purposes to serve as the basis for a major part of a disclosure 
statement.
The FDIC considered proposing disclosures more frequently than once a year, 
particularly of interim significant events that would normally be appropriate
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for discussion in the management narrative section. In the interest of 
minimizing burdens, the proposal does not cover interim disclosures and, 
consequently, leaves the question of interim disclosures to management's 
discretion. However, the FDIC is specifically requesting commenters to 
provide suggestions concerning the appropriate frequency of disclosures.
Consideration was given also to proposing that the disclosure statements be 
mailed routinely to most of the bank's customers and shareholders. That 
alternative, however, was tentatively rejected in the interest of restraining 
costs and administrative burdens. Instead, the proposal would require that 
disclosure statements be provided on request. Persons with a potential 
interest in receiving disclosures would be informed of the availability of the 
documents by means of lobby posters and notices included in the announcement 
of the annual meeting sent to shareholders. The bank would be required to 
provide at least one copy of the disclosure statement free of charge to each 
person making a request, and the means of transmitting the documents is left 
to the bank's discretion. The FDIC is specifically requesting comments 
concerning the proposed procedures for distribution of disclosure statements 
by banks.
B a c k g r o u n d
The FDIC previously published a proposed statement of policy on the disclosure 
of financial and related information by FDIC insured banks in the June 29,
1984 FEDERAL REGISTER (49 FR 26809) (the "1984 proposal"). During the public 
comment period on that proposal, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that pointed toward the 
possible establishment of a system of in-depth disclosures by all national 
banks. To avoid differences between the substantive provisions that could 
have been adopted by the two agencies, the 1984 proposal was not adopted and, 
instead, the staffs of the two agencies have worked to develop a common 
approach.
Public comments on each of the agencies' earlier proposals have been taken 
into account in preparing the current proposal. To assist commenters in 
presenting their views, FDIC's tentative thoughts on certain fundamental 
issues raised in comments on the 1984 proposal are summarized below.
Some of the earlier comments held that bank disclosures would not serve a 
useful purpose. Arguments were made that uninsured depositors are, on their 
own, already receiving all the information they want and small depositors, 
because of FDIC deposit insurance, are not interested in bank disclosures. On 
this point, the FDIC observes that many small, i.e ., fully insured, depositors 
are business firms or professional individuals who maintain deposits as a part 
of a borrowing relationship with the bank. In such instances, the continued 
and uninterrupted flow of credit and banking services may be of equal or 
greater importance than the loss of deposit balances. Accordingly, the FDIC 
believes that many small depositors have the incentive for analyzing and 
acting on bank disclosures.
Comments were received to the effect that most individuals would not be 
capable of understanding the disclosed information and that the news media
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would distort the reported facts. As to a reader’s inability to understand 
the disclosures, the proposal suggests that management include in the 
disclosures a discussion of the financial information and other events. FDIC 
would expect management to view this discussion section as an opportunity to 
provide a descriptive and balanced presentation that would assist the reader 
in attaching appropriate significance to the various items of financial 
information and reaching sound and meaningful conclusions. As to the news 
media, the FDIC notes that bank holding companies and banks that have 
securities registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the bank 
regulatory agencies have made public disclosures more comprehensive than those 
called for by the 1984 and present proposals with no pattern of distorted 
reporting by the media.
Objections were raised to the 1984 proposal because it called for 
automatically disclosing all administrative enforcement actions. Under the 
present proposal, management would decide whether to include a discussion 
section and, assuming a discussion is provided, whether to describe 
enforcement actions. However, in this regard, the proposal provides that the 
FDIC, on a case-by-case basis, may include in an order resulting from an 
administrative enforcement action a provision requiring the respective bank to 
include a description of the enforcement action in its annual disclosure 
statement.
In response to comments on the 1984 proposal concerning possible costs of 
compliance, the present proposal would minimize costs by calling for basic 
financial information that is already compiled by banks for other purposes, 
limiting the disclosures to once a year and providing the disclosures only on 
request instead of by automatic recurring distributions.
Some responses to the 1984 proposal suggested that the FDIC provide an 
exemption for those banks included in filings by holding companies with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Inasmuch as the consolidated reports of a 
holding company are not necessarily indicative of the status of any one of its 
subsidiary banks, the present proposal does not provide a general exemption 
for banks included in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
I s s u e s  f o r  C o m m e n t
The FDIC seeks comments, views and data on any aspect of this proposal. 
Commenters are encouraged to provide suggestions that would maximize the 
utility of the disclosures and reduce the attendant costs and burden on 
banks. In order to aid its consideration of the proposal, the FDIC is 
soliciting specific comments on the following issues:
1. Assuming adoption of a final regulation, should the FDIC monitor banks' 
compliance and, if so, what prior or after the fact reviews would be cost 
beneficial?
2. Should any proposed disclosures be modified and should any additional 
disclosures, such as information on transactions with insiders, be included?
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3. Should disclosures be more frequent than once a year?
4. Should any class of persons be automatically provided with disclosure 
statements or is the proposed notice and subsequent request method appropriate?
5. What costs (money and/or time) would be incurred in complying with the 
proposed regulation?
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605, the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 for initial 
and final regulatory analyses do not apply to the present proposal because the 
Board of Directors of the FDIC hereby certifies that the proposal, if 
subsequently adopted as a final regulation, will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT
The public disclosures that would be required by this proposed regulation are 
considered to be a collection of information subject to review and approval by 
the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") under the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). This proposed collection of information 
requirement has been submitted to OMB for review under Section 3504(h) of that 
Act. It is estimated that public disclosure would add an annual paperwork 
burden of 35,200 hours, collectively, on banks subject to the proposal.
Written comment regarding this proposed collection of information requirement 
should be addressed to Robert Fishman, Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503 and to Hoyle L. 
Robinson, Executive Secretary, FDIC, Washington, D.C. 20429.
PROPOSED REGULATION
For the reasons set out in the preamble, Title 12, Chapter III, Subchapter B 
of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended by adding a new 
Part 350 as set forth below. PART 350
DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION 
BY FDIC INSURED STATE NONMEMBER BANKS
Sec.
350.1 Purpose.
350.2 Scope.
350.3 Requirement for annual disclosure statement.
350.4 Notice and availability.
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350.5 Contents of annual disclosure statement.
350.6 Alternative annual disclosure statements.
350.7 Signature and attestation.
350.8 Disclosure of examination reports.
350.9 Disclosure required by applicable securities law or regulations.
350.10 Prohibited conduct and penalties.
350.11 Safe harbor provision.
AUTHORITY: 12 U.S.C. 1817(a)(1), 1819 "Seventh" and "Tenth".
§350.1 Purpose.
Many bank shareholders, borrowers, depositors and other customers entrust 
their economic well-being and progress to the uninterrupted service of the 
institution with which they have established a banking relationship. By 
accepting that trust, a bank can reasonably be expected to provide, and a 
customer can expect, periodic information suitable for determining whether 
that important relationship should be established or continued. Also, public 
availability of financial and related information on individual banks will 
strengthen the FDIC's safety and soundness goals by promoting public knowledge 
and confidence in sound banks and the Nation's banking system and encouraging 
managers of banks to act prudently.
§350.2 Scope.
This part applies to FDIC insured state-chartered organizations (including 
commercial banks, savings banks and other institutions) that are not members 
of the Federal Reserve System. For purposes of this part, the term "bank" 
refers to such an organization.
§350.3 Requirement for annual disclosure statement.
A bank whose Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income are due to be filed 
with the FDIC within 30 days after the previous year-end is required to 
prepare by February 15 each year, and a bank whose Consolidated Reports of 
Condition and Income are due within 45 days after the previous year-end is 
required to prepare by March 1 each year, an "annual disclosure statement" 
covering the two preceding fiscal years.
§350.4 Notice and availability.
(a) N o t i c e  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  The bank shall include with any announcement 
it makes of a forthcoming annual meeting of shareholders a notice that one 
copy of the bank's annual disclosure statement required by this part may be 
obtained from the bank without charge. The address, telephone number, and 
name or title of the bank employee or officer whom security holders may 
contact for the information shall be included. However, notice to
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( b )  N o t i c e  t o  b o r r o w e r s ,  d e p o s i t o r s  a n d  o t h e r  c u s t o m e r s .  The bank shall 
prominently display at all times in the lobby of its main office and each 
branch a notice that one copy of the bank's annual disclosure statement may be 
obtained from the bank without charge. The address, telephone number, and 
name or title of the bank employee or officer to be contacted for a copy of 
the statement shall be included in the notice.
( c )  A v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  d o c u m e n t s .  Upon receiving a request for a disclosure 
statement, the bank shall promptly mail or otherwise deliver at least one copy 
of its latest annual disclosure statement free of charge to the requester.
§350.5 Contents of annual disclosure statement.
( a )  I n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  f i n a n c i a l  c o n d i t i o n  a n d  r e s u l t s  o f  o p e r a t i o n s .
The annual disclosure statement required by this part shall reflect the bank's 
financial condition and results of operations for the two preceding years.
The annual disclosure statement may, at the option of bank management, consist 
of the bank's entire Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income or 
applicable portions thereof, for the relevant periods. At a minimum, the 
statement shall specifically contain information comparable to that provided 
in the following Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income schedules:
(1) Schedule RC (Balance Sheet);
(2) Schedule RC-N (Past Due and Nonaccrual Loans and Leases —  column A 
covering past due 30 through 89 days and still accruing need not be included);
(3) Schedule RI (Income Statement);
(4) Schedule RI-A (Changes in Equity Capital -- commercial banks, or 
Changes in Net Worth —  savings banks); and
(5) Schedule RI-B (Charge-Offs and Recoveries and Changes in Allowance 
for Loan and Lease Losses —  commercial banks, or Charge-Offs, Recoveries, and 
Changes in Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses —  savings banks).
( b )  O t h e r  r e q u i r e d  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The annual disclosure statement shall 
include such other information as the FDIC may require of a particular bank by 
administrative order. Such an order may include a requirement that a bank 
prepare a disclosure statement that includes a description of an 
administrative enforcement action where the FDIC deems it in the public 
interest to do so.
( c )  O t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The bank may, at its option, provide a narrative 
discussion to supplement the financial data. This narrative section could 
include information which bank management deems important to evaluating the 
overall condition of the bank. Information which management might consider
shareholders of the availability of an annual disclosure statement need not be
given where shareholders are routinely provided with documents prior to the
annual shareholders' meeting that, at a minimum, contain information
comparable to that specified in section 350.4 of this part.
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discussing includes, but is not limited to, a discussion of the financial 
data; pertinent information relating to mergers and acquisitions; the 
existence of and facts relating to regulatory enforcement actions; business 
plans; and material changes in balance sheet and income statement items.
( d )  D i s c l a i m e r .  The following legend shall be included in any narrative 
section to advise the public that the FDIC has not reviewed the information 
contained therein: "This statement has not been reviewed, or confirmed for
accuracy or relevance, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."
§350.6 Alternative annual disclosure statements.
In the case of a bank having a class of securities registered pursuant to 
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the bank's annual report to 
security holders for meetings at which directors are to be elected (see 12 CFR 
§335.203) or its annual report on Form F-2 (see 12 CFR §335.312) may be used 
as an alternative to the required and optional information provisions of 
section 350.4 of this part. In addition, if the bank has audited financial 
statements, such statements may also be substituted to the extent that they 
contain at least all of the information specified in subsection 350.4(a).
§350.7 Signature and attestation.
A duly authorized officer of the bank shall sign the annual disclosure 
statement.
§350.8 Disclosure of examination reports.
Except as permitted under specific provisions of the FDIC's regulations (12 
CFR Part 309), a bank may not disclose any report of examination or report of 
supervisory activity or any portion thereof prepared by the FDIC. The bank 
also shall not make any representation concerning such report or the findings 
therein.
§350.9 Disclosure required by applicable securities law or regulations.
The requirements of this part are not intended to replace or relieve any 
disclosure required to be made under applicable securities law or regulations.
§350.10 Prohibited conduct and penalties.
( a )  M i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . No officer, director, employee, agent, or other 
person participating in the affairs of a bank, shall, directly or indirectly:
(i) Disclose or cause to be disclosed false or misleading information in 
the annual disclosure statement, or omit or cause the omission of pertinent or 
required information in the annual disclosure statement; or
(ii) Represent that the FDIC, or any employee thereof, has passed upon 
the accuracy or completeness of the disclosure statement.
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(b )  P a r t ic ip a t in g  p e rsons . For purposes o f  th is  p a r t ,  a person 
" p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  the  a f f a i r s  o f  a bank" s h a ll in c lu d e  (b u t no t be l im ite d  to )  
any person who p ro v id e s  in fo rm a tio n  co n ta in e d  in ,  o r d i r e c t l y  o r  in d i r e c t l y  
a s s is ts  in  the  p re p a ra t io n  o f ,  the annual d is c lo s u re  s ta te m e n t. Th is  in c lu d e s  
any bank h o ld in g  company, and any o f f i c e r ,  d i r e c to r ,  employee, a g e n t, a u d ito r  
o r independent a cco u n ta n t th e re o f .
(c )  Enforcem ent a c t io n s .  Conduct which v io la te s  su b se c tio n  (a ) o f  th is  
s e c tio n  may c o n s t i tu te  an unsafe o r unsound banking p ra c t ic e  o r o th e rw is e  
serve as a b a s is  f o r  an en fo rcem ent a c t io n  by the  FDIC.
§350.11 . Safe h a rbo r p ro v is io n .
The p ro v is io n s  o f  s e c tio n  350.10 s h a ll n o t a p p ly  un less i t  is  shown th a t  the 
in fo rm a tio n  d is c lo s e d  was in c lu d e d  w ith o u t a reasonab le  b as is  o r o th e r  than 
in  good f a i t h .
(Approved by the  O f f ic e  o f  Management and Budget under c o n tro l number 
( a p p l ic a t io n  p e n d in g ) .)
By o rd e r o f  the  Board o f  D ir e c to r s .  Dated a t W ashington, D .C ., t h is  17th day
o f  June 1987.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
E xe cu tive  S e c re ta ry
Hoylfe L. Robinson
(SEAL)
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RESPONSE:
In our statement of response we recognize the 
internal control environment as the cornerstone of a 
financial reporting system and outline some solutions which 
we believe address your recommendations for public 
companies.
APPENDIX I:
Your report calls for a broader, integrated 
concept of internal control. In this Appendix we show how 
the definition we use is effective in communicating, 
training and reporting on internal control issues.
Your report recommends a continuous appraisal of 
financial reporting risks. Here we outline a control 
self-assessment process as a powerful means of demonstrat­
ing management's ongoing commitment to a sound control 
environment.
APPENDIX III:
The theme of our response is that internal control 
is a manageable dimension of the business. Here we link 
our framework directly to your recommendations for public 
companies.
A RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
Reliable financial reporting is the result of 
corporations, independent public accountants and oversight 
boards functioning effectively. Failure or a breakdown on 
the part of one or more of these participants often results 
in serious consequences to the users of financial 
information, and in some cases to society in general.
Corporations are directly responsible for the 
integrity of the information provided to the public. They 
should shoulder the lion's share of responsibility for 
righting any perceived or real wrongs in the financial 
reporting process. We believe that we have developed and 
tested specific solutions to many of the recommendations 
you propose for public companies. We believe these 
solutions provide a sound basis for companies to discharge 
the responsibilities suggested in your report. They were 
developed with the commitment and efforts of the entire 
Gulf Canada Resources organization. Implementation is 
continuing. We submit them in this response for your 
consideration.
INTERNAL CONTROL IS MANAGEABLE
Internal control is a manageable business dimen­
sion. Academics have noted that sound financial reporting 
is reliant on an appropriate control environment. The link 
between the tone at the top, ethical standards and the 
qualitative factors of management practices has not been 
firmly established by practitioners. Many of the areas you 
have identified as being the most critical to sound finan­
cial reporting have rarely been formally considered as 
internal controls, nor have they frequently been assessed 
or reported on by auditors.
...2 continued...
Gulf Canada Resources, a division of Gulf Canada Corpora­
tion, is involved in the exploration, development, produc­
tion and marketing of oil and gas. After July 1, 1987, the 
division will become Gulf Canada Resources Limited, with 
shares traded on the Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Alberta 
and American stock exchanges.
. .  . 2  
INTERNAL CONTROL ELEMENTS
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS
• Honest and Competent Personnel:
-  Responsibility for Personnel, 
Training and Employee Relations
-  Hiring Practices
-  Performance Standards
-  Training Programs
-  Firing Practices
-  Systems that Do Not Invite Abuse
-  Evaluation and Promotion Practices
-  Work Environment
-  Competence and Integrity
-  Statutory Compliance Standards
• Segregation of Functions
• Overall Plan of Organization
• Accounting/ Finance Organization Plan:
-  Specific Control Standards
-  Segregation from Operations
-  Centralization o f Reporting Responsibility
-  Segregation of Custodial and Reporting Functions
-  Internal Audit Reporting Lines
-  Interface, of A & FC  with Management and Operating Departments
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE CONTROLS
• Development Controls
• Pre-Installation Controls
• Feasibility and Long-Term Plans
AUTHORIZATION AND REPORTING CONTROLS
• General Authorization. Specific Authorization and Approvals
• Budgets. Responsibility Reporting and Management Information Systems
• Computer Controls Related to Authorization
ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS CONTROLS
• Ensuring Transactions are Recorded Initially
• General Ledger and Chart o f Accounts
• Journals, Sub-Ledgers, Balancing Routines
• Document Design
• Cost Accounting
• Computer Processing Controls:
-  Master File Controls -  Error Controls
-  Data Controls -  Management and Audit Trails
ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDING CONTROLS
• Restricted Access
• Periodic Count and Comparison
• Protection of Records
• Insurance
• Computer Operations Controls:
-  Prevention or Detection o f Accidental Errors
-  Prevention or Detection o f Fraudulent Manipulation or Misuse o f Data
-  Security Against Destruction of Records and Equipment
-  Disaster and Recovery Contingency Plans
MANAGEMENT SUPERVISORY CONTROLS
• Management Supervision
• Monitoring of Controls and Detected Errors
• Internal Audit
• External Audit
• Audit Committee
DOCUMENTATION CONTROLS
• Manuals of Policies and Procedures
• Systems Documentation
• Program Documentation
• Documentation of Operating Instructions
• Documentation of File Control Procedures
• Documentation of Data Conversion Procedures
• Documentation of Data Base Components
• Documentation of Data Control Procedures
• Documentation of User Procedures
. . . 3  c o n t i n u e d . .  .
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A PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
In order to better manage internal control we 
need, as the exposure draft suggests, a much broader 
concept. We need a definition or framework which is 
comprehensive, yet understandable and relatively easy to 
communicate. It must be useful to a whole range of users 
including audit committees, auditors, management and 
external audiences. The framework must readily incorporate 
a wide range of input data. It must be theoretically 
defensible, but at the same time applicable to any size or 
type of business activity. To be useful to business, it 
must also recognize cost benefit notions and be capable of 
explicitly portraying business risk and the results of 
management's decisions.
A  TESTED SOLUTION
In August 1986 we modified a definition of inter­
nal control developed by R.J. Anderson in the 1977 text 
"The External Audit" and began to use it as the basis for 
internal control training, assessment and reporting in Gulf 
Canada Resources.
The definition we adopted is shown on the opposite 
page. A graphical depiction of a control assessment using 
the framework is shown on the next page. We have included 
a detailed description of the framework and its uses in 
Appendix I. Unlike other definitions, this one specifi­
cally integrates the notion of organization controls as a 
unique and critical element. It also integrates the role 
of the audit committee as an important management super­
visory control.
THE FRAMEWORK
The framework shown on the opposite page has 
served us as:
1. A comprehensive definition of internal control.
...4 continued...
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ABC COMPANY LTD. 
NTERNAL CONTROL ASSESSMENT 
1 9 8 5 /1 9 8 6
ESTIMATED
INDUSTRY
ORGANIZATION
CONTROLS
SYSTEM AUTHORIZATION ACCOUNTING
DEVELOPMENT 
& CHANGE 
CONTROLS
SYSTEM S
CONTROLS
PHYSICAL MANAGEMENT DOCUMENTATION 
SAFEGUARDING SUPERVISORY CONTROLS
CONTROLS CONTROLSREPORTING
CONTROLS
OCT 85 OCT 86
NOTE: The primary purpose of the graph is to indicate to
users relative control levels and directional 
change. It portrays the relative level of seven 
control elements against a continuum. Each 
control element is comprised of the sub elements 
shown on page 2. The optimum cost effective 
profile for any business will vary depending on 
such things as industry characteristics, growth 
rate, geographic dispersion, political climate, 
competitiveness and degree of regulation.
. . . 5  c o n t i n u e d . . .
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2. A primary tool for Internal Audit to report on
internal control. We have reported on this basis 
to our Audit Committee since October 1986.
3. A common basis for teaching internal control
concepts to all levels and areas of our organiza­
tion.
4. A framework for management to use in assessing and
discussing internal control. Gulf's control self- 
assessment approach is more fully described in 
Appendix II.
5. A basis for managing internal control. We have
used the framework in Gulf Canada Resources for 
risk assessment, cost benefit analysis and for. 
planning purposes.
DIRECT LINKS TO YOUR REPORT
We believe that the control framework we have 
described, combined with a comprehensive self-assessment 
process, provides viable solutions to many of your recom­
mendations.
In Appendix III we provide direct links between 
some of your recommendations and the actions taken and 
mechanisms currently in place in Gulf Canada Resources.
OUR CONCLUSION
We commend you and your staff for your report. We 
believe your recommendations are fundamentally sound. We 
hope that our experiences and ideas will contribute to your 
objectives. We would be pleased to discuss this response 
with you or your staff.
B.W. McCUAIG, C.A. 
General Auditor
T. J. LEECH, M.B.A., C.A. 
Manager Special Audit Services
ref:expose.let
APPENDIX I
AN INTERNAL CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
C O N T E N T S
Building and Understanding the Graph I - 1
Using the Framework for Planning and
Objective Setting I - 2
Seminar Training Using the Framework I - 3
Workshop Training Using the Framework I - 4
The Framework and the Audit Committee I - 5
I  -  1
BUILDING AND UNDERSTANDING THE GRAPH
In the fall of 1986 we wanted to explain the 
effect on our control systems of major changes resulting 
from the sale of our downstream refining and marketing 
operations and the relocation of our corporate head office 
from Toronto to Calgary. Our upstream oil and gas business 
was adjusting to the economics of declining crude prices 
and a deregulated market place. We were also completing 
the migration of corporate financial systems and expertise.
We had in our favour substantial information on 
internal control. For 1985 and 1986, both internal and 
external audits provided significant detail, particularly 
on accounting system controls. Ad hoc committees working 
on productivity issues reported a number of observations 
and conclusions which we categorized into the elements. 
Control self-assessment summaries, where available, pro­
vided additional information. We incorporated the results 
of organization studies resulting from the relocation of 
our business. We also conducted a policy review to deter­
mine the strengths and weaknesses in our policy framework.
Having summarized and categorized this internal 
control information, we constructed our bar graph model to 
represent our internal control environment for 1985 and 
1986. An example of a control bar graph is shown on page 4 
of our response.
While we believe our model can be made more 
empirically defensible by assigning values to the elements 
and internal control data, we have not yet done so. We 
tested the validity of our model through a number of 
presentations and discussions of the graph and supporting 
data with company managers and officers. We consulted with 
our external auditors and others to roughly depict the 
general industry range of internal control elements.
We believe the graphical depiction of an internal 
control environment lends itself to interpretation. A 
capital intensive industry such as ours vests great finan­
cial authority and accountability in a highly qualified 
staff. Organization controls and authorization and report­
ing controls should be high.
...2 continued...
I - 1 BUILDING AND UNDERSTANDING THE GRAPH
Page Two
Conversely, relative reliance on accounting system 
controls is low. We cannot, as a resource industry rely 
solely on accounting systems to ensure all revenue is 
recorded. Well sites, the source of our oil and gas 
revenue, are numerous, geographically dispersed, unattended 
much of the time and often operated by others on our 
behalf. Also, unlike many industries, the upstream oil and 
gas business has not historically competed on the basis of 
cost and has not developed sophisticated cost accounting 
systems.
In any company, low or declining levels of organ­
zation controls mean heightened risk of fraudulent finan­
cial reporting.
129I
I - 2
USING THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
PLANNING AND OBJECTIVE SETTING
The bar graph depiction of internal control 
provides a basis for planning and objective setting. 
Senior management's understanding of the relative 
importance of each control element, together with a working 
level understanding - of the subcomponents, is a necessary 
prerequisite to effectively manage internal control.
Shortly after developing the model showing the 
1985 and 1986 control environment of our business, we 
developed a paper indicating control options for 1987. Our 
purpose was not to recommend specific change, but merely to 
demonstrate the areas of potential change which could be 
made in each element, and to indicate the effect of that 
change. Our options covered a range from re-organization 
to improve segregation, to better training in oil and gas 
law and taxation. We left the decisions on what options to 
select, if any, entirely to management.
Partly as a result of our paper, our management 
prepared a set of 1987 control objectives. We were able to 
critique the effect of their proposed changes. We also 
identified areas of concern which their plans did not 
address. We were able to give some preliminary indication 
of the shift in our 1987 control environment and our 
initial reaction to it.
We believe that a common basis for understanding 
and discussing internal control leads to improved ability 
to plan and manage.
I - 3
THE OBJECTIVES OF INTERNAL CONTROL
1. Safeguarding of Assets
2. Reliability of Accounting Records
3. Profitability and Minimization of 
Unnecessary costs
4 .  Timely Preparation of Reliable 
financial Information
5 .  Avoidance of Unintentional 
Exposure to Risk
6. Prevention or Detection of 
Errors and irregularities
7. Assurance that Delegated 
Responsibilities have been 
Discharged
8. Discharge of statutory 
Responsibilities
NOTE: This categorization of control
objectives was used by Rodney 
J. Anderson FCA in the External 
Audit I, 1977 Copp Clark *
Pitman Ltd. *
*
*
I - 3
SEMINAR TRAINING USING THE FRAMEWORK
C o n c u r r e n t  w i t h  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  o u r  f i r s t  
c o m p re h e n s iv e  a s s e s s m e n t ,  we h e l d  m e e t in g s  w i t h  t h e  
A c c o u n t in g  a n d  C o n t r o l  d e p a r tm e n t ,  I n f o r m a t i o n  S e r v i c e s  an d  
o t h e r  g r o u p s  t o  s e e k  i n p u t  a n d  com m ent. F o l lo w in g  t h o s e  
d i s c u s s i o n s ,  we m ade p r e s e n t a t i o n s  t o  o u r  o f f i c e r s  a n d  o u r  
A u d i t  C o m m itte e .
We fo u n d  t h a t  b y  e x p la in in g  o u r  fra m e w o rk ,  we w e re  
p r o v id in g  t r a i n i n g  and  g e n e r a t in g  i n t e r e s t  i n  c o n t r o l  
c o n c e p ts .  The  f ra m e w o rk  c o n ta in e d  a new a nd  b ro a d  d e f i n i ­
t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l . A t  t h e  same t im e  we b e g a n  a 
c o m m u n ic a t io n  p ro c e s s  e m p h a s iz in g  t h a t  a l l  d e p a r tm e n ts  had  
r o le s  t o  p la y  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  f ra m e w o rk .  We o f f e r e d  t r a i n ­
in g  t o  a l l  d e p a r tm e n ts  o n  t h e  o b je c t i v e s  o f  c o n t r o l  and  t h e  
e le m e n ts  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  f ra m e w o rk  n e c e s s a ry  t o  a c h ie v e  t h e  
o b je c t i v e s  ( t h e  o b je c t i v e s  a r e  s e t  o u t  on  t h e  o p p o s i te  
p a g e ) . T he  t r a i n i n g  was d e s ig n e d  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  and  
i n t e g r a t e  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  t h e  s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t  p ro c e s s  
d e s c r ib e d  i n  A p p e n d ix  I I .  The re s p o n s e  t o  d a te  h a s  b e e n  
o v e rw h e lm in g .
E ach  s e m in a r  i s  c u s to m iz e d  t o  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d is c u s s  
t h e  a u d ie n c e 's  r o le s  a nd  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  
c o n t r o l  e n v ir o n m e n t .  T h is  i s  d on e  b y  l i n k i n g  p o s i t i o n  
g u id e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o  t h e  b a s ic  c o n t r o l  o b je c t i v e s  and  
th e n  m a k in g  t h e  l i n k  t o  t h e  e le m e n ts  u s e d  o r  a v a i l a b le  t o  
s a t i s f y  t h e  o b j e c t i v e .  E ach  s e m in a r  a ls o  c o n t a in s  a 
co m p o n e n t t i e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  o u r  v a lu e s  a nd  e t h i c s  p ro g ra m  
and  c o r p o r a t e  p o l i c y .  D is c u s s io n  i s  s t im u la t e d  th r o u g h  a 
" Q u iz "  f o r m a t  t h a t  c o n t a in s  q u e s t io n s  on  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
d i f f i c u l t  e t h i c s  a n d  p o l i c y  c o m p lia n c e  s i t u a t i o n s  e m p lo y e e s  
f a c e .  P r e - r e a d in g  in c lu d e s  s u c h  a r t i c l e s  a s  a J u l y  -  
A u g u s t ,  1986 H a rv a rd  B u s in e s s  R e v ie w  a r t i c l e  t i t l e d  "Why 
'G o o d ' M a n a g e rs  M ake Bad E t h i c a l  C h o ic e s , "  a n d  a  P r ic e  
W a te rh o u s e  p u b l i c a t i o n  t i t l e d  "T h e  New Ten  C om m andm ents". 
T h e s e  a r t i c l e s ,  a n d  o t h e r s  l i k e  th e m , p r o v id e  g u id a n c e  t o  
b u s in e s s  p e o p le  o n  how t o  d e a l w i t h  and  a v o id  e t h i c a l  
p r o b le m s .
By t h e  e nd  o f  1 9 8 7 , s e m in a rs  w i l l  h a v e  bee n  
d e s ig n e d  a nd  p r e s e n te d  t o  a l l  m a jo r  a re a s  o f  o u r  com pany. 
The  e v a lu a t io n s  a nd  i n t e r e s t  l e v e l s  i n  t h e  s e s s io n s  h a v e  
b e e n  c o n s i s t e n t l y  h ig h .  We in t e n d  t o  c o n t in u e  t h e  s e m in a rs  
a nd  t o  i n t e g r a t e  th e m  i n t o  o u r  b a s ic  c o r e  t r a i n i n g  p ro g ra m . 
We b e l ie v e  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  D e p a r tm e n ts  c a n  a nd  s h o u ld  p la y  a 
k e y  r o l e  i n  t h i s  t y p e  o f  t r a i n i n g .
I - 4
WORKSHOP TRAINING USING THE FRAMEWORK
T h ro u g h  a  j o i n t  d e v e lo p m e n t  e f f o r t  w i t h  o u r  
C o n t r o l l e r ' s  d e p a r tm e n t ,  w o rk s h o p s  u s i n g  t h e  fra m e w o rk  w e re  
d e v e lo p e d  f o r  a c c o u n t i n g  s t a f f .
A t y p i c a l  o n e  d a y  w o rk sh o p  i n c l u d e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
1 . P r e - r e a d i n g  on  t h e  c o n t r o l  o b j e c t i v e s  a n d
e l e m e n t s .
2 .  G ro u p  d i s c u s s i o n s  a n d  l i s t i n g s  o f  e x a m p le s  o f
o b j e c t i v e s  a n d  e le m e n t s  t h a t  a t t e n d e e s  s e e  i n  
t h e i r  a r e a s .  (T he p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  c o m p o n en t i s  t o  
e n s u r e  s t a f f  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  f r a m e w o rk .)
3 . A t te n d e e s  th e n  b r e a k  i n t o  g ro u p s  t o  l i s t  know n 
w e a k n e s s e s  b y  e le m e n t .  G ro u p s  p r e p a r e  an  a s s e s s ­
m e n t o f  w h e re  t h e y  b e l ie v e  t h e  s e v e n  c o n t r o l  b a r s  
s h o u ld  b e  p la c e d .  The r e s u l t s  f ro m  a l l  t h e  g ro u p s  
a r e  co m p a re d  a n d  d is c u s s e d .
4 .  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  p r e s e n ts  s p e c i f i c  w e a k n e s s e s  and  
im p ro v e m e n ts  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  com pany a s  w e l l  as  
t h e  c o n t r o l  p r o f i l e  p r e s e n te d  t o  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m it te e .  A u d i t ' s  c o n t r o l  p r o f i l e  i s  co m p a re d  t o  
t h e  p r o f i l e s  d e v e lo p e d  b y  t h e  g r o u p s .  D i f f e r e n c e s  
a r e  d is c u s s e d .
5 .  The  a t te n d e e s  a g a in  b r e a k  i n t o  g ro u p s  a n d  d e v e lo p  
id e a s  o n  p o t e n t i a l  im p ro v e m e n ts  t o  a d d re s s  c o n ­
c e r n s  i d e n t i f i e d .  A l l  g ro u p s  th e n  p r e s e n t  t h e i r  
id e a s  b y  e le m e n t  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  g ro u p  f o r  c o n s id e r ­
a t i o n  a n d  d is c u s s io n .
6 . A s e n i o r  a c c o u n t i n g  m a n a g e r  p r o v i d e s  a n  o v e rv ie w
o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  s t r a t e g y  f o r  t h e  u p c o m in g  y e a r  a n d  
f e e d b a c k  o n  t h e  i d e a s  d e v e lo p e d  b y  t h e  w o rk sh o p  
g r o u p s .
7 . A t t e n d e e s  a r e  t h e n  g iv e n  a n  a s s ig n m e n t  t o  d e v e lo p
a n d  im p le m e n t a t  l e a s t  o n e  c o n t r o l  im p ro v e m e n t an d  
d o c u m e n t i t .
. . . 2  c o n t i n u e d . . .
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A follow-up session is held three months following 
the initial session to discuss progress.
The interest, participation levels and evaluations 
of these sessions have been consistently high. By 
September of 1987, almost all accounting staff will have 
participated in a workshop. All levels of staff attend - 
from the clerk in payables to the most senior manager. The 
quality of the control assessments and the ideas generated 
for improvement has been consistently high. All partici­
pants have indicated that a highlight of the workshop is 
the group discussion of the major control issues that 
confront the company as a whole. They also give high 
ratings to the group discussion of company strategy to 
address the control concerns raised.
The workshops demand high levels of disclosure and 
frankness by attendees, management and Internal Audit. We 
refer in our company to "The Era of Disclosure." We think 
that through openness and discussion of the issues we will 
generate the best solutions to internal control problems, 
as well as strong commitment to improve.
I - 5
THE CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
AND THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
Our major motive in developing the framework was 
to place in perspective a complex series of control events 
for management and our Audit Committee.
In the past, control reporting was done on an 
exception basis. The Audit Committee relied on the 
coverage provided by internal and external audit. The 
results of those audits, primarily significant weaknesses 
in accounting system controls were reported however the 
committee had no context to assess or interpret them. The 
results of audits alone could not depict our control 
environment. Restructuring and relocation of our business 
raised issues which demanded a context and a more compre­
hensive formal assessment.
In Appendix I - 1 we explained how we built our 
model. In communicating the results to our Audit Committee 
in October 1986, we presented a summary definition of the 
control elements along with a graphical assessment of our 
control environment in 1985 and 1986. We were able to 
explain the reason for the relative levels in both years 
and the major events which led to the year over year 
changes. We were also able to interpret the structural 
reasons for our control element profile and to include an 
estimate of how we ranked against our competitors in the 
industry. Using 1985 as a base year, we have continued to 
track incremental changes in our control environment by 
incorporating the results of audits and other control 
indicators.
APPENDIX II
THE CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
AND
SELF-ASSESSMENT
■ C O N T E N T S
What is Self-Assessment?
What are the Benefits?
II - l
II - 2
II - 1
WHAT IS SELF-ASSESSMENT?
Self-assessment is a process in which work groups 
identify the control objectives that they should be 
fulfilling and assess the adequacy of the mechanisms/proce­
dures in place to meet those objectives. To be effective 
the process must use a "bottom-up" approach. All depart­
ments have roles to play in the control framework and all 
participate in the self-assessment process.
The basic control objectives are listed in Appen­
dix I -3. These must be reduced/modified to a level that 
is meaningful to the group doing the assessment. For 
example, "Safeguarding of assets" might be reduced to:
- Insurance requirements must be complied with
- Materials and supplies must be adequately pro­
tected against pilferage and/or unauthorized 
withdrawals
- Word processor disks must be secured when not in 
use
"Reliability of accounting records" might include:
- Oil production must be accurately measured and 
recorded
Royalty status of wells must be accurate 
Discharge of statutory responsibilities might include:
- Staff must be knowledgeable on applicable environ­
mental legislation
- Corporate policy must be clear and well communi­
cated with respect to compliance with the law
Having set the objectives, the group then identi­
fies and assesses the mechanisms/procedures (or lack 
thereof) in place. Details to support the assessment are 
documented. A summarized report by department is provided 
annually to the General Auditor and the Controller for 
inclusion in the report to the Audit Committee and to 
support management representations.
In addition, the self-assessment reports are used 
in the audit planning process. Audit's role is to test the 
self-assessments for completeness and accuracy. Where we 
find a basis for reliance on the self-assessment process, 
we reduce regular audit frequency. We focus our efforts 
where we see poor disclosure.
I I  -  2
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS?
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 .
6 .
M anagem ent f o r m a l l y  a c k n o w le d g e s  a n d  a c c e p t s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l .  I n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  c l a r i f y i n g  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  a l lo w s  
e x p l i c i t  r i s k  m an ag em en t d e c i s i o n s .
T he c a l i b r e  o f  t h e  s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t s  p r o d u c e d  
p r o v i d e s  v a l u a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
u n d e r s t a n d in g  b e i n g  d e m o n s t r a t e d  b y  m a n ag em en t. 
P o o r  s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t s  r e f l e c t  e i t h e r  p o o r  u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g  o r  p o o r  a t t i t u d e  to w a r d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l .  
B o th  a r e  r e d  f l a g s .
M anagem ent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  o n  c o n t r o l  a r e  f u l l y  
s u p p o r t e d  w i t h  a  d e f e n s i b l e ,  c o m p re h e n s iv e  
a n a l y s i s .
T h e  c o n t r o l  f ra m e w o rk  u s e d  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  b r o a d  
t h a t  i t  c o v e r s  o p e r a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y  i s s u e s .  The 
p r o c e s s  s h o u ld  p o s i t i v e l y  im p a c t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .
T he  f ra m e w o rk  p r o v i d e s  a  v e h i c l e  t o  d i s c u s s  an d  
a n a l y z e  s u c h  i t e m s  a s  b u s i n e s s  e t h i c s ,  t r a i n i n g ,  
p o l i c y ,  p e r f o r m a n c e  s t a n d a r d s ,  e t c .  We s e e  t h i s  
a s  a  p o s i t i v e  w ay t o  p r o v i d e  a  v e h i c l e  f o r  a l l  
g r o u p s  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e s e  a r e a s .
T he  a n a l y s i s  s u p p le m e n ts  a n d  c o m p le m e n ts  t h e  a u d i t  
p r o c e s s .  A u d i t e e s  a r e  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  d i s c u s s  a n d  
com m ent on  c o n t r o l  i s s u e s .  I te m s  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i ­
f i e d  b y  m an ag em en t w i t h  v i a b l e  a c t i o n  p l a n s  a r e  
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t  p r o c e s s  i n  a u d i t  
r e p o r t s .
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APPENDIX III
DIRECT LINKS TO RECOMMENDATIONS
C O N T E N T S
The Tone at the Top I I I  -  1
Accounting Function and Chief Accounting III - 2
officer
Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal III - 3
Auditor
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee III - 4
Reporting on Responsibilities III - 5
Setting Standards for Internal Control III - 6
III - 1
THE TONE AT THE TOP
Recommendations For the top management of a public company 
to discharge its obligation to oversee the financial 
reporting process, it must identify, understand and assess 
the factors that may cause the company's financial state­
ments to be fraudulently misstated.
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal 
controls that are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Recommendation: Public companies should develop and
enforce written codes of corporate conduct. Codes of 
conduct should foster a strong ethical climate and open 
channels of communication to help protect against fraudu­
lent financial reporting. A company's audit committee 
should review compliance with the code annually, including 
compliance by top management, and report thereon to the 
board of directors.
Response:
Our framework reduces the risk of fraudulent 
financial reporting by recognizing and managing the criti­
cal elements in our control framework. We believe our 
process incorporates and integrates all elements of an 
internal control environment and provides an affirmative 
basis for management to discharge its obligations.
We recognize the importance of written codes of 
conduct and a strong ethical climate. Our framework 
explicitly demonstrates this dimension and provides a basis 
for recognizing compliance. Seminars designed to 
communicate our company's control "values" are a strong 
signal of the tone at the top.
\
III - 2
ACCOUNTING FUNCTION 
AND CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain account­
ing functions that can effectively meet their financial 
reporting obligations.
Response:
We believe this recommendation misses the mark. 
Sound financial reporting is the result of the interaction 
of a variety of control elements. Without an effective 
internal control environment, the accounting function alone 
will not meet the obligations of sound financial reporting. 
The standards for the organization, reporting relationship 
and management of the accounting function are part of the 
organization control element. We believe the cause of poor 
financial reporting is not rooted in accounting system 
controls, but in organization controls. Generally, this 
element is influenced by the CEO more than the chief 
accounting officer.
We believe public companies should maintain 
optimum cost effective levels of all the control elements 
in order to meet their financial reporting obligations.
I I I  -  3
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION 
AND CHIEF INTERNAL AUDITOR
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : P u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  m a in t a in  an 
e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  s t a f f e d  w i t h  an  a d e q u a te  
num be r o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l a p p r o p r ia t e  t o  t h e  s iz e  and  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  com pany.
Recommen d a t io n : P u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  e n s u re  t h a t  t h e i r  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n s  a r e  o b je c t i v e .
Re c omme n d a t io n : I n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  s h o u ld  c o n s id e r  t h e  
im p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  n o n f i n a n c ia l  a u d i t  f i n d i n g s  f o r  t h e  
c o m p a n y 's  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts .
Recommend a t i o n : M anagem ent and  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  s h o u ld
e n s u re  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s '  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  t h e  a u d i t  
o f  t h e  e n t i r e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p ro c e s s  i s  a p p r o p r ia t e  
a n d  p r o p e r l y  c o o r d in a te d  w i t h  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n ta n t .
R e s p o n s e :
We b e l ie v e  s t r o n g ly  i n  t h e  e x is te n c e  o f  an  o b je c ­
t i v e ,  in d e p e n d e n t  and  c o m p e te n t  a u d i t  f u n c t io n .  We b e l ie v e  
in d e p e n d e n c e  and  o b j e c t i v i t y  i s  a c h ie v e d  p r i m a r i l y  th r o u g h  
a r e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  CEO, h ig h  p r o f e s s io n a l  
s ta n d a r d s ,  a n d  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e .
We d o  n o t  b e l ie v e  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
f u n c t io n  s h o u ld  b e  l i m i t e d  t o  p e r f o r m in g  a u d i t s .  We see  a 
m o re  v a r ie d  r o l e  e n c o m p a s s in g  t r a i n i n g  t h e  o r g a n iz a t io n  i n  
c o n t r o l  c o n c e p ts ,  p r o m o t in g  a nd  t e s t i n g  a c o n t r o l  s e l f -  
a s s e s s m e n t p ro c e s s  a n d  p r o v id in g  le a d e r s h ip  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  
c o n t r o l  is s u e s  and  o p t io n s  f o r  m a n a g in g  t h e  e n v iro n m e n t .  
We t h i n k  a u d i t s  a r e  n e c e s s a ry  and  a p p r o p r ia t e  b u t  s h o u ld  be  
c o n s id e r e d  t o  b e  o n ly  one  o f  a s e le c t i o n  o f  t o o l s  a v a i l a b le  
t o  do  t h e  jo b .
We b e l ie v e  o u r  fra m e w o rk  a l lo w s  a r o l e  f o r  i n t e r ­
n a l  a u d i t  f a r  b r o a d e r  th a n  e v e n  y o u r  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  
c o n te m p la te .  And we b e l ie v e  th e  f u n c t io n  c a n  be  p e r fo rm e d  
e f f e c t i v e l y  b y  s m a l le r  g ro u p s  th a n  g e n e r a l l y  now e x i s t  i n  
p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s .
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III - 4
MANDATORY INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE
Recommendation: The board of directors of all public
companies should be required by SEC rule to establish audit 
committees comprised solely of independent directors.
Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, 
vigilant, and effective overseers of the financial report­
ing process and the company's internal controls.
R ecommendation: All public companies should develop a
written charter setting forth the duties and responsibili­
ties of the audit committee. The board of directors should 
approve the charter, review it at least annually, and 
modify it as necessary.
Recommendation: Audit committees should have adequate 
resources and authority to discharge their responsibili­
ties.
Recommendation: The audit committee should review manage­
ment's evaluation of factors related to the independence of 
the company's public accountant. Both the audit committee 
and management should assist the public accountant in 
preserving his independence.
Recommendation: The audit committee should approve in 
advance the types and the extent of management advisory 
services that management plans to engage the company's 
independent public accountant to perform.
Response?
We agree that audit committees play an important 
oversight role in the management of internal control. We 
also believe that the existence of outside directors 
enhance the role of the audit committee. Audit committees 
comprised entirely of outside directors is desirable 
although not necessarily practical.
...2 continued...
II I  - 4 MANDATORY INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE
Page Two
Our view is that audit committee members, particu­
larly independent directors will benefit from a framework 
which is comprehensive and understandable. We believe the 
definition of internal control by element will allow 
directors to probe and understand the company's internal 
control environment to satisfy their legal and oversight 
responsibilities. Audit committees should be particularly 
cognizant of the importance of the organization control 
element.
Our framework explicitly recognizes and assesses 
the role played by the audit committee.
III - 5
REPORTING ON RESPONSIBILITIES 
IN THE ANNUAL REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS
Recomndati: All public companies should be required by
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders 
management reports signed by the chief executive officer 
and chief accounting officer. The management report should 
acknowledge management's responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control, discuss how these 
responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide management's 
assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
controls.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders 
a letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
describing the committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year.
Response:
We believe the major impediment to internal 
control reporting by management has been the lack of a 
clear, useful definition. The definitions applied by the 
public accounting and auditing professions are incomplete.
Clearly, recent financial failures of public 
companies has lead to public concern with corporate gover­
nance. We believe that the definition and framework we 
suggest in this paper would provide a sound basis for 
management reporting. From a reporting perspective, we 
believe that the emphasis should be on describing the 
process used to manage control as opposed to a listing of 
specific weaknesses or concerns.
III - 6
SETTING STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL CONTROL
Recomndation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations
should establish a body to guide public companies on 
internal controls.
Response:
We believe pur framework integrates and expands 
upon previous concepts and definitions.
We do see clear need to develop standards for 
judging the effectiveness and appropriateness of internal 
control systems using this framework. In particular, the 
auditing profession requires a methodology and a set of 
standards to evaluate and report on organization controls.
NCNB Corporation 
Charlotte, NC 28255 
Telephone 704 j 374-5000
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G e n t le m e n :
I  h a v e  r e a d  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  o n  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
C o m m it te e  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  c a r e f u l l y  a n d  
w i t h  g r e a t  i n t e r e s t .  I  com m end  y o u  o n  w h a t  I  v ie w  t o  b e  a 
t h o r o u g h  a n d  c o m p le t e  s t u d y  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  I 
c o n c u r  w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s .  T h e  c o m m e n ts  a n d  
s u g g e s t i o n s  w h ic h  f o l l o w  a r e  c l e a r l y  my o w n  a n d  s h o u ld  n o t  
b e  a t t r i b u t e d  a s  my c o m p a n y 's  p o s i t i o n .  I  h a v e  h a d  
e x p e r i e n c e  b o t h  a s  a " B ig  8 "  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m  p a r t n e r  
a n d  a s  a f i n a n c i a l  e x e c u t i v e  i n  a p u b l i c  c o m p a n y ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  
I  f e e l  q u a l i f i e d  i n  m a k in g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o m m e n ts .
1 . R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y ; I n  g e n e r a l ,  I  
c o m p l e t e l y  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  s p e c i f i c s  o f  y o u r  
r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y .  I  t h i n k  m any  
o f  th e m  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  g o o d  b u s in e s s  p r a c t i c e s  a n d ,  i n  
f a c t ,  m a n y  o f  t h e  b e t t e r  m a n a g e d  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  
a l r e a d y  h a v e  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  p l a c e  w h ic h  w o u ld  c o m p ly  
w i t h  m o s t  o f  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s .
H o w e v e r ,  I  q u e s t i o n  t h e  n e e d  f o r  b o t h  a m a n a g e m e n t 
r e p o r t  a n d  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c h a i r m a n  l e t t e r  i n  a n  
a n n u a l  r e p o r t  d e s c r i b i n g  e a c h  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  I  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
i n f o r m i n g  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  r o l e s  a n d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t,  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  a n d  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t ,  b u t  I  
d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  u s in g  t h r e e  s e p a r a t e  
l e t t e r s  t o  a c h ie v e  t h a t  g o a l .  I n s t e a d ,  I  f a v o r  a 
g e n e r a l  p a r a g r a p h  w h ic h  d e s c r i b e s  t h e i r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
2I also question the implementation of your 
recommendation for management to advise the audit 
committee when seeking a second opinion on significant 
accounting issues. I think there can be a variance of 
definition as to what constitutes a significant 
accounting issue and what constitutes seeking a second 
opinion. Further, I believe the premise of what this 
is trying to achieve can be accomplished or is already 
accomplished by audit committees having a thorough 
discussion with independent accountants on potential 
disagreements with management over accounting issues.
2. Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant: 
Again, I generally concur with the thrust of your 
recommendations.
The issue of the degree of the independent accountant's 
responsibility for the detection of fraud is complex.
I generally do not favor extending the auditor's 
responsibility in this area. I think it can be 
extremely costly and certainly subjects the independent 
accountant to potential increased liability in the 
future. To the extent the procedures need to be 
tightened to make sure there is adequate follow-up when 
the risk of fraudulent financial reporting is 
uncovered, I believe this is appropriate. But I do not 
think specifically addressing the absence of fraudulent 
financial reporting should be an additional burden nor 
do I believe that the shareholders or the users of the 
financial statements should think that the independent 
accountant has given complete assurance on this issue. 
However, consistent with this thought, I favor your 
recommendation of clarifying the auditor's role in 
auditor's report.
Another recommendation suggests establishing standards 
to require independent accountants to perform 
analytical reviews. This recommendation is a major 
departure from generally accepted auditing standards 
and I am somewhat skeptical as to its application if 
adopted. I personally favor analytical reviews but I 
favor the auditor using his judgement in the 
application of those reviews. I think if there is a 
standard requiring analytical reviews, there could be a 
great question as to how much is enough. This may 
force the auditor to do more than is necessary which 
may be counterproductive.
33. Recommendations for SEC and Others to Improve
Regulatory and Legal Environment
Recommendations for Education
Generally, I agree with the thrust and specifics of the 
recommendations in these areas.
Sincerely,
 
  
James H. Hance, Jr. 
Executive Vice President
c c : Thomas I. Storrs
Tulane
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O ffice o f  the P re s id e n t
June 25, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Gentlemen:
It has come to my attention that a portion of your generally 
commendable preliminary report contains language that could 
generate considerable problems for individuals serving on the 
audit committees of corporate boards. I refer to the first two 
sentences contained in Appendix K on page 183 under the heading 
"Audit Committee Good Practice Guidelines,” which read, ”An audit 
committee consisting of independent directors is the primary 
vehicle which boards of directors use to discharge their 
responsibility with respect to the company's financial reporting. 
An informed and vigilant audit committee represents one of the 
most effective influences for minimizing fraudulent financial 
reporting.”
This passage overstates considerably the role played by audit 
committees. Should it remain, it would expose such committees to 
an unfair burden in litigation, and would require that audit 
committees bear the expense of a full-time staff to fulfill the 
role set forth for them in the language quoted above.
I respectfully request that you amend the section to which I 
refer to avert placing such an unfair burden on audit committees 
and their members.
Eamon M. Kelly  
President  
Tulane University 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 
(504) 865-5201
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N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N . W .  
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6
G e n t l e m e n :
T e x a c o  i s  p l e a s e d  t o  o f f e r  i t s  c o m m e n t s  o n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  
( E D )  o n  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  T h e  C o m p a n y  a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  t h r u s t  
o f  t h e  E D  a n d  h o p e s  t h a t  i t s  o b s e r v a t i o n s  s e r v e  t o  c l a r i f y  c e r t a i n  p a r t i c u l a r s  
o r  o t h e r w i s e  h e l p  t o  f i n a l i z e  t h e  d o c u m e n t .
C h a p t e r  T w o :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y
T h e r e  i s  n o  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  e x e c u t i v e  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  
t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  q u a l i t y  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  T h e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r  
a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  a l w a y s  s t r i v e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  h i g h  
e t h i c a l  s t a n d a r d  f o r  t h e  C o m p a n y .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  n o  i n f e r e n c e  
t h a t  t h e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r  i s  p r i m a r i l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  h i s  c o m p a n y ' s  
e t h i c a l  c o n d u c t  i n  a r e a s  u n r e l a t e d  t o  h i s  f u n c t i o n .  C l e a r l y ,  t h e  c h i e f  
a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  a r e  a d e q u a t e  t o  d e t e c t  
f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  t h a t  t h e s e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  w r i t t e n  
g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n d u c t ,  a r e  w e l l  d o c u m e n t e d  a n d  
d i s t r i b u t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  e n d o r s e s  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r s '  Q u a l i t y  
A s s u r a n c e  S t a n d a r d  c a l l i n g  f o r  p e r i o d i c  e x t e r n a l  ( p e e r )  r e v i e w s  o f  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  g e n e r a l l y  
r e c e p t i v e  t o  t h i s  Q u a l i t y  A s s u r a n c e  S t a n d a r d ,  a s  i s  e v i d e n c e d  b y  s u r v e y  
r e s u l t s .  A m o n g  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  s u c h  e x t e r n a l  r e v i e w s  a r e  t h e i r  u n f a v o r a b l e  
c o s t / b e n e f i t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a n d  t h e i r  t i m e - c o n s u m i n g  n a t u r e s .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  
t h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a n  i n s u f f i c i e n t  b a s i s  f o r  t h e s e  r e v i e w s  t o  b e  m a d e  
m a n d a t o r y .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  a  f o r m a l  w r i t t e n  c h a r t e r  
w h i c h  o u t l i n e s  t h e  d u t i e s  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  I t  
w o u l d  a p p e a r  t h a t  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  s u c h  a  c h a r t e r  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  t o  
s t o c k h o l d e r s  w o u l d  o b v i a t e  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a n o t h e r  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w h i c h  c a l l s  f o r  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t o  w r i t e  
a  l e t t e r  d e s c r i b i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .
- 2 -
R e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  s e e k i n g  a  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n  o n  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  i s s u e ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  
a d v i s e  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  T e x a c o  a g r e e s  w i t h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a n y  c o m p a n y  t h a t  s e e k s  a n  o p i n i o n  f r o m  a  s e c o n d  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m  w o u l d  n o t  d i s c u s s  t h e  m a t t e r  w i t h  i t s  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  i n c l u s i v e  o f  a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .  W h i l e  g r e a t e r  i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  w i t h  i n t e r i m - p e r i o d  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  m e r i t ,  
a d o p t i o n  o f  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  a n  " o v e r k i l l ” . T h i s  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  i n  t h a t  o n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  a  c o m p a n y ' s  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s u l t s  t o  b e  r e v i e w e d  a t  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  m e e t i n g .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  
T e x a c o  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  i t  w o u l d . b e  u n w a r r a n t e d  t o  r e q u i r e  a  f o r m a l  a p p r o v a l  
b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o f  a l l  q u a r t e r l y  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  b o d y  t o  g u i d e  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s ,  T e x a c o  q u e s t i o n s  w h e t h e r  a  s e p a r a t e  
i n t e r - d i s c i p l i n a r y  b o d y  n e e d s  t o  b e  c r e a t e d .  I n  t h e  C o m p a n y ' s  o p i n i o n ,  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  g u i d a n c e  f o r  t h e  i n t e r n a l - c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  s h o u l d  b e  h a n d l e d  
b y  e x i s t i n g  p r i v a t e - s e c t o r  b o d i e s  t h a t  h a v e  a l r e a d y  s t u d i e d  a n d  p r e p a r e d  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  T e x a c o  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  i f  t h i s  
w e r e  t h e  c a s e ,  a n y  n e c e s s a r y  g u i d a n c e  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  
b e  d e v e l o p e d  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  a n d  e f f i c i e n t l y  t h a n  i f  a n  a l t o g e t h e r  n e w  b o d y  
w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d .  A n y  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  g u i d a n c e  s h o u l d  w e i g h  c o s t / b e n e f i t  
f a c t o r s  a n d  b e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  b r o a d  i n  s c o p e  t o  a v o i d  c r e a t i o n  o f  b u r d e n s o m e  
p r o c e d u r e s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  m a n y  c o m p a n i e s  a n d  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
C h a p t e r  T h r e e :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t
L e g i s l a t i v e  i n i t i a t i v e s  h a v e  f o c u s e d  u p o n  a  n e e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s '  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  d i s c o v e r y  a n d  e x p o s u r e  o f  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  a n d  
f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g . T h e  p o s t u r e  t a k e n  b y  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  a s  t o  t h e s e  
p r o p o s e d  i n c r e a s e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  s e e m s  r e a s o n a b l e .  T e x a c o  e s s e n t i a l l y  
a g r e e s  t h a t  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  s h o u l d  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  
( 1 )  t a k e  a f f i r m a t i v e  s t e p s  i n  e a c h  a u d i t  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  ( 2 )  d e s i g n  t e s t s  t o  p r o v i d e  r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e  o f  
d e t e c t i o n .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  C o m p a n y  c o n c u r s  t h a t  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f
p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  t o w a r d s  t h e s e  e n d s  o u g h t  t o  r e s t  w i t h  t h e  A u d i t i n g  
S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n s t i t u t e  o f  C e r t i f i e d  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  t h e  o u t s i d e  a c c o u n t a n t s  r e v i e w  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l  d a t a  b e f o r e  r e l e a s e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  T h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  n o t  
c o m p l e t e l y  c l e a r  a s  t o  h o w  i n v o l v e d  t h e  o u t s i d e  a c c o u n t a n t s  s h o u l d  b e c o m e  i n  
t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h e  C o m p a n y  v i e w s  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  a s  
p o t e n t i a l l y  l e a d i n g  t o  s o m e  r e q u i r e m e n t  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  a n  a u d i t o r s '  
o p i n i o n  o r  r e v i e w  r e p o r t  o n  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  I n  T e x a c o ' s  
o p i n i o n ,  a n y  s u c h  r e q u i r e m e n t  w o u l d  i n t r o d u c e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s  w i t h  m i n i m a l  
o r  n o  b e n e f i t  t o  u s e r s .  T h e  C o m p a n y  t h e r e f o r e  f a v o r s  a v o i d i n g  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
o f  p o s s i b l y  e x t e n s i v e  a d d i t i o n a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  o u t s i d e  a c c o u n t a n t s '  
a u d i t i n g  o r  r e v i e w i n g  o f  i n t e r i m  r e s u l t s .  M o r e o v e r ,  T e x a c o  u r g e s  t h e  
c o n t i n u a n c e  o f  c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e ,  w h i c h  a l l o w s  t h e  o u t s i d e  a c c o u n t a n t s  t o  e l e c t  
t o  r e v i e w  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  d a t a  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  y e a r - e n d  a u d i t  w o r k .
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Chapter Five; Recommendations for Education
The Company endorses the inclusion, in accountants’ and auditors’ 
continuing professional education, of the study of forces and opportunities 
that contribute to fraudulent financial reporting.
* * * * *
The opportunity to comment is appreciated.
A. J . BRADFORD
AJB/ds
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N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e  N . W.
W a s h in g t o n ,  D . C . 2 0 0 0 6
G e n t le m e n :
T h a n k  y o u  f o r  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  com m ent o n  y o u r  A p r i l  1987 E x p o s u re  
D r a f t .
I n  g e n e r a l,  w e a g re e  w i t h  t h e  C o m m is s io n  t h a t  t h e  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  p ro b le m  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  i s  im p o s s ib le .  We h a v e  
n o t  s e e n  r e l i a b l e  t r e n d  d a t a  t o  i n d i c a t e  i f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t in g  i s  i n c r e a s in g ,  d e c r e a s in g  o r  r e m a in in g  s t a t i c .  Y e t ,  t h e  
C om m iss ion  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  w o u ld  in c r e a s e  a u d i t  c o s t s  f o r  a l l  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n ie s  i n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  in c r e a s e  p r e v e n t i o n / d e t e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  
u n q u a n t i f i e d  p r o b le m .
W e q u e s t i o n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  a r e  
c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  w hen  t h e  in t e r p r e t a t io n s  a n d  p ro n o u n c e m e n ts  o f  o t h e r s ,  
l i k e  t h e  A c c o u n t in g  s ta n d a r d s  B o a rd , w i l l  r e a l l y  d e te r m in e  w h a t  t h e  
c o s t  im p a c t  w i l l  b e . W ith  t h i s  c o s t / b e n e f i t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  w e  a g r e e  
w i t h  m o s t o f  t h e  C om m iss ion  re c o m m e n d a tio n s . T h e r e fo r e ,  o u r  d e t a i l e d  
c o m m e n ts  w i l l  a d d r e s s  o n l y  t h o s e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  w h e r e  w e  f e e l  
c l a r i f i c a t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d  o r  w h e r e  w e  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t io n .
R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  P u b l i c  C o m p a n ie s :
P a g e  3 8  R e c o m m e n d a tio n : T h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  s h o u ld  a p p r o v e  i n
a d v a n c e  t h e  t y p e s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t a d v is o r y  
s e r v ic e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t p la n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m .
C o m m e n t: A s  w r i t t e n ,  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n  c o u l d  b e
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  r e q u i r i n g  s p e c i f i c  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l  f o r  
s p e c i f i c  m a n a g e m e n t a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s  e n g a g e m e n ts .  We 
s u g g e s t  “ . . .a d v a n c e  g u id e l in e s  o n  t h e  ty p e s  o f  s e r v i c e s  a n d  
a n  a n n u a l b u d g e t  f o r  m a n a g e m e n t a d v is o r y  s e r v i c e s . ." t o  
in d ic a t e  t h a t  t h e  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l i s  g e n e r a l  i n  n a t u r e ,  w i t h  
m a n a g e m e n t d e c id in g  o n  s p e c i f i c  e n g a g e m e n ts  w i t h i n  t h e  
e s t a b l i s h e d  g u i d e l i n e s  a n d  b u d g e t .
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
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Recommendations for Public Companies: (Continued)
Page 39 Recommendation: All public companies should be required by
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders 
management reports signed by the chief executive officer 
and chief accounting officer. The management report should 
acknowledge management's responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control, discuss how these 
responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide management's 
assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
controls.
Comment: While we agree with the need for a management
report, we question the in flex ib ility  of th is  
recommendation. The Boeing Company has included such a 
management report in the Annual Report for years, but they 
have been signed by the Executive Vice President-Chief 
Financial Officer and the Vice President-Controller.
We suggest the following revision to provide flexibility: 
"...management reports signed by two company officers, one 
of which should be the chief financial officer. The 
management..."
Page 41 Recommendation: All public companies should be required by
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders 
a letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
describing the committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year.
Comment: We wonder if inserting such a le tte r in the
annual report would really "...reinforce the audit 
committee members' awareness and acceptance of the 
importance of their responsibilities..." The directors 
already sign our form 10-K required by the SEC and 
available to stockholders upon request. In addition, our 
annual Proxy Statement, approved by the board of directors 
and sent to all stockholders, describes the duties and 
responsibilities of the audit committee and includes the 
names of its  members.
We question the need for an additional letter signed by the 
chairman of the audit committee.
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
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Recommendations for Public Companies: (Continued)
Page 42 Recommendation: When a public company changes independent
public accountants, i t  should be required by SEC rule to 
disclose publicly the nature of any material accounting or 
auditing issues discussed with its old and new auditors 
during the three-year period preceding the change.
Comment: We believe this recommendation is not practical
for the following reasons:
1. Public companies would be reluctant to change CPAs, the 
incumbent would be locked-in.
2. This requirement would chill candid exchanges between 
management and the CPAs for fear they might have to 
report i t  someday.
3. The record keeping imposed on both parties would be 
costly and may never be used.
We believe this recommendation should be deleted, or as a 
minimum, revised to cover only disagreements on material 
accounting or auditing issues.
Page 42 Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This 
oversight should include approving financial results prior 
to public release.
Comment: We agree with the first sentence, the audit
committee should look at the process of developing 
quarterly financial data. We disagree with the second 
sentence requiring audit committee approval of the discrete 
numbers resulting from that process.
We believe that audit committee approval of quarterly 
results is not practical. Publication of quarterly data 
could be delayed pending an audit committee meeting.
N atio n a l Commission on
F rau d u len t F in an c ia l
R eportin g
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Recommendations fo r  Independent P u b lic  A ccountan ts:
Page 46 Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise 
standards to restate the independent pub lic  accountant's 
re sp on sib ility  f o r  detection  o f  fra u d u le n t  f in a n c ia l  
reporting, requiring the independent pub lic  accountant to
(1) take affirm ative steps in each audit to  a s se s s  the  
potential fo r  such reporting and (2) d es ign  t e s t s  to  
provide reason ab le  a ssu ran ce  o f  detec tion . R evised  
standards should include guidance fo r  assessing r isk s  and 
p u rsu in g  d etection  when r is k s  a re  id e n t i f ie d .
Comment: We question the cost/benefit relationship o f th is
recommendation. We have no empirical data regarding the  
prevalence o f fraudulent f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g , y e t  a l l  
public companies would pay substantially h igher audit fees  
f o r  th e  " . . . a f f i r m a t iv e  s te p s .. .a n d .. .t e s t s . . ."  th e  
independent p u b lic  accountants would perform .
Page 48 Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should
e s ta b lis h  s tan d a rd s  to  r e q u ire  independent p u b lic  
accountants to perform analytical review procedures in  a l l  
audit engagements and should provide improved guidance on 
the a p p ro p r ia te  use  o f  th ese  p ro ced u res .
Comment: Once aga in , we a re  concerned w ith  the
cost/benefit aspects o f th is  recommendation. C u rren t  
optional analytical review procedures have vary ing degrees  
of sophistication. The impact on audit fees  w il l  depend 
on w hether o r  not th e  "...im proved  g u id a n c e ..."  i s  
practical and rea lis t ic . Since the extent o f fraudulent 
financia l reporting i s  s t i l l  unknown, th e re  may be  a 
tendency to specify "...improved guidance..." that resu lts  
in  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  h igh e r  au d it  fe e s .
Page 50 Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section should
strengthen its  peer review program by increasing review o f 
audit engagements involving public company clients new to  a 
firm. For each office selected fo r  peer review , the f i r s t  
au d it  o f  a l l  such new c lie n ts  shou ld  be  rev iew ed .
BOEING
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Recommendations for Independent Public Accountants: (Continued) 
Page 50 (Continued)
Comment: We question the cost/benefit relationship of this 
recommendation. Peer review of all clients new to a firm 
ignores the concept of sampling which is a basic audit 
principle. I t may also assume that all new clients are 
changes from another CPA firm, ignoring new companies or 
formerly private companies that have just gone public.
We suggest revising the second sentence to read, "for each 
office selected for peer review, evaluate the circumstances 
surrounding new clients before selecting the sample of 
audits to be reviewed. The sample should include the first 
audit of some new clients who changed from another CPA 
firm.”
Page 52 and
Page 53 Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise
the auditor's  standard report to describe the extent to 
which the independent public accountant has reviewed and 
evaluated the system of internal accounting control. The 
Auditing Standards Board also should provide explicit 
guidance to address the situation where, as a result of his 
knowledge of the Company's internal accounting controls, 
the independent public accountant disagrees with 
management's assessment as stated in the proposed 
management's report.
Comment: We question whether a prescribed, standard
wording of the extent of review of internal accounting 
control will really aid the investing public to understand 
the CPA's role if they do not already understand it. Here 
again, if the wording sets too high a standard, i t  could 
cause an unreasonable increase in audit costs, with little 
or no benefit.
In the second half of this recommendation, the increased 
work the CPA would do to have a basis for publicly 
disagreeing with management's assessment of internal 
accounting controls would be very expensive. We question 
the practicality of this recommendation, because client 
companies would balk at paying the CPA for extra work used 
to disagree with them.
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
6 1-9140-WEV-87-326
Recommendations for the SEC:
Page 69 Recommendation: The SEC must be given adequate resources
to perform existing and additional functions that help 
prevent, detect and deter fraudulent financial reporting.
Comment: Without some data on whether fraudulent financial
reporting is increasing, decreasing or remaining static, i t  
is difficult to evaluate this recommendation for SEC 
resources.
Page 70 Recommendation: state boards of accountancy should
implement positive enforcement programs that periodically 
would review the quality of services that the independent 
public accountants they license render.
Comment: We believe the state boards could utilize the
results of professional organization peer reviews to 
perform this oversight function, rather than increasing the 
state board to duplicate peer reviews.
Thank you for this opportunity to provide our comments. Should 
further information be desired, please advise.
Sincerely,
A. H. Lowell 
Vice President 
Controller
WEV:jc
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Carolina Power & Light Company
P.O. Box 1551 • Raleigh, N.C. 27602 
(919) 836-7592
ROBERT A. DINUBILA 
Manager - Audit Services June 2 9 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W.
W a s h in g to n , DC 20006
D ear G en tlem en :
We a re  p le a s e d  to  have th e  o p p o r tu n i t y  to  re sp o n d  to  y o u r  e xp o su re  d r a f t  
p r e s e n t in g  th e  f in d in g s ,  c o n c lu s io n s ,  and recom m enda tions  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  
C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .  O v e r a l l ,  we b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e  
C om m iss ion ’ s recom m enda tio ns  a re  w e l l  th o u g h t o u t a n d , ta k e n  to g e th e r ,  
re p re s e n t  a v a l i d  re sp o n se  to  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  O ur re v ie w  was 
made fro m  th e  p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  a com pany’ s endorsem ent o f  th e  recom m enda tions  
i n  t h e i r  t o t a l i t y .
We do n o t  a g re e , h o w e ve r, w i t h  a p o r t io n  o f  one o f  th e  C om m iss ion ’ s 
recom m enda tio ns  a b o u t q u a r t e r ly  r e p o r t in g .  The C om m ission s ta te s  on page 43 
o f  i t s  r e p o r t  " . . .  t h a t  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  s h o u ld  a p p ro ve  in  adva n ce , th e  
re le a s e  o f  q u a r t e r ly  f i n a n c ia l  r e s u l t s  to  th e  p u b l i c . "  We b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e  
a u d i t  c o m m itte e ’ s o n g o in g  o v e r s ig h t  o f  th e  p ro c e s s  o f  p re p a r in g  and re v ie w in g  
q u a r t e r ly  r e p o r ts  p r o te c t s  th e  p u b l ic  i n t e r e s t .  I t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  th e  
a u d i t  co m m itte e  to  a p p ro ve  th e  re le a s e  o f  each q u a r t e r ly  r e p o r t  i n  o rd e r  to  
a d e q u a te ly  c o n d u c t i t s  o v e r s ig h t  r o l e .  We f u r t h e r  b e l ie v e  t h a t  such  a re v ie w  
w o u ld  d e la y  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f i n a n c ia l  d a ta  fro m  a l l  p u b l ic  com panies 
w h ic h  w o u ld  be d e t r im e n ta l  to  th e  u s e rs  o f  th e  in fo r m a t io n .
We a p p r e c ia te  th e  o p p o r tu n i t y  to  re sp o n d  to  th e  C om m iss ion ’ s re co m m e n d a tio n s .
R o b e rt A . D iN u b ila
RAD/vbd
Xerox Corporation 
P.O. Box 1600
Stamford, Connecticut 06904 
203 329-8700
X E R O X
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M r. Jam es C . T re a d w a y , J r .,C h a irm a n  
N a tio n a l C o m m iss io n  on F ra u d u le n t 
F in a n c ia l R e p o rt in g  
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  A venue , N . W. 
W ash ing ton , D . C . 20006
D e a r M r. T re a d w a y :
We w e lco m e  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  p ro v id e  co m m e n ts  on th e  Exposure  D ra f t  
o f  th e  C o m m iss ion ’s re p o r t .  We agree  th a t  a com prehen s ive  p ro g ra m  
th a t  in c ludes  a l l  p a r t ie s  to  th e  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  process can  indeed 
im p ro ve  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  and re d u c e  th e  in c id e n c e  o f  f r a u d u le n t  
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g . F u r th e r  th e  re s u lt in g  im p ro ve d  c o n fid e n c e  o f  th e  
in v e s tm e n t c o m m u n ity  in  th e  f in a n c ia l  d a ta  d is c lo s e d  b y  p u b lic  
com pan ies w i l l  s u re ly  be b e n e fic ia l to  th e  e f f ic ie n t  o p e ra tio n  o f  th e  
c a p ita l m a rke ts . As a p u b lic  c o m p a n y  w ith  b o th  d e b t and e q u ity  
s e c u r it ie s  l is te d  and tra d e d  a ro u n d  th e  w o r ld ,  w e ha ve  fo u n d  th a t  
co n fid e n ce  in  th e  q u a lity  and r e l ia b i l i t y  o f  o u r f in a n c ia l d a ta  has been an 
im p o r ta n t fa c to r  in  o b ta in in g  o u r c a p ita l.
We s u p p o rt m o s t o f  th e  C o m m iss io n s  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  a n d  h a ve  
c o n c e n tra te d  o u r re v ie w  and e v a lu a tio n  on those  re co m m e n d a tio n s  to  
p u b lic  com pan ies . In  th e  fo l lo w in g  paragraphs, w e have p ro v id e d  o u r 
com m en ts  on those  re co m m e n d a tio n s  th a t  w e b e lie ve  co u ld  be im p ro v e d  
th ro u g h  m o d if ic a t io n ,  shou ld  be re co n s id e re d  o r  m ay n o t p ro v id e  a c o s t-  
ju s t i f ie d  b e n e f it .
R e com m enda tions  f o r  th e  P u b lic  C om pany
O b je c t iv i ty  o f  th e  In te rn a l A u d it  F u n c t io n  -  T h e re  has been a lo n g  ra g in g  
deba te  re g a rd in g  th e  m o s t e f f e c t iv e  re p o r t in g  re la t io n s h ip  f o r  th e  
in te rn a l a u d it fu n c t io n .  The C o m m iss ion  has op te d  to  re co m m e n d  th e  
re p o r t in g  re la t io n s h ip  th a t  w ou ld  g e n e ra lly  p u t th e  in te rn a l a u d it fu n c t io n  
o u ts ide  o f  th e  f in a n c e  fu n c t io n . T h is  c e r ta in ly  m a x im ize s  th e  o b je c t iv i ty  
o f  th e  in te rn a l a u d ito r , b u t i t  m ay n o t m a x im iz e  th e  e ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f  th e  
fu n c tio n . We b e lie ve  th a t  by in c lu d in g  th e  in te rn a l a u d it fu n c t io n  in  
fin a n c e , we m a x im iz e  e ffe c tiv e n e s s  by h a v in g  th e  fu n c t io n  d ire c te d  by 
those  who have  th e  m ost in s ig h t in to  th e  com pany 's  o p e ra tio n s  f ro m  a 
f id u c ia ry  p e rs p e c tiv e . T h is  should he lp  to  assign th e  in te rn a l a u d it  
resources to  th e  areas th a t  a re  m ost se n s itiv e  and re q u ire  in te rn a l a u d it 
re v ie w . T h is  in  tu rn  m a x im ize s  th e  com pany 's  re tu rn  on th e  in te rn a l 
a u d it costs .
Mr. J a m e s  C . T readw ay - 2 - Ju n e  29, 1987
H ow ever, we reco g n ize  th a t  th e  in te rn a l a u d ito rs ’ o b je c tiv ity  m ust be 
p r o te c te d .  T h e re fo re  o u r V ic e -P re s id e n t - In te rn a l  A u d itin g  m ay 
co m m u n ic a te  d ire c tly  w ith  th e  CEO and th e  aud it c o m m itte e  o f th e  
board  o f d ire c to rs  a t  any tim e  req u ire d . We believe  th a t  a  m idpoin t th a t  
could  p rov ide  th e  n e cessa ry  o b je c tiv ity  w ith o u t s a c r if ic in g  e ffe c tiv e n e ss  
would be to  am end  th e  reco m m en d a tio n  to  re q u ire  a  q u a r te r ly  m eetin g  
b e tw ee n  th e  CEO and th e  in te rn a l a u d ito r  to  en su re  th a t  re g a rd le ss  of 
th e  in te rn a l a u d ito r’s re p o rtin g  re la tio n sh ip , th e  sen io r m anager of th e  
c o rp o ra tio n  is k ep t ap p rised  of in te rn a l au d it co n cern s . This is so m eth in g  
th a t  th e  C om m ission  has enco u rag ed , w hich  we b e lie v e  cou ld  be a 
s u b s ti tu te  rec o m m en d a tio n .
In te rn a l A ud it Invo lvem en t a t  th e  C o rp o ra te  L eve l - T he C om m ission  
reco m m en d s  th a t  th e  in te rn a l a u d ito rs  be involved in th e  e n tire  fin a n c ia l 
au d it inc lud ing  p a r t ic ip a tin g  a t th e  C o rp o ra te  level. O ur e x p e rien c e  has 
b een  th a t  th e  independen t a c c o u n ta n ts  p e rfo rm  th e  c o rp o ra te  lev e l au d it 
w ork to  m e e t th e ir  p ro fess io n a l re sp o n s ib ilitie s . To a lso  b rin g  th e  
in te rn a l a u d ito rs  in to  th e  c o rp o ra te  le v e l a u d it w ork w ould only lead  to  
d u p lic a tio n  and in e ffic ie n cy . F u r th e r , even  if th e  in te rn a l au d ito rs  did 
p a r t ic ip a te  in th e  c o rp o ra te  le v e l au d it it m ay only be fo r  th e  m ore 
m undane ta sk s  w hich would not p rov ide  th e  b e n e f its  so u g h t by th e  
C om m ission , w hich we u n d e rs tan d  to  be fo r  th e  in te rn a l a u d ito rs  to  
u til iz e  th e ir  know ledge o f th e  business to  re co g n ize  any  ir re g u la r it ie s  
th a t  o c cu r a t  th e  c o rp o ra te  lev e l. We be lieve  th a t  th e  in te rn a l au d ito rs  
can  ach iev e  th e  sam e o b je c t iv e  th ro u g h  a c c e s s  to  and  a n a ly s is  of 
c o rp o ra te  and  o p e ra t in g  u n it f in a n c ia l  d a ta  to  d e te rm in e  if i t  is 
re a so n a b le  in th e  c o n te x t of th e  o p e ra tin g  un it lev e l au d it w ork. In f a c t  
th is  ty p e  o f a sse ssm en t would seem  to  be n e cessa ry  on an  annual basis fo r 
th e  in te rn a l a u d ito r  to  p lan  th e  n a tu re  and e x te n t of th e  au d it w ork fo r 
th a t  y e a r .
A ud it C o m m itte e  C h a irm an 's  L e t te r  - T he C om m ission  recom m ends th a t  
th e  C h airm an  of th e  a u d it c o m m itte e  include in th e  annual re p o r t a 
l e t t e r  th a t  s e ts  fo r th  th e  c o m m itte e ’s re sp o n sib ilitie s  and  a c t iv i t ie s  
d u rin g  th e  y e a r .  M any c o m p a n ie s  in c lu d in g  X e ro x  in c lu d e  su ch  
in fo rm a tio n  on th e  au d it c o m m itte e  in th e ir  re p o r t of m an ag em en t. We 
b e liev e  th a t  th is  is th e  p re fe ra b le  m ethod  fo r in fo rm ing  sh areh o ld e rs  of 
th e  e x is te n c e  and a c tiv it ie s  of th e  aud it c o m m itte e . The a d d itio n  of 
a n o th e r  s e p a ra te  l e t t e r  from  th e  c h a irm an  of th e  a u d it c o m m itte e  could 
be con fusing  to  sh a reh o ld e rs  and is u n n ecessa ry  if th e  in fo rm a tio n  is 
inc luded  in th e  re p o rt o f m an ag em en t.
M r. Ja m e s  C. T readw ay -3 - Ju n e  29, 1987
P u b lic  D isc lo su re  o f  M a te r ia l A c co u n tin g  o r  A ud itin g  Issues D iscussed  
w ith  A u d ito rs  D uring  T h re e  Y ears  P re c e d in g  a  C hange  in  A u d ito rs  -  We
b e liev e  th e  c u rre n t d isc lo su re  ru le s  in SEC Form  8-K  p rov ide  su ff ic ie n t 
p ub lic  d isc lo su re  o f d isa g re e m e n ts  w ith  a u d ito rs  th a t  a re  p ro x im a te  to  a  
ch an g e  in a u d ito rs . T he rec o m m en d a tio n s  to  d isc lo se  issues d iscussed  
w ith  a u d ito rs  w ould have  a  ch illin g  e f f e c t  on th e  no rm al and h e a lth y  
d ia logue  th a t  o c cu rs  b e tw e e n  c lie n t and a u d ito r  to  a rr iv e  a t  th e  kinds o f 
a c c o u n tin g  tr e a tm e n ts  and a u d itin g  p ro c e d u res  th a t  a re  a p p ro p ria te  to  
sp e c if ic  c irc u m sta n c e s . This re c o m m en d a tio n  if  ad o p ted  by th e  SEC 
cou ld  re s u lt  in th e  d e te r io ra tio n  in th e  a u d ito r  c lie n t re la tio n sh ip  th a t  is 
im p o r ta n t to  th e  a c h ie v e m e n t o f a  high q u a lity  o f f in a n c ia l re p o r tin g  
th ro u g h o u t th e  business w orld w ith o u t in c re m e n ta l b e n e f it  to  th e  q u a lity  
o f  f in a n c ia l re p o rtin g .
A u d it C o m m itte e s  Should A pprove Q u a r te r ly  F in a n c ia l R e su lts  P r io r  to  
Issu an ce  -  We b e lie v e  th a t  th e  au d it c o m m itte e  shou ld  e n su re  t h a t  
in te rn a l  c o n tro ls  a re  a d e q u a te  to  p rov ide  q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l d a ta  th a t  
m e e t th e  n e ce ssa ry  re q u ire m e n ts  o f in te g r i ty  and f a i r  p r e s e n ta t io n .  
H ow ever, w e b e liev e  th a t  hav ing  s a tis f ie d  th e m se lv e s  th a t  th e  q u a r te r ly  
r e p o r t in g  p ro c e ss  is a d e q u a te ,  th e  a u d it  c o m m it te e  shou ld  p e rm it  
m an ag em en t to  p re p a re  and re le a s e  q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l d a ta  w ith o u t 
ro u t in e  re v ie w . We do  s u p p o r t  a n d  c u r r e n t ly  c o m p ly  w ith  th e  
C om m ission’s re c o m m en d a tio n  to  hav e  in d ep en d en t a u d ito rs  p e r fo rm  
th e i r  re v ie w  o f  q u a r te r ly  d a ta  p r io r  to  r e le a s e  o f  th e  q u a r t e r ly  
in fo rm a tio n . A dd itiona lly , m an ag em en t should  in fo rm  th e  e n tire  board  o f 
d ire c to rs  o f m a te r ia l  e v e n ts  th a t  w ill a f f e c t  th e  q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l  
s ta te m e n ts  p rio r to  re le a s e  o f th o se  f in a n c ia l s ta te m e n ts .
In  s u m m a ry , w e b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e  C o m m is s s io n  h a s  p r e p a r e d  a  
co m p reh en siv e  and  g e n e ra lly  w ell th o u g h t o u t s e t  o f rec o m m en d a tio n s  
t h a t  if  im p lem en ted  in to to  would su b s ta n tia lly  im prove  th e  re l ia b ili ty  of 
f in a n c ia l re p o rtin g , as w ell a s , th e  p u b lic ’s p e rc e p tio n  o f  f in a n c ia l  
re p o rtin g . F o r th e  m ost p a r t ,  X erox  a lre a d y  is in co m p lian ce  w ith  th e  
pub lic  com pany  re c o m m en d a tio n s . H ow ever, as  d e sc rib ed  above, w e 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  in  s o m e  i n s t a n c e s  t h e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  m a d e  
re co m m en d a tio n s  th a t  should  be  re c o n sid e re d  o r m odified .
S in cere ly ,
S tu a r t  B. Ross
V ice P re s id e n t F in an ce  and C o n tro l 
C h ie f F in an c ia l O ff ic e r
S B R /jf
c : D T K earns 
JJM cG in ty  
T C T heobald
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B E L L S O U T H
W.H. Guin
Comptroller
BellSouth Corporation
675 West Peachtree Street, N.E.
Room 4432
Atlanta, Georgia 30375 
404 420-8500
June 29, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
Mr. G. Dewey A rn o ld , E xecu tive  D ire c to r  
1701 P ennsylvan ia  Avenue, N. W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. A rn o ld :
B e llS o u th  C o rp o ra tio n  a p p re c ia te s  th is  o p p o r tu n ity  to  respond to  the  A p r i l  
1987 Exposure D ra f t  Report o f  the N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l 
R e p o rtin g . B e llS o u th  commends the  Commission on an e x c e lle n t jo b  o f 
id e n t i f y in g  causa l fa c to rs  th a t  can lead  to  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  and 
s teps to  reduce i t s  in c id e n ce .
W hile  fo r  the  most p a r t  we support the  Commission's re p o r t  and the many 
p r a c t ic a l  and reasonable recommendations th a t  are  con ta ined  in  the  re p o r t ,  we 
shou ld  l i k e  to  comment upon what we b e lie v e  is  a m ajor weakness in  the 
approach to  s tu d y in g  the  causes o f  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  (FFR). In  
our o p in io n , the  Commission shou ld  have a lso  in c lu d e d  in  t h e ir  research 
in v e s t ig a t io n s  o f  in s tan ces  where a tro u b le d  company d id  n o t re s o r t  to  FFR. 
We b e lie v e  th a t  such an in v e s t ig a t io n  would prove in v a lu a b le  in  ana lyz in g  the 
e n t ir e  area o f  FFR and would p ro v id e  a b e t te r  unders tand ing  o f  why FFR may or 
may n o t occu r.
A ga in , we commend the Commission fo r  t h e i r  e f f o r t s ,  and we subm it the 
fo llo w in g  comments which r e f le c t  our re a c t io n s , suggestions and op in ions  
re g a rd in g  in d iv id u a l recommendations. For the  convenience o f  the  Commission, 
we have re s ta te d  the  recommendation as i t  appears in  the  re p o r t ,  fo llo w e d  by 
our comments.
The Tone at the Top
General-We agree that the "tone at the top" is the most important factor 
contributing to the integrity of the financial reporting process. However, we 
believe the Commission should emphasize that what is meant by "tone" is not 
words spoken by management but actions taken by management. Corporate Codes 
of Conduct should be enforced, and evidence of such enforcement should be 
properly communicated to the employee body.
CHAPTER TWO: Recommendations for the Public Company
Recommendation: For the top management of a public company to discharge its 
obligation to oversee the financial reporting process, it must identify, 
understand and assess the factors that may cause the company's financial 
statements to be fraudulently misstated.
The text accompanying this recommendation states that assessing the risk of 
FFR requires judgment and creativity. We suggest that it should read 
"...judgment, creativity and awareness of the importance of assessing the risk 
of FFR."
The text also implies that the Commission is suggesting a procedure to 
document a company's method of assessing the risk of FFR. We believe that 
this would be burdensome to industry and suggest that the Commission clarify 
what is meant by "participation at all levels of the company..." but top-level 
corporate management, such as CEO and the CFO, should supervise the process.
Recommendation; Public companies should maintain internal controls that are 
adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
We agree with this recommendation but believe that the issue of 
cost-effectiveness should be brought out in the text which accompanies this 
recommendation.
Recommendation: Public companies should develop and enforce written codes of 
corporate conduct. Codes of conduct should foster a strong ethical climate 
and open channels of communication to help protect against fraudulent 
financial reporting. A company's audit committee should review compliance 
with the code annually, including compliance by top management, and report 
thereon to the board of directors.
We concur that a company's audit committee should review compliance with the 
code of conduct; however, we suggest that such reviews should be conducted 
periodically which may be more or less frequent than annually. We also concur 
in the need for an accessible internal complaint and appeal mechanism. It
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should offer confidentiality and safeguards against reprisal. The Internal 
Auditing, Legal and Security organizations of a company would be existing 
means to effectively handle complaints. These organizations are in the best 
position to review the allegations made by performing an independent 
investigation without calling undue attention to the situation.
Accounting Function and Chief Accounting Officer
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain accounting functions that
can effectively meet their financial reporting obligations.
The text accompanying this recommendation indicates that the Chief Accounting 
Officer (CAO) is directly responsible for corporate financial statements and 
should be held responsible for fraudulent financial reporting. However, other 
aspects of the draft report suggest that cases occur where the CAO is not 
always informed of fraudulent practices.
We concur that, as presently implied in the SEC Code, the CAO should be held 
responsible for the integrity of corporate financial statements, and submit 
that through proper utilization of corporate internal auditors and 
representation letters, the CAO has sufficient tools to ensure the ongoing 
integrity of such reporting.
Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain an effective internal audit 
function staffed with an adequate number of qualified personnel appropriate to 
the size and the nature of the company.
The text accompanying this recommendation should expand on the term 
professionalism. A mention of the various certifications such as Certified 
Internal Auditor (CIA), the Certified Management Accountant (CMA), and the 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) is appropriate.
This section also endorses the concept of periodic external peer review of the 
internal audit function called for in the IIA Quality Assurance Standard. It 
would be helpful if the Commission would clarify what is meant by "peer 
review". For instance, the Quality Assurance Standard calls for the "external 
review" to be "performed by qualified persons who are independent of the 
organization and who do not have either a real or an apparent conflict of 
interest". The Commission's report should make a recommendation as to what 
persons they suggest perform this review.
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Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their internal audit 
functions are objective.
We agree that the internal audit function should be objective; however, we do 
not believe that the Chief Internal Auditor should be required to report to 
the CEO. We make this suggestion, not because the Commission Draft suggests 
that the majority of fraudulent financial reporting cases reviewed were 
perpetrated at high levels of management, but because experience has taught us 
that in order to be effective the Chief Internal Auditor must possess two 
tools. First, he or she should report to a sufficiently high-level in the 
hierarchy of management to have clout, and second such auditors need absolute 
freedom of access. The Commission has documented a much better case that 
proper career pathing and supervision of such employees would occur by 
reporting to the officer responsible for the integrity of financial reporting 
- the CAO.
We believe the Commission should require that an informed audit committee 
assume responsibility for reviewing and assessing the reporting relationship 
of Chief Internal Auditors as with other important management functions and 
refrain from prescribing reporting relationships. What is important is that 
the Chief Internal Auditor has direct and unrestricted access to both the CEO 
and the audit committee.
Recommendation: Internal auditors should consider the implications of their
nonfinancial audit findings for the company's financial statements.
We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: Management and the audit committee should ensure that the 
internal auditors' involvement in the audit of the entire financial reporting 
process is appropriate and properly coordinated with the independent public 
accountant.
We support this recommendation. However, it should be pointed out that the 
internal and external auditors have different responsibilities and their 
scopes are different. This section implies that there should be no overlap 
between the two groups. We do not agree. If an external auditor has 
investigated a particular subject, this does not automatically dictate that an 
internal auditor should not also look at the subject.
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee
Recommendation: The board of directors of all public companies should be
required by SEC rule to establish audit committees comprised solely of 
independent directors.
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We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective 
overseers of the financial reporting process and the company’s internal 
controls.
We support this recommendation with the exception of the audit committee 
chairman's letter. We believe that it is unnecessary for the chairman of the 
audit committee to write a letter describing the committee’s activities and 
responsibilities for inclusion in the annual report to shareholders. In the 
case of many major corporations, including BellSouth, the annual report 
already contains a description of audit committee activities in the Report of 
Management. We suggest that such reporting be required only where not 
included in management's report.
Recommendation: All public companies should develop a written charter setting 
forth the duties and responsibility of the audit committee. The board of 
directors should approve the charter, review it at least annually, and modify 
it as necessary.
We support this recommendation with the exception of requiring an annual 
review of the charter. We would suggest using "periodically" instead because 
it may be appropriate to conduct such reviews at intervals greater than or 
less than annually.
Recommendation: Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority
to discharge their responsibilities.
We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: The audit committee should review management's evaluation of 
factors related to the independence of the company's public accountant. Both 
the audit committee and management should assist the public accountant in 
preserving his independence.
We support this recommendation, however, we believe that neither management 
nor the audit committee can be held totally responsible for the independence 
of the external accountant. The report should make clear the fact that 
independence is first and foremost the responsibility of the accountant, since 
independence is their primary value to the corporation.
Recommendation: The audit committee should approve in advance the types and 
the extent of management advisory services that management plans to engage the 
company's independent public accountant to perform.
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The proposal that the audit committee review, in advance, the use of the 
independent public accountant is impractical, unnecessary, and infringes on 
management's responsibility. A preferable recommendation is that audit
committees review, on an after—the—fact basis, fees paid to and services 
provided by the public accountant for non-audit services.
Reporting on Responsibilities in the Annual Report to Stockholders
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders management reports signed by 
the chief executive officer and chief accounting officer. The management 
report should acknowledge management's responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control, discuss how these responsibilities were 
fulfilled, and provide management's assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company's internal controls.
It has been clearly evidenced at annual meetings and on other occasions over 
the years that the CEO is responsible not only for the management report but 
for all sections of the annual report; therefore, we do not believe it 
appropriate for the SEC to require such dual signatures. Such matters should 
be left to the prerogatives of management.
We concur with the Commission's recommended content of management's report 
with one minor suggestion. The Commission states "...management's assessment 
should be limited to material matters...", although materiality has not been 
adequately defined. The Commission should provide guidance in this area, 
since this concept of materiality differs from that associated with the fair 
presentation of financial statements.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by the 
chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's responsibilities 
and activities during the year.
As previously stated, we do not support this recommendation. We feel that a 
letter from the chairman of the audit committee is unnecessary. We also do 
not agree with the opening sentence of the text accompanying this 
recommendation which implies the role of the audit committee is largely hidden 
from the investing public. The New York Stock Exchange requires that listed 
companies have an audit committee and we believe the majority of reasonable, 
prudent investors are aware of the audit committee's responsibilities.
In addition, the proxy statement already requires a description of the audit 
committee responsibilities and BellSouth along with many listed companies 
cover such activities and responsibilities in the management report. We 
believe this is over-kill and certainly should not be required where presently 
covered in such a manner.
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Seeking A Second Opinion
Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee when it seeks a
second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
We strongly agree with the statement made by the Commission that "Management 
has, and should have, the prerogative to seek second opinions." Since we do 
firmly believe in this statement, we can not support the Commission's 
recommendation without further clarification. We believe that the audit 
committee need only be informed about a second opinion if it differs from the 
opinion of its external accounting firm and if the second opinion is used by 
the company.
Recommendation: When a public company changes independent public accountants, 
it should be required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature of any 
material accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old and new auditors 
during the three-year period preceding the change.
We believe the current SEC requirements (10-K; Part II Item 9) are adequate. 
We therefore do not support this recommendation which, in our opinion, implies 
that it is always a major disclosure issue when a company changes auditors.
Quarterly Reporting
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight of the 
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include approving 
financial results prior to public release.
Approving the release of quarterly financial results is clearly a function of 
management, not the audit committee. The audit committee is not, and should 
not be expected to be, accountable for the accuracy of quarterly results. We 
do support the concept of having the independent accountant review quarterly 
results prior to their release, and presently review quarterly results with 
the audit committee on a timely basis, which may occur prior to or following 
release to the public.
Setting Standards for Internal Control
Recommendation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations should establish a
body to guide public companies on internal controls.
We agree with the statement that internal control is a complex, dynamic, 
constantly evolving concept. We do not believe, however, that a separate body 
should be established to guide public companies. Instead, we suggest that the
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AICPA Auditing Standards Board is the most appropriate organization to further 
study the issues surrounding internal controls. This Board presently has ten 
outstanding exposure drafts on generally accepted auditing standards, many of 
which parallel the concerns expressed by the Commission.
CHAPTER THREE: Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant
Recognizing Responsibility for Detecting Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise standards to 
restate the independent public accountant's responsibility for detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting, requiring the independent public accountant to 
(1) take affirmative steps in each audit to assess the potential for such 
reporting and (2) design tests to provide reasonable assurance of detection. 
Revised standards should include guidance for assessing risks and pursuing 
detection when risks are identified.
Requiring the auditor to design tests to provide "reasonable assurance" of the 
detection of fraud necessitates that a definition (with guidelines) of 
"reasonable assurance" be developed. In addition, we see a vast difference 
between requiring the independent accountant to "actively consider the 
potential for FFR" and being responsible for detecting FFR. It seems unclear 
how the independent accountant can design audit procedures to detect the lack 
of integrity in financial reporting. We believe the Commission should further 
clarify what action it believes the independent accountant should pursue.
Improving Detection Capabilities
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards to
require independent public accountants to perform analytical review procedures 
in all audit engagements and should provide improved guidance on the 
appropriate use of these procedures.
We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public accountants to 
review quarterly financial data of public companies before release to the 
public.
We support this recommendation. BellSouth has an established procedure for 
the review of quarterly financial data by its independent accountants prior to 
the release of this information to the public.
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Improving Audit Quality
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section should strengthen its peer
review program by increasing review of audit engagements involving public 
company clients new to a firm. For each office selected for peer review, the 
first audit of all such new clients should be reviewed.
We have no comment on this recommendation.
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section requirement for a
concurring, or second partner, review of the audit report should be revised as 
part of an ongoing process of review of this requirement. Standards for the 
concurring review should, among other things, (1) require concurring review 
partner involvement in the planning stage of the audit in addition to the 
final review stage, (2) specify qualifications of the concurring review 
partner to require prior experience with audits of SEC registrants and 
familiarity with the client's industry, and (3) require the concurring review 
partner to consider himself a peer of the engagement partner for purposes of 
the review.
We have no comment on this recommendation.
Recommendation: Public accounting firms should recognize and control the
organizational and individual pressures that potentially reduce audit quality.
We support this recommendation but feel that the text related to this 
recommendation implies that the independent public accountant would "look the 
other way" if time constraints were applied. We do not believe this is true 
and would suggest to the Commission that this text be rewritten with emphasis 
on proper planning for the audit.
Communicating the Auditor's Role
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's 
standard report to state that the audit provides reasonable but not absolute 
assurance that the audited financial statements are free from material 
misstatements as a result of fraud or error.
We have no comment on this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should review the auditor's 
standard report to describe the extent to which the independent public 
accountant has reviewed and evaluated the system of internal accounting 
control. The Auditing Standards Board also should provide explicit guidance 
to address the situation where, as a result of his knowledge of the company's
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internal accounting controls, the independent public accountant disagrees with 
management's assessment as stated in the proposed management's report.
We have no comment on this recommendation.
Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board
Recommendation: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing Standards Board to 
afford a full participatory role in the standard-setting process to 
knowledgeable persons who are affected by and interested in auditing standards 
but who either are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public practice.
We agree with the recommendation that half of the reorganized ASB be persons 
outside of the public accounting arena. This half should not all be 
educators. Persons in the practice of management accounting should accept the 
responsibility to participate in the standard-setting practices of the 
accounting profession. Accountants in management are the first line, without 
whom the educator and independent auditor would not be needed.
CHAPTER FOUR: Recommendations for the SEC and Others to Improve
the Regulatory and Legal Environment
Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to impose civil money 
penalties in administrative proceedings [including Rule 2(e) proceedings] and 
to seek civil money penalties from a court directly in an injunctive 
proceeding.
We support this recommendation; however, we believe that the SEC should also 
use its existing power more effectively. It is also unclear as to whether the 
Commission believes that the fines, if approved, should be levied against the 
individuals within a company who perpetrate the FFR, the company who published 
the misleading financials, or both.
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to issue a cease and desist 
order when a securities law violation or an unsound financial reporting 
practice is found.
The SEC currently has the power in some instances to effectively require a 
company to demand that they adhere to proper financial reporting. In the case 
of registration statements, the SEC has the power to refuse to allow the 
registration statement to go effective. While we support the Commission’s 
recommendation, we feel there should be further clarification as to when these
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"cease and desist" orders would be used. There are other items to consider 
such as if a company's 1934 Act filing were rejected because of a "unsound 
financial reporting practice" would additional penalties be imposed if during 
the process of correcting their report the filing deadline passed. These 
rules must also take into account the effect on the investing public. In 
addition, a definition of "unsound financial reporting practices" should be 
included in the Commission's report.
Recommendation: The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to bar or
suspend corporate officers and directors involved in fraudulent financial 
reporting from future service in that capacity in a public company.
We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: Criminal prosecution of fraudulent financial reporting cases 
should become a higher priority. The SEC should conduct an affirmative 
program to promote increased criminal prosecution of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases by educating and assisting government officials with criminal 
prosecution powers.
We support this recommendation. It is our opinion that making FFR a higher 
priority with all government regulators and other officials is an important 
step towards reducing the occurrence of FFR and maintaining the integrity of 
the United States financial reporting process.
Recommendation: The SEC should require all public accounting firms that audit
public companies to be members of a professional organization that has peer 
review and independent oversight functions and is approved by the SEC, such as 
that specified by the SECPS of the AICPA's Division for CPA Firms.
We have no comment on this recommendation.
Recommendation: The SEC should take enforcement action when a public 
accounting firm fails to remedy deficiencies cited by the public accounting 
profession's quality assurance program.
We support this recommendation. We believe that accounting firms who fail to 
remedy major deficiencies in their quality assurance program should be barred 
from representing clients before the SEC.
Recommendation: The SEC must be given adequate resources to perform existing
and additional functions that help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent 
financial reporting.
We support this recommendation.
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Recommendation; The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board should adopt measures patterned on the Commission's 
recommendations directed to the SEC to carry out their own regulatory 
responsibility relating to financial reporting under the federal securities 
laws.
We have no comment on this recommendation.
Recommendation: The financial institution regulatory agencies should provide
for the exchange of information between the regulatory examiner and the 
independent public accountant.
We have no comment on this recommendation.
Recommendation: Parties charged with responding to various tort reform
initiatives should consider the implications that the perceived liability 
crisis holds for long-term audit quality and the independent public 
accountant's detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
We have no comment on this recommendation.
Recommendation: The SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that the 
corporate indemnification of directors for liabilities that arise under the 
Securities Act of 1933 is against public policy and therefore unenforceable.
We strongly support this recommendation and suggest that it receive more 
emphasis in the Commission's report. We also agree with the Commission that 
the liability crisis could adversely affect the financial reporting process. 
It is essential that corporation's be in a position to recruit qualified 
independent directors, which we believe is a major step towards preserving the 
integrity of the financial reporting process.
CHAPTER FIVE: Recommendations for Education
We support all the recommendations in this chapter.
Again, we should like to commend the Commission on an excellent job and 
express our appreciation for the opportunity to comment on this Exposure 
Draft. If you should have any questions, please contact me on 404-420-8500.
Sincerely
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C N Canadian National
Box 8100, Montreal, Quebec
H3C 3N4
Canadien National
C.P. 8100, Montreal, Quebec
H3C 3N4
S.D.H. Thomas 
Corporate Comptroller
S.D.H. Thomas 
Contrôleur, Affaires générales
Reference N/réf.
29 J u n e  1987
N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , N.W .
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . 200 06
G e n t le m e n :
We ta k e  p le a s u re  i n  s u b m it t in g  t o  y o u  some b r i e f  com m ents on  th e  
recom m endations in c lu d e d  in  th e  Exposure D ra f t  is s u e d  i n  A p r i l  1987. 
W h ile  we a re  n o t  a U.S. company, we do  h a v e  some e x p e r ie n c e  i n  th e  
a r e a  c o n c e rn e d  a n d  we a r e  an  SEC R e g is t r a n t .
CHAPTER TWO: I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  F u n c t io n
-  R e c o m m e n d a t io n : "Management and  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  s h o u ld
e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s ’ 
in v o lv e m e n t  i n  t h e  a u d i t  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  
f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  p ro c e s s  i s  a p p r o p r ia te  
and p ro p e r ly  c o o rd in a te d  w ith  th e  in d e p e n d e n t 
p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t . "
C om m en t: W h ile  we c o n c u r  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u ld  b e  an
in te r n a l p rocess w ith in  th e  company t o  e n s u re  
th a t  in t e r n a l  c o n t r o ls  a re  i n  p la c e , a fo rm  
o f  c o m p lia n c e  t e s t i n g ,  t h i s  n e e d  n o t  b e  
r e s t r ic te d  t o  th e  I n t e r n a l  A u d it  D e p a rtm e n t. 
We h a v e  fo u n d  t h a t  t h e  p r o f e s s io n a l  
accoun tan ts  th a t  s t a f f  t h is  D epartm ent can  be 
b e t te r  employed in  o p e ra tio n a l a u d its  o r  w h a t 
we r e f e r  t o  as "b o tto m  l i n e "  a u d i t s .  O u r  
expe rience  suggests  t h a t  th e  re co m m e n d a tio n  
m ig h t  r e a d :  "M a n a g e m e n t a n d  t h e  a u d i t
c o m m it te e  s h o u ld  e n s u r e  t h a t  a d e q u a te  
c o m p lia n c e  t e s t s  a r e  i n  p la c e  t o  p r o v id e  
re a s o n a b le  a s s u ra n c e  t h a t  th e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  
th e  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  i s  b e in g  
m a in ta ined  and  t h a t  t h i s  e f f o r t  i s  p r o p e r ly  
c o o rd in a te d  w i t h  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t . "
2- Recommendation:
Comment:
Reco mm en da ti on:
Comment:
"When a public company changes independent 
public accountants, it should be required by 
SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature of 
any material accounting or auditing issues 
discussed with its old and n e w  auditors 
during the three year period preceding the 
change."
We believe that the current SEC requirement 
of disclosing all material accounting or 
auditing issues in respect of which there has 
b e e n  a disagreement with the public 
accountants, even where such disagreement was 
resolved to the satisfaction of the public 
accountant, is adequate for the protection of 
all parties. We further believe that the 
recommendation as proposed could serve to 
inhibit open dialogue beneficial to both the 
client and the public accountant.
"Audit committees should increase their 
oversight of the quarterly reporting 
process. This oversight should include 
approving financial results prior to public 
release."
While we have no fundamental disagreement 
with the requirement for the audit committee 
to approve the quarterly results, it would 
present a problem in meeting the S E C  
quarterly filing deadlines.
C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
- Recommendation:
Comment:
"The Auditing Standards Board should revise 
standards to restate the independent public 
accountants’ responsibility for detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting, requiring the 
independent public accountant to (1) take 
affirmative steps in each audit to assess the 
potential for such reporting and (2) design 
tests to provide reasonable assurance of 
detection. Revised standards should include 
guidance for assessing risks and pursuing 
detection wh en risks are identified."
We are sympathetic to the objective of this 
recommendation but are concerned about the 
cost that may be incurred. There must be a 
reasonable balance between cost and benefit 
in respect of the tests designed.
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Hopefully the above comments will be of use to you and if a further 
elaboration is required please let me know.
Sincerely,
S c h o o l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g
G r a d u a t e  S c h o o l  o f  B u s i n e s s  
a n d  C o l l e g e  o f  B u s i n e s s
the U U
U n i v e r s i t yof U T A H
June 29, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I applaud your efforts to improve financial reporting and the audit process.
There is much good in your report and I hope that the bulk of your
recommendations will be adopted. My only concern is with Chapter 5, 
Recommendations for Education.
First of all, the Commission is only one of many groups who have recommended 
adding additional content to the accounting curriculum. You correctly note
the "call for additional liberal arts requirements." AACSB have similarly
expanded business requirements. Your report goes on to make several
recommendations for expanding the curriculum in regard to factors that may 
cause fraudulent financial reporting and strategies that can lead to 
reduction, internal control, regulation and enforcement activities and 
regulatory bodies, developing stronger analytical, problem solving, and 
judgment skills, more emphasis on ethics, etc. I see no recommendations on 
what you would have us eliminate from our curriculum in order to provide room 
for the additions you propose. Implicit is a recommendation that the
accounting curriculum be expanded. Why on earth have you failed to explicitly 
state "the body of knowledge necessary to enter the accounting profession 
cannot be mastered in a traditional 4-year (bachelor's degree) format?" That 
is the only logical position one could come to after reading your 
recommendations for an expanded curriculum. Such a statement should be 
followed by an additional recommendation: "State laws should be amended to
require at least 150 semester hours of college education before candidates can 
qualify to sit for the CPA examination."
Salt L a k e  City, U t a h  8 4 1 1 2  
(801) 5 8 1 - 7 7 9 8
My second concern relates to the last recommendation in Chapter 5 regarding 
business and accounting faculty. That is a noble recommendation but will 
never come to pass in the current academic environment. That recommendation 
could only be met by radically changing the academic reward system. That in 
turn will only occur when accounting schools (departments) detach themselves 
from business schools and become independent professional schools. When that 
occurs, the accounting faculty will have power to alter the reward system to 
achieve the commissions recommendations. Until that time, accounting 
educators will find all the rewards go to those who publish and none go to 
those who "develop their own personal competence" and "classroom materials."
Sincerely yours,
A. Tom Nelson 
Professor of Accounting
ATN/lks
DePaul University
School of Accountancy 25 East Jackson Boulevard 
Chicago, Illinois 60604-2287
312/341-8770
June 29, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue 
Washington, DC 20006
Gentlepersons:
The following comments are presented for your consideration. DePaul University 
has for thirteen years had a course taught by myself on the subject of regulation. 
It is entitled: "The Regulatory Environment of Accounting" and includes the lear­
ning objectives recommended by the Commission.
1. Fraudulent financial reporting is only one aspect of illegal or unethical 
behavior by public corporations. The Commission should consider the need to re­
commend further research into what society might believe is a reasonable expecta­
tion in socially-desirable areas and also how to best motivate corporations to 
strive to accomplish them.
2. Many of the Commission’s recommendations impose new responsibilities on 
corporate audit committees. Several of these require the exercise of judgment 
on highly technical accounting and internal control matters. Appendix K should 
suggest that members of audit committees be expected to have an extensive back­
ground and significant experience in matters of control and accounting in order 
to effectively discharge their responsibilities.
3. Fraudulent financial reporting has occurred despite the presence of audit 
committee members having the NYSE independence qualifications. The fact that 
these definitions have been "in place for a decade" is a signal that they should 
be reviewed to determine their effectiveness in deterring fraudulent financial 
reporting and whether they should be strengthened.
4. Consideration should be given to requiring the attestation of management 
and audit committee disclosures by an independent body, such as an independent 
public accountant. The suggestion of such attestation of public accountability 
for compliance with principles of business ethics and conduct is contained in 
the report of the Packard Commission and appears to be equally applicable to 
disclosures of internal control and other recommendations of the Commission.
5. Several Commission recommendation propose that specific actions be taken 
to accomplish their implementation whereas others do not. Thus, some recom­
mendations appear to be orily desirable rather than necessary. Appropriate im­
plementing action by the SEC or other body should be incorporated into each 
Commission recommendation.
The Commission's Exposure Draft demonstrates a considerable dedication to 
an extremely difficult task for which the Commission should be commended.
Yours very truly
Curtis C. Verschoor 
Professor
C o lo r a d o  S o c ie t y  o f  
C e r t i f i e d  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s
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F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g
1701  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , N.W .
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . 20006
G e n t le m e n :
T h i s  l e t t e r  i s  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  P r i v a t e  C o m p a n ie s  
P r a c t i c e  C o m m it te e  o f  t h e  C o lo r a d o  S o c ie t y  o f  C P A 's  t o  t h e  
p ro p o s e d  e x p o s u re  d r a f t ,  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .
T he  C o m m itte e  i s  a d d r e s s in g  t h e i r  com m ents t o  t h e  s e c t io n  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n ta n t  o n l y ,  a n d  i s  n o t  r e s p o n d in g  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  e x p o s u re  
d r a f t .
The  C o m m itte e  a g re e d  w i t h  t h e  s ta te m e n ts  i n  t h e  d r a f t  a n d  
c o n s id e r e d  i t s  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  a p p r o p r ia t e .  H o w e v e r, we f e e l  t h e  
e x p o s u re  d r a f t  i s  n o t  t h e  a n s w e r t o  t h e  p r o b le m .  We f e e l  t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  e n o u g h  SAS ’ s a l r e a d y ,  a n d  i f  t h e y  w e re  p r o p e r l y  
f o l l o w e d ,  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  w o u ld  b e  r e d u c e d .  I f  
in c r e a s e d  s a n c t io n s  w e re  im p o s e d  o n  t h e  g u i l t y  p a r t i e s ,  h o p e f u l l y  
t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  a u d i t i n g  w o u ld  im p r o v e .  I t  h a s  b e e n  t h e  
C o m m it t e e 's  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  w h e n  a s i t u a t i o n  a r i s e s ,  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t n e r  o r  m a n a g e r in v o lv e d  r e c e iv e s  t h e  b r u n t  o f  t h e  
p u n is h m e n t  a n d  t h e  f i r m  i s  l e f t  u n s c a th e d .  I f  m o re  s e v e r e  
s a n c t io n s  w e re  im p o s e d  o n  t h e  n e g l i g e n t  f i r m ,  m aybe t h e  f i r m  
w o u ld  t a k e  f e w e r  r i s k s  o n  a u d i t s  a n d  p e r f o r m  a d d i t i o n a l  
p r o c e d u re s  t o  p r e v e n t  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
One t h i n g  t h a t  was d i s t u r b i n g  t o  t h e  C o m m itte e  was t h e  t i t l e  
o f  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t .  C P A 's  a r e  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  T h e  t i t l e  i m p l i e s  t h a t  C P A 's  a r e  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  I f  s t a t i s t i c s  
w e re  s t u d i e d  o n  a l l  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  i s s u e d ,  we 
b e l i e v e  t h e y  w o u ld  show  t h a t  t h e  a c c o u n ta n t  was n o t  d i r e c t l y  
in v o lv e d ,  b u t  j u s t  f a i l e d  t o  d e t e c t  t h e  f r a u d  th r o u g h  n o rm a l 
a u d i t  p r o c e d u r e s .
7720 E. Belleview Ave., Bldg. 46B, Englewood, Colorado 80111, 303/773-2877
In closing, the Committee emphasizes that issuing additional 
pronouncements is not the answer to preventing fraudulent 
reporting. I f  management desires to issue a fraudulent report, 
they w ill find a way. I t  probably w ill go undetected as they get 
more sophisticated in their methods.
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the proposed 
statement and to present our views on how the statement may 
impact private companies.
Sincerely,
David P. Hostetler, CPA 
Chairman,
Private Company Practice Committee
B O A R D  O F  G O V E R N O R S
□ F THE
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M r. James C . T re a d w a y , C h a irm a n  
N a t io n a l  Comm is s io n  o n  F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W .
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
D e a r M r. T re a d w a y :
The s t a f f  o f  th e  B o a rd  o f  G o v e rn o rs  o f  th e  F e d e ra l R e se rve  S ystem  
a p p r e c ia te s  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  comment o n  t h e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  o f  th e  R e p o r t 
o f  th e  N a t io n a l  Comm is s io n  o n  F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  ( th e  
"Comm is s io n " ) .
The p ro p o s e d  R e p o r t  r e c ommends t h a t  p u b l i c  co m p a n ie s , a c c o u n ta n ts  
and  o th e r  p a r t ie s  a d o p t a  num ber o f  s p e c i f i c  m easures  and  g u id e l in e s  t o  
im p ro v e  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  and  re d u c e  th e  r i s k  o f  
f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t in g .  I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  th e  d r a f t  R e p o r t  u rg e s  
p u b l i c  com pan ies  t o  m a in ta in  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n s  and  t o  
e n s u re  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v i t y .  I n  a d d i t io n ,  th e  p ro p o s e d  R e p o r t u rg e s  th e  
S e c u r i t ie s  and  Exchange Comm is s io n  ( th e  "SEC") t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  a c c o u n ta n ts  
r e v ie w  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  d a ta  o f  p u b l i c  com pan ies  p r i o r  t o  i t s  r e le a s e ,  
t h a t  a l l  p u b l i c  com pan ies  m a in ta in  in d e p e n d e n t and  e f f e c t i v e  a u d i t  
c o m m itte e s , and  t h a t  m anagem ent and  a u d i t  c o m m itte e s  r e p o r t  o n  t h e i r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  a n n u a l r e p o r t s  t o  s h a re h o ld e rs .
F u r t h e r ,  th e  p re p o s e d  R e p o r t  u rg e s  th e  SEC t o  im p ro v e  i t s  
r e g u la t io n  o f  th e  a c c o u n t in g  p r o fe s s io n  and  t o  re q u e s t  fro m  C ong ress  th e  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  a ss e s s  c i v i l  money p e n a l t ie s ,  is s u e  cease  and d e s is t  o r d e r s ,  
and  b a r  o r  suspend  in d iv id u a ls  who a re  in v o lv e d  w i t h  f r a u d u le n t  r e p o r t in g  
fro m  s e r v in g  as  c o r p o r a te  o f f i c e r s  o r  d i r e c t o r s .  The SEC i s  a ls o  u rg e d  t o  
p la c e  a  h ig h e r  p r i o r i t y  o n  c r im in a l  p r o s e c u t io n  f o r  f r a u d u le n t  r e p o r t in g .
I n  a d d i t io n ,  th e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  in c lu d e s  tw o  reco m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  th e  
F e d e ra l f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  r e g u la t o r y  a g e n c ie s :  (1) t h a t ,  f o r
i n s t i t u t i o n s  r e p o r t in g  u n d e r  th e  f e d e r a l  s e c u r i t i e s  la w s ,  th e  r e g u la to r y  
a g e n c ie s  s h o u ld  a d op t  m easu res  p a t te r n e d  a f t e r  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  
reco m m e n d a tio n s  t o  th e  SEC, in c lu d in g  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  r u le s  m a n d a tin g  
p u b l i c  com pany a d h e re n ce  t o  th e  R e p o r t 's  re co m m e n d a tio n s , enhanced 
e n fo rc e m e n t e f f o r t s ,  and  in c re a s e d  c r im in a l  p r o s e c u t io n  f o r  f r a u d u le n t  
r e p o r t i n g ; and  (2) t h a t  th e  r e g u la t o r y  a g e n c ie s  s h o u ld  p r o v id e  f o r  th e  
exchange  o f  in fo r m a t io n  b e tw een  e x a m in e rs  and  in d e p e n d e n t p u b l i c  
a c c o u n ta n ts .
B o a rd  s t a f f  g e n e r a l ly  s u p p o r ts  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  p r o p o s a l t o  
recommend t h a t  p u b l i c  com pan ies  a d o p t m easures t o  im p ro v e  th e  q u a l i t y  o f
f in a n c ia l  s ta tem en ts , such as m a in ta in in g  e f fe c t iv e  a u d it  com m ittees and 
in te r n a l  a u d it  fu n c t io n s ,  and th a t  these  companies, accoun tan ts  and o th e r  
in d iv id u a ls  in v o lv e d  w ith  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  ta ke  measures and adopt 
s p e c i f ic  g u id e lin e s  aimed a t  re d u c in g  th e  r i s k  o f  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  
r e p o r t in g .  However, w h ile  we agree w i th  th e  te n o r  o f  these  
recommendations, we a re  concerned th a t  some o f  th e  ru le s  f o r  p u b lic  
companies th a t  th e  Commission recommends be mandated by th e  SEC may n o t be 
a p p ro p ria te  f o r  some f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s .  We b e lie v e  th a t  th e  manner in  
w h ich these  recommendations a re  a p p lie d  to  f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s  shou ld  
ta k e  in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  th e  e x te n s iv e  re g u la to ry  and s u p e rv is o ry  framework 
f o r  f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s  th a t  m ig h t n o t be p re s e n t f o r  o th e r  types  o f  
p u b lic  companies.
W ith  regards  to  th e  two p roposed recommendations d ire c te d  to  th e  
fe d e ra l f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s  re g u la to ry  a u th o r i t ie s ,  th e  B o a rd 's  s t a f f  
b e lie v e s  th a t  these  recommendations shou ld  be s u b s ta n t ia l ly  re v is e d  because 
th e y  do n o t re cogn ize  (a) th e  s e c u r it ie s  law  requ irem en t th a t ,  w i th  re s p e c t 
t o  p u b lic  companies, th e  fe d e ra l re g u la to ry  agencies m ust g e n e ra lly  
m a in ta in  re g u la t io n s  t h a t  a re  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  s im i la r  t o  those  o f  th e  SEC,
(b) th e  a u th o r i ty  and enforcem ent e f f o r t s  o f  th e  agenc ies , and (c) t h e i r  
p o l ic ie s  re g a rd in g  a u d ito r  access to  exam ina tion  re p o r ts  and re la te d  
in fo rm a tio n .
The f i r s t  recommendation o f  th e  Commission urges th e  f in a n c ia l  
in s t i t u t io n  re g u la to rs  t o  adopt r u le s  f o r  p u b lic  companies w h ich  a re  a ls o  
b e in g  recommended f o r  a d o p tio n  by  th e  SEC. However, S e c tio n  12( i )  o f  th e  
S e c u r it ie s  Exchange A c t o f  1934 a lre a d y  re q u ire s  th e  fe d e ra l re g u la to rs  to  
adopt s u b s ta n t ia l ly  s im i la r  re g u la t io n s  to  th e  re g u la t io n s  and ru le s  issued  
by th e  SEC, un le ss  th e y  f in d  th a t  im p lem en ta tion  o f  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  s im ila r  
re g u la t io n s  w ith  re s p e c t t o  in s u re d  p u b lic  in s t i t u t io n s  a re  n o t necessary 
o r  a p p ro p ria te  in  th e  p u b lic  in te r e s t  o r  f o r  th e  p ro te c t io n  o f  in v e s to rs ,  
and th e  agencies d is c lo s e  t h is  to  th e  p u b lic .
A ls o , th e  f i r s t  re c omm endation o f  th e  Com m ission to  th e  F ed e ra l 
f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s  s u p e rv is o ry  agencies im p lie s  th a t  th e  agencies 
shou ld  a c q u ire  th e  re g u la to ry  a u th o r i ty  re c ommended f o r  th e  SEC. However, 
th e  F ed e ra l Reserve Board a lre a d y  has th e  a u th o r i ty  th a t  th e  Commission 
recommends f o r  th e  SEC. Fo r example, th e  F ed e ra l Reserve Board has 
s ta tu to r y  a u th o r i ty  t o  is s u e  cease and d e s is t  o rd e rs  and assess c i v i l  money 
p e n a lt ie s  a g a in s t banks, bank h o ld in g  companies and t h e i r  o f f i c e r s ,  
d ir e c to r s ,  and persons p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  th e  conduct o f  t h e i r  a f f a i r s .
A ls o , th e  Board has th e  a u th o r i ty  t o  remove o f f ic e r s  o r  d ir e c to r s  o f  banks 
o r  bank h o ld in g  companies from  t h e i r  p o s it io n s  and t o  b a r them from  fu tu re  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  any F e d e ra lly  in s u re d  in s t i t u t io n ?  and th e  Board has 
e x te n s iv e  c r im in a l r e f e r r a l  p rocedures, w h ich  have been adopted by th e  
o th e r  F ed e ra l bank ing  agenc ies . The Board has used i t s  a u th o r i ty  t o  is su e  
cease and d e s is t  o rd e rs  in  a number o f  cases in v o lv in g  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  
s ta tem ents and re g u la to ry  re p o r ts .  F o r yo u r in fo rm a tio n , we have a tta ched  
a copy o f  a s u p e rv is o ry  l e t t e r  r e la t in g  to  t h is  a rea  th a t  was d is t r ib u te d  
to  a l l  F ed e ra l Reserve Banks.
3Moreover, the Board's staff maintains a close working 
relationship with the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division at the 
Department of Justice and provides the Department of Justice with 
significant referrals with respect to activities, such as fraudulent 
reporting, that undermine the integrity of the supervisory process. With 
representatives from the other Federal banking agencies, Board staff also 
is a member of the Attorney General's Interagency Bank Fraud Enforcement 
Working Group.
The second recommendation to the federal financial institutions 
regulators implies that the agencies have not provided for the exchange of 
information between the regulatory examiner and the independent public 
accountant. However, the Federal Reserve and the other federal banking 
agencies have already implemented the recommended policies. In 1985 the 
staff of the Federal Reserve Board, when responding to a proposed amendment 
of the AICPA bank audit guide, stated its policy that examination reports 
may be used by a bank's auditors on the bank's premises. In addition, it 
was stated that a bank's auditors may discuss the results of examinations 
with the Federal Reserve and be present at meetings between Federal Reserve 
personnel and a bank's management and directors if the bank approves. 
Recently, the Board published for public comment in the Federal Register 
(see 52 Fed. Reg. 13458 (April 23, 1987)) proposed amendments to its access 
to information regulations. These amendments are aimed, inter alia, at 
facilitating the transmission of examination information to accountants. 
Therefore, this recommendation should not be directed to the Federal 
Reserve Board.
As a general comment, we believe that any final recommendations 
should also be directed to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council since this organization is responsible for promoting the 
development of uniform supervisory policies by the Federal financial 
institutions regulatory agencies.
Board staff plans to review the Commission's final 
recommendations with the SEC, the Federal financial institutions 
supervisory agencies, and various banking organizations to determine 
whether any additional policies in this area should be adopted by the 
Board.
Sincerely,
Franklin D. Dreyer  
Deputy Director
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D I V I S I O N  O F  BA N K I N G 
S U P E R V I S I O N  A N D  R E G U L A T I O N
February 7, 1986
TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF EXAMINATIONS 
AT EACH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
Subject: Accuracy of Financial Statements and Reports
As part of our ongoing supervisory responsibilities, 
the Federal Reserve System must ensure that all financial 
statements and reports of State member banks and bank holding 
companies, which are generally available to other regulatory 
agencies, depositors and the public, are accurate and describe 
the conditions and operations of the institutions. In most 
instances, reporting errors and omissions are inadvertant and 
corrections can be accomplished through the voluntary re-filing 
of the statements and reports by the financial institutions.
In some cases, however, formal actions should be considered 
as a remedy for conduct that disregards the integrity of the 
financial statements and reports.
The following summary of four enforcement actions 
relating almost entirely to financial statements and reports 
demonstrates the Federal Reserve System's concerns with these 
matters;
(1) A State member bank in satisfactory financial 
condition entered into a Written Agreement solely on account 
of the bank's repeated refusal to comply with Call Report 
instructions and appropriate generally accepted accounting 
principles associated with the preparation of such reports. 
The action required the re-submission of an accurate Call 
Report for the covered period. It also required that all 
future reports be accurate and acceptable to the Federal 
Reserve Bank supervising the bank.
(2) The Board of Governors issued a Temporary Cease 
and Desist Order against a State member bank that filed and 
published a false and misleading Report of Condition and 
Income. The bank failed to charge-off assets adversely clas­
sified as "loss" by examiners, and it re-booked previously 
charged-off loans. These accounting entries resulted in the
2substantial misstatement of the bank's capital accounts and 
the dissemination of inaccurate information to the bank's 
depositors and creditors and to the public. The Temporary 
Cease and Desist Order required the re-filing and re-publica­
tion of the bank's Call Report for the covered period and the 
future submission of all Call Reports to the Federal Reserve 
Bank for review and approval prior to publication.
(3) In a recent holding company inspection, the 
Federal Reserve Bank determined that the holding company and 
its principals submitted materially false and misleading 
financial statements in support of its formation application.
The company falsely reported the value of real estate held by 
the company; and it falsely reported that another asset on 
its books, which was labelled as "real estate", was, in fact, 
loans to its principals from the holding company. The company 
and its principals entered into a consent Cease and Desist Order. 
The Federal Reserve Bank also made a criminal referral of the 
matter to the U.S. Department of Justice.
(4) Financial institutions and Federal Reserve Banks 
should also note that certification of financial statements 
by independent public accountants or acceptance of such 
statements by different regulatory agencies does not guarantee 
their accuracy and will not necessarily preclude enforcement 
action. A publicly-held bank holding company whose securities 
are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
entered into a transaction that could result in the eventual 
transfer of a group of its assets to another institution 
through a long-term put arrangement. The transaction was 
undertaken by the holding company in an attempt to avoid the 
recognition of a loss resulting from market depreciation in 
the value of some of its equity securities. In financial 
statements and reports submitted to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Form 10-K) and to the Board (Forms Y-6 and Y-9), 
the company did not recognize the loss. The financial statements 
were certified by the company's independent public accountants 
and accepted by the senior staff of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.
The company's financial statements and reports were 
reviewed within the Federal Reserve System, and questions 
regarding their accuracy and the company's and accountant's 
use of certain accounting practices applied to the transaction 
were raised. The matter was referred to one of the independent 
accounting bodies that reviews emerging issues for the accounting 
profession. It determined that the holding company's accounting 
was inappropriate, and the System decided that amendments to
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th e  com pany's f i n a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts — in  p a r t i c u la r  i t s  c a p i t a l  
a c c o u n t— were n e c e s s a ry .
In  o rd e r  to  e n su re  t h a t  th e  h o ld in g  company p re p a re d  
and s u b m itte d  a c c u ra te  amended f in a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts  and r e p o r ts  
to  th e  Board and , in  a l l  f u t u r e  c a s e s , s u b m itte d  a c c e p ta b le  
f in a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts  and r e p o r t s ,  th e  company and th e  D i s t r i c t  
F e d e ra l R eserve Bank e n te re d  in t o  a W r it te n  A greem ent. The 
Agreem ent r e q u ir e d ,  i n t e r  a l i a , th e  r e - f i l i n g  o f  a l l  o f  th e  
com pany's Y-6 and Y-9 r e p o r ts  t h a t  c o n ta in e d  in c o r r e c t  f i n a n c ia l  
s ta te m e n ts  and a ls o  re q u ire d  th e  d is c lo s u r e  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  
a c c o u n tin g  tre a tm e n ts  g iv e n  to  th e  t r a n s a c t io n  in  th e  com pany's 
S e c u r i t ie s  and Exchange Com m ission and Board f i l i n g s  and 
r e p o r t s .
The i n t e g r i t y  o f  f i n a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts  s u b m itte d  to  
th e  F e d e ra l R eserve System  in  c o n n e c t io n  w ith  p e r io d ic  re g u la ­
t o r y  re p o r ts  ( e . g . ,  C a l l  R e p o rts  o r  Forms FR Y-6 o r  Y -9 ) and 
a p p l ic a t io n s  is  a s i g n i f i c a n t  s u p e rv is o ry  and r e g u la to r y  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  When i t  i s  d e te rm in e d  th a t  f a ls e ,  m is le a d in g  
o r  in a c c u ra te  in fo r m a t io n  is  c o n ta in e d  in  f in a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts  
and r e p o r ts ,  F e d e ra l R eserve Banks sh o u ld  c o n s id e r  recommending 
fo rm a l e n fo rc e m e n t a c t io n  to  e n su re  th a t  th e  o f fe n d in g  f in a n c ia l  
i n s t i t u t i o n  o r  in d iv id u a l  c o r r e c t  th e  s ta te m e n ts  and r e p o r t s .
In  t h i s  m anner, th e  F e d e ra l R eserve System w i l l  ensu re  t h a t  
th e  p u b l ic  has access to  a c c u ra te  s ta te m e n ts  and re p o r ts  
r e f l e c t i n g  th e  f i n a n c ia l  c o n d it io n s  and o p e ra t io n s  o f  banks 
and h o ld in g  com panies s u b je c t  to  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n .
I f  you have any q u e s t io n s  r e la t in g  to  t h i s  m a t te r ,  
p le a s e  c o n ta c t  H e rb e r t A . B ie rn  a t  (202 ) 45 2 -2 620 .
WILLIAM TAYLOR 
DIRECTOR
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ALBERT J. DERBES, III, CPA
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Derbes & Company 
P.O. Box 8176 
Metairie, LA 70011 
(504) 837-2200
G e n t le m e n :
T h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  S t a t e  B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y  
(N A S B A ) i s  a  v o l u n t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  5 4  s t a t e  b o a r d s  o f  
a c c o u n t a n c y  ( o r  e q u i v a l e n t  g o v e r n m e n t a l  a g e n c ie s )  w h ic h  h a v e  b e e n  
e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  s t a t u t e  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e  5 0  s t a t e s ,  t h e  D i s t r i c t  o f  
C o lu m b ia ,  G u a m , P u e r t o  R ic o  a n d  t h e  V i r g i n  I s l a n d s ,  a n d  w h ic h  h a v e  
t h e  s t a t u t o r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  e x a m in e  a n d  l i c e n s e  c e r t i f i e d  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  a n d  o t h e r  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  p r a c t i t i o n e r s ,  a n d  
t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n c y  w i t h i n  t h e i r  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n s .  We w is h  t o  c o m p l im e n t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  o n  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  
i t s  e f f o r t s  a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g .
NASBA a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  t e n o r  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  a n d  w is h e s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  c o m m e n t o n  C h a p t e r  4 ,  S e c t i o n  V I I ,  E n h a n c e d  E n f o r c e ­
m e n t  b y  S t a t e  B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y .  A s  n o t e d  t h e r e i n ,  NASBA h a s  
b e e n  a c t i v e  i n  e n c o u r a g in g  s t a t e  b o a r d s  t o  im p le m e n t  p o s i t i v e  
e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s .  We s h a r e  y o u r  o p i n i o n  t h a t  s t a t e  b o a r d s  a r e  
u n i q u e l y  q u a l i f i e d  t o  p l a y  a n  a c t i v e  p a r t  i n  i m p r o v i n g  t h e  q u a l i t y  
o f  a u d i t s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  o v e r s i g h t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w h ic h  t h e y  h a v e  
o v e r  a l l  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s .
O f  p a r t i c u l a r  n o t e  a r e  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  c o n c l u s i o n s  t h a t  
t h e  c r e a t i o n  a n d  s u p p o r t  o f  p o s i t i v e  e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  " r e q u i r e  
a  s t a t e - b y - s t a t e  c o m m itm e n t  b y  g o v e r n o r s ,  l e g i s l a t u r e s ,  a n d  b o a r d s  
o f  a c c o u n t a n c y "  a n d  t h a t  " s t a t e  r e g u l a t o r y  s y s te m s  c a n  w o r k  i f  t h e y  
r e c e i v e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  d i r e c t i o n  f r o m  
g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  s u p p o r t  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n  a n d  
t h e  p u b l i c  a t  l a r g e . "  T h e s e  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  
e m p h a s is  o n  t h e  im p r o v e m e n t  o f  a u d i t  q u a l i t y  m a d e  i n  y o u r  r e p o r t  
w i l l  b e  o f  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  o u r  c o n t i n u i n g  e f f o r t s  t o  f u r t h e r  p r o m o te  
a n d  d e v e lo p  p o s i t i v e  e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  a n d  t o  e n h a n c e  t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  s t a t e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  
c o u n t r y .
2Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the report. 
We would be happy to provide additional information should you 
wish.
Sincerely yours,
 
Albert J. Derbes, III 
President
AJD:ac
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Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. Treadway:
Middle South U tilities, Inc. (MSU) is an investor-owned holding company registered under the Public U tility  Holding Company Act of 1935. MSU owns all of the outstanding common stock of its principal operating subsidiaries - Arkansas Power & Light Company, Louisiana Power & Light Company, Mississippi Power & Light Company, New Orleans Public Service Inc. and System Energy Resources, Inc. The other principal subsidiary of MSU is MSU System Services, Inc. which is the service company of the System.
Middle South U tilities, Inc. and Subsidiaries (the System) submits the following comments in response to the Exposure Draft of the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
General Comments
The System commends the Commission for its worthy intentions in addressing the problem of fraudulent financial reporting. It is our view, however, that many of the Commission's recommendations appear to require policies which may be somewhat inflexible. In 
general, we believe that many of the recommendations would not necessarily improve financial reporting. Further we do not believe these requirements would consistently pass the cost/benefit test, especially as they might impact smaller entities.
SERVING THE MIDDLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM OF COMPANIES
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr. Chairman 
June 30, 1987 
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The specific comments of the System with respect to the 
recommendations for public companies presented in the Commission’s 
Exposure Draft are as follows:
Tone at the Top
We concur with the Commission’s recommendations addressing 
the "tone at the top". With the exception of the written codes 
of corporate conduct recommendation, the Commission’s recommend­
ations in this area relate to fairly basic conventional financial 
reporting controls already in place by most companies. While 
seemingly more restrictive, the Commission's recommendation 
relative to written codes of corporate conduct appears to be 
sufficiently flexible to allow companies to tailor such codes to 
individual company needs. Assuming we have correctly inter­
preted this flexibility, we have no particular problems with the 
provisions.
Accounting and Internal Audit
We support the Commission’s recommendations with respect to 
accounting and internal audit controls for eliminating or 
minimizing fraudulent financial reporting. As noted above, the 
Commission's recommendations in this area are of a basic con­
ventional nature such that they are already in place by most 
companies.
Audit Committees
While the System is currently in substantial compliance with 
the Commission's recommendations relative to audit committees, we 
believe that certain of these recommendations may require further 
clarification by the Commission. The recommendation in reference 
to the development of a written charter setting forth the duties 
and responsibilities of the audit committee seems reasonable.
The intent of the further proviso of this recommendation that the 
charter be reviewed by the board of directors annually and modified 
as necessary is not as clearly understood however. Specifically, 
the Commission might consider amplification of its intent as to the 
extent of this review.
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman 
June 30, 1987 
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Management and Audit Committee Reports
While the Commission's recommendation relative to management 
reports makes good sense from a financial reporting standpoint, 
the further recommendation with respect to audit committee reports 
does not. An audit committee report would, in effect, be a 
duplication of effort as corporate financial management is 
generally held responsible and accountable to the audit committee 
for financial reporting purposes. We therefore oppose the re­
commendation that an audit committee report be included in the 
annual report.
Seeking a Second Opinion
We concur with the Commission's initial recommendation in 
this area. We believe that management has an obligation to in­
form the audit committee when it seeks a second opinion on a 
significant accounting issue. The Commission's further recom­
mendation, however, requiring extensive (three year) disclosure 
of material accounting or auditing issues is, in our opinion, 
expansive and unnecessary financial reporting. Significant issues 
are consistently reported on an ongoing basis as required by dis­
closure rules and cluttering future reports with this information 
seems meaningless.
Quarterly Reporting
The Commission's recommendation that audit committees approve 
quarterly financial results prior to public release represents, 
perhaps, the most restrictive of all of its recommendations for 
public companies. This provision would create severe logistical 
problems involved in coordinating the review and approval pro­
cess in a timely manner. Also, the overall benefit of such an 
approval process does not appear to justify the time, effort and 
expense that would be required.
Miscellaneous
The above comments focus only on the Commission's recom­
mendations for public companies. In addition, we have one 
final comment relative to the Commission's recommendations for 
independent public accountants. In general, we believe the 
Commission's recommendations in this area are too inflexible 
and do not meet the cost/benefit test. Instead, we believe 
the new standards proposed by the Auditing Standards Board 
clarifying and, in some cases, extending the auditor's responsi­
bility appear more reasonable and cost beneficial. We suggest 
that the Commission consider endorsing these proposed new standards 
and incorporating them into their final report rather than creating 
additional and, in some cases, inflexible recommendations.
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman 
June 30, 1987 
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The Middle South System appreciates the opportunity to 
provide its comments on these issues related to the Report 
of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
for the Commission’s consideration.
Sincerely,
Rodney J. Estrada
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T h i s  l e t t e r  o f f e r s  c o m m e n ts  b y  m e m b e rs  o f  t h e  
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B a n k in g  a n d  B u s in e s s  L a w  S e c t i o n  o f  t h e  A B A  o n  t h e  
e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  d a t e d  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  ( t h e  " A p r i l  D r a f t " )  o f  
t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  ( t h e  " C o m m is s io n " ) . T h e s e  c o m m e n ts  
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a l s o  s u p e r v i s i n g  t h e  f u r n i s h i n g  o f  c o m m e n ts  o n  t h e  
c u r r e n t l y  p r o p o s e d  S A S s , a n d  o f  t h e  C h a ir m a n  o f  t h e  
C o m m it t e e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  l e t t e r  d o e s  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
o f f i c i a l  v ie w s  o f  t h e  A B A , t h e  S e c t i o n ,  t h e  C o m m it te e  
o r  t h e  S u b c o m m i t t e e ,  a n d  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  
t h e  v ie w s  o f  e v e r y  m e m b e r o f  s u c h  C o m m it te e  o r  S u b c o m ­
m i t t e e  .
SECTION DIRECTOR 
Irene Tesitor Chicago, IL
Introduction
The April Draft, considered as a whole, is a contribution to 
an important goal: minimization of the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting by public companies. Its emphasis on the 
multiplicity of factors which must be considered in moving 
towards the goal, its stress on the necessity of management 
planning to prevent fraud, its discussion of why and how manage­
ment at various levels may resort to fraud, and its realistic 
approach of building upon the existing system, should all be of 
assistance in promoting the integrity of financial reporting. We 
particularly welcome the stress on the importance of the internal 
audit function, the climate set by top management, the internal 
procedures of public accounting firms, and education.
In evaluating the April Draft in a constructive manner, 
particularly in judging it on the basis of a cost-benefit analy­
sis and in assessing whether the proposals are suitable to the 
ends, it is important to keep in mind the definition of fraudu­
lent financial reporting adopted by the Commission. That defini­
tion is "intentional or reckless conduct, whether act or omis­
sion, that results in materially misleading financial statements" 
(page 2). The April Draft states that the most common types of 
fraud are the inflation or smoothing of earnings, or the over­
statement of assets, perpetrated by top management; and although 
the course of conduct may not have been intentional to begin
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with, over time it becomes increasingly deliberate (page 20).
The more deliberate the actions (or the more they are recognized 
to be questionable), the more likely the perpetrators will take 
measures to conceal them.' Many of the Commission's recommenda­
tions are useful suggestions that should help diminish fraudulent 
financial reporting in the basic sense defined in the April 
Draft. However, we are concerned that the implications of 
portions of the April Draft that imply more rigorous duties for 
audit committees and independent public accountants would (a) 
impose additional burdens and time and work that are unrealistic 
and (b) create aspirations, which may form the basis of liability 
for audit committee members and independent public accountants, 
that are far beyond the realistic ability of persons performing 
those functions to carry out.
Our specific comments follow.
Tone at the Top - Framework
As indicated above, we concur with the emphasis in the April 
Draft on the importance of top management's role in establishing 
and maintaining the proper corporate climate. However, we have 
some difficulty in understanding whether the Commission intends 
the broad term "internal control" to have an aspirational, or a 
normative, meaning. If the term is meant to refer to goals of 
good corporate practice, we have no objection? but we believe the 
Commission should make it clear that it is stating goals when it
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discusses improving the internal audit function, the effective­
ness of audit committees and the over-all control environment 
(e.g., management philosophy and operating styles, organizational 
structure, methods of establishing authority and responsibility 
and personnel management methods). If, on the other hand, the 
term "internal control" is meant to set forth norms which are to 
become part of a legal framework (liability, regulatory require­
ments, etc.), we are troubled. The internal accounting controls 
contemplated by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") may 
have a meaning which is reasonably well understood, but the other 
concepts bound up in "internal control" seem to us to be too 
indefinite and vague to become part of laws. If the Commission 
does intend the term to have such a normative character, we urge 
that it be defined and that the Commission provide an analysis of 
the definition's usage in the context of regulatory compliance 
and sanctions.
Code of Corporate Conduct
While we agree that a public company (and many private 
companies) should have a written code of corporate conduct that 
includes a conflict-of-interest policy, a legal compliance policy 
and a policy of confidentiality, we suggest the deletion of the 
references to "ethical climate", "ethical standards and proce­
dures" and "ethical decision-making". Ethical standards, in 
common with concepts of morality and religious belief, vary
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widely, and conduct within the law may be seen as ethical by some 
but unethical by others. We see no reason why the Commission 
should appear to suggest that a company should establish stan­
dards beyond those required for lawful conduct.
Internal Audit Function
The sweep of the Commission's definition of public company 
(page 2) is a broad one. There are, in fact, many public com­
panies reporting to the SEC that do not presently have and 
realistically cannot afford an internal audit function. The 
cost-benefit analysis deserves focused attention and an empirical 
study, in this regard, of smaller public companies IPOs would be 
useful.
The April Draft states that operational auditing is among 
the functions which internal auditors can provide to the company 
(page 34). The term "operational auditing" would seem to imply 
line reporting to and supervision by the business manager. Such 
a relationship blurs the internal audit function and compromises 
its objectivity, the importance of which is rightly stressed by 
the April Draft (page 33).
We note the Commission's position that the audit committee 
should adopt, on a formal basis, a written document setting forth 
the scope of responsibilities for the internal audit function 
(page 33). This may be a useful procedure but we believe that
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the audit committee should so act only with the benefit of legal 
as well as accounting advice.
Role of the Audit Committee
The April Draft lays great stress on the "crucial role" of 
the audit committee in "preventing and detecting fraudulent 
financial reporting" (page 35).
An audit committee made up of independent directors can 
obviously play an important part in a sound financial reporting 
system. These directors can carry out a more intense review of 
management's accounting decisions than is possible in a full 
board meeting devoted to many other topics where the agenda is 
controlled by management. In addition, they can provide greater 
insulation for the public accountants from management pressure. 
The need to justify decisions, and the more intense scrutiny of 
details which should follow where there is an active independent 
audit committee, should serve to improve the quality of the 
financial reporting product? and the resulting tone may well 
produce an atmosphere in which fraudulent financial reporting is 
less likely to occur.
Nevertheless, we think it is a fundamental misconception to 
think that the audit committee can prevent or detect fraud.
Specifically we believe the April Draft overstates the 
possibility that the audit committee can reduce the incidence of
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fraudulent financial reporting when it lists the following 
functions of such committees:
1. The April Draft states that one such function 
relates to the company's assessment of, and response to, the 
risk of fraudulent financial reporting (page 37). The April 
Draft never describes the specifics of actions the committee 
can take in relation to the company's (presumably manage­
ment's) assessment and response to the risk of fraud; it 
states that "more detailed delineation and description of 
responsibilities is best left to the discretion of manage­
ment and the board of directors The Good Practice
Guidelines for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting set forth in Exhibit K, however, which by their 
terms are to be utilized by the audit committee as one 
participant in the financial reporting process (page 158), 
set forth a completely unrealistic "frame of reference" to 
be followed by any audit committee. For example, they 
stress a "heightened awareness and sensitivity to the 
implications" of the listed factors, which include the 
following:
(a) A company's "internal accounting controls," 
consisting of the company's accounting system and 
specific controls (page 160). We believe it is unreal­
istic to expect non-accountants or an audit committee
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to assess either their company’s accounting system or 
its specific controls; the Guidelines' description of 
what comprises an accounting system, and the listings 
of "specific controls" and "specific control proce­
dures" in the Guidelines (page 160) surely are largely 
meaningless to anyone other than an accountant.
(b) A company's "control environment," which is 
dependent on management's consciousness of and commit­
ment to an effective system of internal control (page 
161). If the typical audit committee members cannot be 
expected to understand internal control in a detailed, 
professional way, it is hard to see how they can assess 
management's consciousness of and commitment to an 
effective system. A review of the IIA's Standards for 
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (page 
169) makes it clear that the typical audit committee 
could not conceivably test the efficacy of a company's 
internal audit staff, which indeed the April Draft 
recommends be done by an external (peer) review of the 
internal audit function (page 33). (We also believe 
that the concept of peer review of internal audit 
function is unjustified. It is an untried concept that 
would seem to be expensive and unworkable.)
2. The April Draft states that another function of 
the audit committee relates to the company's compliance with 
its code of corporate conduct. To effectively carry out 
such a function, the committee would have to be trained as 
auditors or investigators and devote weeks of effort to such 
an inquiry. We believe that this function completely 
misconceives the role that a typical audit committee can 
effectively carry out.
3. The Good Practice Guidelines for the Audit Commit­
tee (Appendix K) contain several similarly unrealistic 
goals, such as an understanding of electronic data process­
ing procedures and controls, and assessing security programs 
to determine the capacity of such programs to protect 
against fraud or misuse.
In short, to accomplish the tasks assigned to the audit 
committee by the April Draft, the committee would have to be 
composed of persons who not only are "vigilant, informed, dili­
gent, and probing" (page 36), but are supermen who are at the 
same time expert and experienced managers, accountants and 
financial executives who would be expected to spend weeks, even 
months, of effort every year on committee matters.
It is striking, in fact, that the Audit Committee Guidelines 
in Appendix K contain no specifics relating to either a review of 
the company's process of assessing the risk of fraudulent
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financial reporting or a review of compliance with the code of 
corporate conduct.
We think that the key task of the audit committee should be 
to exercise an oversight, not an investigatory, function with 
respect to performance by corporate officers of the accounting 
function and the internal audit function. Independent directors 
can be expected to insist on receiving selected analytical data 
as well as the finished financial reports, to review the material 
presented to them, to ask questions, and where they are not 
satisfied with answers, to require additional information and 
explanations. However, the quality of independence which these 
directors have means that they have other occupations and so can 
give only limited time to the company. Full-time investigators 
or an internal audit staff might uncover a careful plan to 
inflate earnings or overstate assets by, e.g., manipulating 
shipping times, or making sales "stick", or capitalizing supply 
costs which should be expensed. We think it completely unrealis­
tic to expect such detective work from the audit committee.
Indeed, the tone of the April Draft's approach would intimi­
date even accounting professionals. Very few, if they have good 
legal advice, would be willing to volunteer for the assignment 
if, as previously remarked, "[t]he audit committee must be 
vigilant, informed, diligent, and probing in fulfilling its 
oversight responsibilities" (page 36). This phrasing sets forth
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desirable goals, but in a litigation context appears to prescribe 
an awesome standard of care. We submit that alert attention by a 
committee member director to the audit committee's activities, 
circumscribed by a realistic agenda, is all that can be asked for 
or should be expected.
The April Draft cites a study to the effect that of the 
companies involved in SEC enforcement proceedings for fraudulent 
financial reporting, 69 percent had audit committees and states 
that this "statistic raises doubts as to whether audit committees 
are meeting their potential for reducing the incidence of fraudu­
lent financial reporting" (page 37). We suggest it should 
promote skepticism about the likelihood that an audit committee 
composed of independent directors has the inherent capacity to 
detect a fraud.
With regard to the recommendation that the SEC require 
public companies to establish audit committees, we think that the 
"potential sources of authority" for such a rule that are cited 
by the April Draft (page 35) are a highly questionable basis for 
concluding that the SEC has authority to mandate a form of 
corporate governance. We suggest that the applicable statutes 
are fully in accord with the prevailing view and consistent 
practice that the internal regulation of corporations is a matter 
left to the states. Assuming that a valid rule in this area 
could be promulgated, we think that further consideration is
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needed regarding the workings of the proposed exemption for 
companies which cannot find qualified independent directors to 
serve on their audit committees. The April Draft recommends a 
case-by-case determination by the SEC conditioned upon the 
diligence of the search and the institution of "functionally 
equivalent" procedures and controls in lieu of the audit commit­
tee. Both of these tests are highly subjective, and a better 
approach might focus on factors such as the size of the company 
and the extent to which it engages in public offerings.
The ability to find qualified directors for the audit 
committee would, we think, be seriously impaired by the adoption 
of another recommendation: the use of a written charter setting 
forth the duties and responsibilities of the committee (page 37). 
Consideration of the utility of such a document cannot be di­
vorced from an understanding of its implications for director 
liability. We believe that, in the current legal climate, any 
deviation from the diligent and frequent discharge of each item 
on a detailed list of responsibilities has a significant risk of 
being used in litigation to establish a dereliction (or at any 
rate a pattern of conduct which, taken together, amounts to a 
dereliction). A director would be ill-advised to serve on a 
committee that has a written charter that consists of more than a 
description, in the most general terms, of the over-all mission 
of the committee. A delineation of specific review procedures,
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so long as it is not unrealistically long, would perhaps be of 
assistance to committee members, but any such list should be 
framed as illustrative only and should not appear in a document 
from which any duty might be implied which goes beyond the 
applicable standard of duty of care imposed by general corporate 
law.
Finally, we note the variety of ways the Commission states 
the audit committee’s role: it is to "review", "assess", "over­
see", "approve", "discuss", "inquire", "understand", "consider", 
"determine" and "satisfy itself". There are, of course, nuances 
and shadings of meaning between and among these verbal expres­
sions, and we question whether or not the Commission actually 
intended each separate verbal expression to have a different 
meaning. We would suggest that "approve", "determine", "recom­
mend" and "review" be used only if the audit committee action 
involves formal authorization; otherwise, the audit committee 
"discusses" or "considers". We would also suggest that the audit 
committee can never "satisfy itself [in any responsible way] that 
controls within the company are adequate to protect the integrity 
of quarterly reporting" (page 43).
Reporting to the Public on Management and Auditing Committee 
Responsibilities
We believe that the recommendation that both top management 
and the audit committee report directly in the Annual Report to
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Shareholders accomplishes nothing but to increase potential 
liability, and will lead to meaningless and un-read boilerplate.
The communication to the public of management’s responsibil­
ity for the company’s financial statements is indeed a matter of 
public education, which is even now being addressed by the 
profession itself in the consideration by the AICPA Auditing 
Standards Board of a revision in the form of the auditor's 
standard report.
It seems clear to us that (i) management's responsibility 
for an assessment of internal control is imposed by law, whether 
or not management so asserts, and (ii) a statement by management 
concerning its assessment of its internal control cannot be 
expected to be an admission of violation of law and therefore 
would amount to a simple statement of compliance with the law.
The April Draft does not define the term "management", which 
is used extensively in Part V of Chapter Two. At times in 
accounting literature the term "management" includes directors, 
whereas it is also used at times to refer to the personnel and 
organization concerned with the corporation's day-to-day business 
and affairs and does not refer to the board of directors. A 
committee of the ABA, in discussing management statements on 
internal accounting control, reached the following conclusion 
(assuming such a statement is included in an annual report):
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In view of this confusion [over the meaning of manage­
ment], and given the fact that the corporate entity is the 
party ’responsible’ for the matters considered, the Commit­
tee believes that the terms ’Company' or 'XYZ Corporation' 
should be used and that references to 'management' should be 
avoided. In this connection, the title for the statement 
might be 'Responsibility for Financial Statements of XYZ 
Corporation' or 'Company Report on Financial Statements'. 
Reports by Management: A Discussion Paper, 36 Business 
Lawyer 1061, 1974 (1981)
It appears to us that a requirement such as that set forth 
in Appendix L simply means that each company must come up with a 
short, elementary textbook description of what financial state­
ments are, and of the function to be served by a system of 
internal control. In our view, that is exactly what the example 
in Appendix L does (the following materials in quotes are short­
hand summaries):
(i) "Management has the responsibility for preparation 
of financial statements, and for integrity and objectivity." 
Why is it necessary for every single issuer subject to SEC 
reporting requirements to say this every year? It is 
elementary and unnecessary. If anything will convert annual 
reports into un-read boilerplate, this will.
(ii) "Statements were prepared in accordance with 
GAAP." Independent accountants are employed to give their 
professional opinion on this matter, and they do. What is 
to be gained by requiring non-independent insiders to state 
the same thing?
(iii) "Under GAAP, financial statements consist to a 
great extent of estimates and judgments." Here again, we 
have the primer in basic accounting.
(iv) "Management prepared and is responsible for the 
annual report." Who else?
The second and fourth paragraphs of the sample management 
report are equally subject to the same critical analysis. The 
third paragraph, as to internal control, again contains an 
elementary textbook description of a system of internal control 
and one of the functions of the internal audit; we fail to see 
what is gained by requiring that this be repeated by every public 
company every year in what obviously will be boilerplate. And to 
state that management believes its system is adequate is again to 
require it to state the obvious with no real likelihood of any 
variation.
It appears that the April Draft takes the position that a 
great deal of education of the public is necessary, and hopes to 
accomplish that purpose by the elementary textbook descriptions 
in the proposed reports by top management and the audit commit­
tee.
It further appears that one consequence of requiring manage­
ment statements such as those in the illustration in Appendix L 
is to increase the likelihood of liability being imposed on the 
CEO and CFO should fraud (by someone else) or misstatement appear
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to have occurred, without regard to their responsibility under 
traditional concepts of negligence or tort liability. We believe 
that liability standards are now adequately set forth in the 
Federal Securities Laws, including the FCPA.
It is well known that some large corporations which have 
utilized management reports have reduced their statements to 
boilerplate, which remains the same year after year.
The same conclusion as to boilerplate applies even more 
strongly to the proposed mandatory audit committee chairman's 
letter. Most of the information in Appendix M is in fact now 
required to be set forth in a company’s proxy statement. We see 
nothing to be gained by requiring an audit committee chairman to 
recite, for example, that the committee "discussed" the financial 
statements or the results of the examinations made by the compa­
ny's internal auditor and independent public accountants.
Finally, to suggest that the audit committee require of the 
company's independent accountants an assessment of the "overall 
quality" of the company's financial reporting calls into question 
the fairness of the presentation upon which the independent 
accountant has already expressed an opinion, and suggests that 
the "quality" of financial reporting differs within GAAP and that 
those differences can be objectively tested. We think such a 
conclusion would be erroneous and could lead to new impositions 
of liability.
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Change in Independent Public Accountants
There currently exists a significant reporting framework 
relating to changes in auditors: Form 8-K, item 4; Schedule 14A, 
item 8; and Regulation 5-X, item 3-16(s). We note that the April 
Draft contains neither a comparison of the present rules with the 
recommended rule (which appears on page 42) nor a demonstration 
of the need for a change. We question the advisability of adding 
additional requirements.
Quarterly Reporting
We believe the April Draft goes too far in recommending the 
following two courses of action to be taken by an audit commit­
tee:
1. The committee should satisfy itself that controls 
within the company are adequate to protect the integrity of 
quarterly reporting (page 43). We have already expressed 
our view that the audit committee cannot be expected to be 
knowledgeable enough concerning accounting to be able to 
assess either the company's accounting system or its specif­
ic controls generally, and it follows that the members could 
not know what controls are necessary much less whether they 
are in fact adequate to "protect the integrity of quarterly 
reporting". Again, this recommendation calls for not an 
impractical investigatory role by the audit committee rather 
than oversight.
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2. The committee should approve, in advance, the 
release of quarterly financial results to the public (page 
43). This proposal is impractical and impossible of fulfill­
ment. It is often impossible for an audit committee to 
review and approve even annual financial statements prior to 
issuance. (This fact is recognized in paragraph 5 of the 
ASB's Proposed Statement on "Communication with Audit 
Committees ..."). The proposal would impede desirable, 
speedy release of periodic results, and would risk leaks of 
material information. The suggestion that such review could 
be by telephone does not take into consideration the diffi­
culty of any meaningful review of financial statements by 
such means. With the full agenda of responsibilities listed 
in Appendix K, clearly requiring at least two or three 
meetings a year, it is in our view absurd to expect three 
additional meetings for the specific purpose of reviewing in 
advance quarterly financial statements, and therefore we 
believe it would be erroneous to recommend even post-issuance 
review of quarterly figures except as part of the commit­
tee's general oversight, such as questioning excessive 
concentration of write-offs in the fourth quarter. 
Communication With Others Regarding Material Irregularities
We believe that the paragraph on page 54 under the above 
caption fundamentally misconceives the auditor's role in its
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assertion and discussion of an "independent public accountant's 
current obligation to communicate to others outside the client 
any material irregularities and illegal acts he discovers in the 
course of an audit". The initiative of disclosure is with the 
client, not the auditor. The client, not the auditor, makes the 
financial statement disclosures. A withdrawal by the auditor is 
not a disclosure of irregularities or illegal acts; and the 
withdrawal imposes no duty to the public to make such disclosure. 
Gold v. DCL, Incorporated, CCH Fed. Sec. L Rep. ¶ 94,036 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973). A qualified or adverse opinion or a disclaimer of opinion 
may properly be stated with a degree of generality that does not 
require such disclosures. The client, not the auditor, is 
required to disclose reportable disagreements in SEC form 8-K 
upon a change of auditors, and to request a letter of comment 
from the former auditor on its filing; and the client is required 
to file the letter of comment if received from the former audi­
tor. The client must consent to any disclosures by the former 
auditor to a successor auditor. Absent client consent, disclo­
sure by an auditor of confidential client information would 
violate AICPA ethics rule 301, and could result in liability to 
the client. See Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 19 Ohio 
App.3d 7, 482 N.E.2d 955 (1983). The disclosure obligation of 
the auditor is, and should continue to be, limited to disclosure 
to the client itself at a sufficiently high level of authority,
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\in order to maintain the auditor’s role as an independent profes­
sional, not a disciplinary superauthority. Role of Independent 
Public Accountant in Detecting Fraud
The Commission has made a number of sound recommendations 
concerning ways in which the accounting profession should attempt 
to develop improved audit procedures designed better to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting. A number of these recommenda­
tions call for the development of better guidance in this area, 
and we concur in many of the statements made in Chapter 3 of the 
April Draft. However, we have a number of concerns.
The Commission recommends revised standards "requiring the 
independent public accountant to (1) take affirmative steps in 
each audit to assess the potential for [fraudulent financial] 
reporting and (2) design tests to provide reasonable assurance of 
detection." The use of the phraseology "reasonable assurance" is 
derived originally from SAS 1.320 relating to accounting control, 
which in turn became the basis for Subsection (B) of Section 
13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requiring issuers 
to "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls 
perceived to provide reasonable assurances that . . . ." The 
literature has discussed at some length the concept of "reason­
able assurance" in this context. See, for example, A Guide to 
the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Secu­
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rities Exchange Act of 1934 prepared by this Committee and
published in the August 1978 issue of The Business Lawyer. It 
should be kept in mind that the definition of fraudulent finan­
cial reporting in the April Draft focuses on intentional (and 
also reckless) conduct resulting in materially misleading finan­
cial statements. In large measure, in reality, the April Draft 
is aimed at deliberate conduct designed to evade the system of 
internal control. While it may be that the development of more 
sophisticated analytical testing by auditors can hope to achieve 
detection of this type of fraudulent activity in more cases than 
in the past, we are concerned that the phrase "reasonable assur­
ance" may in this context be creating an aspiration that will 
imply the ability to detect deliberate evasion of the system in 
more cases than can reasonably be expected. Put another way, a 
system of internal control that generally provides "reasonable 
assurance" that proper accounting and reporting will occur is not 
a system which is premised on the assumption that there will, as 
a matter of course, be deliberate and sophisticated dishonesty; 
on the contrary, we submit it is premised on the assumption that 
such conduct is the exception. It would appear to us that while 
existing and improved auditing standards involve and should 
involve healthy skepticism, the system is premised on the suppo­
sition that unintentional errors are more likely to occur than 
deliberate falsifications or distortions, and that such falsi­
fications or distortions are likely to be much more difficult for
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a n y  s y s t e m  t o  d e t e c t ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e .  I f  t h i s  i s  
c o r r e c t ,  a  m u c h  m o r e  d i s c r e t e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  f o r  d e t e c t i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  t h a n  
" r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e "  w o u l d  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e .  T h e  A p r i l  D r a f t  
s h o u l d ,  a t  a  m i n i m u m ,  b e  r e v i s e d  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  t o  r e f e r  t o  
" i m p r o v e d  l i k e l i h o o d "  i n s t e a d  o f  " r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e " .
I n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n ,  w e  p e r c e i v e  s u b s t a n t i a l  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  
t h e  c u r r e n t  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  A I C P A  t o  f o r m u l a t e  g u i d a n c e  o n  d e t e c t ­
i n g  i l l e g a l  a c t i o n s  ( p r o p o s e d  r e p l a c e m e n t  o f  S A S  1 7 ) .  W e  b e l i e v e  
c a r e  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n  i n  t h a t  e f f o r t  t o  a v o i d  p l a c i n g  u p o n  a u d i ­
t o r s  b u r d e n s ,  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  r i s k  o f  l i a b i l i t y ,  t h a t  m a y  f a r  
e x c e e d  w h a t  c a n  r e a s o n a b l y  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  b e  d e v e l o p e d  o u t  o f  t h e  
c o n t i n u i n g  e v o l u t i o n  o f  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  a u d i t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s .
T h e  A p r i l  D r a f t  a l s o  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  t h e  S E C  a d o p t  a  r u l e  
r e q u i r i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  t o  r e v i e w  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l  d a t a  p r i o r  t o  i t s  q u a r t e r l y  r e l e a s e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .
M a n y  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  a l r e a d y  v o l u n t a r i l y  e n g a g e  t h e i r  i n d e p e n ­
d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m  t h e  c u r r e n t l y  p r e s c r i b e d  
l i m i t e d  r e v i e w  o f  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s ,  a n d  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n ­
t a n t  i n  a n y  e v e n t  m u s t  r e v i e w  ( b u t  n o t  a u d i t )  t h a t  d a t a  i n  
h i n d s i g h t  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  a n n u a l  a u d i t .  K e e p i n g  i n  m i n d  
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  w e  d o  n o t  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  l i m i t e d  r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s  c u r r e n t l y  p r e s c r i b e d  
f o r  q u a r t e r l y  d a t a  w o u l d  b e  v e r y  l i k e l y  t o  p i c k  u p  t r u l y
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i t e e  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
P a g e  - 2 3 -
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
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f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  a n d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  s u c h  
p r o c e d u r e s  w e r e  r e a s o n a b l y  d e s i g n e d  t o  d o  s o  w o u l d  e x a c e r b a t e  
u n r e a l i s t i c  e x p e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  u n d o u b t e d l y  a  g e n u i n e  c o s t  
i s s u e  f o r  m a n y  s m a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s ,  a n d  w e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  
t h e  b u r d e n s  p l a c e d  u p o n  s m a l l e r  i s s u e r s  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  w o u l d  b e  
c o m m e n s u r a t e  w i t h  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  b e  a c h i e v e d .  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d
W e  d o  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  b l a c k  l e t t e r  r e c ­
o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  A S B  s h o u l d  a f f o r d  a  " f u l l  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  r o l e  
i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s "  t o  p e r s o n s  w h o  a r e  n o t  C P A s  
( p a g e  5 5 ) ;  b u t  p r o p e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  
s h o u l d  n o t  l e a d  t o  a  s t r u c t u r e  w h i c h  u n d e r r a t e s  t h e  n e e d  f o r  
d e v o t i n g  t h e  h i g h e s t  d e g r e e  o f  t e c h n i c a l  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e x p e r ­
t i s e  t o  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  c o m p l e x  m a t t e r s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  
s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  A S B  b e  e v e n l y  d i v i d e d  b e t w e e n  C P A s  a n d  o t h e r s  
s e e m s  t o  s u g g e s t  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  l a c k  o f  t r u s t  i n  t h e  c o m p e t e n c e  o f  
t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n  i n  d e c i d i n g  m a t t e r s  w i t h  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  
i m p l i c a t i o n s .  A  l e s s  d r a s t i c  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  m e e t  a n y  l e g i t i m a t e  c o n c e r n .
E n f o r c e m e n t  M a t t e r s
T h e  A p r i l  D r a f t  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  t h e  S E C ' s  s a n c t i o n  p o w e r s  b e  
b r o a d e n e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e a l  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  a n d  c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y  
w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  p r e v e n t i n g  a n d  d e t e r r i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i t e e  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
P a g e  - 2 4 -
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
14
X
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i t e e  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
P a g e  - 2 5 -
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
r e p o r t i n g .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  m a k e s  t h r e e  r e c o m m e n d a ­
t i o n s  :
1 .  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  i m p o s e  c i v i l  m o n e y  
p e n a l t i e s  i n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e e d i n g s  [ i n c l u d i n g  R u l e  
2 ( e )  p r o c e e d i n g s ]  a n d  t o  s e e k  c i v i l  m o n e y  p e n a l t i e s  
f r o m  a  c o u r t  d i r e c t l y  i n  a n  i n j u n c t i v e  p r o c e e d i n g  ( p a g e  
6 0 )  .
2 .  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  i s s u e  a  c e a s e  a n d  
d e s i s t  o r d e r  w h e n  a  s e c u r i t i e s  l a w  v i o l a t i o n  o r  a n  
u n s o u n d  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r a c t i c e  i s  f o u n d  ( p a g e  
6 1 ) .
3 .  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  s e e k  e x p l i c i t  s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t y  t o  b a r  
o r  s u s p e n d  c o r p o r a t e  o f f i c e r s  a n d  d i r e c t o r s  i n v o l v e d  i n  
f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  f r o m  f u t u r e  s e r v i c e  i n  
t h a t  c a p a c i t y  i n  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  ( p a g e  6 2 ) .
T h e  i s s u e  o f  w h e t h e r  t h e  S E C  s h o u l d  h a v e  o r  e v e n  n e e d s  
b r o a d e r  e n f o r c e m e n t  p o w e r  i s  d e b a t a b l e .  T h e  r e a s o n s  c i t e d  b y  t h e  
A p r i l  D r a f t  ( p a g e s  6 0 ,  6 1 )  i n c l u d e :
1 .  G r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  t a i l o r i n g  r e m e d i e s  t o  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e .
2 .  E l i m i n a t i o n  o f  " g a p s "  i n  t h e  S E C ' s  e n f o r c e m e n t  
p o w e r .
3 .  R e m e d y i n g  c o n d u c t  t h a t  m i g h t  o t h e r w i s e  e s c a p e  
r e d r e s s .
4 .  A v o i d i n g  t h e  c o l l a t e r a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a n  
i n j u n c t i o n .
5 .  I m p r o v i n g  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  d i s c e r n  l e v e l s  o f  c u l ­
p a b i l i t y .
I n  1 9 8 4  f o r m e r  S E C  C h a i r m a n  S h a d  f o u n d  t h e s e  r e a s o n s  t o  b e  
r e l a t i v e l y  u n p e r s u a s i v e  w h e n  r e v i e w i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f
g r a n t i n g  t h e  S E C  t h e  p o w e r  t o  i m p o s e  m o n e t a r y  f i n e s  a n d  t o  i s s u e  
c e a s e  a n d  d e s i s t  o r d e r s .  S h a d  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  g r a n t  o f  s u c h  
p o w e r s  w o u l d  b e  i m p r u d e n t .  S e e  L e t t e r  t o  T i m o t h y  E .  W i r t h  ( F e b .  
2 2 ,  1 9 8 4 ) ,  r e p r i n t e d  i n  T h i r d  A n n u a l  S e c u r i t i e s  L a w  &  E n f o r c e m e n t  
I n s t i t u t e  6 9 7 - 7 0 1  ( 1 9 8 4 )  ( t h e  " S h a d  L e t t e r " ) .  S h a d  d e t e r m i n e d  
t h a t  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  b r e a d t h  o f  S E C  s a n c t i o n i n g  p o w e r  m i g h t  
d i l u t e  t h e  S E C ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  o b t a i n  i n j u n c t i o n s  i n  c o u r t ,  t h a t  
b r o a d e r  p o w e r s  w e r e  n o t  w o r t h  t h e  S E C ' s  t i m e  a n d  i t s  e n f o r c e m e n t  
r e s o u r c e s ,  a n d  t h a t  b r o a d e r  p o w e r s  m i g h t  i n h i b i t  t h e  S E C ' s  
a b i l i t y  t o  r e a c h  s e t t l e m e n t  a g r e e m e n t s  ( I d .  a t  6 9 8 - 7 0 1 ) .  F o r m e r  
C h a i r m a n  S h a d ' s  w e l l - r e a s o n e d  a r g u m e n t s  w e r e  p e r s u a s i v e  w h e n  m a d e  
a n d  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  n o w .
T h e  A p r i l  D r a f t ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  p u r s u i n g  s w e e p i n g  S E C  
s a n c t i o n  a u t h o r i t y  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
a p p a r e n t l y  w e r e  m o t i v a t e d  b y  s u c c e s s  i n  p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  I n s i d e r  
T r a d i n g  S a n c t i o n s  A c t  o f  1 9 8 4  ( t h e  " I T S A " )  ( p a g e  6 0 ) .  W e  
q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  s u p p o r t i n g  b r o a d e r  s a n c t i o n s  i n  
t h e  a r e a  o f  i n s i d e r  t r a d i n g  a p p l i e s  e q u a l l y  t o  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n ­
c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  a s  t h e  A p r i l  D r a f t  a p p e a r s  t o  p r e s u m e .  I t  i s  n o t  
c l e a r  t h a t  e x i s t i n g  s a n c t i o n s  f o r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
p r o v i d e  a n  i n a d e q u a t e  d e t e r r e n t  a n d  t h a t  b r o a d e r  s a n c t i o n  a u t h o r ­
i t y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  w a r r a n t e d .  I n d e e d ,  w h e n  a r g u i n g  i n  1 9 8 4  a g a i n s t  
b r o a d e r  s a n c t i o n  a u t h o r i t y ,  f o r m e r  C h a i r m a n  S h a d  s t a t e d :
H o w e v e r ,  u n l i k e  t h e  I n s i d e r  T r a d i n g  S a n c t i o n s  A c t ,
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w h i c h  w a s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e s i g n e d  t o  d e a l  w i t h  p r o b l e m s  
t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
i n s i d e r  t r a d i n g  c a s e s ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  b e e n  u n a b l e  
t o  i d e n t i f y  a  s e r i o u s  n e e d  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  r e m e d i e s  t o  
d e t e r  a  s p e c i f i c  t y p e  o f  c o n d u c t .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  i t s  e x i s t i n g  r e m e d i e s  a r e  e f f e c t i v e  i n  
m o s t  c a s e s  . . . . ( S h a d  L e t t e r  a t  7 0 0 . )
I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  I T S A  h a s  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l  a n d  b e n e f i c i a l  i n  
t h e  n a r r o w  a r e a  i n  w h i c h  i t  w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  a p p l y :  i n s i d e r
t r a d i n g .  T h i s  s u c c e s s  a l o n e  o u g h t  n o t  t o  p o i n t  p e r  s e  t o w a r d  
b r o a d e r  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  p o w e r  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .  A n d  y e t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  l a c k s  a  r a t i o ­
n a l e ,  a p a r t  f r o m  t h a t  c o g e n t l y  r e j e c t e d  b y  S h a d  i n  1 9 8 4 ,  f o r  
a d o p t i n g  s u c h  p o w e r s  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g .
B y  o m i t t i n g  a  p e r s u a s i v e  r a t i o n a l e ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n ­
d a t i o n  f o r  b r o a d e r  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  a u t h o r i t y  m u s t  b e  q u e s t i o n e d .  
L a c k i n g  a  s o u n d ,  r e a s o n e d ,  p o l i c y  b a s i s ,  a d d i t i o n a l  S E C  r e m e d i e s  
i n  f a c t  m i g h t  h a v e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o n  t h e  a c c o u n t ­
i n g  p r o f e s s i o n .  F i r s t ,  e x p a n d i n g  t h e  r a n g e  o f  S E C  e n f o r c e m e n t  
p o w e r  c r e a t e s  a  r i s k  t h a t  l i a b i l i t y  m i g h t  b e  i m p o s e d  n o  m a t t e r  
h o w  e x a c t i n g  a u d i t o r s  m a y  b e ,  p r o v i d i n g  l i t t l e  m o t i v a t i o n  t o  
p r o v i d e  h i g h e r  q u a l i t y  s e r v i c e  b e c a u s e  l i a b i l i t y  i s  i n e v i t a b l e .
S e e  F i s c h e l ,  T h e  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  A c c o u n t i n g ;  S o m e  E c o n o m i c  I s s u e s ,
5 2  B r o o k l y n  L .  R e v .  1 0 5 1 ,  1 0 5 5  ( 1 9 8 7 )  ( " W h y  o f f e r  a  h i g h e r  
q u a l i t y  p r o d u c t  i f  y o u  w i l l  b e  s u e d  r e g a r d l e s s  w h e n e v e r  t h e r e  i s  
a  p r e c i p i t o u s  d e c l i n e  i n  s t o c k  p r i c e s ? " ) .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  g o a l
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o f  d e t e r r e n c e  t h u s  m i g h t  n o t  b e  a c h i e v e d  t h r o u g h  e n h a n c e d  S E C  
s a n c t i o n s .
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  n u m e r o u s  d i v e r s e  s a n c t i o n s  
m i g h t  c r e a t e  p u b l i c  m i s p e r c e p t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  w h o  i s  t o  b l a m e  i n  
a n  i n s t a n c e  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  T h e  c u r r e n t  
i n j u n c t i o n  s a n c t i o n  e n s u r e s  ( i f  o n l y  i n c i d e n t a l l y )  t h a t  o n l y  
t h o s e  p e r s o n s  w h o s e  c o n d u c t  r e a c h e s  a  h i g h  l e v e l  o f  c u l p a b i l i t y  
a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  S E C  s a n c t i o n .  B r o a d e r  s a n c t i o n  a u t h o r i t y  a g a i n s t  
t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n  p e r h a p s  w i l l  m a k e  a u d i t o r s  t h e  s c a p e ­
g o a t  f o r  m a n y  t r a n s a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  e y e s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c .  T h i s  r i s k s  
f u e l i n g  t h e  o f t e n  m i s g u i d e d  p u b l i c  p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t o r  i s  
a l w a y s  t h e  p a r t y  a t  f a u l t .  S e e  G o e l z e r ,  T h e  S E C  a n d  O p i n i o n  
S h o p p i n g  A  C a s e  S t u d y  i n  t h e  C h a n g i n g  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  A c c o u n t i n g  
P r o f e s s i o n . 5 2  B r o o k l y n  L .  R e v .  1 0 5 7 ,  1 0 5 7  ( 1 9 8 7 ) :
[ T ] h e  p u b l i c  . . . p e r c e i v e [ s ]  t h e  a u d i t o r  a s  t h e  p a r t y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  w h e n  a  c l i e n t ' s  b u s i n e s s  f a i l s  w i t h o u t  a n y  
p r i o r  p u b l i c  w a r n i n g  b y  t h e  f i r m  t h a t  h a s  s c r u t i n i z e d  
t h e  b u s i n e s s e s '  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  T h i s  p e r c e p t i o n  
e x a c e r b a t e s  t h e  d i l e m m a  f a c i n g  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n  b y  
r e q u i r i n g  i t  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e s  i n  t h e  
f a c e  o f  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  m i s p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  
r o l e .
W h e r e a s  i t  a r g u a b l y  w a s  c r u c i a l  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  i n s i d e r  
t r a d i n g  t o  c o m m u n i c a t e  a  s e n s e  o f  c u l p a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  i n  
o r d e r  t o  e n h a n c e  d e t e r r e n c e ,  s u c h  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  i n s t a n c e  
o f  a u d i t i n g ,  w h i c h  s o  o f t e n  i n v o l v e s  j u d g m e n t  c a l l s ,  m i g h t  b e  
m i s c o n s t r u e d  b y  t h e  p u b l i c .  I n  s h o r t ,  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  s c o p e  o f
144Z-3
SEC sanctions against auditors might impose unjustified stigma on 
the accounting profession and might also have a detrimental 
effect on the profession as a whole.
The Commission’s goals in proposing expansive SEC remedies 
could be achieved by alternative means that are less intrusive 
yet also effective. For example, the April Draft argues that SEC 
cease and desist power could deter "cute accounting," in circum­
stances where the SEC "might hesitate to pursue injunctive relief 
because the side-effects may seem too harsh and therefore inap­
propriate." (page 61.) A better solution to the problem of cute 
accounting would be for the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
or the SEC, through its rule making procedures, to eliminate the 
"ambiguit[ies] or gap[s] in professional standards" that permit 
justification of "accounting policies that fail to reflect 
economic substance of the transactions." This solution would 
address the problem more precisely than cease and desist authori­
ty. A case-by-case, ad hoc determination of when a policy fails 
to "reflect the economic substance" of a transaction invites 
arbitrariness and the imposition of a cease and desist order 
might itself "seem too harsh and therefore inappropriate." This 
is particularly true given that a cease and desist order, once 
publicized, conveys a strongly negative message about the auditor 
to the public.
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Finally, the April Draft's arguments for SEC authority to 
bar or suspend corporate officers and directors in order to deter 
fraudulent financial reporting are unconvincing. As a practical 
matter, institutional and. practical auditing constraints now 
exist that accomplish the same goal: the required disclosures
under the Proxy Rules (see Regulation S-K, item 401(f)) and the 
inability of the auditors to rely on individuals who have demon­
strated a lack of integrity effectively discourage the presence 
in a corporation of individuals whose conduct would warrant 
imposition of the proposed sanctions. Perceived pressures from a 
public company's shareholders will usually force what in essence 
is a bar or suspension. The April Draft fails to make any 
showing that the proposal is in response to a recognized and 
unchecked problem and shows no sensitivity to the fact that the 
conferring of such authority on the SEC would constitute a 
significant Federal intrusion, into an area traditionally reg­
ulated by the States - the internal governance of corporations.
We think the recommendation is unwarranted.
Although we do not think that the April Draft makes a 
sufficient (much less a compelling) case for its recommendations 
as to SEC enforcement, it is to be commended for its open ac­
knowledgement that, in each of the recommendations cited above, 
the SEC should first seek express statutory authority from 
Congress (pages 61, 63). The overall effort of these
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recommendations would be to shift the SEC's enforcement power 
from a remedial toward a punitive focus; and such a dramatic turn 
ought to be made only by legislation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we believe that the final Report should be 
useful in focusing the awareness of management, auditors, regula­
tors and users on the process of reducing fraudulent financial 
reporting. We hope our comments on the April Draft will be 
viewed as useful efforts to improve this focus.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment; and if there are 
any questions or if we can be of any assistance, please do not 
hesitate to make contact with us.
National Commitee on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
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June 30, 1987
Respectfully submitted
Larry P. Scriggins, Chairman of the 
Law and Accounting Committee
William P. Hackney, Co-Chairman of 
the Law and Accounting Committee
R. James Gormley, Chairman of the 
Auditing Standards Subcommittee
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G e n tle m e n  o f  t h e  C o m m iss io n s
E n c lo s e d  a r e  o u r  com m ents  r e g a r d in g  t h e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  o f  th e  
R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  
R e p o r t in g  d a te d  A p r i l ,  1987 .
In  g e n e r a l we b e l ie v e  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  r e p o r t  i s  com m e ndab le  and 
hop e  t h a t  A m e r ic a n  I n d u s t r y  and i t s  r e g u la t o r s  w i l l  t a k e  
a g g r e s s iv e  s te p s  t o  im p le m e n t t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s .
The tw o  p r i n c i p a l  com m ents  we w is h  t o  make and w h ic h  a re  
d is c u s s e d  s u b s e q u e n t ly  i n  d e t a i l  a re s
1) G r e a te r  e m p h a s is  s h o u ld  be  p la c e d  on th e  r e s p o n s ib i1 i t y  
o f  m a n a g e rs  t o  d e s ig n ,  e s t a b l i s h  and m o n ito r  an 
a d e q u a te  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  s y s te m .
2 ) P r o f e s s io n a l  b u s in e s s  and a u d i t i n g  o r g a n iz a t io n s  s h o u ld  
assum e g r e a t e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  p r o v id e  e d u c a t io n a l  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  m a n a g e rs  and D i r e c t o r s  in  le a r n in g  th e  
s k i l l s  n e c e s s a ry  t o  d e s ig n ,  e s t a b l i s h  and m o n ito r  
a d e q u a te  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
O ur d e t a i l e d  com m ents f o l l o w .
S. D. P a y n e , Di r e c t o r , I n t e r n a l  A u d i t
D. A. G a llo w a y ,  M anager, I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  A u d i t s
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I N T E R N A L  C O N T R O L — A  M A N A G E M E N T  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y
R e g a r d i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n :
P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t h a t  a r e
a d e q u a t e  t o  p r e v e n t  a n d  d e t e c t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l
r e p o r t i n g .
I t  h a s  b e e n  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  t h a t :
a )  O p e r a t i o n s  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e r s  d o  n o t  h a v e  a n
a d e q u a t e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  g o o d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  T h e y  
o f t e n  e m p h a s i z e  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  " e f f i c i e n c y "  a t  t h e  
e x p e n s e  o f  c o n t r o l ,  i . e . ,  o n e  p e r s o n  c a n  h a n d l e  t h e  
e n t i r e  t r a n s a c t i o n  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y  t h a n  s e g r e g a t i n g  
t h e  d u t i e s  a m o n g  t w o  o r  m o r e  p e r s o n s .
b ) D e s p i t e  c o n t i n u a l  r e f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d
a u d i t i n g  l i t e r a t u r e ,  i . e . ,  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S p e c i a l  
A d v i s o r y  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n t e r n a l  A c c o u n t i n g  C o n t r o l ,  
h e l p s  a n d  a i d s  p r o v i d e d  b y  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m s  s u c h  
a s  E r n s t  a n d  W h i n n e y ' s  E v a l u a t i n g  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l — A  
G u i d e  f o r  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  D i r e c t o r s  a n d  A r t h u r  
A n d e r s e n ' s  A  g u i d e  f o r  S t u d y i n g  a n d  E v a l u a t i n g  I n t e r n a l  
A c c o u n t i n g  C o n t r o l s ,  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
p u b l i c a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h e  M u n i c i p a l  F i n a n c e  O f f i c e r s  
A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  H o w  t o  E v a l u a t e  a n d  I m p r o v e  I n t e r n a l  
C o n t r o l s  i n  G o v e r n m e n t a l  U n i t s ,  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  
d o c u m e n t  a n d  e v a l u a t e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  c o n t i n u e s  t o  
f a l l  h e a v i l y  o n  t h e  s h o u l d e r s  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  I n t e r n a l  
A u d i t o r .
T h i s  c o n d i t i o n  f o s t e r s  t w o  c r i t i c a l  p r o b l e m s :
a )  M a n a g e m e n t  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  a n  a d e q u a t e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  n o r  h a v e  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  a n d  
d o c u m e n t e d  t h e  c r i t i c a l  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t h e y  a r e  
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  i m p l e m e n t  a n d  m a i n t a i n .  T h e  r e g u l a r ,  
o n g o i n g ,  m a i n t e n a n c e  a n d  r e v i e w  o f  c o n t r o l s  t h u s  d o e s  
n o t  b e c o m e  a  m a n a g e m e n t  a c t i v i t y .
b )  S i n c e  c o n t r o l s  a r e  n o t  f o r m a l l y  i d e n t i f i e d  a n d  m a d e  a  
p a r t  o f  o p e r a t i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s  w i t h  a  m e a n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
t o  e v a l u a t e  a n d  m o n i t o r  t h e m  c h a n g e s  i n  p r o c e d u r e s  o r  
s t a f f i n g  s u b s e q u e n t  t o  a n  a u d i t  m a y  m a t e r i a l l y  w e a k e n  
c o n t r o l s  w i t h o u t  r a i s i n g  a n  a l a r m .
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I t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  g r e a t e r  e m p h a s is  r e g a r d in g  m a n a g e m e n t's  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  p r o v id e  th e  r e s o u r c e s  n e c e s s a ry  t o  d o cu m e n t 
c o n t r o l s  and p r o v id e  a s y s te m  t o  m a in ta in  and e v a lu a t e  
e s t a b l is h e d  c o n t r o l s  on an o n - g o in g  b a s is  i s  n e c e s s a r y .
I d e a l l y ,  we b e l ie v e ,  t h e  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  f u n c t io n  s h o u ld  t e s t  
c o m p lia n c e  w i t h  an e s t a b l is h e d  s y s te m  o f  s t r o n g  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s  and e v a lu a t e  e x c e p t io n s  t o  e s t a b l is h e d  c o n t r o l s .  
I n s te a d ,  m os t I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  D e p a r tm e n ts  sp e n d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  t im e  d o c u m e n tin g  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  (a  
m anag em e n t, n o t  a u d i t ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) .
I t  d o e s  n o t  s u r p r i s e  u s  t h a t ,  as  y o u  s t a t e ,  " f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  c o n t in u e s  t o  o c c u r  d e s p i t e  t h e  F C P A 's  
s t a t u t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  c o m p a n ie s  m a in ta in  i n t e r n a l  
a c c o u n t in g  c o n t r o l s "  s in c e  we do n o t  b e l ie v e  o p e r a t io n s  and 
f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e rs  h a v e  f u l l y  a c c e p te d  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and 
h a v e  n o t  im p le m e n te d  a d e q u a te  p r o c e d u re s  t o  e n s u re  m a in te n a n c e  
o f  t h e  s y s te m  o f  c o n t r o l s .
We s u g g e s t  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n  p r e v io u s ly  c i t e d  w o u ld  be  b e t t e r  
w r i t t e n :
P u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  e s t a b l i s h ,  d o c u m e n t, m a in ta in  and 
c o n t i n u a l l y  m o n ito r  t h e i r  s y s te m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t o  
e n s u re  i t  i s  a d e q u a te  t o  p r e v e n t  and d e t e c t  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
We a ls o  s u g g e s t  added  e m p h a s is  on th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  
o p e r a t io n s  and f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e rs  t o  d o cu m e n t and m o n ito r  
s p e c i f i c  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  and p r o v id e  th e  n e c e s s a ry  r e s o u r c e s  
(s u c h  as  a M a n a g e r , I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  and r e q u i s i t e  s t a f f  in  a 
la r g e  o r g a n iz a t io n )  t o  e n s u re  th e  c o n t r o l s  a r e  a d e q u a te ly  
im p le m e n te d ,  m o n ito r e d  and m a in ta in e d  on a r o u t i n e  b a s is .
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EDUCATION OF BUSINESS MANAGERS
Enabling managers to understand and assume their 
responsibilities tor establishing and monitoring internal 
controls requires a joint educational effort on the part of 
management, auditing and educational organizations. Managers 
must accept that it is their responsibility to manage resources 
efficiently while maintaining good control.
In this vein, we believe your recommendations on education are 
appropriate, however, we believe that both the management of 
public companies and the independent certified public 
accountants should, through their respective professional 
organizations, provide educational opportunities to assist 
managers in learning the skills necessary to ensure they 
establish adequate internal controls- While the responsibility 
of obtaining this information is discussed on page 81 of the 
draft report, the responsibility of those with Internal Control 
expertise to make such training available lacks emphasis.
We suggest that a recommendation be added to both the Public 
Company and the Independent Certified Public Accountants 
recommendations to the effect that their respective 
organizations provide educational programs designed to provide 
managers and audit committees with the skills necessary to 
ensure the establishment and monitoring of internal controls.
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GM
General Motors Corporation
June 30, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 P ennsylvan ia  Avenue, N.W. 
W ashington, D. C. 20006
Gentlemen:
We a p p re c ia te  the  o p p o rtu n ity  to  respond to  the  Exposure D ra ft  
Report o f  the  N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g . The 
Commission has done an e x c e lle n t jo b  in  id e n t i f y in g  the  fa c to rs  th a t  can lead 
to  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g ,  as w e ll  as id e n t i f y in g  the  p a r t ie s  
re s p o n s ib le  fo r  p re v e n tin g  i t s  in c id e n ce .
A lthough G eneral M o to rs ' (and many o th e r la rg e  c o rp o ra tio n s ) 
s t ru c tu re  encompasses most o f  the  recommendations, the  requ irem ents in  the 
Exposure D ra f t  cou ld  be e x c e s s iv e ly  burdensome to  many sm a ll companies; 
th e re fo re , we fe e l th a t  the  recommendations should p ro v id e  some f l e x i b i l i t y  
fo r  s m a lle r companies, e .g . ,  companies o p e ra tin g  in  a s in g le  s ta te  versus a 
w orldw ide company.
In  g e n e ra l, we agree w ith  the  m a jo r ity  o f  recommendations in  the 
Exposure D ra f t ;  however, we q u e s tio n  the  need fo r  the recommendation th a t  the  
a u d it  committee should approve q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l  re s u lts  p r io r  to  the  p u b lic  
re lea se  o f the  da ta . We b e lie v e  th a t  the  e x is t in g  procedures ( in  GM' s case 
and in  many m ajor companies) whereby the  Finance Committee o f the  Board as w e ll  
as the  e n t ir e  Board rev iew  a c tu a l and fo re c a s t re s u lts  on a m onth ly b a s is  w ith  
any s ig n i f ic a n t  o r new accoun ting  m a tte r (such as a new sta tem ent from  the 
F in a n c ia l Accounting  Standards Board) be ing  reviewed s p e c i f ic a l ly  w ith  the  
A u d it Committee to o , is  more e f f i c ie n t  and e f fe c t iv e .
We a lso  b e lie v e  th a t  the  statem ent in  Appendix K (page 183) to  the 
e f fe c t  th a t ,  "An a u d it  committee c o n s is t in g  o f independent d ire c to rs  is  the  
p rim a ry  v e h ic le  which boards o f d ire c to rs  use to  d ischarge  th e i r  re sp o n s i­
b i l i t y  w ith  respec t to  the  company’ s f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g " ,  may be an 
oversta tem ent and un less p laced in  p roper p e rs p e c tiv e  may r e s u lt  in  an 
unnecessary expansion in  the  l i a b i l i t y  exposure o f a u d it  com m ittees. T h is , o f 
course , cou ld  r e s u lt  in  a re lu c ta n c e  o f d ire c to rs  to  serve on a u d it  committees 
and a p o s s ib le  in c rease  in  the  expense o f such committees as a c tu a l f u l l - t im e  
s ta f f s  o r  even o u ts id e  counsel a re  h ire d  to  p ro te c t  members from  an increased 
exposure.
General Motors Building 3044 West Grand Boulevard Detroit. Michigan 48202
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We b e lie v e  the  p rim ary  v e h ic le  to  ensure sound f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  
is  the system o f  in te r n a l c o n tro ls  adm in is te red  by re s p o n s ib le  management.
The a u d it  com m ittee 's  ro le  should be one o f  o v e rs ig h t,  and a ss ig n in g  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  to  i t  wh ich are  p a r t  o f  management's r o le  should be avoided. 
A c c o rd in g ly , we agree th a t  as a p a r t o f  th is  o v e rs ig h t,  the  a u d it  committee 
should s a t is f y  i t s e l f  th a t  c o n tro ls  w ith in  the  company are adequate to  p ro te c t 
the  in t e g r i t y  o f  q u a r te r ly  re p o r t in g ,  as w e ll  as be ing  kept in form ed on a 
t im e ly  b a s is  o f  any changes in  accoun ting  o r f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  p ra c t ic e s  
th a t  may have a s ig n i f ic a n t  f in a n c ia l  sta tem ent im pact.
A ttached are our s p e c if ic  responses to  the  Commission's o th e r 
recommendations. Thank you fo r  the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  comment.
Very t r u l y  you rs ,
F. A. Smith
C h ie f F in a n c ia l O f f ic e r
A tta c h .
GENERAL MOTORS' RESPONSE TO THE 
REPORT ON THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
The Tone at the Top
Recommendation: For the top management of a public company to discharge its
obligation to oversee the financial reporting process, it must identify, 
understand, and assess the factors that may cause the company's financial 
statements to be fraudulently misstated.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal controls that are
adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
GM's Response: Agree in principle; however, the recommendation should be
clarified to avoid any misunderstanding that internal controls should be 
developed to prevent and detect all fraudulent financial reporting, as this 
would obviously not be cost effective. In addition, it is virtually 
impossible to ensure against broad collusion by key people. Internal 
controls should be maintained to "reasonably ensure" the prevention and 
detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
Recommendation: Public companies should develop and enforce written codes of
corporate conduct. Codes of conduct should foster a strong ethical climate 
and open channels of communication to help protect against fraudulent 
financial reporting. A company's audit committee should review compliance 
with the code annually, including compliance by top management, and report 
thereon to the board of directors.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Accounting Function and Chief Accounting Officer
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain accounting functions that
can effectively meet their financial reporting obligations.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain an effective internal audit
function staffed with an adequate number of qualified personnel appropriate to 
the size and the nature of the company.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
9079I-3
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Recommendation: Public companies should ensure th a t th e ir  in te rna l aud it
functions are o b je c tive .
GM's Response: Agree in  p r in c ip le ; however, the corporate rank o f the
in te rn a l aud ito r (as discussed under th is  recommendation) is  not re levant 
to  h is independence. The appropriate reporting  re la tio n sh ip  fo r  the ch ie f 
in te rn a l aud ito r w i l l  vary among companies; the re fo re , the Commission 
should not attempt to  prescribe the reporting  re la tio n sh ip  fo r  the ch ie f 
in te rn a l a u d ito r, but ra the r require th a t the au d it committee assume 
re s p o n s ib ility  fo r  reviewing and approving i t .
Recommendation: In te rna l aud ito rs  should consider the im p lica tions  o f th e ir
nonfinancia l aud it find ings  fo r  the company's fin a n c ia l statements.
GM's Response: Agree w ith  recommendation.
Recommendation: Management and the aud it committee should ensure th a t the
in te rn a l a u d ito r 's  involvement in  the au d it o f the e n tire  f in a n c ia l reporting  
process is  appropriate and properly coordinated w ith  the independent public 
accountant.
GM's Response: Agree w ith  recommendation.
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee
Recommendation: The board o f d ire c to rs  o f a l l  pub lic  companies should be 
required by SEC ru le  to  es tab lish  aud it committees comprised so le ly  o f 
independent d ire c to rs .
GM's Response: Although we agree w ith  th is  recommendation, we believe some
f le x ib i l i t y  should be perm itted since some companies may have a problem 
fin d in g  q u a lif ie d  candidates.
Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, v ig i la n t ,  and e ffe c tiv e
overseers o f the fin a n c ia l reporting  process and the company's in te rna l 
co n tro ls .
GM's Response: Agree w ith  recommendation.
Recommendation: A l l  p u b lic  companies should develop a w r i t te n  c h a r te r  s e t t in g  
fo r th  the  d u tie s  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  the  a u d it  com m ittee. The board o f  
d ire c to r s  should approve the  c h a r te r ,  rev iew  i t  a t  le a s t  a n n u a lly , and m od ify  
i t  as necessary.
GM's Response: A company's w r i t te n  bylaws s e t t in g  fo r th  the  d u tie s  and 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  the  a u d it  committee should be a llow ed to  meet t h is  
requ irem en t. A d d it io n a l ly ,  an annual rev iew  o f  such a c h a r te r  may be 
excess ive  in  a w e ll- ru n  company. However, the  board o f  d ire c to rs  should 
approve any m o d if ic a t io n s  to  the  c h a r te r .
9079I -4
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Recommendation: Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority 
to discharge their responsibilities.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The audit committee should review management's evaluation of 
factors related to the independence of the company's public accountant. Both 
the audit committee and management should assist the public accountant in 
preserving his independence.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The audit committee should approve in advance the types and
the extent of management advisory services that management plans to engage the 
company's independent public accountant to perform.
GM's Response: We believe this recommendation is not cost-effective. As 
past studies have shown, management advisory services are not relevant to 
the independence of public accountants. Acquiring such services from 
public accountants is a business judgment that should be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis. Comparisons of management advisory services to audit 
fees is also not relevant to their independence. It is not the dollar 
amount, but the type of service that should be considered. Advance 
approval of certain "generic" services would be acceptable as would an 
annual report to the audit committee.
Reporting on Responsibilities in the Annual Report to Stockholders
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders management reports signed by 
the chief executive officer and chief accounting officer. The management 
report should acknowledge management's responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control, discuss how these responsibilities were 
fulfilled, and provide management's assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company's internal controls.
GM's Response: We believe that there should be a clear distinction between
the chief financial officer and the chief accounting officer. The chief 
financial officer, along with the CEO, should sign the management report as 
was recommended by the Financial Executives Institute several years ago.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by an SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by the 
chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's responsibilities 
and activities during the year.
GM's Response: This proposal seems redundant in view of the existing
practice that the CEO and CFO sign a representation letter that includes a 
reference to the company's audit committee and its responsibilities.
90791-5
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Seeking a Second Opinion
Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee when it seeks a
second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
GM's Response: We concur with this recommendation.
Recommendation: When a public company changes independent public accountants,
it should be required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature of any 
material accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old and new auditors 
during the three-year period preceding the change.
GM's Response: Discussions with a company's public accountants regarding 
major accounting and auditing matters are routine in a company of any 
size. The existing SEC disclosure requirements for disagreements with 
former accountants and the required reference in the accountant's report 
are satisfactory.
Quarterly Reporting
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight of the 
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include approving 
financial results prior to public release.
GM's Response: We do not agree with this recommendation. In GM's case 
(and many other companies that we are aware of), the financial accounting 
and reporting process is on an annual cycle. The interim reporting is 
reviewed with the Board and with the Audit Committee if any matter is 
significant or new (such as a new Statement from the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board). We believe this is a far more efficient use of the Audit 
Committee's time and quite effective.
We do agree, however, with the portion of the recommendation which states 
that the audit committee should satisfy itself that controls within the 
company are adequate to protect the integrity of quarterly reporting, as 
well as being kept informed on a timely basis of any changes in accounting 
or financial reporting practices that may have a significant financial 
statement impact. With respect to oversight of financial information, 
General Motors' Audit Committee, as members of the Board of Directors, 
reviews financial results and forecasts monthly (similar to many other 
corporations).
Furthermore, if audit committees were to approve quarterly financial 
information, it would unduly delay release of this information to the 
public and would not meet the spirit of the SEC ruling regarding timely 
disclosure or require three extra meetings each year. In General Motors' 
case, it would delay the public release of quarterly financial information 
by two to three weeks since our Board meets the first Monday of each 
month. More importantly, we feel that the audit committee's role should be 
one of oversight, and assigning responsibilities to it which are part of 
management's role should be avoided.
9079I-6
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Setting Standards for Internal Control
Recommendation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations should establish a 
body to guide public companies on internal controls.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
Recognizing Responsibility for Detecting Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise standards to 
restate the independent public accountant's responsibility for detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting, requiring the independent public accountant to 
(1) take affirmative steps in each audit to assess the potential for such 
reporting and (2) design tests to provide reasonable assurance of detection. 
Revised standards should include guidance for assessing risks and pursuing 
detection when risks are identified.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards to
require independent public accountants to perform analytical review procedures 
in all audit engagements and should provide improved guidance on the 
appropriate use of these procedures.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public accountants to review 
quarterly financial data of public companies before release to the public.
GM's Response: We agree if this is done under the existing standards. We
do not believe it would be cost effective to have full audits done quarterly.
Improving Audit Quality
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section should strengthen its peer
review program by increasing review of audit engagements involving public 
company clients new to a firm. For each office selected for peer review, the 
first audit of all such new clients should be reviewed.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section requirement for a concurring, 
or second partner, review of the audit report should be revised as part of an 
ongoing process of review of this requirement. Standards for the concurring 
review should, among other things, (1) require concurring review partner 
involvement in the planning stage of the audit in addition to the final review 
stage, (2) specify qualifications of the concurring review partner to require 
prior experience with audits of SEC registrants and familiarity with the 
client's industry, and (3) require the concurring review partner to consider 
himself a peer of the engagement partner for purposes of the review.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
9079I-7
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Recommendation: Public accounting firms should recognize and control the 
organizational and individual pressures that potentially reduce audit quality.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Communicating the Auditor's Role
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's 
standard report to state that the audit provides reasonable but not absolute 
assurance that the audited financial statements are free from material 
misstatements as a result of fraud or error.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's
standard report to describe the extent to which the independent public 
accountant has reviewed and evaluated the system of internal accounting 
control. The Auditing Standards Board also should provide explicit guidance 
to address the situation where, as a result of his knowledge of the company's 
internal accounting controls, the independent public accountant disagrees with 
management's assessment as stated in the proposed management's report.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board
Recommendation: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing Standards Board to 
afford a full participatory role in the standard-setting process to 
knowledgeable persons who are affected by and interested in auditing standards 
but who either are not CPA's or are CPA's no longer in public practice.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Increased Criminal Prosecution
Recommendation: Criminal prosecution of fraudulent financial reporting cases 
should be made a higher priority. The SEC should conduct an affirmative 
program to promote increased criminal prosecution of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases by educating and assisting government officials with criminal 
prosecution powers.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Improved Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
Recommendation: The SEC should require all public accounting firms that audit 
public companies to be members of a professional organization that has peer 
review and independent oversight functions and is approved by the SEC, such as 
that specified by the SECPS of the AICPA's Division for CPA Firms.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
9079I-8
- 7 -
Recommendation: The SEC should take enforcement action when a public 
accounting firm fails to remedy deficiencies cited in the public accounting 
profession's quality assurance program.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
SEC Resources
Recommendation: The SEC must be given adequate resources to perform existing
and additional functions that help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent 
financial reporting.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Financial Institution Regulatory Agencies
Recommendation: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (including the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) 
should adopt measures patterned on the Commission's recommendations directed 
to the SEC to carry out their own regulatory responsibility relating to 
financial reporting under the federal securities laws.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The financial institution regulatory agencies should provide 
for the exchange of information between the regulatory examiner and the 
independent public accountant.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Enhanced Enforcement by State Boards of Accountancy
Recommendation: State boards of accountancy should implement positive
enforcement programs that periodically would review the quality of services 
that the independent public accountants they license render.
GM's Response: We agree in principle; however, enforcement programs should 
not be redundant with other current and proposed programs.
Considering the Implications of Liability on Audit Quality
Recommendation: Parties charged with responding to various tort reform 
initiatives should consider the implications that the perceived liability 
crisis holds for long-term audit quality and the independent public 
accountant's detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
9079I-9
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Reconsidering Corporate Indemnification
Recommendation: The SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that the
corporate indemnification of directors for liabilities that arise under the 
Securities Act of 1933 is against public policy and therefore unenforceable.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION
Business and Accounting Curricula
Recommendation: Throughout the business and accounting curricula, educators
should foster knowledge and understanding of the factors that may cause 
fraudulent financial reporting and the strategies that can lead to a reduction 
in its incidence.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should promote a better 
understanding of the function and the importance of internal controls, 
including the control environment, in preventing, detecting, and deterring 
fraudulent financial reporting.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: Business and accounting students should be well-informed
about the regulation and enforcement activities by which government and 
private bodies safeguard the financial reporting system and thereby protect 
the public interest.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should help students 
develop stronger analytical, problem solving, and judgment skills to help 
prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting when they become 
participants in the financial reporting process.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should emphasize 
ethical values by integrating their development with the acquisition of 
knowledge and skills to help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial 
reporting.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Recommendation: Business schools should encourage business and accounting 
faculty to develop their own personal competence as well as classroom 
materials for conveying information, skills, and ethical values that can help 
prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
9079I-10
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Professional Certification Examinations
Recommendation: Professional certification examinations should test students
on the information, skills, and ethical values that further the understanding 
of fraudulent financial reporting and that promote its reduction.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
Continuing Professional Education
Recommendation: As part of their continuing professional education, 
independent public accountants, internal auditors, and corporate accountants 
should study the forces and opportunities that contribute to fraudulent 
financial reporting, the risk factors that may indicate its occurrence, and 
the relevant ethical and technical standards.
GM's Response: Agree with recommendation.
9079I-11
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G E N E  G. E L A M
VICE PRESIDENT AND COMPTROLLER
June 30, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20006
Gentlemen:
In response to the Commission's request for comments on its 
current Exposure Draft regarding Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGandE) submits the following 
for your consideration:
Recommendations for the Public Company 
III. Two Key Functions: Accounting and Internal Audit
B. Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor
1. PGandE disagrees that all public companies, 
regardless of their size, should maintain an 
internal audit function. Many small companies 
secure capital from the public markets, and to 
require that each and every one maintain an 
internal audit function is neither necessary nor 
cost effective.
2. PGandE agrees that internal auditors' involvement 
is appropriate and should be coordinated with the 
independent public accountant. However, the 
report should emphasize that such cooperation will 
require a change of attitude on the part of many 
independent public accountants, who tend to look 
to internal auditors to perform many of the menial 
audit tasks but often do not allow them meaningful 
participation in completing substantive audit 
procedures.
IV .  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  o f  th e  B o a rd  o f  D i r e c t o r s
1 . PGandE a g re e s  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  s h o u ld
r e v ie w  m a n a g e m e n t's  e v a lu a t io n  o f  f a c t o r s  r e la t e d  
t o  t h e  in d e p e n d e n c e  o f  th e  c o m p a n y 's  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n ta n t .  H o w e v e r, i n  o r d e r  f o r  th e  r e p o r t  t o  
be  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  a s s is ta n c e  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  i t  
s h o u ld  c o n t a in  s p e c i f i c  g u id e l in e s  w h ic h  c o u ld  be  
u s e d  i n  m a k in g  s u c h  e v a lu a t io n .
V . R e p o r t in g  t o  th e  P u b l i c  on  M anagem ent and  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  
R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . -
1 . PGandE d is a g r e e s  t h a t  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  
be  r e q u i r e d  t o  in c lu d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l r e p o r t  a 
m anagem ent r e p o r t  s ig n e d  b y  th e  c h i e f  e x e c u t iv e  
o f f i c e r  and  th e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r .  I t  i s  
a p p r o p r ia t e  f o r  m anagem ent t o  a c k n o w le d g e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a te m e n ts ,  b u t  t o  r e q u i r e  a d e t a i l e d  d is c u s s io n  
as t o  how s u c h  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was m e t c e r t a i n l y  
w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  m uch l e g a l i s t i c  ja r g o n ,  s u b je c t i v e  
d e c is io n s  as  t o  th e  d e p th  o f  d is c u s s io n  and  
i n v a l i d  c o m p a r is o n s  w i t h  s u c h  s ta te m e n ts  made b y  
o t h e r  c o m p a n ie s ,  and  w i l l  l a y  th e  f o u n d a t io n  f o r  
l e g a l  c h a l le n g e s  as t o  th e  e x t e n t  o f  d i s c lo s u r e ,  
s in c e  t h e r e  a re  no  o b j e c t i v e  s ta n d a r d s  a g a in s t  
w h ic h  a com pany may co m p a re  i t s  d is c lo s u r e s  f o r  
c o m p le te n e s s .
2 . PGandE d is a g r e e s  t h a t  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  
be  r e q u i r e d  t o  in c lu d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l r e p o r t  a 
l e t t e r  s ig n e d  b y  th e  c h a irm a n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m it te e .  M any o f  t h e  same re a s o n s  as s e t  f o r t h  
a b o v e  a re  a p p l i c a b le .
3 . The C o m m is s io n  h a s  n o t  p r e s e n te d  a n y  o b je c t i v e  
e v id e n c e  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  made i n  
t h i s  s e c t io n  o f  i t s  r e p o r t .
V I .  Two A d d i t i o n a l  R e c o m m e n d a tio n s
A . S e e k in g  a S econd  O p in io n
1 . PGandE b e l ie v e s  t h a t  t h e  p ro p o s e d  re c o m m e n d a t io n  
t h a t  m anagem ent a d v is e  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e
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w h e n e v e r  i t  s e e k s  a  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n  o n  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  m a t t e r  i s  t o o  b r o a d .  T h e  
d i s c l o s u r e  t o  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  
o n l y  i n  t h o s e  i n s t a n c e s  w h e n  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  i t s  
c u r r e n t  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  u l t i m a t e l y  
a r e  u n a b l e  t o  a g r e e  u p o n  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  a n  
a c c o u n t i n g  m a t t e r  o r  r e p o r t i n g  i s s u e .
2 .  P G a n d E  d i s a g r e e s  t h a t  p u b l i c  d i s c l o s u r e  s h o u l d  b e  
r e q u i r e d  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n y  m a t e r i a l  
a c c o u n t i n g ,  a u d i t i n g  o r  r e p o r t i n g  i s s u e  d i s c u s s e d  
w i t h  b o t h  o l d  a n d  n e w  a u d i t o r s  d u r i n g  t h e  
s p e c i f i e d  t h r e e  y e a r  p e r i o d .  T h e  d i s c l o s u r e  
r e q u i r e m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  l i m i t e d  t o  t h o s e  i s s u e s  
w h i c h  i n v o l v e d  a  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  o p i n i o n  w h i c h  w a s  
n o t  f i n a l l y  r e s o l v e d  a m o n g  t h e  t h r e e  p a r t i e s .
B .  Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g
1 .  P G a n d E  d i s a g r e e s  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d
a p p r o v e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .  
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  n o t  p r e s e n t e d  a n y  o b j e c t i v e  
e v i d e n c e  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  I n  m o s t  c a s e s ,  
i m p o s i n g  s u c h  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a  d e l a y  
i n  r e l e a s i n g  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a n d  
i n  m a n y  c a s e s  t h i s  d e l a y  m a y  b e  u n d u l y  l o n g  d u e  t o  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  s c h e d u l i n g  a  q u a r t e r l y  m e e t i n g  o f  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e .  
M a n y  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  a l r e a d y  h a v e  s u c h  
e x t e n s i v e  d e m a n d s  o n  t h e i r  t i m e  t h a t  s c h e d u l i n g  
e v e n  m o r e  m e e t i n g s  m a y  c a u s e  s o m e  o f  t h e m  t o  
d e c l i n e  t o  s e r v e  o n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t
I I I . I m p r o v i n g  D e t e c t i o n  C a p a b i l i t i e s
T i m e l y  R e v i e w  o f  Q u a r t e r l y  F i n a n c i a l  D a t a
1 .  P G a n d E  d i s a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
S E C  s h o u l d  r e q u i r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  
t o  r e v i e w  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  d a t a  o f  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s  b e f o r e  r e l e a s e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  C u r r e n t  
r u l e s  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t  r e v i e w  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s ,  b u t  s u c h  
r e v i e w  m a y  b e  d o n e  o n  a  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  b a s i s  a t  t h e  
e n d  o f  t h e  y e a r .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  n o t  p r e s e n t e d  
a n y  o b j e c t i v e  e v i d e n c e  t o  s u p p o r t  i t s  c o n t e n t i o n  
t h a t  c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e  i s  i n a d e q u a t e  o r  t h a t  b y
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r e q u i r i n g  t h e  c h a n g e  s u g g e s t e d  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  a n y  
m e a n i n g f u l  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  
w i l l  c o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  m o r e  t h a n  b y  a c c o m p l i s h i n g  
s u c h  a  r e v i e w  a t  y e a r  e n d ,  a n d  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  
s u c h  i n c r e a s e d  c o s t s  a r e  a  m a t t e r  o f  s p e c u l a t i o n  
a t  b e s t .
P G a n d E  a p p r e c i a t e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
d r a f t  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
V e r y  t r u l y  y o u r s
G G E : k m
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I N T E R N A T I O N A L
Robert W. Hoaglund
Vice President 
Auditing
Premark International, Inc. 
1717 Deerfield Road 
Deerfield, Illinois 60015 
312-405-6205
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1701  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e ,  NW 
W a s h in g t o n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 0 6
G e n t le m e n :
T h i s  l e t t e r  i s  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  y o u r  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  o n  F r a u d u le n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g .
We b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  e f f o r t s  t o  r e d u c e  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  h a v e  b e e n  m e r i t o r i o u s  a n d  we s u p p o r t  i t s  
r e c o m m e n d a t io n s ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  we s t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t io n  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u ld  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  We b e l i e v e  t h a t  
t h i s  u s u r p s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  a n d  m a k e s  
m a n a g e m e n t s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a p p r o v a l  
p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e  a s  a  r e q u i r e d  a c t i o n  w o u ld  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d e l a y  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  a n d  c r e a t e  a  r i s k  o f  
u n a u t h o r i z e d  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  c o n f i d e n t i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .
The  C o m m is s io n  h a s  r e q u e s t e d  r e a c t i o n s ,  s u g g e s t i o n s  a n d  o p i n i o n s  
f r o m  t h o s e  c o n c e r n e d .  I n  t h a t  r e g a r d ,  we h a v e  c e r t a i n  o t h e r  
c o m m e n ts  t h a t  we b e l i e v e  t h e  C o m m is s io n  s h o u ld  c o n s i d e r  i n  
d e v e l o p i n g  i t s  f i n a l  r e p o r t :
1 . A u d i t  C o m m it te e  M e m b e r s h ip
We s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  SEC s t r o n g l y  re c o m m e n d  t h a t  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n ie s  e s t a b l i s h  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  c o m p r is e d  s o l e l y  o f  
i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s .  I n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h a t  i s  n o t  
p r a c t i c a l ,  i t  s h o u ld  b e  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  t h e  c o m m i t t e e  b e  
c o m p r is e d  o f  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s .  A 
r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  c o m m i t t e e  b e  " c o m p r i s e d  s o l e l y  o f  
in d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s ”  m ay  b e  u n n e c e s s a r i l y  r e s t r i c t i v e  
f o r  s m a l l e r  c o m p a n ie s .
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2. Audit Committee Charter
W e  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  t h e  
c h a r t e r ,  r e v i e w  i t  a n d  m o d i f y  i t  a s  n e c e s s a r y .
H o w e v e r ,  t o  r e q u i r e  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  c h a r t e r  a n n u a l l y  a s  
t h e  d r a f t  r e c o m m e n d s  s u g g e s t s  a  f o r m a l  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
a g e n d a  i t e m  t h a t  p r a c t i c a l l y  m i g h t  b e t t e r  b e  t h e  
e x c e p t i o n  t h a n  t h e  r u l e .
3. Audit Committee Approval of Services
R e g a r d i n g  t h e  t y p e  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  
s e r v i c e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a s  a  
p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r  i t  s h o u l d  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  
c o m m i t t e e  t o  r e v i e w  a n d  c o m m e n t  o n  s u c h  e n g a g e m e n t s .  T o  
r e q u i r e  a d v a n c e  a p p r o v a l  m i g h t  d e l a y  a c h i e v i n g  o p e r a t i n g  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o r  r e q u i r e  s p e c i a l  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  a s  a  
r u l e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  a n  e x c e p t i o n  b a s i s .
4. Annual Report/Management Report
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  a n d  d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  h o w  t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  f u l f i l l e d  a r e  v e r y  
a p p r o p r i a t e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s  i s  a n  o n g o i n g  p r o c e s s ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  w e  d o  n o t  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  g i v e  a n  
o p i n i o n  a s  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  d a t e  t h a t  e v e r y  e l e m e n t  o f  t h a t  
s y s t e m  i s  a d e q u a t e .
5. Annual Report/Audit Committee Letter
A  s e p a r a t e  l e t t e r ,  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e ,  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a  f o r m a l  b u t  u n n e c e s s a r y  
a d d i t i o n .  W e  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  h a v e  i n  t h e  
a n n u a l  r e p o r t  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
m e m b e r s h i p ,  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s .
6. Standards for Internal Control
W e  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
s p o n s o r i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  b o d y  t o  g u i d e  
c o m p a n i e s  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e p o r t  
s e e m s  t o  h a v e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  m a n y  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  
p o i n t s .  W h i l e  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  s t u d i e s  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  
i n  v a r y i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l ,  w e  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e y  c a n  s u i t a b l y  b e  a p p l i e d  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  
c o m p a n i e s  w i t h o u t  c o n f l i c t  r e g a r d i n g  f r a u d  p r e v e n t i o n .
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7. Independent P ub lic  A ccoun tan ts /S tandards
While we concur w ith th e  Commission's recommendation 
th a t  th e  A uditing S tandards Board re v is e  s ta n d a rd s  to  
r e s t a t e  th e  independent p u b lic  a c c o u n ta n t 's  resp o n ­
s i b i l i t y  fo r  d e te c t io n  o f  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  
r e p o r t in g ,  we suggest th a t  i t  be expanded to  ta k e  in to  
c o n s id e ra tio n  th e  ro le  o f  th e  in te r n a l  a u d it  fu n c tio n .
The recommendation should  no te  th e  im portance o f 
avo id ing  an o v erlap  between th e  fu n c tio n s  performed by 
in te rn a l  and e x te rn a l a u d i to r s ,  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  th a t  
th e se  groups co o p era te  to  th e  f u l l e s t  extend p o s s ib le ,  
and th e  re c o g n itio n  th a t  th e  ro le s  w i l l  d i f f e r  from 
company to  company.
We b e lie v e  t h i s  a d d itio n  w il l  a id  th e  Commission's 
d i r e c t io n  o f keeping i t s  recommendations p r a c t ic a l  and 
c o s t - e f f e c t iv e .
8 . Independent P u b lic  A cco u n tan ts /Q u arte rly  Report Review
We do not b e lie v e  th a t  th e  SEC should re q u ire  
independent p u b lic  ac co u n ta n ts  to  review  q u a r te r ly  
f in a n c ia l  d a ta  o f p u b lic  com panies b efo re  r e le a s e  to  th e  
p u b lic . We s tro n g ly  b e lie v e  t h i s  would d e lay  tim ely  
re p o r tin g  and u n n e c e s s a r ily  in c re a se  c o s ts .  The 
independent a u d i to rs  p re s e n tly  have d is c r e t io n  as to  
when th e se  review s a re  to  be perform ed. In our o p in io n , 
t h i s  p re se n t p ra c t ic e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t .
We a p p re c ia te  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  respond to  th e  Commission's 
p ro p o sa ls  and hope th a t  our comments w il l  be u se fu l in  your 
d e l ib e r a t io n s .
   
RWH/rew
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B A N K  A D M IN IS T R A T IO N  IN S T IT U T E
60 GOUUD CENTER. ROLLING MEADOWS IL 60006 (312) 226-6200
June 30 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue, N.W.
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
The com m iss ion  i s  to  be c o n g r a tu la te d  f o r  t h e i r  h a rd  w o rk  and g e n e r a l ly  e x c e l le n t  
f in d in g s  and recom m enda tio ns  d e a l in g  w i t h  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  I  was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  p le a s e d  w i t h  th o s e  recom m enda tio ns  w h ic h  s u p p o r t  th e  need f o r  an 
e f f e c t i v e  and o b je c t iv e  in t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  and th e  need f o r  a u d i t  co m m itte e s  
to  become more in fo rm e d  and in v o lv e d  i n  th e  o v e r s ig h t  o f  th e  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  
p ro c e s s , in c lu d in g  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o ls .
As A s s o c ia te  M anag ing  D i r e c to r  a t  Bank A d m in is t r a t io n  I n s t i t u t e  (B A I)  I ' d  l i k e  
to  add to  t h i s  r e p o r t  b y  r e fe r e n c in g  p rog ram s and re s e a rc h  t h a t  BAI s u p p o r ts  o r  
has  p u b l is h e d .  BA I p u b lis h e d  a "S ta te m e n t o f  P r in c ip le  and S ta n d a rd s  f o r  I n t e r n a l  
A u d i t in g  i n  th e  B a n k in g  I n d u s t r y "  w h ic h  has been w id e ly  a c c e p te d  w i t h in  th e  b a n k in g  
in d u s t r y  (e n c lo s e d ) .  R e fe re n c e  to  t h i s  s ta te m e n t s h o u ld  be in c lu d e d  i n  C h a p te r 2 .
In  a d d i t io n ,  BAI has s u p p o r te d  a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p ro g ra m  e x c lu s iv e ly  f o r  Bank I n t e r n a l  
A u d i to r s  s in c e  1968. The C h a r te re d  Bank A u d i to r  (CBA) C e r t i f i c a t i o n  p ro g ra m  i s  
d e s ig n e d  to  t e s t  a ba n k  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  know ledge  and e x p e r ie n c e  d e a l in g  w i t h  
a u d i t  and a c c o u n t in g  s ta n d a rd s  and is s u e s  w h ic h  d e a l w i t h  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  r i s k  
and th e  need f o r  sound in t e r n a l  c o n t r o ls .  R e fe re n ce  to  t h i s  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p ro g ra m  
s h o u ld  be in c lu d e d  i n  C h a p te r 5 .
A g a in , c o n g r a tu la t io n s  on a f i n e  r e p o r t !
S in c e r e ly ,
T e rence  Jon T r s a r ,  CBA,CPA 
 A s s o c ia te  M anag ing  D i r e c to r  
A u d i t  P rogram s
T JT : l l m
E n c lo s u re
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 The Foundation o f  S Uc c e s s f u l P l a n nigCBA  Recent changes in the financial services industry have brought increased pressures to bear on bank 
management. T he line between profit and loss has 
become razor thin.
To meet the new challenges of tight margins during 
increasingly difficult times, m anagem ent’s planning 
must be on target. T here is no m argin for miscalcula­
tion o r error.
Managing, in a  time when the only constant is change, 
requires accurate up-to-the-minute facts, figures and 
projections of total bank perform ance. Planning for 
the future cannot be accomplished without a clear 
overall picture of present conditions.
In this current environm ent, the bank audit function 
takes on increasing importance. A s reporter, analyst, 
forecaster, and advisor, the modern bank auditor can 
provide the foundation for building successful plans 
and successful banks.
T he professional auditor is a key resource for 
planning your bank’s future course by controlling 
expenses, improving opportunities and profits. 
identifying existing and potential problems and 
building a m ore competitive bank.
T he professional auditor’s insight and research  
are  invaluable aids as banking m oves through the 
uncharted w aters of deregulation and modern 
economic pressures and risks.
E very profession has its m ark of excellence — that 
particular designation reserved  for the select few  that 
are  able to dem onstrate the skill, integrity, and dedica­
tion that show that they are not just working at a job, 
but growing with a  career. In the profession of bank 
auditing, that designation is the CBA.
The Char t red B a nk  A uditor 
Certification Program
T h e  n e e d  f o r  r e c o g n i z e d  a c c r e d i t a t i o n  b e c o m e s  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  g r o w t h  a n d  s t a t u r e  o f  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  b a n k  a u d i t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l .
S i n c e  1 9 6 8  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  d e s i g n a t i o n  c e r t i f y i n g  c o m p e t e n c e  
i n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  b a n k  a u d i t i n g  h a s  b e e n  t h e  C h a r t e r e d  
B a n k  A u d i t o r ,  d e v e l o p e d  b y  B a n k  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  I n s t i t u t e .
A  C h a r t e r e d  B a n k  A u d i t o r
■  H a s  m e t  s t r i n g e n t  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .
■  H a s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  a  b r o a d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
k n o w l e d g e  a n d  s k i l l s .
■  C o m p l i e s  w i t h  a n  e t h i c a l  c o d e  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  
b a n k  a u d i t i n g .
■  H a s  g a i n e d  a  n e w ,  b r o a d e n e d  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  b a n k  
a u d i t  f u n c t i o n .
W h a t  b a n k e r s  s a y  a b o u t  t h e  "The CBA certification program  demon-
CBA Program ...
Bankers across the country have solid 
reasons for supporting the Chartered Bank 
Auditor Certification Program.
Here is what they are saying.
"T e  certificati  r ra  e n­
strates to outside audit firms and regulatory 
agencies the level of professionalism 
among the internal hank audit staff 
members.
" T hose who enter the C B A program 
become more efficient, effective and well 
rounded in auditing and banking By using 
the study guide and resource materials 
progrant participants delve into control 
issues, regulatory issues, and gain a 
broader understanding of banking.
Since our large audit division is com­
posed of somewhat specialized audit 
groups, the CBA program  gives the auditor 
new perspectives. You never stop learning 
That' s why each year we enter 15 to 20 
staff members into the CBA certification 
progrant.
— David M . Perreault, CBA, 
Vice President and Assistant 
General Auditor, National 
Bank of Detroit.
C B A You Are lnvited
U p o n  m e e tin g  c e r ta in  re q u ire m e n ts , o u tlin e d  in  th e  fo llo w ­
in g  re g is tra t io n  m a te r ia ls , y o u  w i l l  be a llo w e d  to  p ro c e e d  
th ro u g h  th e  p ro g ra m  to  y o u r  c e r t if ic a t io n  as a  C h a rte re d  
B a n k  A u d ito r .  Y o u  w i l l  a lso  be  e lig ib le  to  jo in  th e  N a tio n a l 
S o c ie ty  o f  C h a r te re d  B a n k  A u d ito rs ,  a n  o rg a n iz a t io n  
fo rm e d  to  p ro v id e  o p p o r tu n it ie s  fo r  th e  c o n tin u e d  p ro fe s ­
s io n a l g ro w th  a n d  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  C h a r te re d  B a n k  A u d ito rs .
T h e  C h a r te re d  B a n k  A u d ito r  p ro g ra m  is  d e s igne d  to  
e n h a n c e  p ro fe s s io n a lis m  in  th e  a u d it c o m m u n ity .
R e tu rn  th e  e n c lo se d  p ro g ra m  a p p lic a tio n  fo rm  a n d  fee  to  
b e c o m e  a  C B A  ca n d id a te .
I f  y o u  w o u ld  lik e  to  f u r th e r  d iscuss th e  C h a rte re d  
B a n k  A u d ito r  p ro g ra m  p lease  ca ll A m y  D . D a w d y  
T o l l F re e  1 -8 0 0 -3 2 3 -8 5 5 2  o r  (3 1 2 )  2 2 8 - 6 2 0 0  (x 5 3 7 ) .
B A I ’s A u d it  C o m m is s io n  w e lc o m e s  a p p lic a tio n s  to  th e
C h a rte re d  B a n k  A u d ito r  p ro g ra m  f r o m  p ro fe s s io n a ls  in
b a n k  a u d it in g  d isc ip line s  th ro u g h o u t th e  year.
The Audit Department has two major 
programs to enhance professionalism 
among the audit staff. The first is an 
internal core training program designed to 
provide all auditors with a common base of 
knoweldge.
"The second is our professional designa­
tion program. We identify and support 
professional certification programs where 
our individuals can learn and grow. We 
enroll 30-40 new candidates each year in 
the certification programs, including the 
CBA progrant which is closely related to 
the job our people do.
Certification among the bank's audit 
staff is highly desirable and helps demon­
strate our professionalism to bank manage­
ment, external auditors and regulators.
— H e rb  A s h to n , CBA, V ice  
P re s id e n t a n d  M a n a g e r, 
C o rp o ra te  A u d it ,  B a n k  o f  
A m e r ic a .
"W e participate in the CBA program to 
increase the professional certification level 
within the audit department. This nor only 
is an excellent learning opportunity. for staff 
auditors, but also upholds our professional 
image.
"In addition to those joining the depart­
ment who are accounting graduates, we 
also have a number who are finance 
majors. By studying for C BA certification 
the individual learns a great deal more 
about banking regulations, accounting 
auditing, and other aspects of bank 
operations.
"Each year perhaps another 15 staff 
members begin the CBA certification proc­
ess. and a high percentage of those who 
enter the program become certified
—  M in d y  S. U n g e r ,  C B A ,
A u d i t  O f f ic e r ,  F irs t  C h ic a g o  
C o r p o r a t io n .
 Applications to the CBA Program are 
reviewed as they are received.
Application fee—$50.00 
(non-refundable/ 
non transferable)
Applications are limited to five years after 
which time the candidate must re-apply.
The CBA Program examinations are held 
twice a year. This year ’s exams will be held 
on June 18-19, 1987, and November 19-20, 
1987, at conveniently located test centers. 
Candidate knowledge is tested in four areas:
I. Accounting; II. Auditing Principles and 
Bank Laws; III. Auditing Practices;
IV General Business.
T E CBAC 
S
To earn CBA candidacy status, the application 
must be endorsed by an immediate supervi­
sor, attesting to the character of the candidate 
as well as the correctness of the program 
application.
An exam registration card will be sent to each 
registered candidate approximately three 
months prior to each exam. The completed 
card, indicating the exam part or parts for 
which the candidate intends to sit should be 
submitted to BAI as early as possible but no 
later than three weeks prior to the scheduled 
examination.
Examination parts are three hours in length, 
and a  candidate may take any number of 
parts at each sitting.
Test centers are selected geographically 
throughout the United States and foreign 
countries. Candidates are notified two to four 
weeks prior to the exam of the city and loca­
tion of their assigned center.
Candidates may elect to take only one part 
each exam but must pass all four parts within 
five years. The five-year cycle begins the year 
the candidate is accepted into the program. If 
the four parts are not passed in the five-year 
period, all four parts must be retaken.
Examination application fee 
$100.00/exam part 
$325.00/all four parts at one sitting 
$30 .00 surcharge per candidate located 
outside the continental United States, 
Alaska and Hawaii.
Staff M embers -
To aid in preparation for the examination, 
each CBA candidate receives a  Self-Study 
Kit with his/her acceptance letter.
Each kit contains—
* Prior examination questions and answers 
(copy of last published)
* Study tips/outline 
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* Code of Ethics
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D a w d y  toll-free 1-800-323-8552 exten­
sion 5 3 7  for details.
C B A  A w ards  
C B A  First a n d  S e c o n d  Achievement A w a r d s  
are given each year to the candidates with the 
highest scores o n  all four e x a m  sections (all 
parts taken at first sitting). T h e s e  individuals 
are also extended complimentary registra­
tions to the annual B a n k  Auditors Confer­
ence w h e r e  they will receive their awards.
B AI S tudy P r ograms 
B a n k  Administration Institute also offers 
m o r e  study help to C B A  candidates. C B A  
Concentrated Study Sessions are available. 
Please contact A m y  D. D a w d y  for further 
details.
CBA Certification
Requirements— U p o n  successfully satis­
fying all candidacy requirements, the C B A  
designation will be issued w h e n  the fol­
lowing requirements are met.
Candidates m u s t  have six years of banking 
experience for which not m o r e  than four 
years m a y  be substituted by  a  bachelor's 
degree.
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offers a  semi-annual newsletter a n d  periodic 
information to keep C B A s  up-to-date o n  the 
issues a n d  changes affecting ba nk auditing. 
National officers a n d  committees w o r k  with 
C B A s  throughout the country.
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tions, I m u s t  m e e t  the experience requirements, a n d  m u s t  c o m p l y  with the 
C B A  C o d e  of Ethics in order to obtain the C B A  Certification.
I understand a n d  a g ree that I will b e  notified b y  mail w h e t h e r  I h a v e  pas s ed  
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examination papers are the property of B a n k  Administration Institute a n d  
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a n d  other rules a n d  conditions.
I certify that all the statements in this registration are complete a n d  true.
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National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue 
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
We have read the report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting and agree with the general thrust of its 
conclusions. We concur with your observations that the responsibility 
for maintaining adequate systems of internal control and reporting 
fairly the financial results of the corporation are the primary 
responsibility of management. General Dynamics has instituted a 
vigorous code of corporate conduct that emphasizes fairness. Our 
corporate code has the full support of our board and management and 
has been communicated to every employee in our company. We encourage 
others to benefit as we have by instituting a corporate ethics program.
We support the Commission's observation that a strengthened 
regulatory and legal environment will improve the quality of corporate 
financial reporting. You have recommended new SEC sanctions and 
greater criminal prosecution of corporate managers and directors who 
violate the law through fraudulent financial reporting. In addition, you 
have recommended improved regulation of the public accounting profession 
to assure better self oversight. We agree that both recommendations, if 
implemented, will prove to be deterrents to fraudulent reporting. However, 
we believe that the Commission's findings are incomplete without 
acknowledging the considerable benefits of greater criminal prosecution 
of independent auditors who through their direct involvement or 
negligence cause or are associated with fraudulent financial reporting.
You have deduced correctly, in our opinion, that the greater the 
personal risk to the manager, director or auditor, the greater the 
benefit to be realized by the public who rely on their representations.
Continued
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Management and the company they rep resen t c le a r ly  have p rim ary  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
fo r  an o rg a n iz a t io n 's  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  process. Independent a u d ito rs  
c le a r ly  assume r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the fa irn e s s  o f the f in a n c ia l  statem ents 
upon which they re p o r t .  The Commission has observed th a t users o f 
f in a n c ia l  statem ents should be b e t te r  in form ed about the ro le s  management 
and the a u d it  committee p la y  in  the company's f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  process. 
A c c o rd in g ly , the Commission has recommended th a t management and the chairman 
o f the a u d it  committee a f f i rm  th e i r  r e s p o n s ib i lt ie s  a n n u a lly  in  t h e ir  re p o r t 
to  the  shareho lde rs . We are concerned th a t the p u b lic  may m isconstrue  these 
statem ents by management and the a u d it  committee in  annual re p o r ts  to  mean 
th a t a u d ito rs  are absolved o f t h e ir  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the in t e g r i t y  and 
o v e ra l l  fa irn e s s  o f the f in a n c ia l  statem ents they are re p o r t in g  upon.
We recommend th a t  the Commission cons ide r in  i t s  f i n a l  d e lib e ra t io n s  the 
b e n e fits  from  d is c lo s in g  in  annual re p o r ts  to  shareho lders the cons ide rab le  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  the independent a u d ito rs  assume when o p in in g  on co rpo ra te  
f in a n c ia l  statem ents and d im in is h  the emphasis in  your recommendations on 
the l im i ta t io n s  o f the a u d ito rs ' r o le  in  the f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  process.
We shall be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience.
Very t r u ly  you rs ,
Joseph T. Doyle
JTD/pd
CC: S. H. Hoch, E xecu tive  V ice P re s id e n t-F in a n ce , General Dynamics C o rpo ra tion
S. C. Pace, Chairman & C h ie f E xecutive  O f f ic e r ,  General Dynamics C o rpo ra tion
Telephone 319, 398-8511
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June 30, 1987
Mr. James C. Treadway, J r . ,  Chairman 
N a tio n a l Commission on
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R e po rting  
1701 P ennsylvan ia  Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Dear M r. Treadway:
T h is  is  in  response to  the  Commission's o f fe r  to  comment on the  exposure 
d r a f t  o f  "R eport o f  the  N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R e po rting " 
(h e re in a f te r ,  the  "R e p o rt" ) .  We re p re se n t n ine  p u b lic  e n t i t ie s ,  p r im a r i ly  
re g u la te d  investm en t companies ("R IC s") and re a l e s ta te  investm en t t ru s ts  
("R E IT s "), which are p re s e n tly  o b lig a te d  under fe d e ra l s e c u r it ie s  laws to  
re p o r t  c e r ta in  f in a n c ia l  in fo rm a tio n . W hile  we have n o t y e t  had an 
o p p o r tu n ity  to  s tudy  the e n t ir e  R eport, we have read w ith  p a r t ic u la r  in te r e s t  
the  s e c t io n  on Recommendations fo r  the  P u b lic  Company and o f fe r  these comments 
fo r  your in fo rm a tio n  and c o n s id e ra tio n .
We a p p re c ia te  and g e n e ra lly  support most o f  the  Commission's 
recommendations fo r  p u b lic  companies, e s p e c ia lly  the  recommendations 
address ing  top  management and the accoun ting  fu n c t io n .  N o tw ith s ta n d in g  the 
Commission's f in d in g s  th a t  no company, rega rd less  o f  s iz e , is  immune from 
fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g ,  we are concerned th a t  im p lem en ta tion  o f  a l l  
recommendations w i l l  be p a r t ic u la r ly  burdensome fo r  sm a ll companies, in c lu d in g  
those we re p re s e n t.
Each RIC and REIT we re p re se n t c u r re n t ly  has an a u d it  committee o r 
s im ila r  group com prised o f  independent d ire c to rs  and we concur w ith  the 
recommendations concern ing  th is  fu n c t io n .  As a suggestion , perhaps the t i t l e  
"a u d it  com m ittee" need n o t be considered  mandatory, the reby  g iv in g  the  p u b lic  
company d is c re t io n  to  id e n t i f y  such a group however i t  so chooses.
Because o f  the  s iz e  and o rg a n iz a t io n a l s tru c tu re  o f  the  RICs and REITs we 
re p re s e n t, im p lem en ta tion  o f  the  Commission's recommendations concern ing  the 
in te r n a l a u d it  fu n c t io n  would be p a r t ic u la r ly  burdensome. These RICs and 
REITs have no employees, b u t c o n tra c t w ith  us fo r  a d v is o ry , management and 
a d m in is tra t iv e  s e rv ic e s  necessary fo r  t h e i r  d a y -to -d a y  o p e ra tio n s , in c lu d in g  
a l l  accoun ting  and f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g .  We understand and b e lie v e  a s im ila r  
r e la t io n s h ip  e x is ts  w ith  many, i f  n o t most, o f  these e n t i t ie s  w i th in  t h e ir  
re s p e c tiv e  in d u s tr ie s .
C e r ta in ly  we have our own in te r n a l a u d it  fu n c t io n  which n e c e s s a r ily  
rev iew s our p o l ic ie s  and p rocedures , in c lu d in g  those u t i l i z e d  fo r  the RICs and 
REITs, b u t ex tend ing  the in te r n a l a u d it  fu n c t io n  to  each s p e c if ic  e n t i t y ,  
e s p e c ia lly  such e n t i t ie s '  a u d it  com m ittees, would indeed be im p ra c t ic a l.  A l l
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transactions processed for RICs and REITs, regardless of the entity, are 
currently subject to internal audit. The internal auditor reports any 
findings directly to an employee of ours who is also the principal executive 
officer of the RICs or REITs. However, internal auditing is not a substitute 
for good management.
Inherent in our contractural responsibilities is an organizational 
structure and ability to perform the services required by the RICs and REITs, 
including necessary and proper financial and operational controls. By 
contract, we have a fiduciary obligation to the RICs and REITs, violation of 
which will result in termination of the contracts. Each RIC and REIT is also 
subject to audit by independent certified public accountants, who meet with 
the audit committees of each respective entity. We therefore believe an 
operational exception should exist within your internal audit recommendations 
for a situation such as ours (where the public company has no employees).
The recommendations for management and the audit committee to include a 
special report in the annual report to shareholders is considered unnecessary, 
in our opinion. The shareholders elect the directors to oversee the affairs 
of the company and the directors have the responsibility to direct management 
in those affairs. The annual report represents the company's formal document 
for reporting activities and operations of management and the directors. The 
responsibility for financial statements and internal controls is inherent and 
need not be expressly stated. Indeed, we are concerned that express 
representation by only a few persons may place upon them a greater liability 
than that which already exists, either by governing documents (articles, 
bylaws, etc.) or statute, especially in the case of the director(s) 
representing the audit committee. In this regard, we heartily support the 
recommendation (as contained in your Recommendations for the SEC and Others to 
Improve the Regulatory and Legal Environment) that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission reconsider its position on corporate indemnification. A suggestion 
for the management report, if ultimately considered necessary, would be to 
incorporate it into the existing "management discussion and analysis of 
financial condition and results of operations," a report already required 
under present securities laws.
Along with our disagreement on the necessity for a special audit 
committee report, we strongly disagree on the need for audit committee review 
of quarterly results. This would mean additional time necessary for 
completion and publication of the quarterly report and require directors on 
the audit committee to meet at least four times during the year in addition to 
the audit committee's existing meeting schedule. We perceive this recommended 
involvement by the audit committee as nearly infringing on the authority 
delegated to management which, after all, should be allowed to manage. We 
also anticipate some difficulty, if not impossibility, in recruiting audit 
committee members given this proposed level of increased participation in 
regular day-to-day activities. Further, as referenced in connection with the 
audit committee review, we emphatically disagree with the need for review by 
the independent public accountants prior to our release of quarterly
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results. This recommendation, if implemented, will have the deleterious 
effect of adding a significant amount of time and cost to the preparation of 
quarterly reports to the point of being burdensome.
As stated earlier, we have not studied the entire Report, but focused 
primarily on those Recommendations for the Public Company. We have however 
reviewed the Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant and 
seriously believe, without further study, that implementation will result in 
significant additional time and cost associated with the annual audit. We are 
also generally concerned with the role of the independent public accountant as 
more responsibility (and perhaps authority) is derived from your 
recommendations, possibly resulting in an erosion of the duties which are 
clearly those of management and directors of the company.
We were privileged to hear your remarks in San Diego recently at the 
Annual Conference of the National Association of Accountants. You admonished 
those in attendance to assess all recommendations as a package and not 
individually. We have endeavored to do just that, even though most of our 
comments are directed to one particular area. We appreciate the opportunity 
to present these comments and encourage serious consideration of our concerns 
in preparation of your final report.
Very truly yours,
Alan F. Fletcher 
Chief Financial Officer
Investment Division
AFF:aa
JOHN S. VIVIAN
Vice President
and
Corporate Comptroller
S E A R S ,  R O E B U C K  A N D  C O .
S E A R S  T O W E R  
C H I C A G O ,  I L L I N O I S  6 0 6 8 4
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National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Commissioners:
We are pleased to have the opportunity to respond to the exposure draft 
Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. The task 
undertaken by the Commission - to identify causal factors that can lead to 
fraudulent financial reporting and steps to reduce its incidence - is indeed a 
massive task. We commend the Commission on a thorough review.
Management of Sears, Roebuck and Co. has found this document to certainly 
fulfill the objective of raising awareness of and sensitivity to fraudulent 
financial reporting. We have already begun to assess the guidance to determine 
if we can enhance our current procedures. We believe that it is a useful 
document for the rulemakers to evaluate and, after due process, to arrive at 
authoritative guidance. However we do have several concerns and recommendations 
that we would like to share.
Our first concern is that the audit committee remain in an oversight 
role. They should not cross the line into a management role. An example where 
that line may have been crossed is the recommendation which states that the 
audit committee should approve in advance the types and extent of management 
advisory services that management plans to engage the company's independent 
public accountants to perform. We believe the spirit of the recommendation 
on oversight would require the audit committee to review those services, but 
review after-the-fact is sufficient. Management and the CPA firm should 
initially be responsible for not contracting for services that would impair 
independence.
Our second concern is duplication of current rules. An example of this is 
the recommendation which states that all public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to shareholders a letter signed by 
the chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's responsibilities 
and activities during the year. To a great extent this is a duplication of SEC 
Schedule 14A requirements for proxy statement disclosure. Sears, Roebuck and 
Co. also describes the make-up and the duties of our audit committee in 
management's responsibility statement in the Annual Report. The Board of 
Directors approves these documents. We therefore believe a separate letter 
signed by the chairman of the audit committee is duplicative and unnecessary.
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Our last concern is practicality of implementation. An example of this is 
the recommendation that audit committees should increase their oversight of the 
quarterly reporting process, and this oversight should include approving 
financial results prior to public release. We believe that a better 
recommendation is that there should be continuing communication between 
management and the audit committee of material items included in the financial 
reports. We do not believe that requiring a specific "sign-off" on the 
quarterly statements will in itself reduce the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting, and may be difficult to implement because of time 
constraints. Furthermore, delaying the dissemination of such critical 
information may increase the risk of trading on insider information. More 
importantly, the spirit of this recommendation would dictate the audit 
committee and the full Board of Directors should be aware of material items 
arising at any point in time. We believe that our revised recommendation, 
along with the Commission's subsequent recommendation to have the independent 
public accountant review the quarterly data prior to public release would 
effectively fulfill the Commission's objectives. This also relieves another 
duplicative effort.
To summarize, we believe that the report of the Commission lays a good 
foundation for the rulemakers. Our major concern is that the steps 
recommended by the Commission, as well as the steps taken by the rulemakers, 
be wel1-coordinated, balanced and cost-effective. We are in agreement that 
the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting should be reduced, and believe 
that a sensible, balanced implementation of the report recommendations will aid 
in that objective.
Sincerely, 
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T h e  G r e y h o u n d  C o r p o r a t i o n
June 30 , 1987
N a t io n a l C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue, NW 
W a sh in g to n , D . C. 20006
G entlem en:
T h is  i s  i n  re sp o n se  t o  y o u r  i n v i t a t i o n  o f  May 1 , 1987, f o r  
comments upon th e  A p r i l  1987 E xposu re  D r a f t  o f  y o u r  r e p o r t .
In  th e  m a in , f i r s t  we commend th e  C om m ission f o r  a th o ro u g h  
r e p o r t  on a v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  s u b je c t ,  and second we ag ree  w i t h  and 
s u p p o r t  th e  C o m m iss io n 's  f in d in g s  and recom m enda tio ns . I n  o n ly  
one a re a  do we b e l ie v e  th e  recom m enda tions  as d r a f t e d  a re  unsound 
i n  p r i n c ip le  and u n w o rk a b le  i n  p r a c t ic e  -  th e  a re a  i s  t h a t  
d e s c r ib in g  th e  d e s ire d  r o le  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  th e  A u d it  
C om m ittee  o f  th e  B oard  o f  D ir e c to r s  o f  a l l  p u b l ic  com pan ies .
B r i e f l y ,  o u r  comments a re :
1 . The recom m enda tions  as draw n s h i f t  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r
management o f  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  fro m  management t o  th e  
A u d i t  C om m ittee . T h is  i s  a m is ta k e  because (a) 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  i s  rem oved fro m  w here i t  b e lo n g s , (b) 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  i s  p la c e d  w here i t  c a n n o t e f f e c t i v e l y  be 
e x e r c is e d ,  and (c ) th e  s h i f t  u p s e ts  c o r p o r a t io n  la w  
th e o r y ,  i s  i n v i t a t i o n a l  t o  l i t i g a t i o n ,  and w o u ld  d e la y  
t im e ly  p u b l ic a t io n  o f  r o u t in e  r e p o r ts  o f  f i n a n c ia l  
in fo r m a t io n .
R e fe re n c e s : C h a p te r Two
-  M a nda to ry  In d e p e n d e n t A u d i t  C om m ittee , 
t h i r d  recom m enda tion  and f i f t h  
recom m enda tion
-  R e p o r t in g  on R e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  i n  th e  
A n n u a l R e p o rt t o  S to c k h o ld e rs ,  second 
recom m enda tion
-  Q u a r te r ly  R e p o r t in g ,  f i r s t  recom ­
m e n d a tio n .
CREYHOUND TOWER • PHOENIX ARIZONA 85077
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
6/30/87 
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2. The recommendation that Audit Committees should have 
adequate resources and authority is misplaced. We 
believe that the Audit Committee of the Board should not 
only have access to, but should regularly meet privately 
with (i) the chief accounting officer, (ii) the head of 
the internal auditing staff, (iii) the independent 
accountants, and when desired (iv) the chief executive 
or chief financial officers. The Audit Committee 
members oversee or evaluate the adequacy of the 
resources allocated to examination and reporting of 
financial affairs; it would be a rare situation (too 
rare we submit to be covered by the Commission's general 
report) when a fifth group directly supervised by the 
Audit Committee became a part of the financial reporting 
process of public companies. This recommendation should 
be deleted from the report.
Very truly yours,
THE GREYHOUND CORPORATION
FINANCIAL CORPORATION
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June 30, 1987
N a tio n a l C om m iss ion  on 
F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  Avenue, N .W . 
W ashington , D .C . 20006
G e n tle m e n :
Sovran F in a n c ia l C o rp o ra tio n  is p leased to  have the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  co m m e n t on 
the  C om m iss ion ’s R e p o rt on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g . Sovran b e lie ve s  th is  
a v e ry  im p o r ta n t to p ic , and th e  C om m iss ion  has con d u c te d  a com prehens ive  
resea rch  p ro je c t  and reached  m any v a lid  conc lus ions.
W hile  Sovran sees g re a t va lue  in  m any o f  th e  re co m m e n d a tio n s  o f  th e  
C om m iss ion , we a re  conce rned  abou t th e  fo llo w in g  m a tte rs :
o Im p le m e n ta tio n  cos ts  m ay be excessive , 
o M o n ito r in g  o f  co m p lia n ce  m ay be d i f f ic u l t .
o O b ta in in g  d ire c to rs  w il l in g  to  se rve  on th e  a u d it c o m m itte e  m ay becom e 
d i f f ic u l t .
o T im e lin e ss  o f  re lease  o f  f in a n c ia l re p o rts  m ay be ham pered .
M any com pan ies c u r re n t ly  have e x c e lle n t in te rn a l c o n tro l system s in  p la ce  w h ich  
assist in  p re v e n tin g  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  p ra c tic e s . H ow eve r, fo r  those 
com pan ies w h ich  do n o t have co m p lia n ce  p rocedu res  in  p la ce , the  im p le m e n ta tio n  
costs  co u ld  be p ro h ib it iv e .  Even fo r  those com pan ies th a t  c u r re n t ly  have good 
in te rn a l c o n tro l p rocedu res , th is  p roposa l cou ld  inc rease  costs  re la te d  to  the  
in te rn a l a u d it fu n c tio n , a u d it c o m m itte e , and th e  o v e ra ll c o n tro l e n v iro n m e n t 
w ith in  the  com pany. A d d it io n a lly ,  due to  th e  increased  re q u ire m e n ts  the  
re co m m e n d a tio n s  p la ce  on th e  independen t e x te rn a l a u d ito r  th ro u g h  increased  
q u a r te r ly  re v ie w s , s tre n g th e n e d  second p a r tn e r  re v ie w s  and m e thodo lo g ies  to  dea l 
w ith  th e  s h o rt f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  dead lines, e x te rn a l a u d it fees a re  a lm o s t c e r ta in  
to  increase  s ig n if ic a n t ly .  A d d it io n a lly ,  th e  proposed change in  th e  a u d ito r ’s re p o r t 
w h ich  re q u ire s  th a t  the  a u d ito r  re p o r t upon th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  the  in te rn a l 
c o n tro l system s o f  th e  com pany w ere  re v ie w e d  and e va lu a te d  is l ik e ly  to  increase  
a com pany ’s cos t.
S ince th e  p roposa l is  a s e lf  p o lic in g  system  o f  d e te c tin g  th e  p o te n t ia l fo r  
fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o rt in g , th e  m o n ito r in g  o f  co m p lia n ce  is d ispersed th rough  
th e  a u d it c o m m itte e , th e  independen t a c c o u n ta n t, th e  S e c u ritie s  &  Exchange 
C om m iss ion , and o th e r  re g u la to ry  agencies. I t  appears th a t  due to  th is  d ispersed 
m o n ito r in g  sys tem , e n fo rc e m e n t o f  co m p lia n ce  co u ld  be d i f f i c u l t  and in  m any 
ins tances app lied  in c o n s is te n tly .
60-0115 (1/86) Norfolk Supply Center Sovran Financial Corporation
Sovran Center • One Commercial Place • Post Office Box 600 • Norfolk, Virginia 23501 
Telephone 804 • 441 • 4000
J u n e  30, 1 9 8 7  
P a g e  T w o
Responsibility for the corporate e n v i r o n m e n t  or culture within w h i c h  financial 
reporting occurs w a s  very appropriately set at the top m a n a g e m e n t  level b y  the C o m m i s s i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  increased responsibility has also b e e n  given to the audit 
c o m m i t t e e  of the b o a r d  of directors. T h e  increased responsibilities a n d  resulting liability w h i c h  m a y  b e  incurred b y  the audit c o m m i t t e e  m a y  m a k e  it e v e n  m o r e  
difficult to obtain outside directors to serve as audit c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s ,  a n d  
ultimately increase the cost of Di re ct or’s a n d  Officer’s liability insurance. 
Ensuring that financial reports are reasonable, a c c u r a t e  a n d  timely requires a large portion of m a n a g e m e n t ’s time. This w o u l d  also b e  the case for the audit 
c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  n u m b e r  a n d  length of the m e e t i n g s  w o u l d  increase a n d  the 
a m o u n t  of t i m e  required to properly discharge the duties r e c o m m e n d e d  for a n  audit c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r  w o u l d  b e  significant.
Finally, d u e  to the increased r e v i e w s  required b y  the audit c o m m i t t e e  a n d  the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  accountants, the timeliness of financial reports could b e  h a m p e r e d .  A l t h o u g h  the potential for fraudulent financial reporting exists, it a p pe ar s that 
the actual o c c u r r e n c e  of fraudulent financial reporting is minimal. Therefore, it 
does not a p p e a r  reasonable to e x p e c t  c o m p a n i e s  to incur a  significant delay in release of their financial d a t a  to the i n v e s t m e n t  c o m m u n i t y .  W e  believe that 
timeliness of a c c u r a t e  financial data is of critical i m p o r t a n c e  to the i n v e s t m e n t  
c o m m u n i t y ;  therefore, the cost of delays in release of current financial d a t a  could far o u t w e i g h  the benefit derived.
T h e  prevention of fraudulent financial reporting is of u t m o s t  i m po rt an ce . This responsibility does, h o w e v e r ,  lie with top m a n a g e m e n t  of the c o m p a n y .  While 
increased r e v i e w  a n d  surveillance b y  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t  m i g h t  
provide s o m e  additional assurances that financial reports are of the highest integrity, current standards a n d  procedures, if appropriately applied, d o  allow for the detection of fraudulent financial reporting. Basically, a c c u r a t e  financial reporting d e p e n d s  u p o n  the education a n d  integrity of the m a n a g e m e n t  of the 
c o m p a n y  a n d  the i n d e p e n d e n t  public a c c o u n t a n t s  auditing the c o m p a n y .  Integrity c a n n o t  b e  legislated or regulated. W hile i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of the p r o p o s e d  
p r o c e d u r e s  to p r e v e n t  fraudulent financial reporting m a y  serve as a small additional deterrent, fraudulent financial reporting will n e v e r  b e  eliminated until 
senior m a n a g e m e n t  has b e e n  e d u c a t e d  as to the benefits a n d  responsibilities associated with a c ceptable financial reporting practices. W e  feel that e m p h a s i s  
should b e  p l a c e d  o n  this education a n d  increased criminal prosecution of those c o m p a n i e s  that c h o o s e  to e n g a g e  in fraudulent, deceptive practices.
Sincerely
D o n a l d  R. Fisher, Jr. 
Chief A c c o u n t i n g  Officera n d  Treasurer
The Black & Decker Corporation William E. Stevens
701 East Joppa Road Executive Vice President
Towson, Maryland 21204 
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 B LA C K & D E C K E I L
June 3 0 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C o m m iss io n  on
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , NW 
W a s h in g to n ,  DC 20006
Members o f  th e  C o m m is s io n :
We a re  r e s p o n d in g  to  y o u r  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  on F r a u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  d a te d  A p r i l ,  1 9 8 7 . In  r e s p o n d in g ,  i t  i s  
im p o r ta n t  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  we b e l ie v e  s t r o n g ly  i n  th e  s e l f  
r e g u la t o r y  s y s te m  and a re  t h e r e f o r e  in  g e n e r a l  a g re e m e n t w i t h  
th e  p ro c e s s  and f in d i n g s  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n . A t th e  same t im e ,  
we a ls o  f e e l  c o m p e lle d  t o  re s p o n d  t o  c e r t a in  is s u e s  w h ic h  seem 
to  w a r r a n t  f u r t h e r  c o n s id e r a t io n .  These is s u e s ,  w h ic h  
p r i m a r i l y  r e l a t e  t o  th e  P u b l ic  Company s e c t io n  o f  th e  r e p o r t  
a r e :
R e com m en da tion
A u d it  C o m m itte e s  s h o u ld  in c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s ig h t  o f  th e  
q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h is  o v e r s ig h t  s h o u ld  in c lu d e  
a p p ro v in g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e le a s e .
B&D R esponse
We f e e l  t h a t  d i r e c t o r s  s h o u ld  be in v o lv e d  i n  r e v ie w in g  
q u a r t e r l y  d a ta .  H o w e v e r, a p p r o v a l p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e le a s e  o f  
su ch  in f o r m a t io n  w i l l  r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  m e e t in g s  and c o s t  t o  
m ost c o m p a n ie s , w i t h  l i t t l e  o r  no b e n e f i t  t o  th e  i n t e r im  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  M o re o v e r ,  th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n  i s  n o t  
c o n s is t e n t  w i t h  o th e r  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  w h ic h  p u t  th e  b u rd e n  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  q u a l i t y  s q u a r e ly  on m anagem ent.
R ecom m en da tion
When a p u b l i c  com pany ch a n g e s  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n ta n ts ,  i t  s h o u ld  be r e q u i r e d  by SEC r u le  t o  d is c lo s e  
p u b l i c l y  th e  n a tu r e  o f  any m a t e r ia l  a c c o u n t in g  o r  a u d i t in g  
is s u e s  d is c u s s e d  w i t h  i t s  o ld  and new a u d i t o r s  d u r in g  th e  
t h r e e - y e a r  p e r io d  p r e c e d in g  th e  c h a n g e .
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
155
a
Page 2
B&D Response
We feel the current SEC 8-K requirements to report 
disagreement with auditors is sufficient to f u l f i l l  the 
intention of this recommendation. To add a requirement to 
disclose a l l  significant issues discussed with auditors would 
be overly time consuming and not practical.
In addition to our comments relating to specific Commission 
recommendations we have one other concern. The recommendations 
for the Independent Public Accounts may significantly increase 
their costs...and our costs. Such costs would be borne by our 
shareholders or be recovered through product pricing. This 
would be a disadvantage to Black & Decker and the many U.S. 
based enterprises doing business in world markets competing 
with foreign based operations.
We hope these reactions w ill be taken objectively and be a 
positive contribution in completing and issuing your fina l  
report.
Sincerely
William E. Stevens 
Executive Vice President
WES/pm
3862G
156
T h e  G o o d y e a r  T i r e  & Rubber Company  
Akron, Ohio 44316-0001   
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT J u ly  1, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Members o f  the  Commission:
S u b je c t: Exposure D ra f t  on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting
The Goodyear T ire  & Rubber Company has c a r e fu l ly  cons idered the 
recommendations o ffe re d  by the Commission concern ing  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  
re p o r t in g .
When considered  in d iv id u a l ly ,  we agree w ith ,  and have in  p la ce , the m a jo r ity  
o f  the  Commission's recommendations b u t we b e lie v e  th a t  fo rc in g  the adop tion  
o f  the  complete s e t o f  recommendations rep resen ts  an u n d es irab le  tre n d  toward 
new re g u la t io n  and would n o t produce the d e s ire d  r e s u lt  - -  reduc ing  fra u d u le n t 
f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g .  F u rth e r, we fe e l th a t i f  the recommendations would 
become mandatory they would be c o u n te r-p ro d u c tiv e  in  th a t  the in v e s tin g  p u b lic  
would be m is le d  as to  the r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  the managements, a u d it  
committees and independent p u b lic  accountants o f  p u b lic  companies. Many o f 
the  recommendations concern ing a u d it  committees and p u b lic  accountants w i l l  
im p ly  to  the p u b lic  some a d d it io n a l r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  by those groups to  p reven t 
o r d e te c t f ra u d u le n t re p o r t in g , thus c re a t in g  the idea th a t  managements are in  
some way le s s  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  t h e ir  re p o rts  to  the p u b lic .
We concur w ith  the  Commission's recommendation concern ing the mandatory 
independent a u d it  com mittee. Th is recommendation is  a lrea dy  in  p lace  a t 
Goodyear and we b e lie v e  i t  cou ld  fu n c t io n  e f fe c t iv e ly  in  o th e r p u b lic  
companies o f  any s iz e .
Goodyear does have o b je c tio n s  concern ing the Commission's recommendation th a t 
a u d it  committees increase  t h e ir  o v e rs ig h t o f  q u a r te r ly  re p o r t in g  in c lu d in g  
approva l o f  re s u lts  p r io r  to  th e ir  re le a se . We c e r ta in ly  agree th a t  q u a r te r ly  
f in a n c ia l  statem ents are a s ig n i f ic a n t  p a r t  o f  a company's re p o r t in g  
o b lig a t io n  b u t we fe e l th a t  th is  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  belongs w ith  management no t 
the a u d it  com mittee.
( V
2
V
As mentioned earlier, all recommendations that address fraudulent financial 
reporting should promote management responsibility for accurate reporting. By 
requiring interim audit committee oversight, management's responsibility for 
proper financial reporting becomes obscured.
We feel the current system better promotes this responsibility. The penalties 
associated with fraudulent reporting should represent a sufficient risk to 
discourage noncompliance by company managements. It is a company's management 
who should pay the price. Interim involvement by the audit committee only 
confuses this primary management responsibility.
In addition, the increased costs of bringing the audit committee together 
along with potentially delaying the release of quarterly information further 
discourage the recommendation concerning interim audit committee oversight. 
This concern is especially significant, as a key attribute of quarterly 
information is timeliness.
In summary we feel that mandating the Commission's set of recommendations 
represents an undesirable trend toward more regulation. Fraudulent reporting 
occurs in only a rare minority of public companies. The risk of more severe 
punitive actions within the laws and regulations that already exist would be 
the best deterent to those few who would contemplate the crime of fraudulent 
reporting. To embody the Commission's recommendations into a set of new 
regulation will confuse the public but not confound the criminals.
Very truly your.
Executive Vice President
O G Shaffer 
/bc 
157
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A sh land
J u ly  1, 1987
KENNETH B. DENTON
Administrative Vice President and
Controller
(606) 329-5446
N ationa l Commission on 
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D. C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I a pp re c ia te  the  o p p o rtu n ity  to  respond to  you r Exposure D ra ft o f 
f in d in g s ,  co n c lu s io n s , and recommendations.
I d isag ree  w ith  the  Commission's recommendation th a t  A u d it Committee 
o v e rs ig h t o f q u a r te r ly  re p o r t in g  "shou ld  in c lu d e  approving f in a n c ia l 
r e s u lts  p r io r  to  p u b lic  re le a s e ".
The A u d it Committee m o n ito r in g  o f p o l ic ie s ,  key systems, re g u la to ry  
com pliance, adequacy o f key f in a n c ia l pe rsonne l, in te rn a l and e x te rn a l 
a u d it in g  programs, and p r in c ip a l accounting and f in a n c ia l issues places 
the  committee in  an "o v e rs ig h t"  p o s it io n  th roughou t the y e a r. The 
approval o f ac tua l f in a n c ia l re s u lts  would p lace the  A u d it Committee in to  
the  a d m in is tra t iv e  process o f accoun ting , a ro le  th a t  would be incon­
s is te n t  w ith  the Commission's goal as se t fo r th  in  the s tudy . Adding the  
q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l review  d u p lic a te s  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f the c o n t r o l le r ,  
a u d it in g ,  and management fu n c tio n s  o f the e n te rp r is e .
I r e s p e c t fu lly  subm it t h is  comment f o r  you r c o n s id e ra tio n .
Very t r u ly  yo u rs ,
Kenneth B. Denton
mja
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May 1 5 / 1987
TO: R . H. S p ilm a n
SUBJECT: R e v ie w  o f  R e p o r t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  C o m m iss io n
on F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g
The C o m m is s io n  has been  in  e x is te n c e  s in c e  O c to b e r  1 9 8 5 .
I t ' s  c h a rg e  was t o  i d e n t i f y  c a u s a l f a c t o r s  t h a t  can  le a d  
t o  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  and t o  i d e n t i f y  s te p s  
t o  re d u c e  i t s  in c id e n c e .
The C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  e n co m p a ss : th e  to p  m anagem ent
and  b o a rd  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s ; in d e p e n d e n t  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n ts ;  th e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t in g  p r o f e s s io n ;  
th e  SEC and  o t h e r  r e g u la t o r y  and la w  e n fo rc e m e n t  b o d ie s ;  
and th e  a c a d e m ic  w o r ld .
The s tu d y  fo c u s e d  on p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  (c o m p a n ie s  owned 
b y  p u b l i c  i n v e s t o r s ) .
The re c o m m e n d a t io n s  a re  d i v id e d  i n t o  f o u r  c a t e g o r ie s :
( 1 )  R e c o m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  th e  P u b l i c  C om pany; ( 2 )  R e co m m e n d a tio n s  
f o r  th e  In d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n ta n t ;  ( 3 )  R e co m m e n d a tio n s  
f o r  th e  SEC and  O th e rs  t o  Im p ro v e  th e  R e g u la to r y  and L e g a l 
E n v ir o n m e n t ;  ( 4 )  R e co m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  E d u c a t io n .  I  w i l l
com m ent on th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  in  t h a t  o r d e r .
Recommendations for the Public Company
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I agree with the majority of the recommendations and feel 
that they are worthy of further consideration and could 
prevent fraudulent financial reporting if appropriately 
implemented; but I do disagree with the following recommendations:
a. The audit committee should review management's
evalution of factors relating to the independence 
of the company's public accountant. Both 
the audit committee and management should 
assist the public accountant in preserving 
his independence.
Tom.
I haveproblmswitn
The independence of the outside auditor 
is the cornerstone to that profession and 
it is the professional responsibility of 
the individual to adhere to his code of 
ethics. Management should not be responsible 
for the independence of the outside auditor/ 
nor should the audit committee.
b. The audit committee should approve in advance 
the types and the extent of management advisory 
services that management plans to engage 
the company's independent public accountant 
to perform.
May 15, 1987
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DISAGRE *
In my opinion the public accountant's performance 
of management advisory services does not 
impair their independence; and the approval 
of such services by the audit committee is 
not necessary.
c. All public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to include in their annual reports 
to stockholders, management reports signed 
by the chief executive officer and chief 
accounting officer. The management report 
should acknowledge management's responsibilities 
for the financial statements and internal 
control# discuss how the responsibilities 
were fulfilled# and provide management's 
assessment of the effectiveness of the company's 
internal controls.
I disagree for these reasons: (1) unecessary#
additional regulatory intrusion into the 
financial reporting process; (2) informed 
financial report users are now aware that 
management is responsible for the financial 
statements and internal controls; (3) if 
such reporting was required,  the report 
would tend to become boilplate (a sample 
report is included in the Appendix).
May 15/ 1 9 8 7
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d. All public companies should be required b y  
SBC rule to include in their annual reports
to stockholders a letter signed by the chairman 
of the audit committee describing the committee's 
responsibilities and activities during the 
year.
I disagree with this recommendation. A g a i n , 
additional requlatory i ntrusion into the 
financial reporting process; certain disclosures 
are now required in the proxy statements; 
and again the tendency for the letter to 
become boilerplate (a sample of this letter 
is also included in the Appendix).
e. Audit committees should increase their oversight 
of the quarterly reporting process. This 
oversight should include approving financial 
results prior to public release.
I do not feel this is necessary if the audit 
committee fulfills its other normal oversight 
responsibilities.
May 15/ 1987
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Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant
I agree totally with the recommendations in this section;
but I would go further in defining the public accountant's responsibility
to detect fraud (in addition to the recommentdations regarding
the responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial
reporting).
Recommendations for the SEC and Others to Improve 
the Regulatory and Legal Environment
I'm in agreement with all these recommendations especially 
those comments concerning our financial institutuions 
and their regulation by Federal Regulatory Agencies.
Recommendations for Education
I feel the recommendations in this area are most important, 
especially those pertaining to business and accounting 
curricula. Future participants in the financial reporting 
process must be better trained to deter fraudulent financial 
reporting.
In summary, the Commission is to be commended for the 
work it has done and for the recommendations it has made 
in an effort to curb fraudulent financial reporting.
The Commission had a most difficult task. Fraudulent 
financial reporting has been a problem for years and up 
to this time has been addressed only in a piece-meal manner. 
Implementation of even a selected few of these recommendations 
should certainly aide in deterring and/or detecting financial 
reporting fraud.
May 1 5 , 1 9 8 7
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S h e l l  O i l  C o m p a n y
One Shell Plaza 
P. O. Box 2463 
Houston, Texas 77252
M. F. Sullivan 
Controller
J u ly  1, 1987
Mr. G. Dewey A rn o ld , Executive  D ire c to r  
N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. A rno ld :
S he ll O il Company a p p re c ia tes  the o p p o rtu n ity  to  comment on the A p r i l 
1987 Exposure D ra ft  o f  the Report o f  the  N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g .
Viewing the Report in  i t s  t o t a l i t y ,  we b e lie v e  th a t  the Commission 
has done a f in e  jo b  in  a n a lyz ing  fa c to rs  in vo lve d  in  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l 
re p o r t in g  and in  recommending an approach to  i t s  d e te c tio n  and p re ve n tio n . 
N eve rthe less , we are opposed to  c e r ta in  o f  the  Commission's recommendations.
In  o th e r cases, we are concerned th a t  more may be read in to  some recommen­
da tions  than is  in tended and we suggest th a t  the R epo rt's  wording be c a r e fu l ly  
reviewed to  avo id  unintended in fe re n c e s . M oreover, re co g n iz in g  th a t  a la rg e  
number o f  companies a lrea dy  have many o f  the Commission's recommendations o r 
o th e r e q u a lly  adequate c o n tro ls  in  p la ce , we are concerned th a t  in  the 
aggregate the recommendations could t ra n s la te  in to  a r b i t r a r y  ru le s  and 
re g u la t io n s , increased a u d it  fees f o r  in d u s try ,  and more tim e and e f f o r t  
spent com plying w ith  re g u la t io n s  and requirem ents th a t  may no t meet cos t 
b e n e f it  te s ts .  In our v iew , such a r e s u lt  would indeed be u n fo rtu n a te  
co n s id e rin g  i t  would have been tr ig g e re d  by the abuses o f  a r e la t iv e ly  
sm all number o f  companies, a number o f  which were no t SEC re g is t ra n ts .
We b e lie v e , th e re fo re ,  i t  is  im p o rtan t th a t  each recommendation be ca re ­
f u l l y  eva lua ted  to  ensure i t  w i l l  co s t e f fe c t iv e ly  add va lue  to  the  
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  process and is  re q u ire d  to  m a te r ia l ly  increase the 
in t e g r i t y  o f  each company's f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  system.
We are w e ll aware o f  the n o to r ie ty  a ffo rd e d  recen t cases o f  fra u d u le n t 
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g ,  concerns about the so c a lle d  "e x p e c ta tio n  gap", and 
the spectre  o f  a le g is la t iv e  response to  such concerns. N eve rthe less , on 
ba lance , we b e lie v e  the Commission's Report borders on o v e rre a c tio n  to  a 
perce ived m alaise in  in d u s try ,  and seems untempered by the fa c ts  th a t the 
vas t m a jo r ity  o f  company managements va lue in te g r i t y  in  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g ,  
and th a t  a u d it  committees are a lre a d y  a c t iv e ly  in vo lve d  in  the f in a n c ia l 
re p o r t in g  process.
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2While we can appreciate the Commission's objectives and are sensitive  
to the mandate i t  has been given, we would urge tha t i t  reconsider and 
c la r i fy  certa in  o f i t s  recommendations. Our comments on those recommenda­
tions which concern us are attached.
Very t ru ly  yours,
Attachment
YBB87 17401D-S/9
CHAPTER TWO
Recommendations for The Public Company
II. Tone at the Top 
Recommendation:
For the top management of a public company to discharge its obligation 
to oversee the financial reporting process, it must identify, under­
stand, and assess the factors that may cause the company's financial 
statements to be fraudulently misstated.
We agree. It is difficult to see how management could carry out 
its responsibility to oversee the financial reporting process 
without making such assessments. Understanding and assessing 
the factors which might contribute to fraudulent reporting is, 
in our view, essential to the development of a viable system of 
internal controls.
While the Commission recognizes that management's judgment 
should dictate the extent and nature of the assessment 
appropriate to a particular company, and has further stated in 
Appendix H that assessing such risk does not necessitate a 
special effort, it could be inferred from other statements in 
the Commission's Report that a special effort is indeed required. 
For example, the Commission states that such assessments need 
to be performed at all levels, including operating and finan­
cial management, and that the "process" must be supervised by 
top management such as the CEO and CFO. This could be 
interpreted to mean that a large documentation effort, 
similar to that undertaken by many companies to comply with 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), would be required 
to comply with the recommendation.
To avoid any misinterpretation of the type of effort contem­
plated by the Commission, we urge that it further clarify its 
intent by specifically stating that it does not envision the 
kind of documentation effort undertaken to comply with the FCPA.
Recommendation:
Public companies should maintain internal controls that are adequate 
to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
The Commission's recommendation would suggest that an internal 
control system be maintained which will guarantee the prevention 
of fraud. In our view, such an expectation is unrealistic and it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to have a cost effective 
system of internal controls adequate to prevent fraudulent finan­
cial reporting. The recommendation would be more appropriately 
stated if it suggested that companies maintain a system of 
internal controls adequate to reasonably assure the prevention 
and detection of fraudulent financial reporting. The concept of
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2"reasonable  assurance" is ,  f o r  example, embodied in  the FCPA and 
in  the accounting  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and is  understood to  contem plate a 
balance between cos t and b e n e f it .  We s tro n g ly  b e lie v e  th a t  the 
concept o f  reasonable assurance should a lso  be embodied in  the 
language o f  th is  recommendation.
Recommendation:
P u b lic  companies should develop and enforce  w r it te n  codes o f  co rpo ra te  
conduct. Codes o f  conduct should fo s te r  a s trong  e th ic a l c lim a te  and 
open channels o f  communication to  help p ro te c t a g a in s t f ra u d u le n t f in a n ­
c ia l re p o r t in g .  A company's a u d it  committee should rev iew  compliance 
w ith  the code a n n u a lly , in c lu d in g  compliance by top  management, and 
re p o r t thereon to  the board o f  d ire c to rs .
A company's system o f  in te rn a l c o n tro ls  and f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  
process should m ir ro r  i t s  code o f  co rpo ra te  conduct. T h e re fo re , 
the  a u d it  com m ittee 's  ongoing assessment o f  the e ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f 
in te rn a l c o n tro ls  and i t s  o v e rs ig h t o f  the  f in a n c ia l re p o r tin g  
process would embrace compliance w ith  codes o f  conduct. S p e c if i­
c a l ly  recommending an annual rev iew  by the a u d it  committee o f  
com pliance w ith  a company's code o f  conduct suggests th a t  such 
compliance is  somehow separate from the f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  
process and in te rn a l c o n tro l system. We do no t b e lie v e  th a t  is  
a v a l id  d is t in c t io n .  I f  the Commission fe e ls  s tro n g ly  th a t  the 
n o tio n  o f  a u d it  committee rev iew  needs to  be inc luded  in  i t s  
recommendation, we b e lie v e  the la s t  sentence should be changed to  
s ta te  th a t  a company's a u d it  committee should rev iew  compliance 
w ith  the code as p a r t o f  i t s  ongoing assessment o f  in te rn a l 
c o n tro ls .
I I I .  Two Key F unc tions : Accounting and In te rn a l A u d it
Recommendation:
P u b lic  companies should m a in ta in  accoun ting  fu n c tio n s  th a t  can 
e f fe c t iv e ly  meet t h e i r  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  o b lig a t io n s .
W hile we do not d isagree w ith  th is  recommendation per se, we 
are q u ite  concerned about the im p lic a t io n  in  the u n d e rly in g  
d iscu ss io n  which s ta te s  th a t  the CAO should be held respon s ib le  
f o r  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  The CAO, w h ile  in t im a te ly  
in vo lve d  in  the f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  p rocess, does not a lways, 
nor can he be reasonably expected to  have f u l l  c o n tro l and 
knowledge o f  fa c to rs  a t work in  a company which m ight lead to  
fra u d u le n t re p o r t in g .  P a r t ic u la r ly  in  la rg e  complex c o rp o ra tio n s , 
the CAO must reasonably r e ly  on the c e r t i f i c a t io n s  o r  represen­
ta t io n s  o f  o th e r management o r  f in a n c ia l managers, and can on ly  
assure th a t  a reasonable number o f  c o n tro ls  are in  p lace to  
v e r i f y  re po rte d  d a ta , w ith  deference to  cos t b e n e f it  c o n s id e ra tio n s . 
F raudu len t p ra c tic e s  may, and do, as the Commission has po in ted  o u t, 
in v o lv e  CEOs and o th e r top  management who may be a c tin g  independen tly ,
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3without the knowledge of the CAO. We would urge the Commission to 
qualify the responsibility of financial officers for fraudulent 
financial reporting by adopting a standard of care notion for 
such officers ("reasonable prudent person in the same or 
similar circumstances") which recognizes this reality.
Recommendation:
Public companies should maintain an effective internal audit function 
staffed with an adequate number of qualified personnel appropriate to 
the size and the nature of the company.
The discussion following this recommendation seems to reflect 
a strong endorsement of the Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA) standards, including the IIA's Quality Assurance Standard.
As a company we have endorsed and adopted much of the guidance 
set forth by IIA; however, we have not, nor do we intend to adopt 
the IIA's Quality Assurance Standard. We are opposed to it on 
two grounds. First, we do not believe it is cost effective when 
measured against the contribution external peer review can make 
to improving the internal audit function, and secondly, it lends 
itself to the exposure of proprietary company information to 
third parties.
We strongly encourage the Commission to soften its endorsement 
of the IIA's Quality Assurance Standard by suggesting instead 
that companies may want to also consider adopting the IIA's 
Quality Assurance Standard.
Recommendation:
Public companies should ensure that their internal audit functions 
are objective.
There are two points in the underlying discussion which give 
us concern.
First, we feel the discussion in the second paragraph should 
affirmatively state that the reporting relationship of the 
chief internal auditor will depend on what is practical and 
appropriate in the context of a company's organizational 
structure, rather than merely acknowledging that a reporting 
relationship to the CEO may not be practical. The Commission 
would seem to infer that reporting to anyone other than the 
CEO is undesirable, whereas we believe the emphasis should be 
placed on objectivity and independence, and an appropriate 
reporting channel to upper management. We suggest the para­
graph be restated to say that while a direct reporting 
relationship to the CEO might in some instances be desirable, 
the appropriate reporting relationship of the chief internal 
auditor will depend on what is practical and necessary to 
achieve objectivity and independence.
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chief internal auditor should be an "experienced audit professional 
trained in internal or public accounting" troublesome. Such 
qualifications may or may not be consistent with a company's 
personnel policy. Not all companies put an "audit" professional 
in charge of their audit function. We would much prefer to see 
a more general statement that the company staff the chief internal 
auditor position with an individual it believes is qualified to 
manage this important function. Other qualities, such as leader­
ship, objectivity and the ability to communicate, are equally if 
not more important. In summary, while we agree that the audit 
function should be staffed with an appropriate number of audit 
professionals, we do not believe it necessarily follows that the 
chief internal auditor should or need be an "audit" professional. 
Companies must have the latitude to staff this position based on 
what they deem to be the appropriate qualifications.
Recommendation:
Internal auditors should consider the implications of their nonfinan­
cial audit findings for the company's financial statements.
Agree.
Recommendation:
Management and the audit committee should ensure that the internal 
auditor's involvement in the audit of the entire financial reporting 
process is appropriate and properly coordinated with the independent 
public accountant.
We do not agree that internal auditors must be involved in the 
audit of financial statements at the consolidated level because 
we are not convinced they can add as much to that part of the 
financial reporting process as the Commission would suggest.
The consolidated financial statements reflect activities at the 
division, subsidiary, or business component level. The audit 
of those activities is where we believe the internal audit 
function can make its greatest contribution to the detection 
of fraudulent financial reporting. The audit of such activities 
provides an element of assurance to supplement the independent 
auditor's report that the consolidated financial statements 
fairly present an entity's operations. A literal application 
of the Commission's recommendation could easily result in an 
unnecessary duplication of effort which would be counter­
productive, and therefore, fail to meet the test of usefulness.
IV. Audit Committee of the Board of Directors
Recommendation:
The board of directors of all public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to establish audit committees comprised solely of independent 
directors.
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We agree with th is recommendation to the extent that i t  affects  
larger companies. However, th is recommendation may not fu lly  
recognize the d if f ic u lt ie s  small companies have in obtaining 
independent d irectors. In lig h t of the current legal environ­
ment regarding d irectors ' l i a b i l i t y ,  small companies are already 
faced with a d i f f ic u lt  task of finding q u alified  people to serve 
on th e ir  boards. Such companies may find i t  the ru le , rather 
than the exception, that people with the required background 
to serve, w ill not be w illin g  to accept the additional risk  
associated with outside directorships.
Recommendation:
Audit committees should be informed, v ig ila n t, and e ffec tive  overseers 
of the financia l reporting process and the company's internal controls.
We have no disagreement with the recommendation and would endorse 
the Commission's recognition that a detailed delineation and 
description of the audit committee's resp onsib ilities  is best 
le f t  to the discretion of management and the board of directors  
so as to permit companies to balance th e ir  needs with th e ir  
particu lar circumstance.
We do believe, however, that the Report fa i ls  to recognize, 
generally, duties and responsib ilities  of Board members and 
endeavors to allocate too much responsib ility  to audit committee 
members.
Recommendation:
A ll public companies should develop a w ritten  charter setting forth  
the duties and responsib ilities  of the audit committee. The board 
of directors should approve the charter, review i t  at least annually, 
and modify i t  as necessary.
We agree with the Commission's recommendation that a w ritten  
charter be developed and approved by the board of d irectors.
We fa i l  to see, however, why i t  is necessary to prescribe that 
the board of directors review such a charter annually unless 
there is a clear need to do so. We do not believe the 
the resp onsib ilities  of directors should be as specific as 
proposed by the Commission. F in a lly , we believe that once 
approved, review of the charter should be le f t  to the discretion  
of the board of directors and/or audit committee. At best, the 
Commission's recommendation should only require a "periodic" 
review.
Recommendation:
Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority to 
discharge their responsibilities.
Agree.
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The audit committee should review management's evaluation of factors 
related to the independence of the company's public accountant. Both 
the audit committee and management should assist the public accountant 
in preserving his independence.
Agree.
Recommendation:
The audit committee should approve in advance the types and the extent 
of management advisory services that management plans to engage the 
company's independent public accountant to perform.
We do not believe the Commission's report should go beyond 
recommending that the audit committee, in exercising its 
responsibility, satisfy itself that the independent auditor is 
independent. The Commission's preceding recommendation would 
seem to cover this.
In addition, we do not agree that the mere performance of 
non-audit services compromises the independence of the auditor. 
There is no evidence we are aware of, or which the Commission 
has presented, that the performance of such services has com­
promised the independence of auditors. In fact, the Commission's 
discussion seems to recognize that the relationship between 
performing such services and the independent auditor's indepen­
dence may be more perception than reality. As such, we do not 
believe such a perceived "compromise" should be addressed as a 
separate recommendation. Doing so would only serve to reenforce 
the belief that there is a problem when auditors perform such 
services.
Finally, requiring advance approval from the audit committee 
may not always be practical. Situations can and do arise when 
the press of time may not permit advance approval to engage 
the independent auditor to perform advisory services.
Management should have the flexibility to respond to such 
situations. If the Commission feels strongly that the approval 
of such services needs to be set out as a separate recommenda­
tion, we would urge that the recommendation recognize that 
such advance approval will not always be practical.
V. Reporting to the Public on Management and Audit Committee Responsibilities 
Recommendation:
All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include 
in their annual reports to stockholders management reports 
signed by the chief executive officer and chief accounting 
officer. The management report should acknowledge management's 
responsibilities for the financial statements and internal con­
trol, discuss how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and
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company's in te rna l con tro ls .
We question whether a lengthy discussion o f the manner in  which 
management f u l f i l l e d  i t s  re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  adds value to the 
management report. We believe no more should be required than 
an acknowledgment o f management's f in a n c ia l reporting 
re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  and i t s  b e lie f  tha t such re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  
have been discharged in a l l  m aterial respects, coupled w ith a 
statement tha t management has assessed the company's in te rna l 
contro ls and believes them to be adequate to provide reasonable 
assurance as to the r e l ia b i l i t y  o f the fin a n c ia l statements.
Such acknowledgements encompass a confirm ation o f b e lie f o f 
reasonably prudent conduct by management. To require an 
enumeration o f how management f u l f i l l e d  i t s  re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  
represents inform ation overload which does not add value.
The Commission's recommendation also appears inconsisten t w ith 
the sample management report in  Appendix L. I t  specifies tha t 
the management report should be signed by the CEO and the CAO, 
ye t the sample management report in Appendix L shows i t  being 
signed by the CFO. We suggest the recommendation be made in a 
broader context, changing i t  to read tha t the management report 
should be signed by the CEO and e ith e r the CAO or a senior 
fin a n c ia l o f f ic e r  to  whom the CAO reports , depending on the 
company's organizational s truc tu re  and what the company deems 
to be appropriate.
Recommendation:
A ll pub lic  companies should be required by SEC ru le  to include in th e ir  
annual reports to  stockholders a le t te r  signed by the chairman o f the 
aud it committee describing the committee's re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  and 
a c t iv it ie s  during the year.
Today's annual reports ty p ic a lly  include a descrip tion  o f the 
re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  o f the aud it committee and i t s  membership. In 
our op in ion, a signed report by the chairman o f the audit 
committee describing the committee's a c t iv i t ie s ,  e .g ., as set 
fo r th  in  Appendix M, would be o f questionable value. The report­
ing re la tio n sh ip  the committee has w ith  the board o f d irec to rs  
ca rries  w ith  i t  an im p lica tion  th a t the committee is  carry ing 
out i t s  assigned re s p o n s ib ilit ie s . To require a separate signed 
report is  unnecessary, w i l l  evolve in to  l i t t l e  more than b o ile r ­
p la te , and would only add e sse n tia lly  redundant d isclosure to 
already overloaded annual reports. I t  could also serve to  fu rth e r 
discourage independent outside d ire c to rs  from accepting positions 
on aud it committees.
Including a signed report by the aud it committee chairman in 
the fin a n c ia l section o f the annual report also confuses the 
oversight ro le  o f the committee. One could draw the inference
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financial section of the annual report the audit committee 
has participated in the financial reporting process, which is 
clearly not the intended role of audit committees.
Recommendation:
Management should advise the audit committee when it seeks a second 
opinion on a significant accounting issue.
We find the recommendation quite troublesome. First, it does 
not define what a second opinion is. For example, does the 
Commission have both informal, i.e., casual discussions with 
another independent auditor, and formal second opinions in mind? 
This should be clarified. More importantly, the recommenda­
tion infers that there is something inherently wrong with 
seeking a second opinion, and that the engagement auditor's 
opinion on an accounting issue should not be questioned. Valid 
disagreements during the auditing process do arise; and indeed, 
management may be acting irresponsibly if it does not seek a 
second opinion on such disagreements.
Secondly, we do not agree that the mere seeking of a second 
opinion should be reported to the audit committee because it 
may or may not be adopted by management, or result in a disagree­
ment with the independent auditor. We believe that only those 
second opinions which result in accounting for a significant 
transaction on a basis with which the engagement auditor 
disagrees should be brought to the attention of the audit 
committee. Advising the audit committee whenever a second 
opinion is sought on a significant accounting issue, regardless 
of whether it results in a disagreement with the engagement 
auditor, would be unproductive use of the audit committee's 
time by bringing before it issues which have no relevance.
Recommendation:
When a public company changes independent public accountants, it 
should be required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature of 
any material accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old 
and new auditors during the three-year period preceding the change.
The requirement that any material issue discussed be disclosed 
is far too broad. Mere discussion of significant accounting 
issues, which can range from the implementation of new account­
ing standards to accounting issues surrounding specific 
transactions, does not necessarily mean disagreement. Further, 
it could very well discourage the free exchange of ideas bet­
ween auditors and their clients. Also, an auditing or accounting 
issue may not be the reason for wanting to change auditors. The 
recommendation would ignore such considerations as economic 
factors and attitudes toward independent firms, which may 
precipitate a change.
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contemplated by the Commission, including the possibility of 
having to disclose proprietary information which would be 
required under a literal interpretation of the Commission's 
recommendation, could inhibit companies from changing auditors 
for legitimate reasons. Existing SEC rules which require 
disclosure when a company changes auditors, including the reason 
for the change, would seem to be sufficient to inform the 
public of why a company changes auditors. Considering these 
existing requirements, which we believe are completely adequate, 
the Commission's recommendation would only add to already 
burdensome reporting requirements.
Recommendation:
Audit committees should increase their oversight of the quarterly
reporting process. This oversight should include approving financial
results prior to public release.
We disagree.
For many companies, it would not be practical to have the audit 
committee approve quarterly results prior to their release to 
the public and at the same time release such results on a 
timely basis. The logistics involved in furnishing quarterly 
results to the audit committee, and the time spent by the 
committee exercising its oversight responsibility and in 
approving such results, could delay the timeliness of their 
release and, therefore, inhibit the flow of information to the 
public. We believe such a requirement also clouds the distinc­
tion between the audit committee's oversight responsibility and 
participation in the financial reporting process.
The recommendation in Chapter Three which would have the 
independent auditor review quarterly results prior to their 
release should be sufficient to enhance the integrity of 
quarterly financial reporting. The audit committee should be 
able to rely on the independent auditor's review, without the 
need to formally approve quarterly results prior to their 
release.
We would urge that the recommendation be changed to state that 
the audit committee's oversight of the quarterly financial 
reporting process should include a review of quarterly financial 
results. The timing of such a review should be left to the 
discretion of the audit committee.
Y B B 8 7  1 7 4 0 2 D - S / 1 0
10
Recommendation:
The Commission's sponsoring organizations should establish a body to
guide public companies on internal controls.
Developing guidelines against which companies can judge the 
effectiveness of their internal control system would be 
difficult inasmuch as internal control is a broad and complex 
concept which must, of necessity, be uniquely developed in an 
appropriate manner for each company. However, in contrast to 
financial reporting and auditing standards which are the subject 
of vast amounts of professional focus and attention, little or 
nothing has been done on developing useful guidelines for internal 
control. Considering the varying interpretations and philosophies 
surrounding the concept of internal control, and the lack of mean­
ingful guidance, we believe appropriately flexible and considered 
guidelines would be highly desirable to provide a benchmark against 
which companies, audit committees, and independent auditors can 
evaluate and, if required, substantiate the appropriateness of a 
company's internal control system.
CHAPTER THREE
Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant
While we do not take issue with the thrust of the recommendations 
set forth in Chapter Three, we have some overall concerns, and a specific 
concern with the Commission's recommendation on revising the auditor's 
standard report.
The Commission's recommendations should lead to improved audit 
quality and a better understanding of the limitations of the audit process. 
Notwithstanding a stated sensitivity to the cost effectiveness of its 
recommendations, the Commission should more affirmatively acknowledge 
that changes in auditing standards and the role of the independent auditor 
should be afforded full due process to ensure such changes meet the test 
of usefulness and are cost effective.
We fully support the notion that the Auditing Standards Board be 
reorganized and feel strongly that it should include representation from 
industry. We believe the Commission's recommendation on reorganizing the 
Auditing Standards Board should specifically state that the Board include 
members of industry, rather than just stating "persons who are not engaged 
in public accounting".
We are very much concerned with the AICPA's response to the Commission's 
recommendation on changing the auditor's standard report, i.e., that the 
report state that the financial statements are free of material misstatements 
as a result of fraud. To change the entire emphasis of the scope paragraph 
to make the general purpose of the audit "...to evaluate whether the finan­
cial statements are materially misstated (intentionally or unintentionally)
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is a negative way to describe an audit. It also implies that the financial 
statements may still be misstated as a result of fraud, but that the mis­
statement is not material. We find this entire concept troublesome and 
would urge that the Commission reconsider its recommendation. We urge 
retention of the concept that the audit provides, in the opinion of the 
auditor, reasonable assurance that the financial statements fairly present 
a company's results of operations. If the audit scope does not permit the 
auditor to reasonably assure that the financial statements are free of 
misstatements, his report should be "subject to" that limitation. We 
strongly believe this is preferable to the negative connotation the 
Commission's recommendation would introduce into the auditor's standard 
report.
CHAPTER FOUR
Recommendations for the SEC and Others to 
Improve the Regulatory and Legal Environment
We commend the Commission for its recognition of the problem of 
increasing director liability, the difficulty in insuring directors 
against liability, and the impact of the legal climate on the recruitment 
of top quality outside directors. We found it encouraging that the 
Report suggests a need to reconsider the SEC's long standing position 
that indemnification of directors for liabilities arising under the 
Securities Act of 1933 is against public policy and should not be 
enforceable.
We also support the other recommendations set forth in this chapter. 
With respect to the Commission's recommendation on page 61 which would 
have the SEC issue a cease and desist order when an "unsound" financial 
reporting practice is found, the precise intent and scope of this 
provision must be clarified. The application of accounting principles 
often requires judgment, and what may be viewed as unsound by one person, 
may be sound to another. No such case should be subject to such sanctions, 
and safeguards must be in place to ensure against the inappropriate use of 
sanctions. The same sort of procedure and substantive protection must 
surround the right to bar individuals found to be involved in fraudulent 
financial reporting.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Recommendations for Education
We believe the Commission's recommendations in the area of education 
are appropriate and we have no specific comments on this chapter.
APPENDIX K
Audit Committee Good Practice Guidelines
The guidelines should be broader and, therefore, allow audit committees 
more latitude in how they choose to discharge their responsibilities. The 
introduction to Appendix K sets forth the responsibilities of the audit 
committee and that is where we believe the Appendix should end. The informed 
judgment of the audit committee should determine how it will carry out its 
responsibilities. If the Commission's final report follows the degree of 
specificity in the Exposure Draft, audit committees may feel compelled to 
follow the guidelines, whether they believe they are appropriate or not, in 
order to avoid any potential liability for not following recommended 
practices. While it may not be the intent of the Commission, the guidelines 
may have the practical effect of rule making.
Moreover, we disagree with some of the guidelines and have commented 
on these in our comments on Chapter Two. Specifically:
o While we agree that audit committees should endeavor to confirm and 
assist the independence of the independent auditor, we do not 
believe it is necessary that the committee approve, in advance, the 
extent of management advisory services provided by the independent 
auditor. Ensuring the independence of the public auditor is all 
encompassing, and the requirement to separately approve using the 
public auditor for advisory services only adds dignity to what we 
believe is more perception than reality, namely, that the auditor's 
independence is compromised by performing such services.
o In our view, requiring audit committees to approve quarterly financial 
statements prior to their release confuses the role of oversight with 
participation in the financial reporting process. We are also con­
cerned that logistics and the time spent by the committee approving 
such statements will seriously inhibit the timely flow of information 
to the public. While we do not disagree that quarterly financial 
results should be reviewed by audit committees, when such results are 
reviewed should be left to the discretion of the committee.
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APPENDIX L
Good Practice Guidelines for Management's Report
Our reaction to Appendix L is essentially the same as Appendix K, 
that is, it is too specific. The Commission acknowledges that the exact 
contents of management's report cannot be prescribed, yet it is doing so 
by enumerating, in seemingly specific terms, what the contents of the 
report should include. Broader guidelines, along the lines of our previous 
comments on the management report in Chapter Two would seem appropriate 
to cover what should be acknowledged in a management report.
We have concerns about the illustration of a management report 
shown on page 188. It is overly specific in terms of the discussion of 
the kinds of action management has taken in discharging its responsibilities. 
Further, we find the first paragraph particularly negative in that 
it suggests that while the financial statements are not misstated 
due to material error or fraud, they could still be misstated 
because of fraud, but that the misstatement is not material. We 
also question whether a statement that the financial statements are 
not materially misstated is useful or necessary when management is 
acknowledging its responsibility for the integrity and reliability 
of the financial statements and stating its belief that it has 
carried out its responsibility in all material respects. If the 
Commission feels the illustration must be included, it should be made 
very clear that there is no intent on the part of the Commission to 
specifically prescribe how such reports are to be written.
Finally, further to our comments on Chapter Two, we do not believe 
who signs the management report should be prescribed. The Commission's 
Report is somewhat confusing and inconsistent on whether the management 
report should be signed by the CFO or the CAO. In Chapter Two the 
Commission recommends that the report be signed by the CEO and CAO, but 
the sample report in Appendix L is signed by the CFO. We believe the 
management report should be signed by the CEO and either the CAO or a 
senior financial officer to whom the CAO reports. The guidelines 
should be made consistent with the recommendation on the management 
report in Chapter Two.
APPENDIX M
Good Practice Guidelines for Audit Committee Chairman's Letter
For the reasons stated in our earlier comments, we disagree that a 
signed report by the audit committee chairman is necessary. However, we 
concur that the responsibilities of the audit committee and its membership 
should be provided in the annual report.
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D e a r M r. A r n o ld :
P le a s e  a c c e p t  my a p o lo g ie s  f o r  s u b m i t t in g  my com m ents 
on th e  A p r i l  1987 E x p o s u re  D r a f t  o f  th e  R e p o r t  o f  th e  
N a t io n a l  C o m m iss io n  on F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
a t  th e  e le v e n th  h o u r .
F i r s t  and fo r e m o s t ,  I  a p p la u d  th e  C o m m iss io n  f o r  an 
o v e r a l l  e x c e l le n t  w o rk .  The C o m m iss io n  and i t s  s t a f f  
h a ve  done t h e i r  w o rk  w e l l  and as a r e s u l t  th e  R e p o r t  
c o n t a in s  many e x c e l le n t  s u g g e s t io n s .  I  hop e  yo u  w i l l  
n o t  t h i n k  th e  com m ents w h ic h  f o l l o w  a re  c r i t i c a l  in  
n a t u r e ,  th e y  a re  n o t  so in te n d e d .  My com m ents a re  o f f e r e d  
in  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  v e in  and s h o u ld  be v ie w e d  a g a in s t  
th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  r e p o r t .
E x h ib i t  1 -1  (p a g e  14) and E x h ib i t  1 -3  (p a g e  17)
I  am s l i g h t l y  t r o u b le d  b y  th e  use o f  th e  w o rd  " o v e r s ig h t "  
in  th e s e  e x h i b i t s .  My d i c t i o n a r y  d e f in e s  " o v e r s ig h t "  
as " w a tc h f u l  and r e s p o n s ib le  c a r e " .  I  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  
a l l  th e  e n t i t i e s  n o te d  in  th e  e x h i b i t s  f i t  t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n .  
I n  my v ie w ,  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  encom pass 
" w a t c h f u l  and r e s p o n s ib le  c a r e " .  A b e t t e r  d e s c r ip t i o n  
m ig h t  be s o m e th in g  l i k e  " E n t i t i e s  W h ich  I n f lu e n c e  F in a n c ia l  
R e p o r t in g " .  C o n v e r s e ly ,  " o v e r s ig h t "  i s  a p p r o p r ia t e ly  
u se d  in  E x h ib i t  1 -4 .
A . A c c o u n t in g  F u n c t io n  and CFO (p a g e  32)
The f o u r t h  f u l l  p a ra g ra p h  u n d e r  t h i s  c a p t io n  i s ,  I  
b e l ie v e ,  v e r y  w e a k . To s t a t e  on th e  one hand  t h a t  members 
o f  to p  m anagem ent p r e s s u r e  th e  CFO i n t o  f r a u d u le n t  
r e p o r t i n g  and th e n  c o n c lu d e ,  on th e  o t h e r  h a n d , t h a t  
he s h o u ld  ta k e  n e c e s s a ry  s te p s  t o  p r e v e n t  t h i s  fro m  
h a p p e n in g  i s  a t  l e a s t  a n o m a lo u s . I  b e l ie v e  th e  C o m m iss io n  
nee ds  t o  s t r e n g th e n  and c l a r i f y  t h i s  p a ra g ra p h .
Is s u e  R e la te d  t o  . . .  In d e p e n d e n c e  (P age s  3 8 -3 9 )
The c o n c lu d in g  p a ra g ra p h  in  t h i s  s e c t io n  t r o u b le s  me 
b e c a u s e  i t  seems t o  beg  s e v e r a l  q u e s t io n s .  F i r s t ,  a 
f i r m  may n o t  be w i l l i n g  t o  d is c lo s e  t o  an a u d i t  c o m m itte e  
i t s  a g g re g a te  fe e s ,  much le s s  fe e s  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  
o f f i c e .  From  th e  p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s  p o in t  o f  v ie w  t h a t  
in fo r m a t io n ,  may be i r r e l e v a n t  b e c a u s e , s e c o n d , th e  
f i r m ' s  m e thod  o f  d i s t r i b u t i n g  p r o f i t s  o r  r e w a r d in g  
p e r fo rm a n c e  may h a ve  l i t t l e  o r  no r e la t i o n s h i p  t o  fe e s
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f r o m  a g i v e n  o f f i c e .  I  b e l i e v e  th e  C o m m is s io n  s h o u ld  g i v e  
f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n .
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g  (p a g e s  4 2 -4 3 )
The re c o m m e n d a t io n  s t a t e s  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t te e  o v e r s i g h t
" . . . s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v in g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r
t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e " .  T h a t  v e r b ia g e  i s  n o t  r e a l i s t i c
s in c e  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  an a u d i t  c o m m i t te e
t o  " a p p ro v e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s " .  The seco n d  p a r a g r a p h
o f  t h e  s e c t i o n  i s  m ore  t o  t h e  p o i n t  w h e re  i t  s a ys  " . . . a p p r o v e ,
i n  a d v a n c e ,  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f . . . " .  The la n g u a g e  needs
t o  be c o n fo rm e d .
As a p r a c t i t i o n e r  ( a l b e i t  r e c e n t l y  r e t i r e d )  I  h e a r t i l y  
e n d o rs e  t h e  t h o u g h t  i n  t h e  f i n a l  p a r a g r a p h  o f  t h i s  
s e c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n ta n t  r e v ie w  q u a r t e r l y  
r e s u l t s  on a t i m e l y  b a s i s .  S in c e  one hopes t h a t  p e rs o n s  
o t h e r  t h a n  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  w i l l  d i g e s t  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  
f i n a l  r e p o r t ,  I  b e l i e v e  t h e  R e p o r t  s h o u ld  a d d re s s  t h e  
i s s u e  o f  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t  w h ic h  w i l l  f a l l  on p u b l i c  
c o m p a n ie s ,  and n o te  t h a t  s u c h  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t  w i l l  
r e f l e c t  money w e l l  s p e n t .  (See a l s o  t h e  f i n a l  p a r a g r a p h  
on page 49 )
A n a l y t i c a l  R e v ie w  P r o c e d u r e s  (p a g e  4 8 )
The c o n c l u d i n g  p a r a g r a p h  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  c o n t a i n s  th e  
w o rd s  " e x e c u t i v e - l e v e l "  t w i c e .  The C o m m is s io n  may w is h  
t o  d e f i n e  t h e  t e rm  so t h a t  i t  i s  u n d e r s to o d  by  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  
and p u b l i c ,  a l i k e .
P e e r  R e v ie w  (p a g e  50 )
I  m u s t  q u e s t i o n  t h e  v a l i d i t y ,  a c r o s s  t h e  b o a r d ,  o f  
t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  a l l  a u d i t s  o f  new eng a g e m e n ts  be 
r e v ie w e d  i n  e a c h  o f f i c e  s e l e c t e d  f o r  p e e r  r e v i e w .  I  
do so on t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  v e r y  l i t t l e  o f  v a l u e  may be 
le a r n e d  f ro m  b r a n c h  o f f i c e  a u d i t  w o r k ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  
i f  t h e  o f f i c e  p r i m a r i l y  r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  t h e  w o rk  i s  
n o t  i n c lu d e d  i n  t h e  p e e r  r e v ie w  s c h e d u le .  F u r t h e r ,  
i f  one o r  m ore o f  a f i r m ' s  l a r g e r  o f f i c e s  a r e  p e e r  
r e v ie w e d  and many new p u b l i c  company c l i e n t s  o b t a in e d  
o v e r  t h e  p e e r  r e v ie w  p e r i o d ,  much o f  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  
b a la n c e  o f  t h e  p e e r  r e v ie w  p r o c e s s  may be re d u c e d  -  t o  t h e  
d e t r i m e n t  o f  t h e  p e e r  r e v ie w  t a k e n  as a w h o le .  I  b e l i e v e  
t h e  C o m m is s io n  needs  t o  l o o k  f u r t h e r  and e xpa nd  i t s  t h o u g h t s  
on t h i s  i s s u e .
C o n c u r r i n g ,  o r  Second P a r t n e r  R e v ie w  (p a g e s  5 0 -5 1 )
I  h a v e  s t r o n g  r e s e r v a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  recom m end­
a t i o n s  h e r e .  F i r s t ,  I  c a n n o t  a c c e p t  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
s e c o n d  p a r t n e r  i n v o lv e m e n t  i n  t h e  a u d i t  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s  
w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  im p ro v e  a u d i t  q u a l i t y .  I  t h i n k  th e  
C o m m is s io n 's  l o g i c  ne e d s  t o  be f u r t h e r  d e v e lo p e d  on t h i s  
p o i n t .  I t  i s  e a s y  f o r  me t o  im a g in e  a s i t u a t i o n  w h e re  t h e  
s e c o n d  p a r t n e r  m is s e d  a p o i n t  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  s ta g e  and t h u s
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b r o u g h t  l i t t l e  added a s s u ra n c e  t o  th e  p ro c e s s  in  th e  r e v ie w  
a r e a .  F u r t h e r ,  o p e n in g  th e  c o n c u r r in g  r e v ie w  t o  tw o  ( o r  
p o s s ib l y  m o re ) p a r t n e r s ,  and r e q u i r i n g  SEC o r  in d u s t r y  
e x p e r ie n c e  s u g g e s ts  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  many p a r t n e r s  b e in g  
in v o lv e d  in  th e  w h o le  p ro c e s s  w i t h  a c o n c u r r e n t  d im in u t io n  
o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  seems t o  me t h a t  th e  
p r o p o s a l may o r  c o u ld  p la c e  s e v e re  h a r d s h ip s  on s m a ll 
f i r m s  and s m a l le r  o f f i c e s  o f  la r g e r  f i r m s ,  a l l  in  c ir c u m ­
s ta n c e s  w h e re  th e  num ber o f  p a r t n e r s  w i t h  s p e c ia l i z e d  
e x p e r ie n c e  may be l i m i t e d .
The s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  a r e v ie w in g  p a r t n e r  c o n s id e r  h im s e l f  
a p e e r  o f  th e  re v ie w e d  p a r t n e r  s t r i k e s  me as a b i t  f a r  o u t .  
I  s u s p e c t  t h a t  some yo u n g  p a r t n e r s  w i t h  la r g e  egos may f e e l  
th e m s e lv e s  q u a l i f i e d ,  b u t  who know s? I  see l i t t l e  v a lu e  in  
t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n  and b e l ie v e  th e  f i n a l  R e p o r t  w o u ld  be 
b e t t e r  w i t h o u t  i t .
F irm  P re s s u re s  (p a g e s  5 1 -5 2 )
I n  a l l  c a n d o r ,  I  see t h i s  s e c t io n  as p u re  "m o th e rh o o d " .
I  b e l ie v e  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  com m ents a re  l i k e l y  t o  be seen  
as c o n t r o v e r s ia l ,  and g u id a n c e  i s  l a c k in g .  A c c o r d in g ly ,
I  had  t r o u b le  f i n d i n g  s u b s ta n c e  h e r e .  I f  th e  s e c t io n  s h o u ld  
re m a in  in  th e  R e p o r t ,  I  b e l ie v e  th e  C o m m is s io n  o u g h t t o  
d e v e lo p  i t s  th o u g h ts  a b i t  m ore and p r o v id e  s p e c i f i c  
g u id a n c e  t o  p r a c t i t i o n e r s .
C o m m u n ic a tio n s  W ith  U s e rs :  . . . C o n t r o l s  (p a g e s  5 2 -5 3 )
I  a p p la u d  th e  C o m m is s io n  f o r  u r g in g  th e  p r o f e s s io n  to  
r e v is e  i t s  s ta n d a r d  a u d i t  r e p o r t .  W h ile  th e  t a s k  o f  
d e v is in g  an in f o r m a t i v e  b u t  s u c c in c t  a u d i t  r e p o r t  w i l l  be 
a c h a l le n g e ,  I  w o n d e r i f  i t  m ig h t  n o t  be an i n v i t a t i o n  to  
e v e r  e x p a n d in g  d i s c lo s u r e s  in  a u d i t o r s '  r e p o r t s .  In  t im e ,  
t h a t  r e p o r t  c o u ld  becom e le n g th y  and so bu rde nsom e  as to  
n e g a te  i t s  u t i l i t y  b e c a u s e  i t  was ig n o r e d  b y  th e  p u b l i c .
I  s t r u g g le d  a b i t  w i t h  th e  f i n a l  p a ra g ra p h  o f  th e  s e c t io n  
and th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e  w h e re  th e  a u d i t o r  d is a g r e e s  w i t h  
m a n a g e m e n t's  v ie w  o f  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t in g  c o n t r o l s .  The 
C o m m iss io n  h as  l e f t  t o  th e  r e a d e r 's  im a g in a t io n  w h a t th e  
a u d i t o r  s h o u ld  do a n d , m ore im p o r t a n t l y ,  w hen . I  can  see 
some e x c i t i n g  t im e s  i f  t h a t  d is a g re e m e n t  s u r fa c e d  a f t e r  
th e  a n n u a l r e p o r t  was p r i n t e d ,  and e ven  m ore i f  I  t h i n k  o f  
an a g re e d  c le a n  o p in io n  t h a t  needs t o  be chan g e d  when an 
a n n u a l r e p o r t  p r o o f  i s  in  hand  c o n t a in in g  m anagem ent 
com m ents th e  a u d i t o r  c a n n o t l i v e  w i t h .  I n  sum m ary, I  l i k e  
th e  C o m m is s io n 's  id e a ,  b u t  t h i n k  i t  nee ds  t o  be m ore f u l l y  
d e v e lo p e d .
Mr. G. Dewey Arnold Page 4 June 29, 1987
A u d i t in g  S ta n d a rd s  B o a rd  (p a g e s  5 4 -5 7 )
I  s e rv e d  as a member o f  an AICPA T a sk  F o rc e  s e v e r a l  y e a rs  
ago w h ic h  re v ie w e d  th e  s t r u c t u r e  and o p e r a t io n s  o f  ASB 
and p re p a re d  an e x te n s iv e  w r i t t e n  r e p o r t  t o  I n s t i t u t e  
m embers as t o  i t s  c o n c lu s io n s .  Those c o n c lu s io n s  w e re  q u i t e  
d i s s i m i l a r  t o  th o s e  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n . I t  m ig h t  be u s e f u l ,  
c e r t a i n l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  me, t o  le a r n  in  m ore d e t a i l  how 
th e  C o m m iss io n  re a c h e d  i t s  c o n c lu s io n s .
Cease and D e s is t  O rd e rs  (p a g e s  6 1 -6 2 )
I  am c o n c e rn e d  t h a t  ma y p r a c t i t i o n e r s  w i l l  n o t  s h a re  th e  
C o m m is s io n 's  v ie w  t h a t  th e  SEC w o u ld  n o t  abu se  an a u t h o r i t y  
t o  is s u e  su ch  o r d e r s .  I  b e l ie v e  th e  C o m m is s io n  s h o u ld  
d e v e lo p  b e t t e r  r a t i o n a le  f o r  i t s  re c o m m e n d a tio n  i f  i t  hopes  
t o  g a r n e r  b ro a d  - s u p p o r t  in  th e  p r o f e s s io n .
B a rs  o r  S u s p e n s io n s  From  S e rv in g  . . .  (p a g e s  6 2 -6 3 )
When I  re a d  th e  s e n te n c e  "T h e y  may a v o id  th e  d i f f i c u l t  and 
u n c e r t a in  t a s k  o f  l e g a l l y  p r o v in g  t h a t  th o s e  who v i o l a t e  
c o u r t  o r d e r s  o f  i n j u n c t i o n  d id  so i n t e n t i o n a l l y . "  a c h i l l  
ra n  down my s p in e .  I f  I  re a d  th o s e  w o rd s  c o r r e c t l y  th e  
C o m m iss io n  i s  a d v o c a t in g  s id e s te p p in g  due p ro c e s s  as a 
means t o  e x p e d ite  p u n is h m e n t o f  p resum ed  r e p e a t  o f f e n d e r s .
I t  w o u ld  be an u n d e rs ta te m e n t  o f  some p r o p o r t io n s  t o  sa y  
t h a t  I  was ta k e n  b a c k .  The p o t e n t i a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  s u ch  
a c o u rs e  f r i g h t e n  me. I  u rg e  th e  C o m m iss io n  t o  r e c o n s id e r  
th e  p o in t  and d e le t e  i t  f ro m  th e  R e p o r t .
E n fo rc e m e n t (p a g e  6 8 )
I  f i r m l y  b e l ie v e  t h a t  SECPS s h o u ld  h a ve  th e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  
e x p e l a member f ro m  th e  D iv i s i o n  i f  t h a t  member f a i l s  t o  
c o r r e c t  d e f i c i e n c i e s  in  h i s  p r a c t i c e .  I f  m e m b e rs h ip  i s  made 
m a n d a to ry  by  th e  SEC, so much th e  b e t t e r .  The a v a i l a b i l i t y  
o f  s u c h  a s t r o n g  s a n c t io n  w i t h  i t s  a t t e n d a n t  im p a c t on th e  
a b i l i t y  o f  a f i r m  t o  p r a c t i c e  b e fo r e  th e  SEC c o u ld  o n ly  be 
an added  a r ro w  in  th e  p r o f e s s io n 's  q u i v e r ,  one t h a t  has 
lo n g  been  n e e d e d . I  d o u b t th e  SECPS w o u ld  use  t h a t  sw o rd  
f r e q u e n t l y ,  b u t  so much th e  b e t t e r .
SEC R e s o u rc e s  (p a g e  6 9 )
A g a in  I  a g re e  w i t h  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  v ie w ,  t h a t  SEC s h o u ld  
h a ve  e xpa nded  b u d g e ta r y  r e s o u r c e s .  H o w e v e r, I  c a n ' t  h e lp  
b u t  w o n d e r i f  th e  s u g g e s t io n  i s  r e a l i s t i c  a t  t h i s  p o in t  in  
h i s t o r y .  I  b e l ie v e  th e  C o m m iss io n  s h o u ld  e xpa nd  i t s  re a s o n ­
in g  h e re  t o  b u i l d  a s o l i d  c a s e , t y i n g  t o g e t h e r  a l l  t h a t  
has  been  s a id  e a r l i e r  in  th e  r e p o r t .
C o n s id e r in g  th e  I m p l i c a t io n s  o f  L i a b i l i t y  . . .  (p a g e  72 )
I  was d is t r e s s e d  t o  n o te  t h a t  th e  C o m m iss io n  does n o t  ch o o se  
t o  ta k e  a p o s i t i o n  on th e  p r o f e s s io n 's  p r o p o s a ls  f o r  r e fo rm  
o f  th e  t o r t  s y s te m  s in c e ,  q u i t e  c l e a r l y ,  l i a b i l i t y  i s  a 
s e r io u s  p r o b le m . l t  seems c le a r  t o  me t h a t  e n d o rs e m e n t o f  
t o r t  r e fo r m  b y  s u c h  a d i s t i n g u is h e d  g ro u p  as c o m p r is e  t h i s  
C o m m iss io n  w o u ld  s u r e ly  a s s i s t  in  m o v in g  a w o r th w h i le  and
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needed  r e f o r m  f o r w a r d .
*  *  *  *  *
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I  hope  my comments a r e  u s e f u l  t o  t h e  C o m m is s io n .  I  you  have  
a d e s i r e  t o  d i s c u s s  them  more f u l l y ,  I  s h a l l  be p l e a s e d  t o  
p l a c e  m y s e l f  a t  y o u r  d i s p o s a l .
A g a i n ,  my c o m p l i m e n t s  t o  t h e  C o m m is s io n  and i t s  s t a f f  f o r  
a v e r y  w e l l  done r e p o r t .
Y o u r s  s i n c e r e l y ,
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G ordon E. P ilcher  
1943 A malfi Way 
Mountain View, Ca. 9 4 0 4 0  
(415) 9 6 9 -7 5 2 5
J u n e  2 6 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on  F r a u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , N.W .
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . 20006
G e n t le m e n :
F o l lo w in g  a re  com m ents made r e g a r d in g  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  A p r i l  
1987 E x p o s u re  D r a f t .
I n  th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  th e  p u b l i c  com pany (C h a p te r  2) th e  
s tu d y  r e f e r s  t o  th e  r o l e  o f  t h e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r ,  
in c lu d in g  h i s  t a k in g  " a c t io n s  n e c e s s a ry  t o  p r e v e n t  th e  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g . "  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  th e  r e p o r t  d o e s  n o t  
in c lu d e  a n y  s p e c i f i c  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  t o  a c c o m p lis h  t h i s ,  o t h e r  
th a n  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  as a m em ber o f  t o p  m a nag em e n t, t h i s  o f f i c e r  
c a n  h e lp  s e t  t h e  to n e  o f  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n 's  e t h i c a l  c o n d u c t .
I t  seems t o  me t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  m o re  c a n  and  s h o u ld  be  don e  
t o  s t r e n g th e n  th e  r o l e  o f  t h e  CFO b o th  as  a b u lw a r k  o f  e t h i c a l  
c o n d u c t  and  as  th e  f i r s t  l i n e  o f  d e fe n s e  w i t h i n  t h e  com pany 
a g a in s t  f r a u d u le n t  r e p o r t i n g .
P o s s ib le  a c t io n s  t o  e n h a n c e  t h e  in d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h i s  c o r p o r a t e  
o f f i c e r  w o u ld  in c lu d e :  (1 ) e s t a b l i s h i n g  a d i r e c t  r e p o r t i n g
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  th e  B o a rd  o f  D i r e c t o r s ,  (2 ) r e v i s i n g  in c e n t i v e  
c o m p e n s a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to w a rd  lo n g e r - t e r m  g o a ls  as w e l l  as  a 
lo w e r  p r o p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  c o m p e n s a t io n ,  (3 ) g r e a t e r  u s e  o f  
e m p lo y m e n t c o n t r a c t s ,  a nd  (4 ) e x p a n d in g  p u b l i c  r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e ­
m e n ts  t o  in c lu d e  e x p la n a t io n s  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  s u c h  f i n a n c i a l  o f f i c e r  
p o s i t i o n s .
As a c o r p o r a t e  o f f i c e r  a nd  p r o f e s s io n a l ,  I  h a v e  b e e n  c o n c e rn e d  
f o r  some t im e  w i t h  th e  is s u e  o f  a c c u ra c y  i n  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
(s e e  c o p y  o f  F in a n c ia l  E x e c u t iv e  May 1983 a r t i c l e  e n c lo s e d ) .
I  commend th e s e  f u r t h e r  s u g g e s t io n s  f o r  y o u r  r e v ie w  and  
c o n s id e r a t io n .
G o rd o n  E . P i l c h e r
GEP: j  
E n c .
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C A L I F O R N I A  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y
HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 
Department of Accounting 
Telephone 415 881-3336
June 3 0 , 1987
N a t io n a l  Com m ission on F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue, N.W.
W a sh in g to n , D .C . 20006
G en tlem en :
I  am g r e a t l y  im p re sse d  by and g e n e r a l ly  ap p ro ve  o f  y o u r  A p r i l  1987 
E xposu re  D r a f t  f in d in g s ,  c o n c lu s io n s  and re co m m e n d a tio n s . The e x te n t  
o f  y o u r  s tu d y  and d e l ib e r a t io n s ,  in c lu d in g  th e  e x te n s iv e  re s e a rc h ,  
i s  to  be commended. The p ro b le m s  w i l l  b e g in  w i t h  th e  im p le m e n ta t io n s  
o f  y o u r  re co m m e n d a tio n s— th e  u l t im a te  t e s t  o f  th e  f i n a n c ia l  w o r ld ’ s 
com m itm ent to  s a t i s f y in g  th e  p u b l ic  nee d .
A decade ago u n d e r s im i la r  c o n d i t io n s  th e  Cohen C om m iss ion ’ s 1978 
r e p o r t  had s im i la r  recom m enda tio ns— n o t  a l l  o f  w h ich  w ere im p le m e n te d . 
As w i th  th e  Cohen Com m ission recom m enda tions  each s te p  i s  i n  th e  
p o s i t i v e  d i r e c t io n .  B u t w i l l  th e s e  recom m enda tions  be s u f f i c i e n t ?  
Words a lo n e  w i l l  n o t  s u f f i c e .  The r e s is te n c e  to  change and th e  
m a in te n a n ce  o f  th e  s ta tu s  quo a re  s t r o n g .  Y our recom m enda tions  
a re  w hat th e  p u b l ic  r e q u ir e s .  Now i t  i s  up to  th o s e  in v o lv e d  in  
f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  ( c o r p o r a te  m anagem ents, a u d i to r s  and e d u c a to rs )  to  
p u t t h e i r  m inds and s p i r i t  to  th e  r e a l  ta s k  w i th  a r e a l  com m itm ent 
to  c a r r y  o u t th e  recom m enda tions  w i th  a c t io n s .  As you  so r i g h t l y  
n o te d  th e  to n e  ( s p i r i t )  m ust be s e t  a t  th e  to p  and fo l lo w e d  th ro u g h  
a l l  th e  w ay. I  hope t h a t  th e  f i n a n c ia l  w o r ld  w i l l  heed y o u r  
s u g g e s t io n s  and b r in g  l i f e  to  them .
S in c e r e ly
D r . C a ro l In b e rg
General Offices/3M
3M Center
St. Paul, Minnesota 55144-1000 
612/733 1110
1 6 3
June 3 0 , 1987
N a t io n a l Com m ission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l 
R e p o r t in g
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue, N.W.
W a sh in g to n , DC 20006
Dear S i r s :
T h is  l e t t e r  i s  in  re s p o n s e  t o  th e  A p r i l ,  1987 E x p o s u re  D r a f t  
r e p o r t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l Com m ission on F ra u d u le n t R e p o r t in g  and th e  
re q u e s t  f o r  comments c o n ta in e d  t h e r e in .  In  g e n e ra l,  we s u p p o r t 
th e  c o n c lu s io n s  o f  th e  Com m ission and b e l ie v e  t h e i r  im p le m e n ta tio n  
w ou ld  re p re s e n t an enhancem ent o f  th e  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  p ro c e s s . 
We d o , how eve r, have comments on some o f  th e  s p e c i f i c  
recom m enda tions as n o te d  on th e  a tta c h e d  re s p o n s e .
O ur comments r e la t e  t o  th e  s p e c i f i c  recom m enda tions  as re le a s e d ;  
h o w e v e r, o u r  o p in io n  may change d e p e n d in g  upon th e  u l t im a te  fo rm  
t h e y  ta k e .  The key to  t h i s  i s  w h ich  agency is  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  
im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  re co m m e n d a tio n s .
We a p p r e c ia t e  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  o f f e r  o u r  com m ents t o  
C om m ission and c e r t a in l y  a p p re c ia te  th e  t im e  and e f f o r t s  o f  
co m m iss io n e rs  in  d e v e lo p in g  th e s e  re co m m e n d a tio n s .
th e
th e
V e ry  t r u l y  y o u r s ,
L . J . S c h o e n w e tte r   
LJS/m rw
RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
Tone at the Top
We agree wholeheartedly with the recommendations in this area. As 
stated in our January 12 response, the integrity in a system 
designed not only to prevent fraudulent financial reporting, but 
support fair and objective financial reporting in all respects, 
flows from the top down. Our only concern in this area is that 
management be allowed the flexibility to develop its own code of 
conduct. If such a code of conduct were mandated upon a company 
from the outside, there is a risk of it becoming a boilerplate 
document to which only lip service is paid.
Accounting Function and Chief Accounting Officer
We agree with the recommendation in this area.
Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor
We agree with the recommendations in this area.
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee
In general, we agree with the recommendations in this area. Our 
only concern is that the recommendation removing management's 
authority to act concerning the use of accountants' management 
advisory services may be interpreted as overly restricted. We 
believe adequate control of this independence risk could be 
maintained with the use of pre-determined limits under which 
management would have the authority to act without audit committee 
approval. While the audit committee must maintain an oversight 
role, it should not take the place of the management committee.
Reporting on Responsibilities in the Annual Report
We agree with the recommendation regarding a management report but 
believe the value of a letter signed by the audit committee chair 
is over-rated.
Seeking a Second Opinion
In order for these recommendations to become operational, there 
needs to be some refining of what constitutes the seeking of a 
second opinion.
Quarterly Reporting
Pre-release approval of quarterly results has some conceptual 
appeal but could present some logistical problems in practice. 
The audit committee would be asked to deal with potentially 
complex issues in a relatively short period of time. Because of 
this, we believe such approvals may only add to the already 
existent public "expectation gap."
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
Recognizing Responsibility for Fraudulent Financial Reporting
We agree with the recommendations in this area and believe the 
Auditing Standards Board is already addressing the main issues in 
this area.
Improving Detection Capabilities 
Same as above.
Improving Audit Quality
We agree with the recommendations in this area but wonder if the 
recommendation covering second partner review would be unduly 
discriminary against the non-national practitioner.
Communicating the Auditor's Role
We agree with the recommendations in this area. The Auditing 
Standards Board is already addressing the main issues.
Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board
We agree with the recommendations in this area.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEC AND OTHERS
We agree with the recommendations in this area. In general, we 
believe the primary focus should be the prevention of fraudulent 
financial reporting. While it's hard to argue with added 
enforcement and criminal prosecution, these are not the key areas 
for enhancement of financial reporting. They are
detection-oriented and should be recognized as having limited 
value.
Another comment in this area relates to the recommendation for 
enforcement action by the State Boards of Accountancy. We are 
concerned about the inconsistencies that would result from fifty 
different sets of rules.
RECOMMENDATION FOR EDUCATION
We are not in a position to respond to these recommendations, and 
wonder whether the institutions involved are in any position to 
react to them.
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Avon Products, Inc. Nine West Fifty Seventh Street, New York. N.Y. 100 19
Office of the
Group Vice President France 
Chief Financial Officer 
Ju n e  30 , 1987
The C o m m is s io n e rs  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  
C o m m is s io n  on F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  
R e p o r t in g
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G e n tle m e n :
We a re  in  r e c e ip t  o f  th e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  o f  y o u r  R e p o r t  on 
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .  As members o f  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i n a n c i a l  c o m m u n ity  we r e c o g n iz e  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  is s u e s  
p o s e d  by f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  and we a p p la u d  th e  
C o m m is s io n s ’ s e f f o r t s  t o  i d e n t i f y  m e a su re s  w h ic h  w o u ld  im p ro v e  
th e  q u a l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  As a p u b l i c  com pany, we 
w o u ld  l i k e  t o  ta k e  t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  com ment u po n  some o f  y o u r  
p ro p o s e d  re c o m m e n d a t io n s .
F o r  th e  m o s t p a r t ,  we a g re e  w i t h  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  
re c o m m e n d a tio n s  s e t  f o r t h  by  th e  C o m m is s io n . I n  o u r  v ie w ,  m ost 
w e ll-m a n a g e d  c o m p a n ie s  a l r e a d y  c o m p ly  w i t h  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  th e s e  
re c o m m e n d a tio n s  and  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  be e n c o u ra g e d  t o  
f o l l o w  th e s e  p r a c t i c e s .  We a re  c o n c e rn e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  you  
recom m end a d o p t io n  o f  c e r t a i n  p r a c t i c e s  as SEC r e g u la t i o n .  We 
can  e n v is io n  c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e re ,  f o r  e x a m p le , th e s e  
r e q u ir e m e n ts  m ig h t  be o n e ro u s  f o r  s m a l l  c o m p a n ie s . I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
i t  has been  o u r  e x p e r ie n c e  t h a t  r e g u la t i o n  f r e q u e n t l y  le a d s  t o  a 
ty p e  o f  s t a n d a r d iz a t io n  t h a t  can  a c t u a l l y  d im in is h  th e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  c e r t a in  p r a c t i c e s .  M a n a g e m e n t's  d is c u s s io n  and 
a n a ly s is  o f  o p e r a t io n s ,  f o r  e x a m p le , i s  s o m e tim e s  le s s  m e a n in g fu l 
th a n  o t h e r  in f o r m a t io n  p u b l is h e d  by a com pany b e c a u s e  i t s  
s t r u c t u r e  and  fo rm  a re  l a r g e l y  d i c t a t e d  by r e g u la t io n  and 
r e s t r i c t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
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A
W ith  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  p ro p o s e d  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  s e t  f o r t h  
b e lo w ,  we d is a g r e e  w i t h  th e  C o m m is s io n s  p o s i t i o n  f o r  t h e  re a s o n s  
i n d i c a t e d .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : The a u d i t  c o m m itte e  s h o u ld  a p p ro v e  in  
a d va n ce  th e  ty p e s  and th e  e x t e n t  o f  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  
s e r v ic e s  t h a t  m anagem ent p la n s  t o  engage  th e  c o m p a n y 's  
in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t  t o  p e r fo r m .
The SEC and o t h e r  g ro u p s  h a ve  s t u d ie d  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  
m anagem ent a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s  p r o v id e d  by in d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n ta n ts  
a t  le n g th  and h a ve  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a la c k  o f  e v id e n c e  
t h a t  s u c h  s e r v ic e s  c o m p ro m is e  in d e p e n d e n c e . We b e l ie v e  t h a t  a 
C o m p a n y 's  m anagem ent i s  b e s t  e q u ip p e d  t o  c h o o s e  th e  s o u rc e  f o r  
m anagem ent a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s  and t h a t  r e q u i r i n g  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l by 
th e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  c o u ld  le a d  t o  an u n n e c e s s a ry  d e la y  in  s u ch  
s e r v i c e s .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  be r e q u i r e d  by
SEC r u le  t o  in c lu d e  in  t h e i r  a n n u a l r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o ld e r s  
a l e t t e r  s ig n e d  by th e  c h a irm a n  o f  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  
d e s c r ib in g  th e  c o m m it te e 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and a c t i v i t i e s  
d u r in g  th e  y e a r .
We b e l ie v e  t h a t  e x i s t i n g  p r o x y  d is c lo s u r e s  a b o u t th e  
f u n c t io n s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  A u d i t  C o m m itte e s  a re  a d e q u a te .  
The r o le  o f  th e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  i s  one o f  th e  r e v ie w  and 
a p p r o v a l ,  and in c lu s i o n  o f  a l e t t e r  f ro m  th e  c h a irm a n  o f  th e  
a u d i t  c o m m itte e  in  th e  a n n u a l r e p o r t  t o  s t o c k h o ld e r s  m ig h t  a p p e a r 
t o  e x te n d  th e  C o m m it te e 's  r o le  t o  one o f  d i r e c t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  p r e p a r a t io n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : M anagem ent s h o u ld  a d v is e  th e  a u d i t
c o m m itte e  when i t  s e e k s  a s e c o n d  o p in io n  on a s i g n f i c a n t  
a c c o u n t in g  is s u e .
G iv e n  th e  c o m p le x i t y  o f  some o f  t o d a y 's  a c c o u n t in g  is s u e s ,  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  g o e s  on in  v i r t u a l l y  e v e ry  segm en t o f  th e  a c c o u n t in g  
p r o f e s s io n .  We f a i l  t o  see  th e  need  t o  a d v is e  th e  a u d i t  
c o m m itte e  o f  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t s  i n t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t in g  is s u e s .  
F u r t h e r ,  we w o u ld  p o in t  o u t  t h a t  s e e k in g  a s e c o n d  o p in io n  i s  m ore 
i n d i c a t i v e  o f  so u n d  b u s in e s s  p r a c t i c e  th a n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
p r o b le m s .  F i n a l l y ,  we b e l ie v e  t h a t  SEC r e q u ir e m e n ts  r e g a r d in g  
d i s c lo s u r e  o f  d is a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  in d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n ta n ts  s e rv e s  
th e  p u rp o s e  c o n te m p la te d  by t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n .
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R ecom m endation: When a p u b l ic  company changes in d ep e n d en t
p u b l ic  a c c o u n ta n ts ,  i t  sh o u ld  be r e q u i r e d  by SEC r u le  to  
d i s c lo s e  p u b l ic ly  th e  n a tu re  o f any m a te r i a l  a c c o u n tin g  o r  
a u d i t in g  i s s u e s  d is c u s s e d  w ith  i t s  o ld  and new a u d i to r s  
d u r in g  th e  t h r e e - y e a r  p e r io d  p re c e d in g  th e  c h an g e .
We b e l ie v e  t h a t  a d o p tio n  o f t h i s  recom m endation  would 
i n e v i t a b ly  le a d  to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  any change in  in d ep e n d en t 
p u b l ic  a c c o u n ta n ts  was r e l a t e d  to  a d is p u te  o v e r a c c o u n tin g  o r  
a u d i t in g  i s s u e s .  As m en tioned  above , we b e l ie v e  t h a t  c u r r e n t  SEC 
re q u ire m e n ts  r e g a rd in g  d i s c lo s u r e  o f d is a g re e m e n ts  w ith  p u b l ic  
a c c o u n ta n ts  s e r v e s  th e  p u rp o se  c o n te m p la te d  by t h i s  
recom m endation .
R ecom m endation: A u d it co m m ittees  sh o u ld  in c r e a s e  t h e i r
o v e r s ig h t  o f th e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t in g  p r o c e s s .  T h is  
o v e r s ig h t  sh o u ld  in c lu d e  a p p ro v in g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  
to  p u b l ic  r e l e a s e .
Once a g a in ,  we d is a g r e e  w i t h  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n  b e ca u se  o f  
o u r  v ie w  o f  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e 's  r o l e .  We b e l ie v e  th e  c o m m itte e  
f u n c t io n s  m o s t e f f e c t i v e l y  by d e te r m in in g  t h a t  a p p r o p r ia t e  
r e s o u r c e s ,  s u c h  as i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  and  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s ,  
a re  b r o u g h t  t o  b e a r  t o  in s u r e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  p r o p e r  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .  A p p r o v a l o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  in f o r m a t io n  s h i f t s  
p r im a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  ( o r  may a p p e a r  t o  s h i f t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y )  
away f ro m  m anagem en t.
We a p p r e c ia te  t h i s  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  resp o n d  to  y o u r d r a f t  
r e p o r t  and we a re  a t  y o u r d i s p o s i t i o n  to  d is c u s s  any o f ou r 
p o s i t i o n s .
S in c e r e ly
 J u le s  Zimmerman
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CONSOLIDATED - BATHURST INC.
8 0 0  Dorchester Boulevard West. Montreal. Quebec H 3B 1Y 9 □  telephone: [514] 875-2160
Mail Address: P.O. Box 69, Montreal H3C2R5
July 6, 1987
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
U.S.A.
Subject: Exposure Draft - April 1987
Dear Sirs:
We take pleasure in submitting the following suggestions and opinions 
in response to the proposals contained in the April 1987 Exposure 
Draft of the Commission.
Consolidated-Bathurst Inc. is a large public Canadian forest products 
and packaging company with 1986 sales of Cdn. $2.0 billion. The Com­
pany has its principal manufacturing facilities in Canada, the United 
Kingdom and West Germany and had 1986 export sales from Canada of 
Cdn. $625 million of which 77% were to the United States.
Our observations are as follows:
1. Composition of audit committee solely of outside directors
We believe that a majority of the members of the audit committee 
should be independent (NYSE definition). The requirement that 
all members should be independent is, in our opinion, too severe 
in that it could be ineffective in a multi-subsidiary organiza­
tion. For instance, Consolidated-Bathurst Inc. (C-BI) has an 
80%-owned public subsidiary, CB Pak Inc. The Chairman of the 
C-BI Audit Committee is also a member of the CB Pak Audit Commit­
tee because of his role as a liaison officer on behalf of the 
C-BI Audit Committee. He plays an important role in overseeing 
the activities of the subsidiary's Audit Committee and in ensur­
ing that the standards of financial reporting and control of the 
parent are adhered to in the subsidiary. According to the NYSE
.. ./2
2d e f in i t io n ,  th is  o u ts id e  d ire c to r  o f C-BI cou ld  no t serve on the 
A u d it Committee o f CB Pak because he is  an a f f i l i a t e  o f th a t sub­
s id ia r y .  We b e lie v e  th a t h is  e x c lu s io n  from  the s u b s id ia ry 's  
A u d it Committee would weaken the c o n tro l and rev iew  process o f 
the whole o rg a n iz a tio n .
2. Approval in  advance by the a u d it  committee o f the management ad­
v is o ry  s e rv ice s  p rov ided  by the p u b lic  accountant
We b e lie v e  th a t th is  is  im p ra c t ic a l.  In  our o p in io n , the Commis­
s io n 's  recommendation th a t the a u d it  committee should oversee 
management judgements r e la t in g  to  the independence o f the p u b lic  
accountant cou ld  be implemented through an annual rev iew  by the 
a u d it  committee o f the t o ta l  fees pa id  to  the independent p u b lic  
accoun tan t.
3. In c lu s io n  o f management re p o r t signed by the c h ie f  execu tive  o f ­
f ic e r  and c h ie f  accoun ting  o f f ic e r
We are o f the o p in io n  th a t the management re p o r t should be signed 
by the c h ie f  f in a n c ia l  o f f ic e r  to  whom the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the 
maintenance o f adequate in te r n a l c o n tro ls  and the in t e g r i t y  o f 
f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  has been de legated by the c h ie f  execu tive  o f­
f ic e r .
4 . In c lu s io n  o f a l e t t e r  s igned by the chairman o f the a u d it  commit­
tee d e s c r ib in g  the com m ittee 's  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and a c t iv i t i e s  
d u rin g  the year
We b e lie v e  th a t the com pos ition  and ro le  o f the a u d it  committee 
should be b r ie f ly  described  in  the management re p o r t and th a t 
th is  d is c lo s u re  would rep resen t an e f fe c t iv e  communication to  the 
in v e s tin g  p u b lic .
5. Management should adv ise  the a u d it  committee when i t  seeks a sec­
ond o p in io n  on a s ig n i f ic a n t  accoun ting  issue
We b e lie v e  th a t i t  is  the ro le  o f the c h ie f  accoun ting  o f f i c e r  to  
keep abreast o f the e v o lu t io n  o f accoun ting  methods and p ra c tic e s  
and th a t t h is  is  accomplished by g e t t in g  in p u t from v a rio u s  ac­
coun ting  sources in c lu d in g  the f i r m 's  independent p u b lic  accoun­
ta n t .  I t  is  no t p r a c t ic a l to  d iscuss w ith  the a u d it  committee 
each accoun ting  issue  where a so c a lle d  "second o p in io n " has been 
o b ta ined .
... /3
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In  the same ve in  and fo r  the reason noted above, we do not concur 
w ith  the recommendation th a t the re  be a d is c lo s u re , when a change 
o f independent p u b lic  accountants has taken p lace , o f the s ig n i f ­
ic a n t accoun ting  issues d iscussed w ith  the o ld  and new indepen­
dent p u b lic  accountants d u rin g  a th re e -y e a r (o r  tw o-year as 
appears to  be an upcoming SEC re g u la t io n )  p e r io d  preced ing the 
change.
6. Approval by a u d it  committee and rev iew  by independent p u b lic  ac­
coun tan ts  o f q u a r te r ly  re s u lts  p r io r  to  p u b lic  re lea se
We take o b je c t io n  to  the Commission's statem ent th a t q u a r te r ly  
re p o r t in g  is  su b je c t to  fewer c o n tro ls  than annual re p o r t in g .  
C o n so lid a te d -B a th u rs t fo llo w s  the same ru le s  and p ra c tic e s  a t 
q u a rte r-e n d  as a t year-end in  the p re p a ra tio n  o f i t s  f in a n c ia l  
s ta tem en ts. S tu b -p e rio d  f in a n c ia l  s tatem ents may be used a t any 
tim e fo r  f in a n c in g  purposes which would re q u ire  management re p re ­
s e n ta tio n s  on the  in t e g r i t y  o f these f in a n c ia l  s ta tem ents.
The Commission's recommendations would p lace an undue burden on 
the p re p a ra tio n  and d isse m in a tio n  in  a t im e ly  fa sh io n  o f f in a n ­
c ia l  in fo rm a tio n  a t q u a rte r-e n d  and would impose a s h o rt-te rm  
p e rsp e c tive  on the a u d it  com mittee.
7. E stab lishm en t o f ano ther body to  guide p u b lic  companies on in t e r ­
n a l c o n tro ls .
We are o f the o p in io n  th a t th e re  are a lrea dy  enough re g u la to ry  
bodies in  the c o n t ro l,  accoun ting  and a u d it in g  f ie ld s .  F u rth e r­
more, u n lik e  standards o f f in a n c ia l  accoun ting  and re p o r t in g ,  we 
do not b e lie v e  th a t m eaningfu l standards o f in te r n a l c o n tro ls  can 
be developed because o f the s iz e , d iv e r s i t y  and s tru c tu re  o f o r­
g a n iz a tio n s .
Should you need c la r i f i c a t io n  on the suggestions made in  th is  re p o r t ,
p lease do no t h e s ita te  to  co n ta c t us.
R e s p e c tfu lly  subm itted ,
Jean-Jacques C a rr ie r
V ice -P re s id e n t and C orporate C o n tro l le r
JJC/ml
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Chevron Corporation25 Bush Stret, San Francisco, California 94104-4289
Selers Stough Vice-President, Finance San Francisco, CA July 2, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Sirs:
We have reviewed the Exposure Draft of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, and appreciate the opportunity to comment on this important document.
We support the objectives of the Commission’s recommendations pertaining to public companies. In particular, we feel that the Commission’s emphasis on the role and function of top management is the key ingredient in reducing fraudulent financial reporting. At Chevron, we have long maintained a strong senior management commitment to ethical, accurate financial reporting. To ensure that senior management's attitude is communicated to all areas and operations of the company, we maintain and enforce written guidelines in the form of policy manuals and codes of conduct, and maintain a sound system of internal controls. Without this sincere senior management commitment to the importance of ethics and public trust, no company can be certain of the integrity of its financial statements.
We concur with the Commission's recommendations regarding education and endorse many of the Commission's findings and recommendations pertaining to independent accountants and the SEC. However, we do feel that an increased emphasis on the existing criminal penalties for fraudulent financial reporting, coupled with the implementation of the Commission's recommendations to public companies, independent accountants and education, should precede the enactment of additional laws and regulations. Only after these other courses of action have proved ineffective should additional laws and regulations be considered.
While we are supportive of the Commission's objectives, we are concerned about the rigidity of certain of the Commission's recommendations which do not address the uniqueness of individual companies. Accordingly, we offer the following comments on certain specific recommendations contained in the Exposure Draft.
1. Overall, we endorse the inclusion in the annual report of a report from management and a letter from the audit committee that outlines each group's duties and responsibilities regarding the company's internal controls and financial statements. However, we do not feel that affixing signatures to either the management report or the audit committee letter would reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. The signatures of the chief financial officer and a majority of the board of directors are already required in the Form 10-K filed with the SEC. As the Form 10-K is the official document of public record, we feel that requiring additional signatures within the annual report adds little to the prevention of fraudulent financial reporting not already contained in the signature requirement for the Form 10-K.
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2 .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  d a t a  b e  r e v i e w e d  b y  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .  F o r  m a n y  l a r g e r  c o m p a n i e s ,  s u c h  
a s  C h e v r o n ,  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t ' s  r e v i e w  i n  a d v a n c e  o f  a  
t i m e l y  e a r n i n g s  p r e s s  r e l e a s e  i s  s i m p l y  i m p r a c t i c a l .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  c o u l d  s u p p o r t  a  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  o f f i c i a l  f i l i n g s  w i t h  t h e  S E C  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  s u c h  a d v a n c e  
r e v i e w s .  T h i s  i s  a  p r a c t i c e  t h a t  C h e v r o n  h a s  f o l l o w e d  f o r  a  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s .
3 .  T a k e n  a s  a  w h o l e ,  w e  e n d o r s e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  p o s i t i o n  r e l a t i n g  t o  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  h a v e  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n s  
w i t h  t h e  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i n  t h i s  a r e a  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s .  T h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  e a c h  s u c h  d o c u m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  
s u b j e c t  t o  a d v a n c e  r e v i e w  a n d  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  W h i l e  w e  c o n c u r  i n  
p r i n c i p l e ,  i n  l a r g e  c o m p a n i e s  d e t a i l e d  q u a r t e r l y  r e v i e w s  a r e  n o t  p o s s i b l e  p r i o r  t o  a  
t i m e l y  p r e s s  r e l e a s e  a n d  m a y  n o t  a l w a y s  b e  f e a s i b l e  i n  a d v a n c e  o f  S E C  f i l i n g s .  T o  
e n s u r e  p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  m u s t  h a v e  
t h e  l a t i t u d e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  s p e c i f i c  p r o c e s s  t o  b e  f o l l o w e d  i n  t h e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  
t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n  l a r g e  c o m p a n y  e n v i r o n m e n t s ,  i t  i s  
m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e v i e w s  o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  
e m p h a s i z e  m a t e r i a l  c h a n g e s  i n  a c c o u n t i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  u n u s u a l  i t e m s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  w h e n  a c c o u n t i n g  j u d g m e n t  w a s  e x e r c i s e d .  W h i l e  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  
a p p e a r s  t o  s u p p o r t  a  f l e x i b l e  a p p r o a c h ,  w e  s t r o n g l y  u r g e  t h a t  i t  b e  a f f i r m a t i v e l y  
s t a t e d  i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  f i n a l  r e p o r t .
4 .  W e  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o n  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  
a  s t r o n g ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  r e p o r t s  t o  a  s e n i o r  o f f i c e r  n o t  
d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  p r e p a r i n g  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  W e  a l s o  
a c k n o w l e d g e  t h a t ,  f o r  m a n y  c o m p a n i e s ,  t h i s  s e n i o r  o f f i c e r  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  c h i e f  
e x e c u t i v e .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  o u r  f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o f  a  c o m p a n y  s h o u l d  b e  l e f t  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o m p a n i e s  t o  d e c i d e ,  
s u b j e c t  t o  r e v i e w  a n d  a p p r o v a l  b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  A s  a l l  c o m p a n i e s  a r e  
u n i q u e ,  t h e y  a r e  i n  a  m u c h  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  t o  j u d g e  w h a t  r e p o r t i n g  m e c h a n i s m  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t s  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  
o b j e c t i v i t y .  I t  i s  o u r  f e e l i n g  t h a t ,  s o  l o n g  a s  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  h a s  
u n r e s t r i c t e d  a c c e s s  t o  b o t h  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  a n d  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  
w h i l e  n o t  r e p o r t i n g  t o  t h e  c o m p t r o l l e r ,  t h i s  o b j e c t i v i t y  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  c a n  b e  
m a i n t a i n e d .
5 .  W e  s u p p o r t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s .  B a s e d  o n  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  a r e  
i n  k e e p i n g  w i t h  t h e  p o l i c i e s  a n d  p r a c t i c e s  c u r r e n t l y  f o l l o w e d  b y  t h e  l a r g e  a c c o u n t i n g  
f i r m s .  T h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  a l l  f i r m s  w o u l d  b e  a  
c o n s t r u c t i v e  s t e p  t o w a r d  e l e v a t i n g  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n  a s  a  w h o l e .  
H o w e v e r ,  w e  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  c a l l i n g  f o r  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  t o  r e d e s i g n  t h e i r  a u d i t  s c o p e  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  
d e t e c t i n g  f r a u d  w i l l  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s e  a u d i t  f e e s  w i t h o u t  a n y  m a t e r i a l  r e d u c t i o n  
i n  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  a n y  f i n a l  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i n  t h i s  a r e a  s h o u l d  b e  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  a  f a s h i o n  t h a t  e n c o u r a g e s  
s u b s t a n t i v e  c o v e r a g e  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  " b o i l e r p l a t e "  a p p r o a c h e s .
I n  s u m m a r y ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  c o n s t r u c t i v e l y  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  i s s u e s  t h a t  
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  T a k e n  t o g e t h e r ,  w e  s u p p o r t  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  m o s t  o f  w h i c h  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  C h e v r o n ' s  c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e s .  
H o w e v e r ,  a s  c i t e d  a b o v e  w e  f e e l  t h a t  c e r t a i n  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a r e  e x c e s s i v e l y  
r i g i d  o r  r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  t o  e n s u r e  p r a c t i c a l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
W e  r e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b m i t  t h e s e  c o m m e n t s  a n d  h o p e  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  b e  u s e f u l  t o  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  i n  f o r m u l a t i n g  i t s  f i n a l  r e p o r t .
Very truly yours,
Sellers Stough
N a t io n a l C o u n c il o f  
S a v in g s  I n s t i t u t io n s
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June 30, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
W ashington, D. C. 20006
RE: Exposure D ra f t  on the  Report o f  the  N a tio n a l
Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting
Dear S irs :
The Committee on A ccounting  Standards and C orporate Finance o f  the  
N a tio n a l C ounc il o f  Savings In s t i t u t io n s  app re c ia te s  the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  
comment on the  N a tio n a l Commission's Exposure D ra f t  on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l 
R e po rting  and hopes the  fo llo w in g  comments, w hich p e r ta in  to  the  
recommendations fo r  the  p u b lic  company, w i l l  p rov id e  m ean ing fu l in p u t to  
the  Commission's d e l ib e ra t io n s .
General Comments: We commend the  Commission fo r  i t s  s tudy  o f  the  
many complex issues su rround ing  the  inc idence  o f  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  
re p o r t in g .  The Commission's f in d in g s  and conc lus ions  have, as a minimum, 
ra is e d  the  co rp o ra te  com munity's awareness o f  t h is  problem . The C ounc il 
supports  the  Commission's e f f o r t s  to  promote g re a te r u n ifo rm ity  in  the  
p ra c t ic e s  o f  p u b lic  companies in  m eeting t h e ir  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  r e l ia b le  
f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g .
The C ounc il concurs w ith  the  Commission's v iew  th a t  f ra u d u le n t 
f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g ,  however in fre q u e n t, is  a se rio u s  problem  w ith  
w idespread consequences. We agree, fo r  the  most p a r t ,  th a t  the  
Commission's recommendations fo r  the  p u b lic  company are  based la rg e ly  on 
p ra c t ic e s  many companies a lre a d y  fo llo w  which c o n firm  the  va lue  o f  c u r re n t 
business p ra c t ic e s .  However, the  C ounc il w ishes to  p o in t  o u t th a t  the  
known fra u d u le n t a c tio n s  o f  a sm a ll number o f  companies have p laced  a 
burden on the  m a jo r ity  to  e i th e r  dem onstrate th a t  t h e i r  c u r re n t p ra c t ic e s  
do in  fa c t  comply w ith  bo th  the  le t t e r  and s p i r i t  o f  the  Commission's 
recommendations, o r  to  implement the  recommended p ra c t ic e  proposed by the  
Commission. In  a d d it io n ,  the  C ouncil w ishes to  express i t s  concern over 
the  e x te n t noncompliance w ith  one o r more d e ta i ls  o f  the  p ra c t ic e s  
recommended by the  Report w i l l  be accepted by c o u rts  as a b a s is  fo r  
e s ta b lis h in g  l i a b i l i t y  fo r  neg ligence on the  p a r t  o f  o f f ic e r s  and d ire c to rs  
in  la w s u its  b rough t a g a in s t them c la im in g  v io la t io n  o f  t h e i r  f id u c ia r y  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  p reven t and d e te c t fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g .
1101 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-5070 /  (202) 857-3100
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The conclusions of the Commission are difficult to criticize on a 
general basis since they do, in theory, represent an ideal set of 
procedures to lessen the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. 
However, on a practical level, we believe that the Commission's 
recommendations raise a number of implementation problems.
Specific Comments: We believe that the scope of the draft is too
narrow for some of the Commission's recommendations in that it fails to 
provide sufficiently detailed guidance on a practical level for implementa­
tion or to include an adequate number of examples for clarification. In 
addition, the terminology used in some recommendations is unclear and 
should be clarified to avoid any misunderstanding of the Commission's 
intent.
Our specific comments are as follows:
The Tone at the Top
The Exposure Draft provides a comprehensive discussion of the 
factors that management should consider in evaluating its vulnerability to 
fraudulent reporting practices. We agree that individual management 
characteristics may contribute to the risk of fraudulent financial 
reporting; however, these characteristics are extremely difficult to 
define and would be best considered when assessing the overall strength of 
the company's control environment.
We concur with the Commission that top management's judgment should 
dictate the extent and nature of the risk assessment appropriate for the 
company. However, we recommend that the Commission include practical 
guidelines to illustrate how the company's risk assessment process should 
be documented. These guidelines could also facilitate the implementation 
of the Commission's recommendation that the audit committee review the 
company's risk assessment process on an annual basis.
We are concerned with the actions that are necessary to be taken by 
a company to demonstrate that their system of internal controls is adequate 
to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting, especially since 
there are no uniform authoritative internal control standards by which 
these systems can be measured. In addition, we recommend that the 
Commission clarify the word "adequate" in its final Report.
Regarding the Commission's recommendation that a company's audit 
committee conduct an annual review of its compliance with the code of 
corporate conduct, we suggest that employees, who are in positions in which 
they can affect financial reporting, be required to complete and sign 
annually a representation letter or questionnaire acknowledging both the 
existence of the code and their obligation to adhere to it.
We are not convinced that the implementation of a management report 
in the annual report to stockholders will improve communication with 
financial statement users about the nature of financial information and the 
processes and responsibilities that surround its preparation and presenta­
tion. The proposed management report would "acknowledge management's
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responsibilities for the financial statements and internal control, discuss 
how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide management's 
assessment of the effectiveness of [these controls].”
The Internal Audit Function
We agree that the appropriate size of the internal audit function 
and the composition of its staff depend on the scope of responsibilities 
assigned to the function. The role of the internal auditor in preventing 
and detecting fraudulent financial reporting should be a decision made by 
each company. Thus, we commend the Commission for not setting a standard 
scope of work for the internal audit function.
Internal audit coverage focuses primarily on the evaluation of 
controls at the division, subsidiary or other operating unit level and 
allocates much less effort to auditing the financial reporting process and 
its controls at the corporate level. We believe that the internal audit 
function needs greater support by the public accounting profession for the 
expansion of its scope of work.
The Commission should include specific examples in its Report to 
clarify how internal audit's nonfinancial audit findings can impact the 
detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
The Audit Committee
The use of the term "vigilant" in describing the duties of the 
audit committees composed of independent directors that would be required 
by the Report should be defined in detail.
We believe that the Commission's recommendation requiring advance 
approval of the audit committee prior to engaging the company's independent 
public accountants for management advisory services imposes an undue 
limitation on management's decision making authority. Rather, advance 
approval on an annual basis by the audit committee of the types of services 
that can be performed by the independent public accountant and the 
limitations on the amount of fees may be more appropriate.
Our comments pertaining to the implementation of a letter signed by 
the chairman of the audit committee in the annual report to stockholders 
are similar to those expressed on the Commission's recommendation on 
management reports.
The Commission should include examples in its Report to clarify 
what is considered a significant accounting issue when a second opinion has 
been sought by management. In addition, the Commission should explain how 
its recommendation on seeking a second opinion relates to SAS No. 50, 
Reports on the Application of Accounting Principles. Differences of 
opinion do arise in financial reporting, especially when complex or novel 
transactions are involved. We believe that consultation with another 
independent public accountant on accounting issues is appropriate, 
represents a good business practice, and should not, in all situations, be 
construed to be opinion shopping.
-4 -
 
The Commission recommends th a t the audit committee should approve, 
in  advance, the release of quarte rly  financ ia l re su lts  to  the public . We 
believe th a t reliance on the independent public accountant's tim ely 
involvement in  the quarte rly  review of the financ ia l statements may be 
adequate to  ensure th a t quarterly  reports contain re lia b le  financ ia l 
information.
Standards for In ternal Control
We concur th a t there i s  an urgent need for estab lish ing  common 
standards fo r in te rn a l control due to  the d iv e rs ity  in  in te rn a l control 
p rac tices  among public companies and in  the d e fin itio n s  and terminology 
used to  discuss in te rn a l con tro ls. Such standards w ill provide sp ec ific  
guidance usefu l in  determining what co n stitu tes  an adequate system of 
in te rn a l con tro ls. We encourage the Commission's sponsoring organizations 
to  quickly e s tab lish  a body to  in teg ra te  the various in te rn a l control 
concepts and to  develop a common reference point to  guide public companies.
We encourage the Commission to  consider the p rac tic a l d i f f ic u l t ie s  
th a t public companies w ill face in  implementing the proposed recommenda­
tio n s when adopting an e ffec tiv e  date for i t s  f in a l Report.
Thank you for the opportunity to  present our views. We w ill be 
pleased to  discuss any of the above issues or respond to  questions you may 
have with respect to  our comments.
Sincerely
D avid L. Rice 
Chairman
Committee on Accounting
Standards and Corporate 
Finance
National Council of Savings 
In s titu tio n s
Cornell University 
Malott Hall
Ithaca NY 14853-4201
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J o h n s o n  G r a d u a t e  S c h o o l  
o f  M a n a g e m e n t
J u ly  6 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C om m ission  on F ra u d u le n t  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  Avenue NW 
W a s h in g to n , DC 20006
S i r  o r  Madam:
E n c lo s e d  p le a s e  f i n d  th e  re sp o n se  to  th e  R e p o r t o f  th e  N a t io n a l  Com­
m is s io n  on F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  p re p a re d  b y  a C om m ittee  o f  th e  
A m e rica n  A c c o u n t in g  A s s o c ia t io n .
We a p p r e c ia te  th e  o p p o r tu n i t y  to  e x p re s s  th e  v ie w s  o f  th e  C om m ittee . 
These v ie w s  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  r e f l e c t  th o s e  o f  th e  A s s o c ia t io n .
S in c e r e ly ,
Thomas R. Dyckman  
Ann W h itn e y  O l in  P ro fe s s o r  o f  
A c c o u n t in g  and A s s o c ia te  Dean f o r  
Academ ic A f f a i r s
TRD: t a l
c c : P ro fe s s o r  R. S o m m e rfie ld , P re s id e n t  - AAA 
P ro fe s s o r  W. B e a ve r, P r e s id e n t  E le c t  - AAA 
P ro fe s s o r  S. D a v id so n  
P ro fe s s o r  C. H o rn g re n  
P ro fe s s o r  J .  K ro g s ta d  
P ro fe s s o r  S. Z e f f
REPORT OF THE AAA
TREADWAY COMMISSION TASK FORCE
Sidney Davidson 
Thomas Dyckman, Chair 
Charles Horngren 
Stephen Zeff
R E V I S E D  D R A F T
July 6, 1987
We commend the National Commission on its report concerning fraudulent 
financial reporting and support the general thrust of the recommendations 
contained therein.
Most of our comments refer to the section of the Commission's report 
dealing with "Recommendations for Education."
Those involved in the measurement and dissemination of accounting 
information play a critical role in the functioning of our society. In so 
doing they have accepted a responsibility to the public that transcends 
organizational loyalties as well as personal considerations. This public 
obligation is the very quintessence of any profession. We believe that 
professionalism should, therefore, be the central theme of this report. 
Professionals in this case include not only those who hold CPA and CMA 
certificates, but all who exercise an influence over the measurement and 
dissemination of financial accounting information. Ethics is an essential 
and inseparable element in professional conduct. What our remarks have to 
offer in regard to professionalism will, therefore, embrace ethical con­
siderations.
We find evidence of a growing concern over the erosion of profession­
alism in this country. This erosion is reflected in and is, we believe, a 
major contributing factor to the increased incidence of fraudulent finan­
cial reporting. Broadly-based general education, business school programs 
in general, and accounting education specifically can contribute to a 
revitalization of professionalism as it relates to financial reporting. 
However, we need to remember that detecting fraud is but one aspect of a 
sound education and, hence, only one topic to be addressed in the educa­
tional preparation of a professional.
168
B
2
Currently, little attention is given to professional issues in text­
books and, we surmise, in classes as well. The history of the accounting 
profession, its role in society, and the responsibilities of its members 
are largely ignored in the classroom. We believe this to be true not only 
for those studying external financial reporting but also for students of 
internal auditing as well as all those who may ultimately be responsible 
for the reporting of financial information.
We believe that more attention should be given to the profession and 
to professional behavior, and that this attention should not be restricted 
to a single course, but integrated broadly in the curriculum. This inte­
gration should occur throughout the business curriculum, not just in ac­
counting courses. Furthermore, since the educational experience, includ­
ing its professional aspects, transcends the business curriculum, we 
should not, as the commission recognizes, allow an increased allocation of 
time to professional issues to come at the expense of the liberal com­
ponents of a college education.
We believe the difficulties today in educating individuals for profes­
sional responsibilities are more acute than in the past. Fewer prospec­
tive accounting teachers acquire practical experience in the profession 
before entering their doctoral program. And, as we have observed, ac­
counting courses seem to devote little time to professional issues. More­
over, the intensified research requirements at many schools make it less 
likely that this institutional experience will be obtained while pursuing 
their advanced academic careers. What teachers do not know they cannot 
pass on to others.
Moreover, the educational initiative to instruct financial-reporting
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practitioners in their professional responsibilities should not be re­
stricted to colleges and universities. The task must be continued follow­
ing graduation. The conditions faced by practitioners differ from those 
addressed in the classroom. Meeting firm growth and profitability goals 
coupled with the demands of making a living, creates new pressures, loyal­
ties, and uncertainties that can profoundly influence professional deci­
sion making.
The American Accounting Association should have a role in preparing 
accounting teachers to fortify their knowledge of the professional dimen­
sions of accounting and financial reporting. The Trueblood Seminars could 
serve as a model for a similar program dedicated to professional consider­
ations. With the support of one or more of the public accounting firms, 
the Association could develop and offer a program possessing, we believe, 
considerable academic and professional merit.
For practicing accountants, professionalism issues should be added to 
the continuing education requirements, with the support of the AICPA, the 
IIA, the State Societies, and other interested parties. Furthermore, we 
hope that accounting firms will increase the use of these materials in 
their in-house programs.
The Commission's Report stresses the need to "help students develop 
stronger analytical, problem solving, and judgment skills." These skills 
are critical, but they must be augmented by management skills. An under­
standing of how people are motivated, how groups establish and achieve 
goals, the ways in which reward systems influence behavior, and the impor­
tance of feedback and support systems is relevant to describing the en­
vironment in which financial reporting occurs. The Commission has ap­
propriately identified the importance of "the tone at the top" as "an
4
element within the company of overriding importance in preventing 
fraudulent financial reporting."
The Commission also recognizes the important impact of the CPA Exami­
nation on accounting curricula and textbook development. Some substantive 
portion of the exam should be devoted to professionalism; this would ac­
celerate its incorporation into accounting education. If the CPA Examina­
tion is broadened in this manner, we believe the newly added professional 
questions would not lend themselves to short-answer questions, but in­
stead essay questions should be used in which the subtleties and ramifica­
tions of particular options can be addressed.
There is, in addition, divided opinion as to the educational require­
ments for sitting for the professional examinations. In particular, the 
question of whether the undergraduate accounting curriculum should be 
expanded from four to five years is a subject of concern, and it is ad­
dressed by the Commission. While we recognize that the inclusion of ad­
ditional material, on professionalism or any other topic for that matter, 
is easier to fit within a five-year than a four-year program, resolution 
of the five-versus four-year program debate cannot rest on this issue 
alone. And, while we concur with the Commission's desire to protect the 
liberal arts component of the educational experience, we find it unneces­
sary for the Commission, under its charge, to address the five-versus 
four-year choice. It is, therefore, appropriate that the Commission re­
frain from making a recommendation.
The Commission also chose to address the relevance of the MBA degree 
in the context of its comments on curricula. We believe that an MBA de­
gree with an accounting emphasis should be regarded as no less appropriate
168E
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as a more specialized accounting degree "for advancement as a corporate 
accountant or independent public accountant." More specialized degrees 
frequently do not prepare individuals for the breadth of knowledge and 
responsibilities incumbent on these rising to positions of responsibility. 
And it is often these individuals who set the tone in organizations where 
financial reporting occurs. Additional technical expertise is no substi­
tute for the judgmental skills endorsed by the Commission.
Further, an MBA can be coupled with an extensive exposure to the lib­
eral arts at the undergraduate level, thereby supporting the breadth of 
education deemed desirable by the Commission.
We note that several of the Commission’s recommendations involve cost- 
benefit considerations. One example is the recommendation that "audit 
committees should increase their oversight of the quarterly reporting 
process. This oversight should include approving financial results prior 
to public release." Since audit committees typically meet just prior to 
board meetings, which are not necessarily timed to coincide with the re­
lease of quarterly financials, this recommendation could place a substan­
tial added burden on individuals considering service on corporate boards.
The Commission also recommends establishing a body to guide public 
companies on internal controls. It is not clear to us, based on the argu­
ments contained in the report, that the unspecified activities of such a 
body would be justified on a cost-benefit basis.
The Commission further recommends that the "Auditing Standards Board 
should establish standards to require independent public accountants to 
perform analytical review procedures in all audit engagements and should
6
provide improved guidance on the appropriate use of these procedures." 
While the implementation of and choice among procedures is not always 
ideal, we believe it is fair to observe that analytical procedures are 
always provided for in audit arrangements. The more substantive problem, 
inadequately addressed in the report, is the difficulty of applying these 
procedures in the presence of weak internal controls.
Finally, we will comment on the Commission's recommendation to reor­
ganize "the Auditing Standards Board to afford a full participating role 
in the standard setting process to knowledgeable persons who are affected 
by and interested in auditing standards but who either are not CPA's or 
are CPA's no longer in public practice." We believe that disinterested, 
independent parties can assist the deliberations of this standard setting 
body when it addresses reporting issues and may also contribute to techni­
cal matters concerned with procedures and the obtaining of evidence. We 
further believe, however, that in any case the substantial majority of the 
members of the ASB should be CPA's engaged in public practice.
In conclusion, we are grateful to the Commission for its comprehensive 
report and appreciate the opportunity to respond to its recommendations.
168G
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404 391 8000
J u l y  6 ,  1 9 8 7
M r .  J a m e s  C . T r e a d w a y
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h in g t o n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  M r .  T r e a d w a y :
C o n t e l  C o r p o r a t i o n  ( C o n t e l )  i s  p l e a s e d  t o  s u b m i t  i t s  
c o m m e n ts  o n  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g .  C o n t e l  i s  
a n  i n t e g r a t e d  t e l e c o m m u n ic a t i o n s  c o m p a n y  p r o v i d i n g  a b r o a d  
r a n g e  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o c e s s i n g  
p r o d u c t s  a n d  s e r v i c e s .  C o n t e l  p r o v i d e s  r e g u l a t e d  p r i m a r y  
l o c a l  t e l e p h o n e  s e r v i c e  t o  r e s i d e n t i a l  a n d  b u s in e s s  
s u b s c r i b e r s  t h r o u g h  t e le p h o n e  o p e r a t i n g  c o m p a n ie s  s e r v i n g  
t h i r t y  s t a t e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  C o n t e l  o f f e r s  a  v a r i e t y  o f  
n o n - r e g u l a t e d  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o c e s s i n g  
p r o d u c t s  a n d  s e r v i c e s  t o  c o m m e r c ia l ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l ,
g o v e r n m e n t a l  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  c u s t o m e r s .  R e v e n u e s  f o r  t h e  
t w e l v e  m o n th  p e r i o d  e n d e d  M a r c h  3 1 ,  1 9 8 7  w e r e
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  $ 3 . 1  b i l l i o n  a n d  t o t a l  a s s e t s  a s  o f  M a r c h  
3 1 ,  1 9 8 7  w e r e  $ 5 . 3  b i l l i o n .
O v e r a l l ,  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  p r o v i d e  
a  s o u n d  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s i s  f o r  a s s u r i n g  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  G e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  m ade  
p r a c t i c a l  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  im p r o v e m e n t  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  O f  c o n c e r n ,  h o w e v e r ,  a r e  c e r t a i n  
a s p e c t s  o f  tw o  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  a r e :
A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u ld  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  o f  
t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  o v e r s i g h t  
s h o u ld  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  
p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .
T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u ld  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  
t y p e s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  
t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m .
Mr. James C. Treadway 
July 6, 1987 
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From a management perspective, it is impractical for the 
audit committee to approve quarterly financial results 
prior to public release. Management is obligated to 
disclose financial results within a very compressed time 
frame. Although increased association with quarterly 
financial results by the audit committee -- and the 
external auditors -- is desirable, the benefit of audit 
committee association can be more efficiently realized 
after release of results to the public. Management's 
stewardship function includes the responsibility for 
accurately reporting financial results to the public. 
Inserting audit committee approval of financial results 
into management's existing review process will only delay 
the timely communication of financial results. Prior 
approval alone provides no further guarantee of the 
quality of reported earnings.
It is also impractical to obtain advance approval from the 
audit committee for each management advisory service 
provided by the company's external auditors. Independence 
in fact and appearance is a shared concern of the auditor 
and management. However, advance approval introduces 
delay and inefficiency into the management process not 
offset by the benefit of audit committee review. An 
acceptable alternative may be audit committee guidelines 
clearly identifying unacceptable types of assignments for 
the company's external auditors. In addition, management 
should be required to provide periodic reports to the 
committee on the use of advisory services. Establishing 
this standard for assuring independence would be 
beneficial and not impair management's efficiency.
In summary, Contel conceptually agrees with the objectives 
and recommendations of the Treadway Commission Report. 
However, the integrity of the financial reporting process 
also depends upon practical approaches to managing people 
and events. A vigilant, informed audit committee can 
provide great benefit to stockholders and management. 
However, care must be exercised in identifying the proper 
role for the audit committee. Audit committee 
participation in the financial reporting process will not 
in itself improve the quality of reported results.
Respectfully submitted,
 Jerry W. Braxton
JWB:ae
F I R S T  C H I C A G O
The First National Bank of Chicago
One First National Plaza 
Chicago, Illinois 60670 
Telephone: (312) 732-4000
James J. Carey
Senior Vice President 
& General Auditor
July 2, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
We appreciate the opportunity to provide a response to the April 1987 
Exposure Draft of the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting
First, we believe the subject of fraudulent financial reporting is 
important and timely. Financial institutions that lend funds to 
companies frequently suffer losses as a result of fraudulent financial 
reporting by certian borrowers. Analytical tools for determining the 
credit worthiness of customers are blunted by receiving misleading 
financial information. We commend the sponsoring associations for 
undertaking this private-sector initiative and the Commission and its 
staff for conducting a broad-based study within a tight timeframe. We 
are pleased that the initiative included underlying research to enable a 
better understanding of problems and practices across a broad spectrum of 
companies, public accounting firms, and regulators.
Second, we are generally supportive of the Recommendations for the Public 
Company, which was the primary focus of our review. We agree with the 
overall conclusion that the public company has the initial and final 
responsibility for its financial statements. We concur that within the 
company lies the greatest potential for reducing fraudulent financial 
reporting, particularly through a rigorous internal audit function. We 
would add, however, that the external oversight by public accountants and 
the regulatory process are also essential, especially for companies 
having a less rigorous internal audit function.
The remainder of this response addresses specific recommendations for 
which we have reservations or other suggestions.
Recommendations for the Public Company
1. We have reservations about the recommendation that "the Commission's 
sponsoring organizations should establish a body to guide public 
companies on internal controls." The underlying rationale and the 
proposed nature of such a body are not explained. We question the 
need to establish a separate body. Instead, we urge further
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coop e ra tion  by the  F in a n c ia l Executives I n s t i t u t e ,  N a tiona l 
A s s o c ia tio n  o f  A ccountants , I n s t i t u t e  o f  In te rn a l A u d ito rs ,  AICPA, 
SEC, and p o s s ib ly  o the rs  in  deve lop ing  and p rom u lga ting  a p p ro p ria te  
guidance th a t  would be fo llo w e d  by p u b lic  companies and o th e r 
p a r t ie s .  That m ight re q u ire  a j o in t  ta s k  fo rc e  to  ta c k le  the 
d iv e r s i t y  and co m p le x ity  o f  the issues in v o lv e d .
2. We a ls o  have re s e rv a tio n s  about the  recommendation th a t  the  SEC 
re q u ire  a l l  p u b lic  companies " to  in c lu d e  in  t h e i r  annual re p o rts  to  
s tockh o ld e rs  a le t t e r  signed by the  chairman o f  the  a u d it  committee 
d e s c r ib in g  the  com m ittee 's  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and a c t iv i t i e s  d u rin g  the  
y e a r . "  A u d it committees t y p ic a l ly  have o v e rs ig h t,  ra th e r  than 
d i r e c t ,  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  the r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  f in a n c ia l statem ents 
and need no t p rov id e  form al re p o rts  to  the p u b lic  in  o rd e r to  
e xe rc is e  th a t  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  e f fe c t iv e ly .
We fe e l th a t  the  a u d it  com m ittee 's scope and q u a l i ty  o f  rev iew , as 
a s s is te d  by in te rn a l a u d ito rs ,  is  c r i t i c a l  in  determ ing fra u d u le n t 
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  Is s u in g  a re p o r t ,  in  i t s e l f ,  would no t be a 
d e te r re n t and thus no t c o s t -e f fe c t iv e .  A b e t te r  q u a l i ty  c o n tro l 
mechanism would be fo r  the  p u b lic  accoun tan t, as p a r t  o f  a u d it in g  
f in a n c ia l s ta tem en ts , to  rev iew  the  adequacy o f  the  a u d it  com m ittee 's 
coverage.
3. A general o b se rva tio n  is  th a t  in  some p u b lic  companies ( f o r  in s ta n c e , 
in  the  banking in d u s try )  the  Board o f  D ire c to rs  and o th e r committees 
handle c e r ta in  o v e rs ig h t r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  th a t  the  Exposure D ra ft  
assigns to  a u d it  com m ittees. In  some in s t i t u t io n s ,  the  Board o f  
D ire c to rs ,  ra th e r  than the  A u d it Committee, review s accoun ting  
p o l ic ie s  and f in a n c ia l s ta tem en ts . A ls o , a separa te  exam ining o r 
c r e d it  rev iew  committee f re q u e n t ly  handles re la t io n s  w ith  examiners 
o r  the  q u a l i t y  o f  c r e d it  d e c is io n s  and re p o r t in g ,  re s p e c t iv e ly .  We 
fe e l th a t  t h is  use o f  separate committees can be e f fe c t iv e  in  h e lp in g  
to  p reven t f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  i f  the  Board o r committee 
has a t le a s t a m a jo r ity  o f  o u ts id e  members and is  no t dominated by 
s e n io r management.
We would be pleased to  d iscuss any o f  these m atte rs  w ith  members o f  s t a f f
o f  the  Commission.
S in c e re ly ,
J ames J. Carey
Corporate Headquarters
40 West 40th Street 
New York, New York 10018 
Tel. (212) 703-5127
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William B. Boyd
Chairman, President and 
Chief Executive Officer
A m e r i c a n  S t a n d a r d  I n c .
J u ly  6 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  Avenue NW 
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
D ear S i r s :
A m e r ic a n -S ta n d a rd  a p p re c ia te s  th e  o p p o r tu n i t y  to  re sp o n d  to  th e  
A p r i l ,  1987 E xposu re  D r a f t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t 
R e p o r t in g .  A m e r ic a n -S ta n d a rd  i s  a d e c e n t r a l iz e d  company w i t h  n e a r ly  
o n e - h a l f  i t s  $3 b i l l i o n  i n  s a le s  o r i g in a t in g  o u ts id e  th e  U n ite d  
S ta te s .
A m e r ic a n -S ta n d a rd  commends th e  C om m ission on a th o ro u g h  r e p o r t  th a t  
t i e s  to g e th e r  th e  m a jo r  re q u ire m e n ts  f o r  r e s p o n s ib le  f i n a n c ia l  
r e p o r t in g .  We p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u p p o r t  p r i v a t e  s e c to r  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  
th e  is s u e s  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .
We a g re e  t h a t  th e  "T one  a t  th e  T op" i s  th e  m ost im p o r ta n t  in g r e d ie n t  
i n  re d u c in g  a Company’ s e xp o su re  to  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  
A v o id in g  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  i s  c le a r l y  a f u n c t io n  o f  
management to d a y ,  and th e  C om m ission c o r r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e s  t h a t  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  H ow ever, th e  recom m enda tions  a ls o  in d ic a te  a
s u b s t a n t ia l  d e g ree  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  r e s t s  w i t h  A u d i t  C om m ittees . 
A m e r ic a n -S ta n d a rd  b e l ie v e s  t h a t  A u d it  C om m ittees s h o u ld  o ve rse e  th e  
p ro c e s s  management u t i l i z e s  to  e n su re  an a p p r o p r ia te  le v e l  o f  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l .  We do n o t  b e l ie v e  th e  A u d it  C om m ittee  s h o u ld  have 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a l  c o rp o ra te  f u n c t io n s .  To 
ch a rg e  them  w i t h  such  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  b lu r s  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  
management and p u ts  a b u rd e n  on th e  A u d it  C om m ittee  w h ic h  i t  w o u ld  be 
d i f f i c u l t  and e x p e n s iv e  to  c a r r y  o u t e f f e c t i v e l y .
The im p o rta n c e  o f  A u d it  C om m ittees i s  c le a r ,  b u t  we s h o u ld  be c a r e f u l  
to  m a in ta in  th e  d e l in e a t io n  be tw een  th e  m anagem ents' and th e  A u d it  
C o m m itte e s ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  S e v e ra l o f  th e  recom m enda tio ns  and 
d is c u s s io n s  s u g g e s t A u d i t  C om m ittee  a p p ro v a l o r  a d o p t io n  o f  v a r io u s  
p o l i c i e s .  Such a s te p  w o u ld  im pose a f a r  g r e a te r  deg ree  o f
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  th a n  i s  a p p r o p r ia te  on th e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e , w h ic h  has 
p r im a r i l y  an o v e r s ig h t  f u n c t io n .
National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting - 2 - July 6, 1987
"Recommendations for Audit Committees - Chapter Two, Section IV:
- "The audit committee should approve in advance the types and the 
extent of management advisory services that management plans to 
engage the company's independent public accountants to perform."
Our comment:
At present we require advance corporate management approval 
for all engagements of our independent auditors. Once each 
year all services performed by the independent auditors are 
discussed and approved by the Audit Committee. We believe 
requiring advance approval would delay operating decisions and 
is impractical because the audit committee is not always 
available. We recognize the independence issue but fail to 
see how advance approval would prevent fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Section V:
- "All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in 
their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by the chairman 
of the audit committee describing the committee’s responsibilities 
and activities during the year."
Our comment:
This requirement would add to the legal exposure of the Audit 
Committee chairman without any measurable benefit to 
stockholders. This and the recommendation discussed below 
could transfer the responsibility for fraudulent financial 
reporting to the Audit Committee from the persons committing 
the fraud.
Section VI:
"Audit committees should increase their oversight of the quarterly 
reporting process. This oversight should include approving financial 
results prior to public release."
Our comment:
The independent auditors discuss with management the quarterly 
report and material accounting issues, if there are any, prior 
to issuance. This we consider is sufficient. Requiring Audit 
Committee approval prior to issuance of quarterly financial 
results would expand the responsibility of the Committee 
beyond that of oversight to participation in financial
reporting, which we believe is management’s responsibility. 
The fact that the Audit Committee would have to rely on the 
independent auditors would create a need for additional 
high-cost "mini" audits. Requiring approval prior to release 
would also delay issuance of quarterly reports.
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t
F in a n c ia l R eporting  -  3 -  J u ly  6, 1987
A lthough Am erican-Standard is  most concerned w ith  the proposa ls  
re g a rd in g  the A u d it Committee, we are a lso  concerned w ith  se ve ra l 
o th e r recommendations and te x tu a l comments.
A lthough the  exposure d r a f t  s ta te s  th a t  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l
re p o r t in g  in  fa c t  is  no t w idespread, the tone o f language in  much o f 
the d r a f t  suggests th a t  i t  is  pe rvas ive  and th a t  the c o n tro l 
environm ent in  many companies is  poor. A few examples where the 
language c rea tes  an in a c c u ra te  im press ion  a re :
Chapter Two, Addressing the Problem a t Two L e ve ls : Using the
words "Im prove the tone se t by top m anagem ent..." im p lie s  th a t 
the tone se t by a l l  top managements needs improvement. Th is 
im p lic a t io n  is  no t j u s t i f i e d  in  many companies. "Top
management should e s ta b lis h  the p roper t o n e . . . "  may be more 
a p p ro p ia te .
Chapter Two, S ec tion  I I I :  Using the  words " In  numerous cases,
o th e r members o f top  management, such as the  c h ie f  execu tive  
o f f i c e r ,  p ressure  the c h ie f  accoun ting  o f f i c e r  in to
fra u d u le n t ly  m a n ip u la tin g  the f in a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts . . . "  
im p lie s  th is  o fte n  occu rs , which is  n o t the case. "Where 
fra u d  has o c c u r re d . . . "  shou ld be added to  the  te x t .
"Recommendations fo r  the  Independent P u b lic  Accountant -  Chapter 
Three, S ec tion  I I I :
-  "The SEC should re q u ire  independent p u b lic  accountants to  rev iew  
q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l  data  o f p u b lic  companies be fo re  re lea se  to  the 
p u b l ic . "
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Our comment:
Our independent a u d ito rs  d iscuss the  q u a r te r ly  re p o r t p r io r  to  
issuance. On a re tro s p e c tiv e  b a s is  they a lso  rev iew  the 
q u a r te r ly  data  in c lu d e d  in  the annual re p o r t .  Having an 
understand ing  o f the  f u l l  y e a r 's  re s u lts  a t the tim e o f the 
re tro s p e c tiv e  rev iew  a llo w s  fo r  a more c r i t i c a l  re v ie w , and i t  
is  c a r r ie d  ou t a t le s s  cos t than c u rre n t rev iew  would e n ta i l .  
The knowledge th a t  upon rev iew  a t year-end a resta tem ent o f 
in te r im  re s u lts  cou ld  be re q u ire d  p rov id es  a t le a s t  as much 
in c e n t iv e  fo r  a p p ro p ria te  in te r im  re p o r t in g  as a c u rre n t 
a u d it .  Furtherm ore , a re v ie w , as d iscussed in  the exposure 
d r a f t ,  f o r  the  purpose o f uncovering  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  
re p o r t in g  p r io r  to  re p o r t in g  the  c u r re n t-q u a r te r  r e s u lts  
would re q u ire  e x tens ive  in te r im  a u d it in g .  Th is  is  n e ith e r  
p r a c t ic a l no r c o s t - ju s t i f ie d .
We hope th a t  these comments w i l l  be g iven  c o n s id e ra tio n  in  the
p re p a ra tio n  o f the f in a l  re p o r t .
S in c e re ly ,
W il l i a m  B . B oyd
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F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
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W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
G en tlem en :
S o u th e rn  C a l i f o r n ia  E d is o n  Company a p p re c ia te s  th e  o p p o r tu n i t y  t o  comment on th e  
C o m m iss io n 's  p ro p o se d  recom m enda tio ns  t o  d e te r  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  
E d is o n  i s  one o f  th e  n a t io n 's  la r g e s t  p u b l i c l y  h e ld  e l e c t r i c  u t i l i t y  o p e r a t in g  
co m p a n ie s , s u p p ly in g  o v e r  3 - 1 /2  m i l l i o n  c u s to m e rs  w i t h  e l e c t r i c i t y  i n  a 5 0 ,0 0 0  
s q u a re  m i le  a re a  in  c e n t r a l  and s o u th e rn  C a l i f o r n ia .  The Company r o u t in e ly  
r e p o r ts  f i n a n c ia l  in fo r m a t io n  t o  o v e r  177 ,00 0  s h a re h o ld e rs  as w e l l  as th e  SEC 
and num erous o th e r  r e g u la to r y  a g e n c ie s .
G e n e ra l Comments
We have fo l lo w e d  th e  a c t io n s  and d e l ib e r a t io n s  o f  th e  C om m ission le a d in g  t o  th e  
re le a s e  o f  th e  e xp o s u re  d r a f t .  The Company a g re e s  w i t h  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  
recom m enda tio ns  s e t  f o r t h  i n  th e  i n i t i a l  r e p o r t  and commends th e  C om m ission f o r  
i t s  t im e ly  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  d e te r r e n ts  a g a in s t  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  
p r a c t ic e s .
As re q u e s te d  in  th e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t ,  we have  e v a lu a te d  th e  C o m m iss io n 's  
recom m enda tio ns  i n  t h e i r  e n t i r e t y  as a b a la n c e d  a p p ro a ch  to  d is c o u ra g in g  
f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t in g  p r a c t ic e s .  H ow ever, we a re  o f f e r in g  th e  
f o l lo w in g  comments on s e le c te d  recom m enda tions  w h ic h  we b e l ie v e  do n o t  f u r t h e r  
th e  C o m m iss io n 's  s ta te d  g o a ls  o f  p r o v id in g  p r a c t i c a l  g u id a n c e  w i th o u t  undue 
im p le m e n ta t io n  b u rd e n s .
Recommen d a t io n :
A l l  p u b l i c  com pan ies  s h o u ld  be r e q u ir e d  b y  SEC r u le  t o  in c lu d e  i n  t h e i r  
a n n u a l r e p o r t s  t o  s to c k h o ld e rs  a  l e t t e r  s ig n e d  b y  th e  c h a irm a n  o f  th e  a u d i t  
c o m m itte e  d e s c r ib in g  th e  c o m m it te e 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and a c t i v i t i e s  d u r in g  
th e  y e a r .
The Company a g re e s  t h a t  th e  fu n c t io n s  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  o f  th e  A u d i t  
C om m ittee  s h o u ld  be com m unica ted  t o  s h a re h o ld e rs  and f i n a n c ia l  s ta te m e n t 
re a d e rs .  H ow ever, we oppose th e  p ro p o se d  re q u ire m e n t t o  in c lu d e  in  th e  
A n n u a l R e p o rt a s e p a ra te  l e t t e r  fro m  th e  A u d i t  C om m ittee  C ha irm an to  
S h a re h o ld e rs . As an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  p u b l ic  com pan ies s h o u ld  in c lu d e  a
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discussion of the functions and responsibilities of the Audit Committee in 
the Management Report. This approach provides adequate disclosure of the 
role and activities of the Audit Committee and will avoid the presentation of 
a boilerplate discussion of Audit Committee activities (as outlined in 
Exhibit M of the Exposure Draft). Considering the liability imposed by 
existing securities laws, we believe that shareholders, regulators, and other 
interested persons are provided adequate assurances that Audit Committee 
members are discharging their oversight responsibilities in a competent, 
professional manner without publishing a letter in the Annual Report.
Recommendation:
When a public company changes independent public accounts, it should be 
required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature of any material 
accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old and new auditors during 
the three-year period preceding the change.
The Company opposes the Commission's proposed expansion of SEC rules to 
require public disclosure of disagreements with auditors for the preceding 
three years. It is the Company's opinion that current SEC requirements for 
Form 8-K, proxy statements and financial statement disclosures, are adequate 
for informing readers and the new auditors of the circumstances relating to 
disagreements with and changes in auditors.
Current disclosures in Form 8-K require a statement whether, in connection 
with the audits of the two most recent fiscal years and any subsequent 
interim periods, any disagreements developed between the former accountants 
and management regarding:
o Accounting principles or practices, 
o Financial statement disclosure, or 
o Auditing scope or procedure.
The Company further believes that disagreements that may have taken place 
with independent accountants over two years ago are not likely to be as 
relevant to auditor changes as more current transactions and financial 
reporting issues. If the Commission retains this recommendation, we suggest 
that the final document include a discussion regarding how the changes will 
further deter fraudulent financial reporting over present rules as is 
provided for other Commission recommendations.
National Commission on
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Recommendation:
Audit committees should increase their oversight of the quarterly reporting 
process. This oversight should include approving financial results prior to 
public release.
To be effective, financial reporting oversight exercised by the Audit 
Committee must be practical within established time constraints of accepted 
reporting practices. Investors, regulators, and security analysts require 
timely information in order to evaluate investment risks and opportunities as 
soon as such information is available and considered by management to be 
reasonably reliable. The Company agrees that audit committee members should 
be apprised of significant internal control changes or unusual accounting 
adjustments which have a significant affect on financial position or results 
of operation in interim periods. However, mandated audit committee review of 
internal controls and unaudited financial data on a quarterly basis would 
result in needless delays in providing the public with reliable information. 
For most public companies, changes in internal control systems occur rarely 
and are usually undertaken to enhance the existing system. The Company 
suggests that the Commission's recommendations place management responsible 
for advising the audit committee of significant matters that affect interim 
financial data as required to maintain a current knowledge by committee 
members. This practice will broaden management's responsibilities while 
avoiding unnecessary delays in financial reporting.
Recommendation:
The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's standard report to 
describe the extent to which the independent public accountant has reviewed 
and evaluated the system of internal accounting controls. The Auditing 
Standards Board also should provide explicit guidance to address the 
situation where, as a result of his knowledge of the company's internal 
accounting controls, the independent public accountant disagrees with 
management's assessment as stated in the proposed management's report.
The Company opposes the inclusion of a description of the independent 
accountant's review of internal controls in the auditors standard report.
The principle objective of an audit should be to provide reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements are presented fairly. As expressed in the 
exposure draft, the extent of internal control testing is based on the 
auditor's assessment of the most cost-effective procedures available to 
complete the audit. Thus, the lack of auditor evaluation is not indicative 
of poor internal controls as would be implied by the proposed amendments to 
the auditors report. The Company further believes that internal control 
system designs must consider the relative costs and expected benefits of 
specific control measures. The proposed amendments could encourage 
management to adopt controls which may not be cost justified to avoid 
negative comments in their auditors report.
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In conclusion, we wish to express our overall support for the financial 
reporting objectives and recommendations set forth in the exposure draft and 
urge the Commission to give thoughtful consideration to the comments offered 
during their final deliberations.
Yours truly,
R. K. Bushey
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P u b l i c  S e r v i c e
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P.O. Box 840
Denver, CO 80201-0840 
(303)571-7511
Public Service
Company of Colorado
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D. C. 20006
Re: Comments on the Exposure D ra f t ,  Report o f  the N a tio n a l
Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting_____
Dear Commissioners:
P u b lic  S erv ice  Company o f  Colorado (Company) endorses the  Commission’ s 
s ta tem en t, "The tone se t by top  management -  the co rp o ra te  environm ent o r 
c u ltu re  w ith in  which f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  occurs -  is  the  most im po rtan t fa c to r  
c o n tr ib u t in g  to  the  in t e g r i t y  o f  the  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  p ro c e s s ."  C e r ta in ly  
the  Commission’ s recommendation re g a rd in g  the Code o f Corporate Conduct is  an 
in te g ra l p a r t  o f s e t t in g  the  " to n e "  a t  the  Top. (Reference I I ,  Pages 28 and 
30) W ith  respec t to  the  Recommendation on Page 29 fo r  Steps 1 and 2 fo r  
Id e n t i f y in g ,  Understanding and Assessing the  R isk  o f  F raudu len t F in a n c ia l 
R e p o rtin g , the  Recommendation th a t  the  Independent P u b lic  Accountants do th is  
f o r  each a u d it  may be v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  c o n s id e rin g  th is  would be s u b je c t iv e  even 
fo r  a person ve ry  knowledgeable about the  Company.
The Company a lso  agrees w ith  the  Commission’ s g oa l " to  develop recommenda­
t io n s  th a t  would be p r a c t ic a l ,  reasonable in  the  c ircum stances, ju s t i f i e d  by 
the  b e n e f its  to  be ach ieved , and would lend  themselves to  im p lem enta tion  
w ith o u t undue b u rd e n ." (See I I ,  Page 3) We a ls o  endorse the  Commission’ s 
re c o g n it io n  o f  the  need fo r  c o s t -e f fe c t iv e  responses as evidenced by i t s  
s ta tem en t, "a c c o rd in g ly , the  Commission has l im ite d  i t s  responses to  recommen­
d a tio n s  th a t  are reasonable in  the c ircum stances and th a t  companies can im p le ­
ment r e a l i s t i c a l l y ,  w ith  cos ts  and burdens ju s t i f i e d  by the  b e n e fits  to  be 
a c h ie v e d ."  (Reference V I, Page 24)
A lthough the  Commission addresses the  need to  design and implement 
in te r n a l c o n tro ls  th a t are adequate to  p reven t and d e te c t f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  
r e p o r t in g ,  the  Commission f a i l s  to  recogn ize  th a t  "q u e s tio n a b le  f in a n c ia l  
r e p o r t in g "  can be as m is le a d in g  and damaging to  in v e s to rs  as " f ra u d u le n t 
f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g "  as recogn ized in  the F in a n c ia l E xecu tives Research 
Foundation P u b lic a t io n  e n t i t le d  "F ra u d u le n t and Q uestionab le  F in a n c ia l 
R e p o rtin g ."  W hile  que s tio n a b le  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  p ra c t ic e s  are p robab ly  more 
d i f f i c u l t  to  p reven t o r d e te c t,  they are a lso  p roba b ly  more e a s ily  perpe­
t ra te d .
W ith respec t to  the  Commission’ s obse rva tions  (Reference I I I ,  Pages 32, 33 
and 34) concern ing the  key fu n c t io n s  o f Accounting  and In te rn a l A u d it in g , the 
Company concurs th a t  the  "C h ie f Accounting O f f ic e r  is  d i r e c t ly  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  
the  f in a n c ia l  s ta tem en ts , can take a u th o r i ta t iv e  a c t io n  to  c o r re c t them, and 
should be h e ld  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g . "  The Commission 
s ta te s  th a t the  C h ie f A ccounting O f f ic e r  g e n e ra lly  has the p rim ary
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responsibility for designing, implementing, and monitoring the Company's 
financial reporting system and internal accounting controls. With respect to 
the monitoring function, it is our position that this should primarily be the 
function of the Chief Internal Auditor and Independent Public Accountant.
Additionally, the Company agrees that the Chief Internal Auditor must have 
the acknowledged support of top Management and the Board of Directors through 
its audit function.
Regarding the objectivity of the internal audit function, the Company 
concurs with the Commission's recommendation that "Public companies should 
ensure that their internal audit functions are objective." The Company is 
encouraged that the Commission recognizes that, in large corporations, it may 
be impractical for the Chief Internal Auditor to report directly to the CEO or 
President. Equally as important, the Chief Internal Auditor must report 
administratively to an individual in the organization with the appropriate 
authority to promote independence and objectivity. We agree this individual 
should be someone other than the officer directly responsible for preparing the 
Company's financial statements, but it is our opinion that to merely establish 
a reporting structure without substantive knowledge of the workings of an 
organization is a matter of form over substance. The Company does agree with 
the Commission's observation encouraging the Chief Internal Auditor to meet 
regularly with the CEO or President and have direct and unstructured access to 
the Audit Committee.
On Page 42, the recommendation regarding Quarterly Reporting states that, 
"Audit committees should increase their oversight of the quarterly reporting 
process. The oversight should include approving financial results prior to 
public release." While this recommendation is well-intentioned, it is not 
practical, and would definitely slow the release of timely information to 
shareholders and potential investors which, in itself, is counter-productive to 
good financial reporting. Rather than requiring the Audit Committee to approve 
financial results prior to public release, the following recommendation by the 
Commission is sufficient to accomplish its objective: "Management should 
insure that the Audit Committee is kept informed of significant matters 
affecting the Company's quarterly financial statements. For example, it should 
inform the Audit Committee on a timely basis of any changes in accounting or 
financial reporting practices that may have a significant financial statement 
impact."
With respect to the Commission's recommendation that "the SEC require 
independent public accountants to review quarterly financial data of public 
companies before release to the public" (Reference III, Page 49), this require­
ment would slow the release of timely information to shareholders and potential 
investors. As a matter of Company practice, quarterly reviews are conducted 
prior to the filing of quarterly financial information with the SEC on Form 
10-Q. Such reviews should be sufficient deterrent to preclude a company from 
releasing fraudulent financial information to the public knowing that the 
independent public accountants would likely discover this condition a short 
time later.
A significant element concerning the Commission's Report is the indepen­
dent public accountant's role, and the extent to which the Commission's
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recommendations will impact the audit scope and related fees. While we believe 
the impact will be minimal, the following recommendations may have a tendency 
to increase fees.
1. Specified audit procedures to assess the potential for fraudulent
financial reporting and design tests (Reference II, Page 46) to 
provide reasonable assurance for the detection of fraud are already 
within the audit framework. There may be a need to change
documentation to conform with revised GAAS, and some time will be 
required to expand analytical review procedures. (Reference III, 
Page 48)
2. With respect to Chapter 4 regarding the regulatory and legal
environment, the Commission's recommendations on Pages 63 through 70
will require additional consulting time, if services are required, as 
well as an increase in the accounting firm’s overhead.
3. The Commission’s observation concerning the expanded business and
accounting curricula (Reference III, Page 80) will lead to increased
salary costs for new hires, which will ultimately increase the fees. 
Conversely, students should be better trained and more alert to 
ethical issues.
Public Service Company of Colorado recognizes the effort put forth by the 
Commissioners regarding this project, and appreciates the opportunity to 
respond.
Very truly yours
J. N . Bumpus
Senior Vice President
Finance
cc: Audit Committee
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W. Brian McGowan, Vice President 
and Controller
W. R. Grace & Co.
Grace Plaza
1114 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-7794
J u n e  3 0 ,  1 9 8 7
T h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W . 
W a s h in g t o n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  C o m m is s io n e r s :
I n  r e p l y  t o  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  i n  A p r i l  1 9 8 7 ,  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  a r e  W. R . G r a c e 's  ( " G r a c e " )  r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  
c o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s .
I s s u e  1 : T h e  C o m m is s io n  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o f
t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  s h o u ld  i n c r e a s e  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  
o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  i n  s o  d o i n g ,  
t h e  C o m m is s io n  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
s h o u ld  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s ,  a n d  a l s o  s a t i s f y  i t s e l f  t h a t  
c o n t r o l s  o v e r  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a r e  
a d e q u a t e .
R e s p o n s e  1 : I t  i s  G r a c e 's  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u ld
h a v e  a c c e s s  t o  a n d  h a v e  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  th e m  t h e  
q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  C o m p a n y  o n  a  t i m e l y  b a s i s ,  
h o w e v e r ,  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l ,  b e f o r e  r e l e a s e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c ,  
o f  s u c h  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s  b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  w o u ld  
r e s u l t  i n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e l a y  i n  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  s u c h  
r e s u l t s .  G r a c e  f o l l o w s  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  r e p o r t i n g  
m o n t h ly  t o  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  o n  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  
b u s i n e s s ,  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  v a r i a n c e s  b e tw e e n  s u c h  
r e s u l t s  a n d  b u d g e t  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  c o m p a r a b le  p e r i o d  o f  
i t s  p r i o r  y e a r .  T h e s e  m o n t h ly  r e p o r t s  a l s o  c o v e r  
u n u s u a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  o r  a c c o u n t i n g  t r e a t m e n t  w h ic h
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might have occurred or are expected to occur. The 
Grace audit committee has the opportunity to question 
and review the financial statements prepared by the 
Company at any time.
If informative communications already exists between 
management and the audit committee (i.e., companies 
that on a normal basis present financial data as 
outlined above), the proposed recommendations for the 
advance approval of the quarterly financial results 
will add delay in making such financial results 
available to shareholders and the investment community 
without significantly improving on quality.
Issue 2: The Commission recommends that the internal audit
function report administratively to a senior officer 
not directly responsible for the financial statements.
Response 2: we believe that the director of internal audit should
have direct and unrestricted access to top management, 
the Chief Executive Officer and the audit committee. 
The operating independence of the internal audit 
function is the important issue; the administrative 
reporting relationship is far less significant.
We appreciate the opportunity to express our views to the 
Commission.
Very truly yours,
/nl
cc: P. Greene
S. V. Oroho 
J. F. Spellman
Unocal Corporation
1201 West 5th Street, P.O. Box 7600 
Los Angeles, California 90051
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Charles S. McDowell
Comptroller
James C. T readw ay , J r .
N a t io n a l  C om m ission on
F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W. 
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
D ear M r. T readw ay:
We have re v ie w e d  th e  E xp o su re  D r a f t  o f  th e  R e p o r t o f  th e  N a t io n a l  C om m ission 
on  F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .  We w e re  p le a s e d  t o  see t h a t  many changes ' 
have been made fro m  y o u r  i n i t i a l  c o n c lu s io n s .  We w e re  a ls o  p le a s e d  t o  see 
t h a t  many o f  th e s e  changes in c o r p o r a te d  comments t h a t  we made t o  th e  
C om m ission i n  o u r  l e t t e r  o f  J a n u a ry  2 9 , 1987 . We d o , h o w e ve r, w is h  t o  make 
some a d d i t io n a l  comments on s e v e r a l o f  th e  s p e c i f i c  recom m enda tio ns  in c lu d e d  
i n  th e  E xp o su re  D r a f t .
We a g re e  w i t h  y o u r  recom m enda tio n  t h a t  p u b l i c  com pan ies  s h o u ld  e n s u re  t h a t  
t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n s  a re  o b je c t iv e ?  h o w e ve r, we d is a g re e  w i t h  th e  
n o t io n  t h a t  th e  c h ie f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  s h o u ld  a d m in is t r a t i v e ly  r e p o r t  t o  a 
s e n io r  o f f i c e r  who i s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  p r e p a r in g  th e  f i n a n c ia l  
s ta te m e n ts .  You a cknow led ge  t h a t  f o r  la r g e r  c o r p o r a t io n s  i t  may be 
im p r a c t ic a l  f o r  th e  c h ie f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  t o  r e p o r t  t o  th e  CEO and we a g re e . 
L ik e w is e ,  i t  may be im p r a c t ic a l  t o  r e p o r t  t o  someone o th e r  th a n  th e  p e rs o n  who 
i s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  f i n a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts .  Because o f  t h i s  we b e l ie v e  t h a t  
th e  c h ie f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  s h o u ld  a d m in is t r a t i v e ly  r e p o r t  t o  th e  p e rs o n  t h a t  
b e s t  f i t s  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  p a r t i c u la r  c o r p o r a t io n .  The ke y  
s t i l l  re m a in s  t h a t  th e  c h ie f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  m us t have  d i r e c t  a cce ss  t o  th e  
a u d i t  c o m m itte e  o f  th e  b o a rd  and m eet on a p e r io d ic  b a s is  w i t h  th e  CEO.
The C om m ission c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  s h o u ld  o v e rs e e  management 
ju d g m e n ts  r e la t i n g  t o  th e  ind e p e n d e n ce  o f  th e  p u b l ic  a c c o u n ta n ts .  We a g re e  
w i t h  t h a t  c o n c lu s io n .  H ow ever, we do n o t  a g re e  t h a t  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  
s h o u ld  a p p ro v e  i n  advance  th e  ty p e s  and th e  e x te n t  o f  management a d v is o r y  
s e r v ic e s  t o  be p e r fo rm e d . The a u d i t  c o m m it te e 's  in v o lv e m e n t i n  t h i s  a re a  
s h o u ld  o n ly  be on a  re v ie w  b a s is .  C o n t r a c t in g  f o r  a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s  i s  a 
n o rm a l management f u n c t io n .  I t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  t o  o n ly  
re v ie w  t h i s  a c t i v i t y  t o  in s u r e  t h a t  th e  in d e p e n d e n ce  o f  th e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t 
i s  n o t  b e in g  comp ro m is e d .  To a p p ro v e  in  advance  f o r  th e s e  s e r v ic e s  w o u ld  be 
an u n n e c e s s a ry  b u rd e n  on th e  management f u n c t io n .
- 2 -
The recommendation that the chairman of the audit committee submit a letter 
for inclusion in the annual report to stockholders will add additional "boiler 
plate" language to the annual report without adding anything of significance. 
If anything is important enough to be detailed in the audit committee letter 
it will also be important enough to already be included in other parts of the 
annual reports, i.e, the MD&A or the standard auditor’s report. Thus no 
additional useful information is provided to the user of the financial 
statements.
The Commission recommends that the audit committee approve the quarterly 
financial statements before public release. We believe that the word 
"approve" is perhaps too strong. We would suggest instead that the audit 
committee should review the quarterly financial statements in conjunction with 
the results of the review performed by the independent public accountant.
The AICPA has exposed for comment ten auditing standards. Unocal plans to 
comment on several of those proposals and, therefore, has not commented on 
that area of the Commission's report.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this exposure draft. We would 
also like to compliment the Commission on its endeavor on a very difficult 
topic.
PKG:aj/1802
Sincerely,
Sonat Inc.
Post Office Box 2563 
Birmingham AL 35202 2563 
205 325 7572
S O N A T
J Robert Doody
Vice Chairman and 
Chief Financial Officer
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June 30, 1987
N a t io n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P e n n sy lva n ia  Avenue, N.W.
W ash ing ton , D . C. 20006
G entlem en:
Sonat In c .  i s  a w o rld w id e  energy company in v o lv e d  in  n a tu r a l gas 
p ip e l in e s ,  o i l  s e rv ic e s ,  and o i l  and gas e x p lo ra t io n  and p ro d u c t io n .  
Sonat r e s p e c t f u l ly  su bm its  i t s  comments on th e  recom m endations o f  the  
N a t io n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o r t in g .
Sonat g e n e ra l ly  agrees w ith  th e  C om m ission 's recom m endations and is  
p re s e n t ly  in  s u b s ta n t ia l  com p liance  w ith  th e  recom m endations. However, 
Sonat b e lie v e s  some o f  th e  recom m endations shou ld  n o t be adopted f o r  the  
fo l lo w in g  re a son s .
Sonat b e lie v e s  i t  w ou ld  be o f  no b e n e f i t  to  th e  s to c k h o ld e rs  to  in c lu d e  
in  th e  annua l r e p o r t  a l e t t e r  s ig n ed  by th e  chairm an o f  th e  a u d it  
com m ittee  d e s c r ib in g  th e  co m m itte e ' s r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and a c t i v i t i e s  
d u r in g  th e  y e a r .  The fu n c t io n  o f  th e  a u d it  com m ittee  i s  a t  p re s e n t 
a d e q u a te ly  d e s c r ib e d  in  the  p ro xy  s ta te m e n t.
Sonat d is a g re e s  w ith  th e  recom m endation th a t  the  a u d it  com m ittee  approve 
q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l  r e s u l t s  p r io r  to  p u b l ic  re le a s e . Sonat b e lie v e s  i t  
i s  n o t n ecessa ry  to  have th e  a u d it  com m ittee  re v ie w  u n a u d ite d  f in a n c ia l  
r e s u l t s .  Sonat a ls o  b e l ie v e s  i t  i s  n o t th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  th e  a u d it  
com m ittee  to  be as in v o lv e d  w ith  th e  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t  p ro cess  as the  
Commission recommends.
Sonat fe e ls  th e  recom m endation to  re q u ire  th e  c h ie f  e x e c u tiv e  o f f i c e r  and 
c h ie f  a c c o u n tin g  o f f i c e r  to  s ig n  th e  management r e p o r t  in c lu d e d  in  the  
annua l r e p o r t  to  s to c k h o ld e rs  i s  in a p p ro p r ia te .  Sonat b e lie v e s  the  
management r e p o r t  sh ou ld  be s ig n ed  by th e  a p p ro p r ia te  re s p o n s ib le  
p e rso n , and th a t  pe rson  w i l l  depend upon th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  
o rg a n iz a t io n .
Sonat b e lie v e s  th e  recom m endations co n ce rn in g  second o p in io n s  a re  too  
b ro a d . Seeking a second o p in io n  i s  a p p ro p r ia te  when c ircu m s ta n ce s  c re a te  
a un ique  a c c o u n tin g  s i t u a t io n .  We do a g re e , how ever, th a t  th e  a u d it  
com m ittee and th e  p u b l ic  shou ld  be in fo rm e d  o f  second o p in io n s  when an 
a c c o u n tin g  change i s  in v o lv e d .  L ik e w is e ,  c o n ce rn in g  changes in  
independen t a c c o u n ta n ts , p u b l ic  d is c lo s u re  o f  second o p in io n s  shou ld  be 
re q u ire d  o n ly  when an a c c o u n tin g  change i s  in v o lv e d .
Sonat believes the establishment of a body to guide public companies on 
internal controls is not necessary. Sufficient guidance is already 
provided by such organizations as the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, the Financial Executives Institute and the National 
Association of Accountants.
Sonat is pleased to have had this opportunity to comment on these 
recommendations and we will be happy to discuss our comments with the 
Commission at its convenience.
Very truly yours,
J. Robert Doody
JRD/dks
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  H e r s h e y
R. A. Z IM M E R M A N
Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer
Hershey Foods Corporation 
C orporate Headquarters 
Hershey, Pennsylvania 1 7 0 3 3 -0 8 1 0  
Phone: (717) 534 -424 1
J u ly  1 ,  1987
N a t io n a l C om m ission
on F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , NW 
W a s h in g to n , DC 20006
G en tlem en :
Though o u r  company has n o t  been s p e c i f i c a l l y  re q u e s te d  to  comment 
on th e  E xposu re  D r a f t  d a te d  A p r i l  1987 , p le a s e  p e rm it  us to  do 
s o . The v a s t  m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  Treadw ay C o m m iss io n 's  recommen­
d a t io n s  a re  q u i t e  a c c e p ta b le  and many a re  now p r a c t ic e d  by 
A m e rica n  c o r p o r a t io n s .
T he re  i s  one s e c t io n  o f  th e  r e p o r t ,  h o w e ve r, w ith  w h ic h  we ta k e  
is s u e .  T h a t s e c t io n  i s  fo u n d  i n  A pp e n d ix  K on page 183 u nde r th e  
h e a d in g , " A u d i t  C om m ittee  Good P r a c t ic e  G u id e l in e s . ”  I t  re a d s  as 
f o l lo w s :  "An a u d i t  co m m itte e  c o n s is t in g  o f  in d e p e n d e n t d i r e c t o r s
is  th e  p r im a ry  v e h ic le  w h ich  b o a rd s  o f  d i r e c t o r s  use to  d is c h a rg e  
t h e i r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  w i th  re s p e c t  t o  th e  com pany 's  f i n a n c ia l  
r e p o r t in g .  An in fo rm e d  and v i g i l a n t  a u d i t  co m m itte e  re p re s e n ts  
one o f  th e  m ost e f f e c t i v e  in f lu e n c e s  f o r  m in im iz in g  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g . "
In  my o p in io n  and t h a t  o f  my s e n io r  management g ro u p , th o s e  
s ta te m e n ts  a re  n o t  i n d ic a t i v e  o f  th e  r o le  c u r r e n t l y  p la y e d  by 
a u d i t  c o m m itte e s  n o r  w ou ld  i t  be good p r a c t ic e  f o r  a u d i t  
c o m m itte e s  to  u n d e r ta k e  th e  s p e c i f i c  r o le  in d ic a te d  i n  th e  above 
q u o te d  s ta te m e n t.  We b e l ie v e  t h a t  i t ' s  th e  r o le  o f  th e  com pany 's  
management t o  im p le m e n t c o n t r o l  p ro c e d u re s  and p r a c t ic e s  w h ich  
p r o v id e  th e  p r im a ry  a s su ra n ce  to  i t s  b o a rd  o f  d i r e c t o r s  t h a t  th e  
com pany 's  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  i s  n o t f r a u d u le n t  i n  any way and i s  
a c c u r a te .  We do n o t b e l ie v e  t h a t  i t  i s  l o g i c a l  f o r  an a u d i t  
co m m itte e  to  u n d e rta k e  a b u rd e n  such  as t h a t  w h ic h  i s  p ro p o se d  in  
y o u r  E xposu re  D r a f t .
National Commission
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
July 1, 1987 
Page 2
An audit committee must be in a position to ascertain that manage­
ment is carrying out its assigned duties and responsibilities.
The audit committee must look to management as the source of its 
information and to assure itself that the books and records of the 
corporation are accurate and suitable in every respect. The audit 
committee can rely upon the company's outside auditors to produce 
a viewpoint independent from that of management. But an audit 
committee is in no position to undertake the burden you would 
ascribe to it without substantive changes to its normal charter 
and without the assignment of adequate staff to it.
It is my hope that the two quoted sentences above will be modified 
in a way which will moderate the burden which they would seem to 
place upon an audit committee.
Sincerely, 
RAZ/gjl
 
J. G. S A L O M O N E
A tlantic electric
People Meeting Your Energy Needs
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT - FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING
June 30, 1987
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N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvan ia  Avenue, N.W. 
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
RE: Exposure D ra f t  o f  A p r i l ,  1987
A t la n t ic  C ity  E le c t r ic  Company (th e  "Company") is  an investo r-ow ned
e le c t r ic  u t i l i t y  s e rv in g  over one m i l l io n  people in  the  southern  o n e - th ird  o f 
the  S ta te  o f New Je rsey . As a r e g is t r a n t  under Federa l s e c u r it ie s  law s, the 
Company has made every e f f o r t  to  comply w ith  S e c u r it ie s  & Exchange Commission 
re g u la t io n s  and g u id e lin e s . The Company has taken steps to  in s u re  th a t  i t s  
in te r n a l a u d it in g  s e rv ic e s  fu n c t io n  and i t s  independent accountants have an 
open and f re e  access to  the  A u d it Committee o f  i t s  Board o f D ire c to rs  which 
c o n s is ts  o f  a l l  o u ts id e  D ire c to rs  o f the  Company. In  t h is  re g a rd , the  Company 
has a w r i t te n  Code o f  Conduct, which is  a n n u a lly  rev iew ed, updated and signed 
o f f  by D ire c to rs ,  O ff ic e rs  and Managers. The In te rn a l A u d it in g  S erv ices 
Department w ith in  the  Company re p o r ts  d i r e c t ly  to  the A u d it Committee o f the  
Board o f D ire c to rs  and re p o r ts  o n ly  a d m in is t ra t iv e ly  to  an o f f i c e r  le v e l 
w i th in  the  Company. The Company' s in te r n a l a u d it in g  s e rv ic e s  fu n c t io n ,  as 
w e ll as i t s  independent accountants meet w ith  the  A u d it Committee o f the  Board 
o f  D ire c to rs  on a re g u la r  b a s is  to  re p o r t  on the  s ta tu s  o f the annual in te r n a l 
and e x te rn a l a u d it  programs and an update on the  independent accou n ta n t' s 
rev iew  o f  the  a p p lic a t io n  o f accoun ting  p r in c ip le s  w ith in  the Company. In  
a d d it io n ,  the  Company has in  p lace  an e s ta b lis h e d  program to  p rov id e  
com pliance w ith  the  F ore ign  C o rrup t P ra c tic e s  A c t. T h is  program, which is  
m on ito red  by a committee in c lu d in g  re p re s e n ta tiv e s  o f  o u ts id e  le g a l counse l, 
independent accoun tan ts , the  in te r n a l a u d it in g  fu n c t io n  and the C h ie f 
F in a n c ia l O f f ic e r ,  in c lu d e s  re g u la r  rev iew s o f in te r n a l c o n tro ls  in  p lace  in  
the  v a r io u s  departm ents w ith in  the  Company. Given the  fo re g o in g  as a base, we 
b e lie v e  th a t  the  Company has se t the  a p p ro p ria te  "to n e  a t  the  to p " o f  the 
Company re g a rd in g  o b je c t iv e  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g .
The Company's in te r n a l a u d it in g  se rv ic e s  fu n c t io n  is  e f fe c t iv e  and
o b je c t iv e  and p e r io d ic a l ly  reviewed by our e x te rn a l a u d ito rs .  In te rn a l a u d it  
re p o r ts  are issued d i r e c t ly  to  the  C h ie f E xecu tive  O f f ic e r  o f  the  Company, as 
w e ll  as the  Chairman o f the A u d it Committee o f the  Board o f  D ire c to rs .
Regular w r i t t e n  re p o r ts  are made m onthly by the  C h ie f E xecu tive  O f f ic e r  o f the 
Company to  the  A u d it Committee o u t l in in g  co rp o ra te  management's fo l lo w  up on 
the  re s u lts  and recommendations con ta ined  w ith in  in te r n a l a u d it  re p o r ts .
Atlantic City Electric Com pany  
1199 Black Horse Pike 
Pleasantville, N.J. 08232 
609-645-4411
A tlantic electric
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TO: National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting 
June 30, 1987 
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The Audit Committee meets regularly and frequently with the Manager 
of the Internal Auditing Services Department. In addition, the Audit 
Committee meets regularly with representatives of the independent accountants.
It is within this foregoing background of independence and 
compliance with existing regulations that the Company takes exception to 
two (2) issues within the Commission's Exposure Draft.
Quarterly Reporting
Recommendation: Audit Committee should increase their oversight of the
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include 
approving financial results prior to public release.
This recommendation indicates that the independent accountant should 
not only perform a timely review of quarterly financial statements, as is 
currently the case, but also should communicate positively the results of this 
quarterly review to the Audit Committee. Based on this report by the 
independent public accountants and their review of the financial statements, 
it is recommended by the Commission that the Audit Committee should approve, 
in advance, the release of quarterly financial results to the public. At 
present, the quarterly reviews by independent accountants are required as part 
of prudent corporate management. The reports from the independent accountants 
to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors are on a "negative" basis, 
versus the "positive" approach recommended by the Commission. The current 
structure is certainly more effective and more timely and appropriate within 
the time schedules under which quarterly financial statements are prepared, 
reviewed, filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission and released to the 
public.
Securities & Exchange Commission regulations as currently in effect, 
require review and approval of quarterly financial results by independent 
accountants which are included in any filing in support of the issuance of 
additional securities.
It is strongly believed that Audit Committees can effectively 
perform their oversight responsibilities absent a regular review of the 
quarterly financial statements. Their oversight currently is based on their 
effective use of the independent accountants as their experts in evaluating 
corporate management's preparation and reporting on financial statements. An 
effort to make audit committees a more integral part of the financial 
statement review process could possibly remove some of the objectivity which 
they currently exercise over the financial reporting process.
A tlantic electric
People Meeting Your Energy Needs
TO: National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting 
June 30, 1987 
Page 3
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Five Year Accounting Programs
Although the Commission made no recommendation with regard to 
expansion of the undergraduate accounting curriculum from four to five years, 
it did choose to list that issue in its summary of recommendations. Merely by 
listing the issue, it gave a status of recommendation and, therefore, deserves 
a response.
Although the Company certainly supports improvements in the 
education of all professional disciplines upon which the Company draws to 
provide service, it is difficult determine how an additional year of 
undergraduate study would be effectively equated into higher levels of ethical 
standards or sound judgement which are prerequisites to the strong executive 
integrity necessary to foster a high level of quality in financial reporting. 
It seems that all aspects of the financial reporting system would benefit from 
an increased emphasis on ethical inquiry, analytical reasoning, sound 
judgement and problem solving skills within a four year undergraduate 
curriculum. Therefore, the Company supports a reorientation of the study of 
ethical standards versus an expansion of the undergraduate timeframe. Drawing 
from an ethically well educated financial professional cadre, corporations 
should be well equipped to train these financial professionals in the 
specifics and unique skills necessary for their particular industry.
As you indicate in your report, some public companies have already 
implemented many of your recommendations as a matter of good business 
practice. It is in this frame of reference that we have responded to areas of 
most concern to our Company. While the results of the Commission's efforts 
may be noteworthy, they should be tempered with the consideration that for 
every cost, there should be a measurable benefit. As noted in the foregoing, 
"positive" independent accountant reports to the audit committees on quarterly 
financial results do not appear to have a measurable benefit. In addition, 
the Commission's "non-recommendation" to increase accounting undergraduate 
education from four to five years does not have clearly measurable benefits.
Atlantic Electric is pleased to have this opportunity to provide our 
comments to the Commission on the exposure draft.
Very truly yours,
cc: Mr. L. E. Cooper
Vice President - Control
R. L. Leach
Vice President-Accounting
Eaton Corporation 
Eaton Canter
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
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June 30, 1987
Mr. G. Dewey A rn o ld , E x e c u tiv e  D ir e c to r
N a t io n a l Commis s io n  on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g
1701 P en n sy lva n ia  Avenue, N.W.
W ash ington, D.C. 20006
Dear N r. A rn o ld :
We have rev iew ed  th e  A p r i l  1987 Exposure D ra f t  R eport o f  
th e  N a tio n a l Commis s io n  on F ra u d u le n t R e p o rtin g  and 
a p p re c ia te  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  express o u r comme n ts .
We ta k e  h e a r t  th e  Commis s io n  has in d e p e n d e n tly  co n firm e d  
th e  v a lu e  o f  a number o f  th e  in t e r n a l  a c c o u n tin g  and 
o th e r  c o n t ro ls  w h ich  have been i mp le mented  a t  ou r 
company and mo s t o th e r  la rg e  p u b l ic  compan ie s  to  ensure 
f a i r  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  and guard  a g a in s t f ra u d u le n t  
f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .
O ffe re d  be low  f o r  th e  Commis s io n 's  c o n s id e ra t io n ,  a re  
o u r s u g g e s tio n s  f o r  f in e - tu n in g  th e  Commis s io n 's  
re co mme n d a tio n s .
C hapte r Two: Recomme n d a tio n s  For th e  P u b lic  Company
Recomme n d a tio n : P u b lic  comp an ie s  sh ou ld  ma in ta in
a c c o u n tin g  fu n c t io n s  th a t  can e f f e c t i v e ly  me e t t h e i r  
f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  o b l ig a t io n s .
Commen t : The t e x t  r e la te d  to  t h i s  re co mme n d a tio n  shou ld  
acknowledge i t  i s  th e  r o le  o f  th e  e n t i r e  to p  manageme n t 
team, n o t ju s t  th e  c h ie f  a c c o u n tin g  o f f i c e r ,  to  s e t th e  
to n e  o f  th e  comp a n y 's  e th ic a l  conduct p o l ic y .  O n ly  w ith  
th e  f u l l  s u p p o rt o f  a l l  o f  to p  manageme n t can th e  
a c c o u n tin g  fu n c t io n  and in te r n a l  c o n t ro l s y s te m 
re a s o n a b ly  be expected  to  guard  a g a in s t f ra u d u le n t  
f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  F u r th e r ,  th e  t e x t  shou ld  be 
re v is e d  to  s ta te  th e  e n t i r e  to p  manageme n t te a m, n o t 
j u s t  th e  c h ie f  a c c o u n tin g  o f f i c e r ,  sh o u ld  be h e ld  
re s p o n s ib le  f o r  f ra u d u le n t  r e p o r t in g .  There can e x is t  a
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num ber o f  in s ta n c e s  w h e re  mem bers o f  t h e  to p  m anagem ent 
te a m , a c t i n g  in d e p e n d e n t ly  o r  i n  c o l l u s i o n  w i t h o u t  th e  
k n o w le d g e  o f  th e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r ,  can  t a k e  
a c t io n s  t h a t  r e s u l t  i n  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
I t  i s  u n f a i r  t o  h o ld  th e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r  
p r i m a r i l y  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  t h i s  ty p e  o f  f r a u d .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : P u b l ic  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  m a in t a in  an
e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  s t a f f e d  w i t h  an  
a d e q u a te  num ber o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l a p p r o p r ia t e  t o  
th e  s i z e  a n d  th e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  com pany.
Com m ent: T h e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y in g  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n
s h o u ld  b e  r e v is e d  t o  i n d i c a t e  i t  m u st b e  m an ag em en t, n o t  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e , t h a t  a d o p ts  th e  d ocu m en t w h ic h  s e ts  
f o r t h  th e  s c o p e  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  th e  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t  f u n c t i o n .  T h e  a d o p t io n  o f  t h i s  docu m en t by  
m anagem ent i s  one w ay i n  w h ic h  th e  im p o r t a n t  r o l e  o f  th e  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  w i t h i n  th e  com pany ca n  be  
e m p h a s iz e d . I f  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  f o r m a l ly  a d o p t in g  
t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  
r e s t s  w i t h  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e , th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
f u n c t io n  may n o t  r e c e i v e  th e  f u l l  s u p p o r t  o f  m an ag em en t.
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : P u b l ic  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  e n s u r e  t h a t
t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n s  a r e  o b j e c t i v e .
Com m ent: T he  t e x t  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n
im p l ie s  t h a t  i t  i s  b e s t  f o r  th e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  
t o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t iv e  o f f i c e r .  O ur 
e x p e r ie n c e  i n d ic a t e s  th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  ca n  
p e r fo r m  v e r y  e f f e c t i v e l y  i f  i t  r e p o r t s  t o  th e  c h i e f  
f i n a n c i a l  o r  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r  o r  c o n t r o l l e r .
A t  o u r  com pany, a  num ber o f  t h e  a c c o u n t in g  f u n c t io n s  a r e  
d e c e n t r a l i z e d .  We b e l i e v e  t h e r e  i s  s u b s t a n t i a l  b e n e f i t  
t o  h a v in g  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  r e p o r t  i t s  a u d i t  
f i n d i n g s  r e l a t i n g  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  o p e r a t in g  l o c a t i o n  to  
t h e  c h i e f  c o r p o r a t e  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r  s in c e  t h i s  
a s s i s t s  h im  i n  d e t e r m in in g  w h e th e r  th e  r e c o r d s  o f  th e  
com pany a r e  b e in g  k e p t  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  g e n e r a l l y  
a c c e p te d  a c c o u n t in g  p r i n c i p l e s  an d  e s t a b l i s h e d  c o r p o r a te  
p o l i c i e s .  H o w e v e r, i n  o r d e r  t o  e n h a n c e  th e  r e p o r t i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  w i t h i n  o u r  
com pany, p r o v is io n s  h a v e  b een  made f o r  t h e  c h i e f  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  t o  h a v e  u n r e s t r i c t e d  a c c e s s  t o  th e  
in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  an d  t o  a n y  member o f  to p  
m an ag em en t. A ls o ,  th e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  i s  g iv e n
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u n r e s t r i c t e d  a c c e s s  t o  th e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  o f  th e  B o a rd  
o f  D i r e c t o r s  an d  ca n  m e e t w i t h  t h i s  C o m m itte e  w i t h o u t  
m em bers o f  to p  m anagem ent p r e s e n t .
T h e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y in g  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n  s h o u ld  be  
r e v i s e d  t o  i n d i c a t e  whom th e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  
r e p o r t s  t o  i s  n o t  as  im p o r t a n t  as  th e  e n t i r e  r e p o r t i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  an d  s h o u ld  r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  th e  r e p o r t i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  ca n  v a r y  fro m  com pany t o  com pany d e p e n d in g  
on th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s .
A n o th e r  s u g g e s t io n  r e g a r d in g  th e  t e x t  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  
re c o m m e n d a tio n  c o n c e rn s  t h e  r e q u ir e m e n t  f o r  th e  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t o r  t o  be t r a i n e d  i n  p u b l ic  o r  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g .  
D e p e n d in g  on  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s , th e  i n d i v i d u a l  who i s  i n  
c h a rg e  o f  le a d in g  th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  d e p a r tm e n t  can  
f u n c t io n  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  i f  th e y  p o s s e s s  
th e  n e c e s s a r y  l e a d e r s h i p ,  c o m m u n ic a tio n  an d  i n t e r ­
p e r s o n a l  s k i l l s  c o u p le d  w i t h  b ro a d  b u s in e s s  e x p e r ie n c e  
and  sound  ju d g e m e n t. A u d i t in g  e x p e r ie n c e  i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  s in c e  th e s e  s k i l l s  c a n  be  
d e v e lo p e d  b y  an  i n d i v i d u a l  w h ic h  o th e r w is e  h as  a l l  th e  
o t h e r  r e q u i r e d  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : T he  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  s h o u ld  a p p ro v e  i n
a d v a n c e  t h e  ty p e s  and  th e  e x t e n t  o f  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  
s e r v ic e s  t h a t  m anagem ent p la n s  t o  en g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  
in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l ic  a c c o u n ta n t  t o  p e r fo r m .
Com m ent: T he  p o t e n t i a l  e x i s t s  f o r  t h e  com pany t o  h a v e
an  im m e d ia te  n e e d  t o  u t i l i z e  th e  m anagem ent c o n s u l t in g  
s e r v ic e s  o f  i t s  p u b l ic  a c c o u n ta n ts .  F o r  e x a m p le , is s u e s  
r e l a t e d  t o  b u s in e s s  a c q u i s i t i o n s  an d  d i v e s t i t u r e s ,  
in co m e  t a x  is s u e s ,  a c c o u n t in g  an d  c o m p u te r  s y s te m s  may 
a r i s e  w h e re  i t  may be d is a d v a n ta g e o u s  f o r  th e  com pany to  
w a i t  u n t i l  t h e  n e x t  m e e t in g  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  i n  
o r d e r  t o  r e c e i v e  i t s  a p p r o v a l  t o  en g a g e  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  
a c c o u n ta n ts .  We s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y in g  t h i s  
re c o m m e n d a tio n  be r e v is e d  t o  a d d re s s  th e s e  ty p e s  o f  
s i t u a t i o n s  so  as  n o t  t o  h a n d c u f f  t h e  com pany. A 
s u g g e s t io n  w o u ld  be t o  g iv e  th e  com pany a p p r o v a l  f o r  
e n g a g in g  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  f o r  p r o je c t s  u n d e r  a  
c e r t a i n  f e e  l i m i t  and  p r o v id in g  f o r  an  a f t e r - t h e - f a c t  
r e v ie w  b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : A l l  p u b l ic  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  be r e q u i r e d
b y  SEC r u l e  t o  in c lu d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l r e p o r t s  t o  
s to c k h o ld e r s  a  l e t t e r  s ig n e d  b y  th e  c h a irm a n  o f  th e
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a u d i t  c o m m itte e  d e s c r ib in g  th e  c o m m it te e 's  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r in g  th e  y e a r .
Com m ent: T he  re c o m m e n d a tio n  f o r  a  s e p a r a te  a u d i t
c o m m itte e  l e t t e r  i n  th e  C om pan y 's  a n n u a l r e p o r t  s h o u ld  
be d ro p p e d . I n  m ost in s t a n c e s ,  t h i s  ty p e  o f  in f o r m a t io n  
i s  a l r e a d y  in c lu d e d  i n  th e  e x i s t i n g  r e p o r t  o f  m anagem ent 
i n  th e  a n n u a l r e p o r t  a n d , t h e r e f o r e ,  a d d in g  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m itte e  l e t t e r  w o u ld  be r e d u n d a n t .  A s u g g e s t io n  w o u ld  
be t o  p o s s ib ly  c l a r i f y  th e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  f o r  th e  c o n t e n t  
o f  th e  e x i s t i n g  r e p o r t  o f  m an ag em en t.
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : M anagem ent s h o u ld  a d v is e  th e  a u d i t
c o m m itte e  when i t  s e e k s  a  s e c o n d  o p in io n  on a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t in g  is s u e .
Com m ent: M anagem ent s h o u ld  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  a d v is e  th e
a u d i t  c o m m itte e  t h a t  i t  r e q u e s te d  fro m  a  p r e v io u s ly  
u n a s s o c ia te d  in d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n ta n t  a  sec o n d  o p in io n  on  
a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t in g  is s u e ,  o n ly  when th e  sec o n d  
o p in io n  was r e l i e d  on and  d i f f e r e d  fro m  t h e  o p in io n  o f  
th e  c o m p a n y 's  p r e s e n t  a c c o u n ta n ts .  As w r i t t e n ,  th e  
re c o m m e n d a tio n  may im ped e  m anagem ent fro m  e x e r c i s in g  i t s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  s e e k  th e  b e s t  a c c o u n t in g  t r e a t m e n t  f o r  
s i g n i f i c a n t  t r a n s a c t io n s .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : When a  p u b l ic  com pany c h an g es
in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l ic  a c c o u n ta n ts ,  i t  s h o u ld  be r e q u i r e d  b y  
SEC r u l e  t o  d is c lo s e  p u b l i c l y  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n y  m a t e r i a l  
a c c o u n t in g  o r  a u d i t i n g  is s u e s  d is c u s s e d  w i t h  th e  o ld  and  
new a u d i t o r s  d u r in g  t h e  t h r e e - y e a r  p e r io d  p r e c e d in g  th e  
c h a n g e .
Com m ent: T h is  re c o m m e n d a tio n  s h o u ld  be d ro p p e d  s in c e
th e  e x i s t i n g  SEC d is c lo s u r e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  a r e  a d e q u a te .  
O t h e r w is e ,  t h e  re c o m m e n d a tio n  s h o u ld  be r e v is e d  t o  
r e q u i r e  a  com pany t o  d is c l o s e  th e  m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t in g  
a n d  a u d i t i n g  is s u e s  d is c u s s e d  d u r in g  th e  l a s t  t h r e e  
y e a r s  w i t h  i t s  o ld  an d  new in d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n ta n ts  o n ly  
i f  th e  o p in io n s  o f  th e  new a c c o u n ta n ts  d i f f e r e d  fro m  th e  
o ld  a c c o u n ta n ts  an d  th e  com pany r e l i e d  on th e  o p in io n  o f  
t h e  new a c c o u n ta n ts .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : A u d i t  c o m m itte e s  s h o u ld  in c r e a s e  t h e i r
o v e r s ig h t  o f  th e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s . T h is  
o v e r s ig h t  s h o u ld  in c lu d e  a p p r o v in g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  
p r i o r  t o  p u b l ic  r e l e a s e .
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Comm e n t: T h is  re c o m m e n d a tio n  s h o u ld  be d ro p p e d  s in c e
th e  m o n th ly  and  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  o f  m ost 
l a r g e  p u b l ic  c o m p a n ie s  a r e  a l r e a d y  re v ie w e d  b y  t h e i r  
b o a rd s  o f  d i r e c t o r s .  R e q u ir in g  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  t o  
a p p ro v e  q u a r t e r l y  p r e s s  r e le a s e s  w o u ld  u n n e c e s s a r i ly  
d e la y  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t s  and  ad d  t o  th e  c o s ts  in v o lv e d  
w i t h o u t  a  c o r r e s p o n d in g  im p ro v e m e n t i n  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s .
V e r y  t r u l y  y o u r s ,
R .  L . L e a c h
CC: F E I
M API
NEMA
180
  Champion
Champion International Corporation 
Andrew C. Sigler
June 17, 1987
Dear M il :
These are our comments. Do w ith  
them what you w i l l .
S in c e re ly ,
ACS/dc
Champion International Corporation
Champion
To:
A ndrew  C . S i g l e r
D ate:
June 16, 1987
A
From:
Austin A. Moore
S ub ject:
Treadway Commission Exposure Draft
T he T re a d w a y  C o m m is s io n 's  e x p o s u re  d r a f t ,  d a te d  A p r i l  1 9 8 7 , c o n t a in s  
n um ero us re c o m m e n d a tio n s  d i r e c t e d  to w a rd s  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s , in d e p e n d e n t  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n ts ,  th e  SEC an d  o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  b o d ie s ,  a n d  e d u c a t o r s .  
T he c o m m is s io n  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e s e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  c a n :
-  Im p ro v e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  e n v ir o n m e n t  a n d  re d u c e  t h e  
in c id e n c e  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
-  Im p ro v e  a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s ,  th e  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  
an d  t h e  s y s te m  f o r  e n s u r in g  a u d i t  q u a l i t y ,  t h e r e b y  d e t e c t i n g  
f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  e a r l i e r  a n d  th u s  d e t e r  i t .
-  E n h a n c e  r e g u l a t o r y  e n fo r c e m e n t  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  d e t e r r e n c e .
-  E n h a n c e  t h e  e d u c a t io n  o f  f u t u r e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .
T h e  r e p o r t  a s  w r i t t e n  o f f e r s  c o n s t r u c t iv e  id e a s  w h ic h  i f  a d o p te d  c o u ld  
re d u c e  t h e  in c id e n c e  o f  a n d  im p ro v e  t h e  d e t e c t i o n  o f  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A lth o u g h  we i n  c o n t r o l  w o u ld  n o t  s u p p o r t  a l l  o f  
th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s , we g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  m a jo r  c o n c e p ts  
p r e s e n t e d .
Some o f  t h e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  we w o u ld  s u p p o r t  r e l a t e  t o :
-  M an ag em en t e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  p r o p e r  c o r p o r a t e  e n v ir o n m e n t  b y  
s e t t i n g  t h e  t o n e .
-  M a i n t a in in g  a  q u a l i f i e d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n .
-  * A u d i t  c o m m itte e s  com posed e n t i r e l y  o f  in d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s .
-  A u d i t  c o m m itte e s  b e in g  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e v ie w  b o t h  t h e  t y p e  an d  
e x t e n t  o f  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  s e r v i c e s .
We do n o t  s u p p o r t  a s ta t e m e n t  i n  t h e  a n n u a l r e p o r t  d o c u m e n tin g  
m a n a g e m e n t’ s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s u c h  r e p o r t s  a n d  in c l u d i n g  a  s ta t e m e n t  
b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  r e g a r d in g  i t s  r o l e .  A lth o u g h  th e s e
re c o m m e n d a tio n s  w o u ld  b e  i n f o r m a t i v e  t o  t h e  u s e r s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s ,  th e y  w o u ld  n o t  c o n t r i b u t e  a n y t h in g  to w a r d  a s s e s s in g ,  
p r e v e n t in g  o r  d e t e c t i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
R e g a r d in g  th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  to  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n ts ,  we 
a g r e e  w i t h :
-  I n v o l v i n g  n o n - p u b l ic  a c c o u n t in g  p r o f e s s io n a ls  in  t h e  a u d i t i n g  
s ta n d a r d s  s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s .
-  E s t a b l i s h i n g  an d  c o m m u n ic a tin g  m o re  c l e a r l y  t h e  a u d i t o r ’ s r o l e  
r e g a r d in g  th e  r e v ie w  an d  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t in g  
c o n t r o l s .
We do n o t  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t  s h o u ld  b e  h e ld  
t o  a  h ig h e r  s t a n d a r d  f o r  d e t e c t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
We b e l i e v e  s t r o n g l y  t h a t  im p le m e n t in g  s y s te m s  t o  p r e v e n t  an d  d e t e c t  
f r a u d  i s  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  m anagem ent a n d  c a n  o n ly  b e  e f f e c t i v e l y  
c o n t r o l l e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t. T h e  c o n c e rn  i s  t h a t  h o ld in g  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t  t o  a  h ig h e r  s t a n d a r d  f o r  d e t e c t i o n  w i l l  l e a d  t o  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s ts  w i t h  o n ly  m a r g in a l  im p ro v e m e n ts , i f  a n y ,  
i n  a u d i t  q u a l i t y .
We g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  r e g u l a t o r y  
a g e n c ie s  a n d  f o r  e d u c a t io n .
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  c o m m is s io n ’ s re c o m m e n d a tio n s  o f f e r  a  g oo d  b a s e  f o r  
d is c u s s io n s  r e g a r d in g  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  E ach  
re c o m m e n d a tio n  s h o u ld  b e  v ie w e d  on i t s  own a n d  e v a lu a t e d  fr o m  a  
c o s t / b e n e f i t  s t a n d p o i n t .
AAM: hb
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June 30, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I  am a r e t i r e d  chairman o f Peat, M arw ick, M itc h e ll  & C o., hav ing  spent most 
o f my p ro fe s s io n a l ca ree r in  the  accoun ting  and a u d it in g  aspects o f the  
p ra c t ic e  o f p u b lic  accountancy. In  a d d it io n ,  I  served fo u r  years as a 
member and la te r  another th re e  years as chairman o f the  AICPA committee on 
a u d it in g  procedure (now a u d it in g  standards board) and s im ila r  pe rio ds  o f 
tim e as member and chairman o f the  AICPA committee on SEC R e g u la tio n s . I  
now serve as an o u ts id e  d i r e c to r ,  in c lu d in g  membership on the  a u d it  
committee o f one New York Stock Exchange Company re g is te re d  w ith  the  SEC. 
A lthough my ca ree r in  p u b lic  accoun ting  p ra c t ic e  no doubt in flu e n c e s  my 
o p in io n s  on the  m atte rs  about which I  w i l l  comment, I  make my comments 
p r im a r i ly  from  my c u rre n t p e rsp e c tive  o f board member and a u d it  committee 
member.
I  have read your May 1, 1987 d r a f t  re p o r t w ith  co n s ide rab le  in te r e s t  and 
agree w h o le -h e a rte d ly  w ith  the genera l th ru s t  o f the re p o r t .  The 
commission is  to  be commended fo r  i t s  thorough in v e s t ig a t io n  and 
comprehensive d r a f t  re p o r t .
There are a few m a tte rs , however, about which I  b e lie v e  the  commission 
should g iv e  a d d it io n a l c a re fu l c o n s id e ra tio n  and e ith e r  change o r d e le te  
some o f the  recommendations con ta ined  in  the  d r a f t  r e p o r t .
Near the  end o f page 38 the  commission recommends th a t the a u d it  committee 
should approve in  advance the  types and e x te n t o f management s e rv ice s  to  be 
perform ed by the  independent a u d ito r ,  thus s tro n g ly  im p ly in g  th a t such 
se rv ice s  may ve ry  w e ll im p a ir the  independence o f the a u d ito r .  In  the 
f i r s t  p la ce , I  th in k  such procedure would be ve ry  cumbersome, to  say the 
le a s t ,  and would d iscourage companies from  u t i l i z i n g  a p p ro p ria te  se rv ice s  
o f t h e i r  independent p u b lic  accoun tan ts . I  have no o b je c t io n  to ,  and I  
th in k  i t  a p p ro p ria te  f o r ,  the  a u d it  committee to  rev iew  a n n u a lly  a l l  o f the 
se rv ice s  to  the company th a t have been perform ed by the  independent 
accoun ting  f i r m .  Th is  is  f re q u e n t ly  be ing done a lre a d y  by a u d it  
com m ittees, e s p e c ia lly  those o f p u b l ic ly  h e ld  companies a u d ited  by members 
o f the  SEC p ra c t ic e  s e c tio n  o f the  American I n s t i t u t e  o f C e r t i f ie d  P u b lic  
A ccountants.
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I n  th e  t e x t  o f  th e  r e p o r t  on p ag e  3 9 , th e  c o m m is s io n  v e r y  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  
c a l l s  a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  n e i t h e r  i t s  own r e s e a r c h  s tu d y  n o r  an y  
p r e v io u s  s t u d ie s  c o u ld  f i n d  e v e n  one a c t u a l  c a s e  w h e re  in d e p e n d e n c e  was 
co m p ro m ised  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r  p e r fo r m in g  m anagem ent 
a d v is o r y  s e r v i c e s . The r e p o r t  th e n  goes on t o  s t a t e  t h a t ,  n o n e t h e le s s ,  
t h e r e  d oes  e x i s t  i n  some q u a r t e r s  a  p e r c e p t io n  a lo n g  th e s e  l i n e s .  I  a g re e  
w i t h  th e s e  f a c t u a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  g iv e n  th e  f a c t s  as  s t a t e d ,  j u s t  
s im p le  i n t e l l e c t u a l  h o n e s ty  w o u ld  seem t o  d i c t a t e  t h a t  th e  c o m m is s io n
c o n c lu d e  t h a t  n o t h in g  s h o u ld  be done t o  e x a c e r b a t e  th e  p e r c e p t io n  ( r e a l l y  
m is p e r c e p t io n )  t h a t  a l r e a d y  e x i s t s  i n  some q u a r t e r s  b y  fo c u s in g  e v e n  m ore  
a t t e n t i o n  on (a n d  u n j u s t i f i c a b l y  f u r t h e r  t a i n t i n g )  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f
m anagem ent a d v is o r y  s e r v i c e s .  I  h a v e  no p ro b le m  w i t h  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  
r e v ie w in g  e a c h  y e a r  a l l  s e r v ic e s  t h a t  w e re  p e r fo rm e d  b y  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  
a c c o u n t in g  f i r m ,  and  e v e n  d is c l o s u r e  o f  t o t a l  f e e s  r e c e iv e d  fro m  th e  
com pany f o r  a l l  k in d s  o f  s e r v i c e s .  B u t I  do n o t  t h i n k  i t  i s  a p p r o p r ia t e  
f o r  th e  c o m m is s io n  to  s u g g e s t a s  a  g u i d e l i n e  t h a t  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e
s h o u ld  b e  e s p e c i a l l y  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  th e  m a g n itu d e  o f  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  
s e r v ic e s  fe e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a n n u a l a u d i t  f e e .  P r o f e s s io n a l  fe e s  a r e  
p r o f e s s io n a l  f e e s ,  so why s i n g l e  o u t  one p o r t io n  o f  th o s e  fe e s  as  b e in g  
im p o r t a n t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  some o t h e r  p o r t io n ?  The k e y  is s u e  r e a l l y  i s ,  o r  
s h o u ld  b e ,  th e  n a t u r e  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  s e r v ic e s  r e n d e r e d ,  i . e .  w h e th e r  th e  
a c c o u n t in g  f i r m  i s  a s s i s t i n g  and  a d v is in g  (w h ic h  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e )  as
c o n t r a s t e d  t o  m a k in g  m anagem ent d e c is io n s  (w h ic h  is  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e ) .
A re c o m m e n d a tio n  i s  made on p age  41 t h a t  a l l  p u b l ic  c o m p a n ie s  be r e q u ir e d  
t o  in c lu d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l r e p o r t s  a l e t t e r  s ig n e d  by th e  c h a irm a n  o f  th e  
a u d i t  c o m m itte e  d e s c r ib in g  th e  c o m m it te e 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and  a c t i v i t i e s  
d u r in g  th e  y e a r .  I t  seems to  me t h a t  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e 's  a c t i v i t i e s  can  
b e ,  and o f t e n  a r e ,  a d e q u a t e ly  d e s c r ib e d  i n  th e  r e p o r t  b y  m anagem ent i n  th e  
a n n u a l r e p o r t  and a ls o  in  th e  p ro x y  s t a t e m e n t .  I  do n o t  t h i n k  i t  i s  e i t h e r  
n e c e s s a r y  o r  d e s i r a b l e  to  h a v e  y e t  an  a d d i t i o n a l  r e p o r t  i n  th e  a n n u a l  
r e p o r t  t o  s h a r e h o ld e r s .
The seco nd  re c o m m e n d a tio n  on p age  42  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  when a  p u b l ic  com pany  
ch ang es  in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s ,  i t  s h o u ld  d is c l o s e  p u b l i c l y  th e  n a t u r e  o f  a n y  
m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t in g  o r  a u d i t i n g  is s u e s  d is c u s s e d  w i t h  i t s  o ld  and new  
a u d i t o r s  d u r in g  th e  p a s t  t h r e e  y e a r s .  A lth o u g h  I  h a v e  no o b j e c t i o n  to  w h a t 
a p p e a rs  t o  be th e  i n t e n t  o f  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n , i t  does  seem t o  me t h a t  
th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n  s h o u ld  be c h an g ed  s l i g h t l y  t o  m ake i t  c l e a r  t h a t  
r e p o r t a b l e  is s u e s  be l i m i t e d  t o  th o s e  d is c u s s e d  w i t h  b o th  th e  o ld  and  th e  
new a u d i t o r s .  O t h e r w is e ,  th e  r e p o r t i n g  w o u ld  in c lu d e  a  m u l t i t u d e  o f
m a t e r i a l  m a t t e r s  d is c u s s e d  o v e r  th e  p a s t  t h r e e  y e a r s  w i t h  o n ly  th e  o ld
a u d i t o r s .  I  do n o t  t h i n k  t h i s  was in t e n d e d .
N e a r  th e  end  o f  p a g e  42  th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n  i s  made t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m itte e s  
s h o u ld  a p p ro v e  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l ic  r e l e a s e .  I n
m an y , i f  n o t  m o s t , c a s e s  t h i s  w o u ld  be an  undue b u rd e n  on th e  a u d i t
c o m m it te e , w o u ld  u n d u ly  d e la y  th e  is s u a n c e  o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  
s ta te m e n ts  and  e v e n  c r e a t e  m ore p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n s i d e r  t r a d i n g .  Some 
c o m p a n ie s  do f o l l o w  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  h a v in g  th e  a u d i t  e n g ag em en t p a r t n e r ,  
a f t e r  h a v in g  c o m p le te d  th e  r e v ie w  o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  d a t a ,  h a v e  some
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The re c o m m e n d a tio n s  n e a r  th e  b o t to m  o f  p age  50 r e g a r d in g  a d d i t i o n a l  
s ta n d a rd s  f o r  c o n c u r r in g  p a r t n e r  r e v ie w s  a p p e a r ,  on t h e i r  f a c e ,  to  be  
a lm o s t m o th e rh o o d  and  i t  i s  som ew hat d i f f i c u l t  to  e x p re s s  o b j e c t i o n  to  
th o s e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s . I  d o , h o w e v e r , q u e s t io n  th e  p r a c t i c a l i t y  o f  
l i t e r a l l y  c o m p ly in g  w i t h  a l l  o f  th e s e  s u g g e s t io n s  i n  a l l  c a s e s .  The  
s u g g e s t io n s  c o u ld  p o s s ib ly  be im p le m e n te d  i n  m ost c a s e s  i n  v e r y  l a r g e  
a c c o u n t in g  f i r m s ,  b u t  I  q u e s t io n  t h e i r  p r a c t i c a l i t y  i n  m any c a s e s  f o r  
s m a l le r  a c c o u n t in g  f i r m s .
B e g in n in g  on p age  5 5 , th e  c o m m is s io n  recom m ends t h a t  th e  a u d i t i n g  s ta n d a r d s  
b o a rd  be r e o r g a n iz e d  so t h a t  o ne  h a l f  o f  th e  mem bers o f  t h a t  b o a rd  be  
e i t h e r  p e o p le  who a r e  n o t  C P A 's  o r  a r e  C P A 's  no lo n g e r  i n  p u b l ic  p r a c t i c e .  
I  b e l i e v e  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n  t o  b e  f a t a l l y  f l a w e d .  A u d i t in g  s ta n d a r d s  
s h o u ld  be s e t  b y  p e o p le  who a r e  c u r r e n t l y  e n g a g e d  i n ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  w e re  v e r y  
r e c e n t l y  e n g a g e d  i n ,  a u d i t i n g  w o r k . My own e x p e r ie n c e  as  mem ber and  l a t e r  
c h a irm a n  o f  th e  a u d i t i n g  s ta n d a r d s  b o a rd  ( t h e n  c o m m itte e  on a u d i t i n g  
p r o c e d u r e )  t e l l s  me t h a t  n o n - p r a c t i t i o n e r s  ( u s u a l l y  tw o  on th e  c o m m it te e )  
made s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r ib u t i o n s  to  th e  p ro c e s s  o c c a s i o n a l l y ,  b u t  c e r t a i n l y  
n o t  v e r y  o f t e n .  Some s o r t  o f  a d v is o r y  c o u n c i l  w o u ld  a p p e a r  t o  be th e  way  
t o  g e t  e f f e c t i v e  n o n - p r a c t i t i o n e r  in p u t  and  i n f l u e n c e .  You w i l l  r e c a l l ,  
h o w e v e r , t h a t  t h i s  was t r i e d  a t  th e  t im e  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  th e  a u d i t i n g  
s ta n d a rd s  b o a rd  and  i t  d id  n o t  p ro v e  t o  be e f f e c t i v e .  M aybe i t  s h o u ld  be  
t r i e d  a g a in  w i t h  some d i f f e r e n t  f o r m a t ,  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o r  
d i f f e r e n t  a u t h o r i t y  and  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  F o r  e x a m p le , one a p p ro a c h  m ig h t  
be to  h a v e  th e  a d v is o r y  c o u n c i l  e x p r e s s  i t s  v ie w s ,  c o n c u r r in g  o r  o t h e r w is e ,  
w i t h  a n y  s ta n d a r d  p ro m u lg a te d  by th e  a u d i t i n g  s ta n d a r d s  b o a r d .  I  c a u t io n  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  j u s t  an  a p p ro a c h  t h a t  m ig h t  be c o n s id e r e d .
A g a in ,  I  commend th e  c o m m is s io n  f o r  i t s  w o rk  and  th e  g e n e r a l  t h r u s t  o f  th e  
r e p o r t .  I  a ls o  a p p r e c ia t e  t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  comment r e g a r d in g  th e  a b o v e  
m e n tio n e d  m a t t e r s  w h ic h  I  b e l i e v e  n e e d  v e r y  c a r e f u l  r e c o n s id e r a t i o n  b y  th e  
c o m m is s io n .
c o n t a c t  b y  te le p h o n e  o r  o t h e r w is e  w i t h  th e  c h a irm a n  o f  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e
r e g a r d in g  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  q u a r t e r l y  r e v ie w  and  a n y th in g  e l s e  t h a t  th e
tw o  o f  th em  m ig h t  w an t t o  d is c u s s .  I  h a v e  no o b j e c t i o n  t o  such  a
p r o c e d u r e ,  b u t  t h i s  i s  f a r  s h o r t  o f  r e q u i r i n g  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  to
f o r m a l ly  a p p ro v e  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  p r i o r  t o  p u b l ic  r e l e a s e .
S in c e r e l y  y o u r
Thomas L .  H o l to n
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W a s h in g t o n  DC 2 0 0 0 6
S u b j e c t :  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t
D e a r  S i r s :
On b e h a l f  o f  N o r t o n  C o m p a n y , I  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  c o n v e y  o u r  
p o s i t i v e  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t .
We a r e  g e n e r a l l y  c o m p ly in g  w i t h  t h e  R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  
P u b l i c  C o m p a n ie s ,  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
1 .  O u r  A u d i t  C o m m it te e  C h a ir m a n  d o e s  n o t  w r i t e  a  
l e t t e r  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  C o m m i t t e e 's  f u n c t i o n  f o r  
i n c l u s i o n  i n  o u r  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s ,  
a n d
2 .  O u r  A u d i t  C o m m it te e  d o e s  n o t  r e v i e w  a n d  a p p r o v e  
t h e  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  
r e l e a s e .
We do not believe that the above two activities are necessary 
given the charter and oversight role of our Audit Committee. 
Further, we doubt that a meaningful review of each quarter's 
financial results could be completed by the Audit Committee 
on a timely basis.
We will be interested to learn of the responses of other 
public companies to these two recommendations, and their 
treatment in your final report.
We expect our external auditors Arthur Young & Co. to respond 
to the exposure draft recommendations for the Independent 
Public Accountant and to the recommendations to the SEC and 
Others to Improve the Regulatory and Legal Environment.
We commend the Commission's work and hope that it will result 
in improvement in financial reporting.
Sincerely,
Frederick G. Crocker, Jr.
Vice President & Controller 
and Chief Accounting Officer
MFM
ARG
JGM
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J u l y  8 ,  1 98 7
M r .  G . D ew ey A r n o ld  
E x e c u t iv e  D i r e c t o r
T h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t in g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e  N .W .
W a s h in g to n ,  DC 2 0 0 0 6
D e a r M r .  A r n o l d :
I n  a l e t t e r  d a te d  J u n e  2 9 ,  1 9 8 7 ,  t h e  M a n a g e m e n t A c c o u n t in g
P r a c t i c e s  C o m m it te e  (MAP) o £  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  
A c c o u n t a n t s  (NAA) p r o v id e d  o v e r a l l  c o m m e n ts  o n  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  
R e p o r t  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n .  S u b s e q u e n t  t o  t h e  d e t a i l e d  
d e l i b e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  MAP C o m m it te e ,  NAA r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  M e s s r s .
D . W. B a k e r ,  J .  F .  C h i r o n n a ,  W. J .  I h l a n f e l d t ,  A .  M . K in g ,  a n d  I  
m e t w i t h  C h a irm a n  Ja m e s  C . T re a d w a y  i n  S a n  D ie g o ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  o n  
J u n e  2 4 ,  p r i o r  t o  h i s  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  N A A 's  1 9 8 7  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C o n fe r e n c e .  T h e  s p e c i f i c  p u r p o s e  o f  o u r  m e e t in g  w as t o  
f a m i l a r i z e  M r .  T re a d w a y  w i t h  t h e  im p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  NAA 
b e l i e v e s  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p r o g r a m  o f  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  C e r t i f i e d  
M a n a g e m e n t A c c o u n t a n t s  c a n  m ake i n  f u r t h e r a n c e  o f  t h e  
C o m m is s io n 's  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  im p ro v e m e n t  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n y 's  o v e r a l l  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  A t  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  
o f  o u r  m e e t in g ,  M r .  T re a d w a y  i n v i t e d  NAA t o  s u b m i t  w r i t t e n  
c o m m e n ts  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  C o m m is s io n .
We a s k  t h e  C o m m is s io n  t o  a g r e e  w i t h  o u r  v ie w  t h a t  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  f i n a n c i a l  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  b o t h  t h o s e  p r e p a r in g  t h e  s t a t e m e n ts  
a n d  m o re  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h o s e  s i g n in g  t h e  s t a t e m e n ts  o n  b e h a l f  o f  
c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  b e s t  w ay o f  a c h ie v in g  t h e
C o m m is s io n 's  o b j e c t i v e s .  C e r t i f i c a t i o n  i n v o l v e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
a s p e c t s :
. D e m o n s t r a t io n  o f  a  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  k n o w le d g e .
• A g re e m e n t  t o  a b id e  b y  a c o d e  o f  e t h i c a l  c o n d u c t ,  w h ic h  i n  
t u r n  m e a ns  t h a t  a c e r t i f i c a t e  c a n  b e  w i t h d r a w n  f o r  n o n -  
c o m p l ia n c e .
. A r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e d u c a t i o n .
We d o  n o t  e x p e c t  y o u r  C o m m is s io n  t o  re co m m e n d  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  
a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m is s io n  (SEC) t h a t  t h o s e  s ig n in g  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n ts  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  SEC m u s t  h a v e  a c e r t i f i c a t e  
im m e d ia t e l y .  A lo n g - r a n g e  g o a l  f o r  t h e  SEC w o u ld  b e  t o  r e q u i r e  
s u c h  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h i n  a 10 t o  15 y e a r  p e r i o d .  T h is  w o u ld  g e t  
t h e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r c e s  i n t o  p l a y  v e r y  q u i c k l y .  We re co m m e nd  y o u r
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NAA, th r o u g h  i t s  C e r t i f i e d  M anagem ent A c c o u n ta n t  (CMA) p ro g ra m , 
p r o v id e s  a m e th o d  f o r  c o m p a n ie s  t o  re s p o n d  p o s i t i v e l y  t o  s e v e r a l  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  i n  th e  C o m m is s io n 's R e p o r t .  T he  CMA p ro g ra m , 
s i m i l a r  t o  th e  CPA p ro g ra m , m e a s u re s  th e  k n o w le d g e  o f  
a c c o u n ta n ts .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  th e  CMA p ro g ra m  t e s t s  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  
t o  a p p ly  t h i s  k n o w le d g e  t o  b u s in e s s ,  a c c o u n t in g ,  and f i n a n c i a l  
m anagem ent p r o b le m s .  T he  a c c o u n ta n t  who h a s  e a rn e d  th e  CMA h a s  
m e t p r o f e s s io n a l  s ta n d a r d s  b y :
. p r o v id in g  e v id e n c e  o f  e d u c a t io n a l  a t t a in m e n t ,
. a g r e e in g  t o  a b id e  b y  S ta n d a rd s  o f  E t h i c a l  C o n d u c t f o r  
M anagem ent A c c o u n ta n ts ,
. s u c c e s s f u l l y  c o m p le t in g  a r ig o r o u s  tw o  and o n e - h a l f  d a y  
e x a m in a t io n ,
* p r o v id in g  e v id e n c e  o f  a t  l e a s t  tw o  y e a r s  e x p e r ie n c e  i n  
p o s i t i o n s  a p p ly in g  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  m anagem ent a c c o u n t in g ,
* a g r e e in g  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  c o n t in u in g  p r o f e s s io n a l  
d e v e lo p m e n t .
S in c e  i t s  i n c e p t io n  i n  1 9 7 2 , m o re  th a n  7 ,0 0 0  i n d i v i d u a l s  h a ve  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  p a s s e d  th e  CMA e x a m in a t io n  and  m e t o t h e r  n e c e s s a ry  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  o b t a in in g  and  m a in t a in in g  c e r t i f i c a t i o n .  M ore  
th a n  8 ,0 0 0  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  e x a m in a t io n  
p r o c e s s ,  w h ic h  o r d i n a r i l y  r e q u i r e s  m o re  th a n  o n e  s i t t i n g  f o r  i t s  
s u c c e s s f u l  c o m p le t io n .  The  " p a s s "  r a t e  o f  s l i g h t l y  o v e r  40% f o r  
a n y  o ne  s e g m e n t o f  th e  e x a m in a t io n  i s  a b o u t  th e  same e x p e r ie n c e  
a s  r e p o r t e d  f o r  th e  CPA e x a m in a t io n .  M e m b e rs h ip  i n  NAA i s  n o t  a 
r e q u i s i t e  f o r  b e in g  a CMA, o r  s i t t i n g  f o r  th e  exam .
T he  a re a s  o f  k n o w le d g e  i n  w h ic h  CMAs h a ve  d e m o n s tra te d  t h e i r  
c o m p e te n c e  a re  d i f f e r e n t  f ro m  th o s e  o f  CPAs. T h e s e  a re a s  a re  
d i r e c t l y  r e le v a n t  t o  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  m anagem ent a c c o u n t in g  and 
f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t, and  i n  la r g e  p a r t  r e c o g n iz e  th e  a re a s  o f  
m anagem ent c o m p e te n c e  and  e t h i c s  t h a t  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  R e p o r t  
a ls o  s t r o n g l y  e m p h a s iz e s .  T h is  r e le v a n c e  c a n  be s e e n  b y  th e  
c o v e ra g e  o f  t h e  CMA e x a m in a t io n .  The  f i v e  a re a s  in c lu d e :  
E c o n o m ic s  and B u s in e s s  F in a n c e ;  O r g a n iz a t io n  and  B e h a v io r ,  
I n c l u d i n g  E t h i c a l  C o n s id e r a t io n s ;  P u b l i c  R e p o r t in g  S ta n d a r d s ,  
A u d i t i n g  and  T a x e s ;  I n t e r n a l  R e p o r t in g  and  A n a ly s i s ;  and  D e c is io n  
A n a ly s i s ,  I n c lu d in g  M o d e l in g  and  I n f o r m a t io n  S y s te m s .
f i n a l  r e p o r t  c o n t a in  a re c o m m e n d a t io n  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t .  A t  t h i s
p o i n t  we w o u ld  l i k e  t o  e x p la in  N A A 's  C e r t i f i c a t e  i n  M anagem ent
A c c o u n t in g  p ro g ra m  and  how i t ,  among o t h e r s ,  w o u ld  f i t  t h i s
re c o m m e n d a t io n .
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The nature and content of the CMA program currently relate to 
several of the Commission's recommendations. The program 
provides a way for management, audit committees, and statement 
users to be more reasonably assured about the quality and 
competence of accounting personnel if today's accountants 
(tomorrow's financial executives) become CMAs. The broad base of 
the examination subject matter provides CMAs the opportunity to 
reflect understanding of the general nature of internal controls 
as suggested in the Report as well as the more specific issues of 
internal accounting controls and internal audit functions. The 
CMA program currently addresses external reporting requirements 
and regulations. The examinations contain questions on ethical 
situations which require the prospective CMA to discuss ethical 
issues and possible solutions. The focus of the program has been 
on the role of the management accountant in participating with 
and supporting management in its decision-making activities. 
Also covered is the development of information for external 
purposes.
The current content of the CMA examination should encourage 
schools to modify curricula along the lines suggested in the 
Commission's Report. The examination already includes coverage 
of internal controls, reporting regulations, and business ethics. 
The nature of the examination requires prospective CMAs to apply 
analysis and judgment to reach solutions to the questions. As 
developments and expansions of responsibilities for managements 
and management accountants in this area occur, the Board of 
Regents for the CMA program is prepared to consider appropriate 
modifications in the program. Additional details on the CMA 
program appear in the enclosed CMA Program Announcement.
Given the background of an ever-expanding CMA program, we are of 
the opinion that anything that can be done to expand the use and 
application of the CMA program will directly serve the objectives 
of the Commission's Report. We believe the CMA program, with its 
coverage on organization, behavior, ethical considerations, 
public reporting standards, auditing, internal auditing, internal 
reporting and analysis, and decision analysis is the most firmly 
established and comprehensive professional development program 
that is directed toward furthering the Report's conclusions on 
the "Accounting Function and Chief Accounting Officer."
Very candidly, both NAA and the Institute of Certified Management 
Accountants would benefit from any explicit recognition for the 
CMA program that the Commission integrates into the final Report. 
There will be a greater number of financial professionals serving 
companies who will be in a better position to carry out their 
responsibilities as recommended by the Commission. In several 
places the report broadly alludes to these matters, but makes no 
specific reference to the  C M A  p r o g r a m . We suggest that the
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following are illustrations of portions of the Report where the 
Commisssion may wish to include specific reference to the CMA 
program and to certification of statement preparers:
Page 32
"The Financial Executives Institute (FEI) and the National 
Association of Accountants (NAA) play active roles in 
enhancing the financial reporting process by sponsoring 
research, technical professional guidance, and continuing 
professional education and by participating in the shaping of 
standards.”
Page 75
"The process of educating present and future participants in 
the financial reporting system can take place in the 
undergraduate and graduate business school classroom, in 
continuing education programs..."
Page 80
"The AICPA examination for accountants (the CPA examination) 
has an especially strong influence on accounting curricula. 
Accordingly, the AICPA's Board of Examiners as well as the 
Boards of Examiners of the IIA and NAA should modify future 
professional certification examinations in light of the 
recommendations in this report.."
We very much appreciate this opportunity to respond to Mr. 
Treadway's suggestion that we furnish the Commission with a more 
detailed description of the matters covered with him on June 24 
in San Diego. We hope that these comments have been helpful to 
the Commission and that the Commission will amend the final 
report to incorporate the suggestions we have offered above. NAA 
looks forward to some future date, even if it is 10-15 years in 
the future, when a significant number of senior financial 
officers signing the Management Report for U.S. corporations will 
have successfully participated in the CMA certification program. 
Please be sure to contact us if we can furnish any further 
information or if you would like NAA representatives to meet with 
the Commission or Commission Staff for additional discussion.
We would also like to take this opportunity to comment on the 
following recommendation that was not addressed by the MAP 
Committee:
"The Commission's sponsoring organizations should establish a 
body to guide public companies on internal controls.”
This strikes us as an excellent idea and we would be pleased to 
jointly explore the concept developing such guidelines. It 
may not be necessary for such a body to have a permanent life.
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Rather, its charter could be to develop guidelines following 
adequate due process, publish findings, and then disband until 
such time as it appears necessary to update the guidelines to 
reflect ongoing developments. To the extent appropriate, NAA is 
prepared to assume a leadership role in organizing such a body.
We commend the Commission on the excellent job it is doing in 
dealing with this extremely complex subject. As mentioned in the 
MAP Committee's letter of June 29, 1987, NAA stands ready to 
assist in the publicizing and distribution of the Commission's 
final report.
Sincerely,
John C. Arme 
President
cc: J. Treadway, PaineWebber Inc
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LAWRENCE B. SKATOFF 
Vice President 
and Controller
Monsanto Company 
800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard 
St. Louis, Missouri 63167 
Phone: (314) 694-8405
June 3 0 , 1987
M r. James C. T readw ay, J r .  
C ha irm an
N a t io n a l  C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W. 
W a s h in g to n , D . C. 20006
D ea r M r. T readw ay:
I  am p le a s e d  t o  p r e s e n t  M onsanto  Com pany's comments on th e  e xp o su re  d r a f t  o f  
th e  r e p o r t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .
M onsanto  i s  m ost s u p p o r t iv e  o f  th e  o b je c t iv e s  o f  th e  C om m iss ion . Our 
p o l i c ie s  and p r a c t ic e s  a lr e a d y  a c h ie v e  th e s e  o b je c t iv e s  as th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  
th e  C o m m iss io n 's  recom m enda tio ns  have been  o p e r a t io n a l  a t  M onsanto  f o r  many 
y e a r s .
T h e re  a re  c e r t a in  re co m m e n d a tio n s , h o w e ve r, w h ic h  we b e l ie v e  a re  n o t  i n  th e  
b e s t  in t e r e s t s  o f  th e  p u b l i c .  We o f f e r  th e  f o l lo w in g  comments f o r  y o u r  
c o n s id e r a t io n .
I .  A u d i t  C om m ittee  O v e rs ig h t  R o le
The C om m ission recommends t h a t  a u d i t  co m m itte e s  a p p ro ve  f i n a n c ia l  
r e p o r ts  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  p u b l ic  r e le a s e .  We a g re e  t h a t  a u d i t  co m m itte e s  
s h o u ld  be c lo s e ly  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  p ro c e s s .
H ow ever, r e q u i r in g  a u d i t  co m m itte e s  to  p a r t i c ip a t e  d i r e c t l y  i n  th e  
s p e c i f i c s  o f  in t e r im  (and  a n n u a l)  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  i s  c o n t r a r y  to  
th e  r o le  o f  th e  a u d i t  co m m itte e  o r  any  co m m itte e  o f  th e  b o a rd  o f  
d i r e c t o r s .  T h is  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  d e la y in g  th e  p re s s  re le a s e s  o f  f in a n ­
c i a l  r e s u l t s  t o  th e  p u b l ic  and w i l l  cause com panies t o  in c u r  a d d i t io n a l  
c o s ts .
We b e l ie v e  a u d i t  co m m itte e s  s e rv e  an im p o r ta n t  f u n c t io n  i n  com pan ies . 
H ow ever, t h a t  r o le  i s  m os t e f f e c t i v e l y  s e rv e d  as one o f  o v e r s ig h t  —  
n o t  d i r e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  The a u d i t  c o m m itte e  s h o u ld  have a th o ro u g h  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  sys tem s t h a t  d e v e lo p  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r ts  and th e  
c o n t r o l  e x e rc is e d  b y  management o v e r  th o s e  s y s te m s . F u r t h e r ,  t h a t  
co m m itte e  s h o u ld  r e g u la r l y  re v ie w  th o s e  sys tem s and p ro b e  f o r  weak­
nesses in h e r e n t  i n  them . I n  o u r  v ie w ,  advance a p p ro v a l o f  q u a r t e r ly
2financial reports for release to the public is an inappropriate 
responsibility for the audit committee.
We are also concerned that implementation of this recommendation could 
result in needless delays in financial reporting. Our Audit Committee 
is composed of a diverse group of members, in terms of both background 
and geographic location. Requiring a timely review of quarterly 
financial reports (both press releases and Form 10-Q filings) would 
necessitate special meetings that will increase costs and likely delay 
the release of financial information. We suspect that, for the vast 
majority of corporations, investors and analysts would prefer to 
receive information at the earliest possible date, as opposed to 
waiting for a committee of the board of directors to review and 
approve that data. An additional consideration is scheduling audit 
committee meetings within the SEC-mandated 45 day reporting deadline 
for Form 10-Q filings.
II. Review of Quarterly Financial Results by Independent Public Accountants
The Commission recommends that the SEC require timely reviews by a 
company's auditors of interim financial reports. Under current SEC 
rules, auditors are permitted to review quarterly financial data after 
the fact, or at year-end as part of the annual audit.
As with the Commission's recommendation on audit committee participa­
tion in the interim financial reporting process, we are concerned that 
requiring such reviews by auditors could needlessly delay the release 
of financial reports.
III. Impact of Nonfinancial Audit Findings
The Commission recommends that internal auditors consider the implica­
tions of their nonfinancial audit findings for the company's financial 
statements. We find this recommendation vague and are uncertain 
whether the Commission is suggesting that internal auditors change the 
scope of their audit plan or that the scope of audits should be 
extended. We suggest the Commission clarify this recommendation in 
the final report.
IV. Other Comments
The Commission recommends that public accounting firms recognize and 
control the organizational and individual pressures that potentially 
reduce audit quality. The Commission cites tight reporting deadlines 
and fee and budget pressures as sources of pressure.
While we agree that public accounting firms must deal effectively with 
these pressures, we are concerned that efforts to deal with these 
pressures may be inappropriately directed at eliminating the sources 
of pressure. Tight deadlines result from the importance of providing 
timely information to the public and financial markets. Fee and 
budget pressures are normal conditions in a free enterprise system. 
Such pressures provide control over the cost of conducting an audit —  
just as those pressures serve as controls over the cost of other
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services used by businesses and other organizations. We suggest that 
the Commission make clear that this recommendation is not aimed at 
eliminating those pressures, but rather is suggesting that accounting 
firms develop means of coping with them.
The Commission recommends that the Auditing Standards Board be 
reorganized to include members other than practicing CPAs. We agree 
with this recommendation. Including knowledgeable individuals from 
business and the investor/analyst community would strengthen the 
standard-setting process.
We would appreciate an opportunity to review these points with you or other
members of the Commission in person.
Very truly yours,
Lawrence B. Skatoff
A s s o c i a t i o n
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l
M a n u f a c t u r e r s
Gerald J. Mossinghoff
PRESIDENT
J u l y  7 ,  1 9 8 7
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N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on  F r a u d u le n t  
F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
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G e n t le m e n :
The P h a r m a c e u t ic a l  M a n u fa c tu r e r s  A s s o c ia t io n  i s  a 
n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  a s s o c ia t io n  r e p r e s e n t in g  o v e r  100 r e s e a r c h - b a s e d  
m a n u fa c tu r e r s  o f  p r e s c r i p t i o n  p h a r m a c e u t ic a ls .  The PMA w e lco m e s  
th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  com m ent on  y o u r  A p r i l  1987  E x p o s u re  D r a f t ,  
" R e p o r t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  
R e p o r t i n g " .  PMA m em bers a re  s u p p o r t i v e  o f  y o u r  e f f o r t s  t o  
im p ro v e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  We h o p e , h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  y o u r  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  a re  e x te n d e d  t o  th o s e  non-S E C  r e g i s t r a n t s  w hose 
a u d i t  f a i l u r e s  h a v e  a ls o  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  th e  c u r r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  " e x p e c t a t io n  g a p " .
The f o l l o w i n g  com m ents  a re  d i r e c t e d  t o  s e v e r a l  s p e c i f i c  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s .  We b e l ie v e  th e s e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  s h o u ld  be 
m o d i f ie d  t o  a l lo w  f o r  m ore  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  p r a c t i c e  th a n  i s  
c u r r e n t l y  d e s c r ib e d  in  th e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t .
R e c o m m e n d a t io n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  d e v e lo p  a n d  e n f o r c e
w r i t t e n  c o d e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n d u c t .  C odes o f  c o n d u c t  s h o u ld  
f o s t e r  a s t r o n g  e t h i c a l  c l im a t e  and o pe n  c h a n n e ls  o f  co m m u n ica ­
t i o n  t o  h e lp  p r o t e c t  a g a in s t  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A 
c o m p a n y 's  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  s h o u ld  r e v ie w  c o m p lia n c e  w i t h  th e  c o d e  
a n n u a l l y ,  i n c lu d in g  c o m p lia n c e  b y  to p  m a n a g e m e n t, and r e p o r t  
th e r e o n  t o  th e  b o a rd  o f  d i r e c t o r s .
We b e l ie v e  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  h a v e  th e  
l a t i t u d e  i n  d e v e lo p in g  t h e i r  c o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t  t o  r e f l e c t  t h e i r  
i n d i v i d u a l  f a c t s  and c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  we s t r o n g ly  
b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e  c o d e  s h o u ld  be o f  a g e n e r a l  n a t u r e  r a t h e r  th a n  a 
s p e c i f i c  l i s t  o f  c o m p lia n c e  a c t i v i t i e s .  We a re  c o n c e rn e d  t h a t  
d e g e n e r a t io n  o f  a c o d e  i n t o  a s p e c i f i c  l i s t  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  w o u ld  
r e s u l t  i n  a s u b s t a n t i a l  and u n p r o d u c t iv e  c o m p lia n c e  e f f o r t .
R e c o m m e n d a t io n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  m a i n t a i n  a c c o u n t i n g
f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  c a n  e f f e c t i v e l y  m e e t  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
o b l i g a t i o n s .
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PMA supports this recommendation but would suggest 
clarification of the chief accounting officer's responsibility 
for fraud or fraudulent financial reporting in those situations 
in which he has no involvement or knowledge. We recommend that 
the text accompanying the recommendation be clarified on this 
point.
Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their
internal audit functions are objective.
We agree with the Commission's position that the chief 
internal auditor does not need to report to the CEO if he has 
access to him. In most large organizations, a direct reporting 
relationship is not practical.
Recommendation: Management and the audit committee should ensure
that the internal auditors' involvement in the audit of the 
entire financial reporting process is appropriate and properly 
coordinated with the independent public accountant.
We support audit coordination for several reasons: it
is more efficient, it provides greater audit coverage and it is a 
better use of resources. However, auditors should not be an 
integral part of external reporting. The independent certified 
public accountants should retain lead oversight because they lend 
credibility to the results, and this avoids an unnecessary 
duplication of effort.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC
rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter 
signed by the chairman of the audit committee describing the 
committee's responsibilities and activities during the year.
We seriously question the value of the inclusion of a 
letter signed by the audit committee chairman in the annual 
report to stockholders. The auditor's opinion letter and 
management's report on responsibility for financial reporting are 
sufficient attestation to the integrity of the company's annual 
report. We see no value added by a third letter signed by the 
audit committee chairman. Furthermore, the audit committees 
duties are presently included in the proxy statement, and presen­
tation in the annual report is unnecessary duplication.
Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee
when it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
We disagree with this recommendation as written. We 
would agree that management should advise the audit committee of 
those second (or third, etc.) opinions that it chose to follow
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and t h e r e f o r e  r e l i e d  u p o n . We u rg e  th e  C o m m is s io n  t o  c o n s id e r  a 
c h a n g e  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : A u d i t  c o m m it te e s  s h o u ld  in c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s ig h t
o f  th e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h is  o v e r s ig h t  s h o u ld  
in c lu d e  a p p r o v in g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e le a s e .
We b e l ie v e  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n  i s  im p r a c t i c a l  f o r  m o s t 
la r g e  c o m p a n ie s .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  i t  in c r e a s e s  th e  r i s k s  o f  h o ld in g  
m a t e r i a l  n o n p u b l ic  in f o r m a t io n  f o r  a lo n g e r  p e r io d  o f  t im e  b e fo r e  
r e le a s e  t o  th e  p u b l i c .  We recom m end t h a t  an a u d i t  c o m m it te e  be 
a l lo w e d  t o  d e te r m in e  i t s  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  in v o lv e m e n t  a f t e r  
a s s e s s in g  i t s  i n d i v i d u a l  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  and  r i s k s .
PMA a p p r e c ia t e s  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  com m ent on  th e  
C o m m is s io n 's  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  and commends th e  C o m m is s io n  on  a 
th o r o u g h  and w e l l - b a la n c e d  r e p o r t .
R e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b m it t e d ,
G e ra ld  J .  M ossingh o f f
The May Department Stores Company
Jerome T. Loeb 
Vice Chairman 
Chief Financial Officer
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N a t io n a l C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
M r. James C. T re a d w a y , J r .
C ha irm an
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W.
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
D ear M r. T readw ay:
The May Department S tores Company and the  A u d it Committee o f  the  Board o f 
D ire c to rs  o f  May a p p re c ia te  the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  respond to  the  A p r i l ,  1987 
Exposure D ra f t  o f  the  Report o f  the  N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l 
R e p o rtin g . T h is  response was developed as a r e s u lt  o f  a d iscu ss io n  o f  the 
Report among management, members o f  the  A u d it  Committee o f  May and A r th u r  
Andersen & Co. re p re s e n ta t iv e s .
G enera l Comments
We e n th u s ia s t ic a l ly  support the  Commission's e f f o r t  to  id e n t i f y  the  causes 
o f  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  and to  make recommendations f o r  p ra c t ic e s  
which would m in im ize i t s  occurrence o r  r e s u lt  in  i t s  more t im e ly  d e te c t io n .
We b e lie v e  s tro n g ly  th a t  im p lem enta tion  o f  such p ra c t ic e s  by p r iv a te  s e c to r 
i n i t i a t i v e  is  p re fe ra b le  to  having them mandated by va rio u s  ru le  making groups. 
We a lso  fe e l i t  w orth  m ention ing  th a t  most businesses have been successfu l 
in  p re ve n tin g  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  A d d it io n a l ly ,  we must a l l  be 
cau tioned  no t to  prom ise o r be perce ived  to  prom ise the  users o f  f in a n c ia l 
re p o rts  th a t  a company which implements the  recommendations would be in s u la te d  
and p ro te c te d  from  the  occurrence o f  o r  f a i lu r e  to  d e te c t fra u d u le n t re p o r t in g .
Executive Offices, 611 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101 Telephone (314) 342-6321
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Specific Comments
While we generally endorse the Commission's recommendations, we would like 
to comment in a few areas.
Commission Recommendation
° Audit committees should increase their oversight of the quarterly reporting 
process. This oversight should include approving financial results 
prior to public release.
Comment
We believe this recommendation inappropriately places an audit committee 
in a management role and raises serious logistical questions regarding timely 
disclosures. While the audit committee should be certain that proper procedures 
are in place and followed in quarterly reporting, we feel this recommendation 
goes too far toward moving the responsibility for the reporting to the audit 
committee.
It also exasperates the liability issue recognized by the Commission.
Commission Recommendation
° The audit committee should approve in advance the types and extent of
management advisory services that management plans to engage the company's 
independent public accountant to perform.
Comment
While we agree with this recommendation and substantially follow it, the 
accompanying discussion in the Report, we believe, overemphasizes the extent 
of services and fee relationships to audit fees. We feel an equally or 
more important consideration is the type of services obtained, our concern 
being that the independent public accountants neither perform management 
functions nor be influenced in their opinions regarding, for example, specific 
controls where they have designed those controls.
Commission Recommendations
° All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in their 
annual reports to stockholders management reports signed by the chief 
executive officer and chief accounting officer. The management report 
should acknowledge management's responsibilities for the financial statements 
and internal control, discuss how these responsibilities were fulfilled, 
and provide management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's 
internal controls.
° All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in their 
annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by the chairman of the 
audit committee describing the committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year.
July 6, 1987 
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Comment
We agree with the spirit of these recommendations and have made such disclosures 
in our annual reports since 1978. However, the specific format should not 
be dictated. We see little benefit in making requirements so specific.
Further, we feel specifically mandated disclosures can become quite routine.
And, in the case of the audit committee, this is a further inappropriate 
step toward moving responsibility for the reporting to the audit committee.
Nor do we feel there should be a signature requirement which would only 
dilute the responsibility for the entire report by so emphasizing several 
paragraphs.
Again, our appreciation for the opportunity to comment.
Respectfully submitted,
Jerome T. Loeb, Vice Chairman and 
Chief Financial Officer
Audit Committee
Richard R. Shinn, Chairman 
Executive Vice Chairman of 
the New York Stock Exchange
Thomas S. Carroll
President & Chief Executive Officer 
of International Executive Service Corps
Paul Kolton
Chairman of the Advisory Council
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
Edward H. Meyer
Chairman of the Board, President &
Chief Executive Officer 
of Grey Advertising Inc.
Russell E. Palmer
Dean of The Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Director of the Center for the Study 
of American Business & Mallinckrodt 
Distinguished University Professor at 
Washington University
AmSouth Bancorporation
Post Office Box 11007 
Birmingham, Alabama 35288 
(205) 326-5771
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M em b e rs  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c i a l  
R e p o r t in g
1 70 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N . W.
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G e n t le m e n :
T h e  m e m b e rs  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t in g  a r e  t o  b e  com m ended  f o r  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  i n  
p r e p a r i n g  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  o n  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .  T h is  u n d e r t a k in g  was o b v i o u s l y  a n  e x t e n s i v e  a n d  
a m b i t i o u s  a t t e m p t  t o  p r o d u c e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  w h ic h  w o u ld  
r e d u c e  o r  a t  l e a s t  e x p o s e  t h e  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
w h ic h  i s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  v a r io u s  i n d u s t r i e s .
W h i le  I  c o n c u r  w i t h  m a n y  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  
c o n t a in e d  w i t h i n  t h e  r e p o r t  —  i n  f a c t ,  m any o f  t h e s e  i te m s  
a r e  c u r r e n t l y  o p e r a t i n g  e f f e c t i v e l y  w i t h i n  t h e  A m S o u th  
s t r u c t u r e  —  I  f e e l  c o m p e l l e d  t o  s t a t e  A m S o u t h 's 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  e n f o r c e d  im p le m e n t a t io n  o f  
t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  c o n t a in e d  w i t h i n  t h i s  r e p o r t .
I n  g e n e r a l ,  i t  i s  my o p i n i o n  t h a t  a b a la n c e  n e e d s  t o  b e  s t r u c k  
b e tw e e n  w h a t  i s  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  e n f o r c e a b l e ,  a n d  t h e  c o s t s  
a s s o c ia t e d  w i t h  im p le m e n t in g  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s .  W h i le  n o t  
d i s c o u n t i n g  t h e  v a l u e  a n d  c o n c e p t  o f  s t r o n g  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s ,  t h e  e f f o r t s  re c o m m e n d e d  b y  t h i s  c o m m is s io n  d o  n o t  
a d e q u a t e l y  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  r e a s o n a b le n e s s ,  
m a t e r i a l i t y ,  a n d  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  A l t h o u g h  c o n c e p t u a l l y  
c o r r e c t  i n  t h e i r  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  re c o m m e n d e d  a r e  
i n  e f f e c t  a r e s p o n s i v e  o v e r k i l l  t o  a s i t u a t i o n  w h i c h  
i s  p r e s e n t  i n  o n l y  a fe w  i n s t a n c e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t  
p r e p a r a t i o n .
We a t  A m S o u th  d o  n o t  p e r c e i v e  t h a t  we h a v e  p r o b le m s  w i t h  t h e  
f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  m a t e r i a l i t y ,  o r  r e a s o n a b le n e s s  
o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  w h ic h  a r e  c o n t a in e d  i n  o u r  p u b l i s h e d  
q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t s  o r  o u r  a n n u a l l y  a u d i t e d  f i n a n c i a l  f i g u r e s .  
W h e re a s  we d o  e n c o u ra g e  a n d  f a v o r  t h e  a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  p r o p e r
internal controls are in place during the preparation, 
computation, and presentation of our financial position, we 
do not b e l i e v e  the e x t r e m e  m e a s u r e s  p r o p o s e d  by the 
commission would result in any material increase in the 
accuracy of the figures or the information presented.
Specifically, we have major difficulties with the following 
items:
1. Many of the recommendations for the public company 
proposed by the Commission are both impractical or 
impossible to implement to the degree required to provide 
complete assurance that fraudulent financial reporting 
activities would be detected. Currently, neither the 
Internal Audit Department of AmSouth, nor the external 
a c c o u n t i n g  firm e n g a g e d  to p r e p a r e  an o p i n i o n  on 
A m S o u t h 's f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  p e r f o r m  t e s t w o r k  
sufficient to comply with the standards set forth in the 
e x p o s u r e  draft. The t h r u s t  of our I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  
D e p a r t m e n t  has b e e n  to r e v i e w  the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  
practices and procedures to ensure that an acceptable 
level of internal controls is maintained throughout the 
organization. We prioritize our focus based on the 
element of risk to the organization. Should the items of 
this exposure draft become requirements, significant 
changes would need to be made not only to our level of 
audit expense but also to our audit approach. We would 
find ourselves devoting considerable energy to fulfilling 
these requirements at the expense of reviewing those 
areas which we feel have a significant impact on the 
bank's performance. I do not believe that this is in the 
best interest of our shareholders and our organization.
2. Currently our external accountants audit to the detailed 
level that will allow them to issue an opinion that the 
financial position reported fairly reflects the current 
position and results of operations of our company. If 
the recommendations made by this Commission were required 
of external accountants, a major shift in emphasis would 
be required, the result of which would be a significant 
increase in the scope of audit work performed by the 
outside accountants. This would undoubtedly result in 
significant increases in already high fees without an 
offsetting recognizable benefit in terms of detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting. In all candor, industry 
consensus reveals that the vast majority of fraudulent 
activities within organizations are not discovered by 
the Internal Audit Department or the external accounting 
firm. Even if all recommendations of this commission were 
implemented, I doubt whether any significant increase 
would occur in the ability of these staffs to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting activity.
3 . I  a l s o  t a k e  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  c o m m it te e  r e c o m m e n d a tio n  
t h a t  t h e  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  O f f i c e r  a n d  C h i e f  F i n a n c i a l  
O f f i c e r  p r o v i d e  s p e c i f i c  a s s u r a n c e s  b y  s t a t i n g  c l e a r l y  i n  
a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  t h a t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  o r  
m a t e r i a l  e r r o r  i s  n o t  c o n t a i n e d  w i t h i n  t h e  p r e s e n t e d  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s .  S u ch  a  d i s c l o s u r e  a p p e a r i n g  in  t h e  
a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  w o u ld  p r o v i d e  l i t t l e  a d d i t i o n a l  a s s u r a n c e  
t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i n  o r d e r  f o r  me t o  f u l f i l l  t h i s  
o b l i g a t i o n ,  I  w o u ld  n e e d  t o  c o m p l e t e  d u e  d i l i g e n c e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  p e r s o n a l l y  —  a  r e p e t i t i o n  o f  t h e  w ork  t h a t  
I  h i r e  e x p e r t s  t o  p e r f o r m .  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  a l r e a d y  a r e  
s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  p r e s e n t i n g  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
f a i r l y ,  a n d  a d d in g  s u c h  a  s t a t e m e n t  w o u ld  s e r v e  o n l y  t o  
a d d  t o  t h e  l e n g t h  a n d  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t s .
4 .  T he c o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  m em bers o f  t h e  
A u d i t  C o m m itte e  o f  t h e  B o a rd  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  u n r e a l i s t i c .  
W h i le  o u r  B o a r d  h a s  a n  a c t i v e  a n d  p r o f i c i e n t  A u d i t  
C o m m itte e , t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  p r o p o s e d  w o u ld  r e q u i r e  a  
m uch g r e a t e r  co m m itm en t o f  t im e  a n d  i n t e l l e c t u a l  e f f o r t  
t o  f u l f i l l  a n d  I  f e e l  w o u ld  r e s u l t  i n  l i t t l e  m e a n in g f u l  
a d d i t i o n s  t o  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s
p r e s e n t e d .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  s e c u r i n g  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s  who 
w o u l d  b e  b o t h  w i l l i n g  a n d  a b l e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  a s  
e x t e n s i v e l y  a s  reco m m en d ed  b y  t h i s  c o m m is s io n  w o u ld  be  
e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  d u e  t o  t h e  a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  
o u r  B o a rd  memb e r s  i n  m an ag em en t o f  o t h e r  c o m p a n ie s  an d  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  I  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  m any  o f  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  m ade  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  a r e  o n e s  w i t h  w h ic h  
A m South a l r e a d y  c o m p l i e s .  H o w ev e r, we a r e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  
o p p o s e d  t o  im p o s i n g  a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l  o f  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o n  a l l  c o m p a n ie s  w h ic h  a r e  w e l l - r u n  d u e  t o  t h e  
r e l a t i v e l y  fe w  c o m p a n i e s  w h ic h  h a v e  c r e a t e d  p r o b l e m s  b y  
a l l o w i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  o c c u r  
w i t h i n  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  I  am a f r a i d  t h a t  t h e s e  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i l l  im p o se  a s i g n i f i c a n t  b u r d e n  o n  t h o s e  
c o m p a n i e s  w h ic h  a r e  a l r e a d y  m a k in g  m e a n i n g f u l  e f f o r t s  t o  
p r o v i d e  t h e i r  s h a r e h o l d e r s  w i th  a c c u r a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  w i l l  
b e  v i r t u a l l y  ig n o r e d  b y  t h o s e  c o m p a n ie s  w h ic h  m o s t n e e d  t o  
s t r e n g t h e n  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  p r a c t i c e s .
J o h n  W. Woods
C h a irm a n  o f  t h e  B o a rd  & 
C h ie f  E x e c u t iv e  O f f i c e r
JW W /esl
1 8 8
Robert G. Weiss
Vice President and Controller
S c h e r i n g - P l o u g h
Schering-Plough Corporation 
One Giralda Farms 
Madison, NJ 07940-1000 
Telephone 201-822-7250 
Telex 219165
J u l y  7 ,  198 7
T h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t in g  
1 70 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , N .W .
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 2 6
G e n t le m e n :
We a p p r e c ia t e  t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  co m m e n t o n  t h e  A p r i l  1 98 7  
E x p o s u re  D r a f t  e n t i t l e d  " R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g " .  We com m end t h e  C o m m is s io n  f o r  
i t s  t h o r o u g h n e s s  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  i s s u e  c u r r e n t l y  
c o n f r o n t i n g  u s .
I n  g e n e r a l ,  we a g r e e  w i t h  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
o b s e r v a t io n s  m ade a n d  c o n c lu s io n s  r e a c h e d  b y  t h e  C o m m is s io n  o n  
t h e  c a u s e s  o f  a n d  a c t i o n s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e c r e a s e  o r  p r e v e n t  
i n s t a n c e s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  I n  f a c t ,  S c h e r in g -  
P lo u g h ,  l i k e  m o s t  o t h e r  m a jo r  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n ie s ,  a l r e a d y  
h a s  i n  p la c e  m o s t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  p r o p o s e d  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
•  A s t r o n g  s y s te m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  w h ic h  we b e l i e v e  t o  
b e  a d e q u a te  t o  p r o v id e  r e a s o n a b le  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  
m a t e r i a l  f r a u d u l e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  w o u ld  n o t  g o  u n d e t e c t e d .
•  A w r i t t e n  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t ,  a s  c o d i f i e d  i n  o u r  s t a n d a r d  
b u s in e s s  c o n d u c t  p o l i c y ,  w h ic h  m u s t  b e  c o m p l ie d  w i t h  b y  
a l l  m a n a g e m e n t e m p lo y e e s .  P o l i c y  c o m p l ia n c e  i s  r e v ie w e d  
p e r i o d i c a l l y  a n d  a l l  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e v i a t i o n s  a r e  p r o m p t l y  
b r o u g h t  t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m it te e  o f  t h e  
B o a rd  o f  D i r e c t o r s  f o r  r e s o l u t i o n .
•  A n  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n ,  h e a d e d  b y  a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l l y - t r a i n e d  a u d i t o r ,  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a p p r o x i ­
m a t e ly  2 5  i n d i v i d u a l s  (50%  C P A s) w i t h  a n  a v e r a g e  o f  s i x  
y e a r s  a u d i t  e x p e r ie n c e .
•  A n  A u d i t  C o m m it te e  t o t a l l y  c o m p r is e d  o f  in d e p e n d e n t  
d i r e c t o r s  w h o s e  d u t i e s  h a v e  b e e n  p r e s c r i b e d  i n  a w r i t t e n  
" S t a te m e n t  o f  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s "  a p p r o v e d  b y  o u r  B o a rd  o f  
D i r e c t o r s . 
•  R e p o r t in g  b y  m a n a g e m e n t t o  s h a r e h o ld e r s  i n  o u r  A n n u a l 
R e p o r t  o n  m a n a g e m e n t 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  a n d  r e l i a n c e
on a system of internal accounting controls, the existence 
and role of the Company's internal audit function and 
Audit Committee, and the role the Company's independent 
certified public accountants assume in examining the 
annual financial statements.
We have the following specific comments concerning certain 
recommendations made in the exposure draft. These comments 
are arranged in order of their importance to Schering-Plough.
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal
controls that are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
While we wholeheartedly agree with the Commission's goals and 
objectives in this area, we wish to point out that it is 
virtually impossible to design a system of internal controls 
which will prevent fraud. We can only take reasonable actions 
and institute controls which should reduce the likelihood that 
fraudulent activities could occur, or if occurring, would go 
undetected. We therefore suggest the Commission consider 
rephrasing this recommendation in its final report.
Recommendation: Audit Committees should be informed, 
vigilant, and effective overseers of the financial reporting 
process and the company's internal controls.
While we agree with the concept and spirit of this recommenda­
tion, we are troubled with what we perceive to be the Commis­
sion's attempt to broaden the Audit Committee's responsibilities 
beyond what would be reasonably necessary and prudent to 
fulfilling their oversight function. In Appendix K, "Audit 
Committee Good Practice Guidelines", the Commission has 
"offered" guidance on areas which it believes Audit Committees 
should explore to effectively discharge their oversight 
responsibilities. Included in this list are suggestions that 
Audit Committees:
• Obtain from management explanations for all significant 
variances in the financial statements between years
• Inquire about the existence and substance of any 
significant accounting accruals, reserves or estimates 
made by management
• Determine the open years on federal income tax returns and 
whether there are any significant items that have been or 
might be disputed by the IRS, etc.
We believe "suggesting" Audit Committees perform these types of 
inquiries is inappropriate. In our opinion, the actions/ 
inquiries Appendix K proposes Audit Committees assume seem to 
more properly represent management duties. In this regard, the 
Commission's report has blurred the distinction between over­
sight and operating responsibilities.
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We are also concerned that the proposed increase in the scope 
and responsibility of Audit Committees would create a new 
springboard for potential shareholder/creditor litigation based 
upon the question of whether or not the Audit Committee has 
adequately performed/discharged these expanded duties. As a 
result of the Commission's proposals, shareholders/creditors may 
inappropriately perceive the Audit Committee function as the 
"cure all" to potential reporting transgressions and therefore 
hold the Committee "legally accountable.”
Finally, we believe the amount of time Audit Committee members 
would have to spend to properly perform the expanded duties 
proposed by the Commission's report would be excessive and 
unduly burdensome given the current meeting schedules of most 
Audit Committees. Expanding these meeting schedules to 
accommodated the increased responsibilities will present, in 
many situations, significant logistical problems.
Recommendation: Audit Committees should increase their
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public 
release.
We believe a pre-clearance requirement is impractical from a 
logistical standpoint and represents an inappropriate redundancy 
of management's responsibilities. Such a policy will create 
many practical difficulties and will result in delays in the 
issuance of this data with no appreciable benefit flowing to the 
public.
We firmly believe the Audit Committee can remain a vigilant, 
effective overseer of the integrity of a company's reported 
results through their continual involvement and assessment of 
the existing control environment and therefore need not 
mandatorily examine quarterly results prior to their release. 
Determining whether this information should be reviewed prior to 
its release should be left to the discretion of each company's 
own Audit Committee.
In our opinion this proposal would cause the Audit Committee to 
become excessively involved in the financial reporting process 
and lose sight of its oversight role vis-a-vis management. 
Furthermore, requiring that Audit Committees perform this type 
of review of results creates opportunities for potential 
litigious actions to be initiated against the Committee by 
disenchanted shareholders and creditors.
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public 
accountants to review quarterly financial data of public 
companies before release to the public.
We are concerned that the Commission's recommendation is not 
justifiable on a cost/benefit basis. If public accountants are 
required to examine the interim information this will result in 
performance of additional test procedures and increased audit 
fees. However, these procedures will be limited in scope
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(usually analytical analysis and inquiries of management). The 
report issued by the auditors would provide only limited 
assurance and therefore is not likely to enhance the public's 
perception of the fairness of the interim period results.
As a result, we remain unconvinced as to whether this review 
will help in detecting fraud. Also, we believe this proposal 
will result in significant delays in dissemination of what 
should be timely reported information.
Recommendation: When a public company changes independent 
accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to disclose 
publicly the nature of any material accounting or auditing 
issues discussed with its old and new auditors during the 
three-year period preceding the change.
We believe that the current Form 8-K filing requirements for 
reporting a change in a registrant's public accountants along 
with the recent issuance of SAS No. 50 "Reporting on the 
Application of Accounting Principles" by the Auditing Standards 
Board effectively serve the same purpose as the proposed action 
suggested in this recommendation. In this regard, the current 
8-K disclosures and SAS No. 50 requirements adequately address 
the issue of disagreements with public accountants and control 
the potential opinion shopping abuses the Commission is 
concerned about.
Furthermore, we can see no incremental benefit in the 
Commission's proposal. In fact, disclosure of the information 
called for by the proposal could compromise a company's 
proprietary interests and adversely affect the public's 
evaluation of management's integrity. Therefore, we recommend 
this proposal be dropped from the Commission's final report.
Recommendation: Management should advise the Audit Committee
when it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting 
issue.
We wish to point out that accounting opinions on various issues 
are frequently discussed informally to obtain the benefits of 
others' experience in evolving areas. To require communication 
of each of these discussions to the Audit Committee is clearly 
not the best use of the Audit Committees time and resources.
We therefore suggest this proposal be dropped from the 
Commission's final report.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by
SEC rule to include in their annual report to stockholders 
management reports signed by the chief executive officer and 
chief accounting officer. The management report should 
acknowledge management's responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control and provide management's 
assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
controls.
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As previously acknowledged, we agree with the first portion of 
this recommendation concerning management communication with 
stockholders. However, we are concerned that some of the 
language proposed in the sample "Management Report on 
Responsibility for Financial Reporting” included in Appendix L 
"Good Practice Guidelines for Management's Report" may be 
misinterpreted by potential readers. For example, in the first 
paragraph the second sentence states:
"The statements were prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis 
and are not misstated due to material fraud or error".
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In our opinion this statement inappropriately leads the reader 
to presume that management can insure the financial statements 
are totally free from potential fraud when, in fact, all 
management can actually represent is that they are reasonably 
sure that they are. Given the nature of the estimating process 
and management judgements inherent in the financial reporting 
system, we believe it would be more appropriate to state:
"The statements were prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis 
and are not believed by management to be materially misstated 
due to fraud or error".
Similarly, we believe the opening sentence of the third 
paragraph of the sample report should be modified to indicate 
that management has established an internal control system 
geared to limit the potential for material fraudulent financial 
reporting. As stated previously, we believe it is virtually 
impossible to design a system foolproof enough to prevent all 
potential fraudulent activities.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise
standards to restate the independent public accountant's 
responsibility for detection of fraudulent financial 
reporting, requiring the independent public accountant to (1) 
take affirmative steps in each audit to assess the potential 
for such reporting and (2) design tests to provide reasonable 
assurance of detection. Revised standards should include 
guidance for assessing risks and pursuing detection when 
risks are identified.
While we understand the Commission's desire to make the public 
accounting firms more responsive to the issue of fraudulent 
financial reporting and their responsibilities for detecting 
such occurrences, we are concerned that this proposal will shift 
the emphasis of the auditor's examination away from opining on 
the fairness of the financial statements and toward searching 
for fraud.
As stated, the Commission's recommendation implies that fraud 
detection should be a primary objective of the auditor's 
examination. We are concerned that the Commission's
recommendation will require the public accounting firms to 
expand their audit as a result of being "charged" with this 
additional audit responsibility. As a result, we believe the 
incremental costs incurred in terms of audit fees will outweigh 
the benefits derived because as the Commission's report notes, 
many frauds are not the result of audit failures but rather 
occur because of circumstances (i.e., collusion) beyond the 
realm of normal audit detection.
Accordingly, we recommend the Commission emphasize in its final 
report that this recommendation is made in the spirit and 
pursuit of financial propriety at reasonable cost.
Recommendation: The Audit Committee should approve in 
advance the types and the extent of management advisory 
services that management plans to engage the company's 
independent public accountant to perform.
We believe requiring pre-approval by the Audit Committee of 
management advisory services to be provided by their auditors is 
overkill and serves no useful purpose in deterring the potential 
for fraudulent financial reporting. While it may be argued that 
providing management advisory services to an existing client 
presents a potential independence conflict for the public 
accountant, we believe, given the relative disparity in most 
cases between MAS and audit fee dollars, such a conflict (if one 
exists) does not compromise the public accountant's integrity or 
independence. In our opinion, Audit Committees simply need to 
be aware of the extent of these services being provided by the 
company's public accountants in order to judge their 
independence.
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Recommendation: All public companies should be required by
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders a 
letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
describing the committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year.
While we agree with the Commission's conclusion concerning the 
need to increase public awareness of Audit Committee activities, 
we believe this proposal is unnecessary. We believe this is 
overkill and will result in excessive and redundant boilerplate 
narrative since many companies already provide a listing of 
committee members, a description of their duties and frequency 
of committee meetings in the company's "Report by Management" 
and "Listing of Directors and Officers" sections of the annual 
report.
*  *  *  *  *
In conclusion we, at Schering-Plough, commend the Commission on 
its efforts and forward thinking in dealing with such a 
difficult topic as fraud detection. We would be pleased to 
discuss our views more fully or to provide any additional 
information the Commission may find useful in its deliberations 
before issuing its final report.
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Sincerely,
Robert G. Weiss
Vice President and Controller
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M r .  G .  D e w e y  A r n o l d  
E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r  
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
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D e a r  M r .  A r n o l d :
IB M  c o m m e n d s  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  i t s  e f f o r t s  a n d  a p p r e c i a t e s  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  R e p o r t  o f  
T h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g .
F o r  t h e  m o s t  p a r t  w e  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  d o n e  a n  e x c e l l e n t  j o b  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  
c a u s e s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  a  
c o m p r e h e n s i v e  s e t  o f  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  p r e v e n t i o n  a n d  
d e t e c t i o n .
W e a r e  o p p o s e d  t o  r e q u i r i n g  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  
t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  a  l e t t e r  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  
C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  c o m m i t t e e ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r .  M o s t  o f  t h i s  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  a l r e a d y  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r o x y  s t a t e m e n t  a n d  s o m e  
i s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  w h i c h  i s  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  
C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  B o a r d  a n d  t h e  C h i e f  F i n a n c i a l  O f f i c e r  o f  I B M .
T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  v e h i c l e s  b y  w h i c h  t h e  B o a r d  
e x e r c i s e s  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  n o t  
a c t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e  B o a r d  a n d  a  s p e c i a l  l e t t e r  w i l l  c r e a t e  
t h i s  e f f e c t .
W e a r e  a l s o  o p p o s e d  t o  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  t o  a p p r o v e  
i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  S u c h  
a n  a c t i v i t y ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  b e i n g  i m p r a c t i c a l ,  w o u l d  c l o u d  t h e  
d i c t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e ' s  o v e r s i g h t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
p r o c e s s ,  w h i c h  i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  m a n a g e m e n t .
Mr. G. Dewey Arnold 
July 7, 1987 Page 2.
We believe that the existing financial reporting system functions 
remarkably well and that organizations charged with overseeing 
the process do an admirable job of balancing the public interest 
with the burdens imposed at times by regulations on business. We 
endorse voluntary adoption of the commission's recommendations.
/arv
Very truly yours
F inancia l D iv is ion
CityPlace
Hartford, CT 06156
Frederick W. Deichmann
Vice President
Corporate Comptrollers Department 
(203) 275-3776
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M r. G. Dewey A rn o ld  
E x e c u t iv e  D i r e c t o r  
N a t io n a l  C om m ission on 
F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W.
W a s h in g to n , DC 20006
D ear M r. A r n o ld :
A e tn a  L i f e  & C a s u a lty  i s  p le a s e d  to  have t h i s  o p p o r tu n i t y  to  comment 
upon th e  A p r i l  1987 E xposu re  D r a f t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  C om m ission on 
F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .  We w is h  to  commend th e  C om m ission f o r  
i t s  e f f o r t s  i n  p ro d u c in g  t h i s  co m p re h e n s ive  E xposu re  D r a f t  and s ta te  
t h a t  we a re  i n  ag reem en t w i t h  th e  o v e r a l l  c o n c lu s io n s  re g a rd in g  
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  and th e  need f o r  im p ro ve m e n t.
W h ile  we g e n e r a l ly  a g re e  w i t h  th e  to n e  and d i r e c t io n  o f  th e  recommen­
d a t io n s ,  we have  p ro v id e d  comments on s p e c i f i c  re co m m e n d a tio n s . We 
w o u ld  l i k e  to  em phasize  tw o g e n e ra l c o n c lu s io n s  w h ic h  a f f e c t  th e  
n a tu re  o f  o u r  comments and w h ic h  we f e e l  s h o u ld  be c o n s id e re d  d u r in g  
th e  p ro c e s s  o f  a d d re s s in g  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .
The f i r s t  is s u e  we w is h  to  em phasize  i s  t h a t  a num ber o f  th e  Commis­
s io n ’ s recom m enda tio ns  w o u ld  r e q u ir e  e i t h e r  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  o r  b o a rd  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  fu n c t io n s  w h ic h  we c o n s id e r  to  be o p e r a t io n a l  and 
th e r e fo r e ,  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  c o rp o ra te  m anagem ent. We w o u ld  
c a u t io n  th e  C om m ission t h a t  th e s e  ty p e s  o f  recom m enda tio ns  a re  g e n e r­
a l l y  n o t  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  a n d , because th e y  w o u ld  r e q u ir e  B oard  and 
A u d i t  C om m ittee  in v o lv e m e n t i n  a re a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  v ie w e d  as manage­
m e n t’ s r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  -  w i t h  th e  in c re a s e d  r i s k  t h a t  e n t a i l s  -  c o u ld  
le a d  to  re sp o n se s  w h ic h  te n d  to  c a r e f u l l y  c ir c u m s c r ib e  th e  a t te n d a n t  
r i s k .
The second p o in t  d e a ls  w i t h  th e  r o le  o f  th e  SEC. W h ile  we a g re e  t h a t  
th e  e n fo rc e m e n t re m e d ie s  o f  th e  SEC s h o u ld  be b ro a d e n e d ; we g e n e r a l ly  
s u p p o r t  s e l f - r e g u la t i o n  and f e e l  th e  SEC s h o u ld  m a in ta in  an o v e r s ig h t  
r o l e .
These recom m enda tio ns  o f  th e  C om m ission a b o u t w h ic h  we have s p e c i f i c  
comments a re  as f o l lo w s :
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
1. " P u b l ic  com pan ies s h o u ld  d e v e lo p  and e n fo rc e  w r i t t e n  codes o f  
c o rp o ra te  c o n d u c t.  Codes o f  c o n d u c t s h o u ld  f o s t e r  a s t ro n g
Ӕtna Life Insurance Company /  The Ӕtna Casualty and Surety Company
-2-
ethical climate and open channels of communication to help 
protect against fraudulent financial reporting. A company's 
audit committee should review compliance with the code annually, 
including compliance by top management, and report thereon to the 
board of directors."
Comment: While we agree and do in fact, have and enforce a 
corporate code of conduct at Aetna, we disagree that the process 
of monitoring compliance should be a responsibility of the audit 
committee. The determination of the method by which such a code 
should be monitored is an operational decision which should be 
left to corporate management.
2. "All public companies should develop a written charter setting 
forth the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee.
The board of directors should approve the charter, review it at 
least annually, and modify it as necessary."
Comment: We disagree only with the provision calling for an 
annual review of the written charter since a well written charter 
should serve its purpose over a considerable period of time. 
Instead, we suggest that the written charter be modified as 
necessary. In addition to establishing a charter for the audit 
committee, the board of directors should periodically review the 
activities of the committee.
3. "The audit committee should approve in advance the types and the 
extent of management advisory services that management plans to 
engage the company’s independent public accountant to perform."
Comment: We agree that the audit committee should certainly be 
informed about the types and extent of management advisory 
services performed by the company’s independent public accoun­
tant; however, we strongly disagree that the approval of the 
audit committee should be obtained in advance.
In our opinion, decisions to utilize the independent public 
accountant for management advisory services are operating decis­
ions and outside the realm of responsibilities of the audit 
committee. In addition, it is not cost beneficial either to 
assemble the audit committee or put off making business decisions 
until such approval can be obtained.
While we agree conceptually, that the magnitude of management 
advisory services provided and the amount of fees charged may 
impede independence over time, the role of the audit committee is 
to review these services in their totality. Our suggestion is 
that the audit committee annually review these types of services.
4. "All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include 
in their annual reports to stockholders management reports signed 
by the chief executive officer and chief accounting officer. The 
management report should acknowledge management’s responsibil-
-3-
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ities for the financial statements and internal control, discuss 
how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide manage­
ment's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
control."
Comment: Aetna's annual report currently contains a statement 
addressing the processes involved in the preparation of the 
financial statements and the internal accounting control environ­
ment. We have observed that many other public companies provide 
similar disclosures. We do not agree with the proposal which 
would require the annual report to contain a signed discussion of 
these responsibilities and how these responsibilities were ful­
filled. The required inclusion of such a report elevates form 
over substance.
5. "All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include 
in their annual reports to stockholder's a letter signed by the 
chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's 
responsibilities and activities during the year."
Comment: We support disclosures in the annual report which 
describe in a general way the audit committee's responsibilities 
and activities, and we do include such information in Aetna's 
annual report. However, we do not agree that such disclosures 
should be required to appear in a letter signed by the chairman 
of the audit committee. This requirement would add information 
to the annual report which we believe would be of little value or 
interest to the readers and which would likely evolve into 
additional "boilerplate" disclosure.
6. "When a public company changes independent public accountants, it 
should be required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature of 
any material accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old 
and new auditors during the three-year period preceding the 
change."
Comment: We strongly object to this recommendation because we 
believe that existing SEC disclosure requirements dealing with 
disagreements between management and the independent public 
accountant, required when a company changes auditors, are suffi­
cient. Additional disclosure requirements may only serve to 
inhibit timely changes in public accounting firms in an effort to 
avoid public discussion of issues which, in a healthy environ­
ment, should be the subject of continuing dialogue between a 
public company and its accounting firm and which can be expected 
to be resolved to the satisfaction of both the company and its 
accounting firm. Another effect may be to inhibit time by 
discussion of accounting matters and thereby create greater 
opportunities for misunderstanding and confrontation between a 
public company and its accounting firm.
7. "Audit committees should increase their oversight of the quarter­
ly reporting process. This oversight should include approving 
financial results prior to public release."
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Comment: While we certainly agree that the audit committee should 
be kept informed about significant matters which affect the 
company's quarterly financial statement, we object to a require­
ment that the audit committee’s oversight should include approv­
ing financial results prior to public release. This function can 
be served by the board of directors or another committee of the 
board. We do think it important that a majority of the approving 
body be outside directors.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
While we agree conceptually with most of the recommendations listed in 
this section, we wish to reiterate that we strongly support self-reg­
ulation of the accounting profession. In that regard, we would note 
that many of these recommendations appear in the recent Exposure 
Drafts released by the Auditing Standards Board and that we generally 
agree with the proposals made in those drafts especially as they 
relate to improving the communications process and enhancing share­
holder understanding.
8. "The SEC should require independent public accountants to review 
quarterly financial data of public companies before release to 
the public."
Comment: We agree conceptually with this recommendation but we 
feel it should emphasize the fact that the quarterly financial 
statements use estimates and assumptions with regard to future 
events. Consequently, we believe that the independent public 
accountant’s quarterly review should be limited to reviewing the 
appropriateness of those assumptions and estimates.
9. "The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s stan­
dard report to describe the extent to which the independent 
public accountant has reviewed and evaluated the system of 
internal accounting control. The Auditing Standards Board also 
should provide explicit guidance to address the situation where, 
as a result of his knowledge of the company’s internal controls, 
the independent public accountant disagrees with management's 
assessment as stated in the proposed management report."
Comment: We disagree with of this recommendation. Public account­
ing firms do not always rely, or rely 100%, on a company's system 
of internal accounting control in performance of their work.
Asking that they evaluate the system in such cases will only add 
to audit fees but produce little benefit. Further, the distinc­
tion between the overall internal control system, which is 
clearly managements responsibility, and that portion of the 
system related to accounting will be difficult or impossible to 
articulate.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEC AND OTHERS 
TO IMPROVE THE REGULATORY AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
We support most of the recommendations made in this section. Although 
we believe that the enforcement powers of the SEC should be strength­
ened, we would emphasize that we feel the SEC should continue its 
traditional oversight role. In our opinion, the SEC should not become 
a policy-making body. If the SEC desires to have input in the account 
ing policy making process, the vehicle for that already exists in its 
relationship with the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
10. "The SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that the
corporate indemnification of directors for liabilities that arise 
under the Securities Act of 1933 is against public policy and 
therefore, unenforceable."
Comment: We fully support this recommendation. Given the impor­
tance of recruiting and retaining qualified directors, provisions 
should be made to foster an atmosphere in which these individuals 
feel free to make contributions and assume responsibility.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION
We agree that the education process can have a very positive influence 
on the financial reporting system. In that regard, we fully support 
the Commission’s recommendations which call for; an expanded account­
ing curricula, modifications in professional certification examina­
tions, improvements in continuing professional education and broaden­
ing the scope of corporate education.
CONCLUSION
We again, wish to express our appreciation for this opportunity to 
provide comments on the Commission’s Exposure Draft. With regard to 
our overall views about the responsibilities of audit committees and 
the SEC, we would re-emphasize our position that audit committees 
should retain an oversight function and should not be involved in the 
operational aspects of companies and that the SEC should maintain an 
oversight role. We sincerely hope these comments will be useful to 
the Commission in formulating its final report.
Very truly yours,
Frederick W. Deichmann 
Vice President
:dmd
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Citicorp Thomas E. Jones
Park Avenue Senior Vice President—
New York, NY Chief Accounting Officer
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July 10, 1987
Mr. G. Dewey Arnold, Executive D irec to r 
N ational Commission on Fraudulent 
F inancial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. Arnold:
C itico rp  appreciates th is opportun ity to comment on the d ra ft   
report o f the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting.
C itico rp  generally supports the conclusions and recommendations set 
fo rth  in the Commission’s report. Most o f the guidelines are 
reasonable, not costly to im plem ent and m irro r the management 
practices in w e ll-run  corporations throughout the United States. We 
believe th a t a ll corporations, whether pub lic ly - or p riva te ly-he ld , 
would bene fit by im plem enting most o f the Commission's 
recommendations.
C itico rp  strongly supports the Commission's recommendation tha t 
the SEC reconsider its  stance against corporate indem nifica tion  of 
d irectors. Given the problems many corporations are experiencing 
in obtaining adequate d irectors ' lia b ility  insurance a t reasonable 
rates, recru itm en t and re tention o f qua lified  d irectors w ill become 
increasingly d if f ic u lt .  A shortage o f outside d irectors  would d ire c tly  
im pact a corporation 's a b ility  to comply w ith  the Commission's 
recommendations on independent audit com m ittees.
Before issuance of the report in fin a l fo rm , we believe the 
Commission should reconsider or c la r ify  several o f its  
recommendations. Our concerns are as fo llows:
Recommendations fo r  Public Companies
o The report should make i t  c lear th a t the recommendation which 
requires senior management of public companies to  id e n tify , 
understand and assess the facto rs  tha t foste r fraudulent
National Commission on Fraudulent
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financial reporting does not require well-managed companies 
with adequate controls and procedures to undertake a separate, 
extensive documentation program similar to the documentation 
effort undertaken in response to the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act.
o The report should emphasize, at the outset, that the concept of 
reasonable assurance, rather than absolute assurance, is the 
guiding principle in establishing controls and procedures. While 
the report does make this point in the context of explaining 
certain recommendations, there should be greater emphasis and 
discussion of the concept as an introduction to the 
recommendations to avoid the appearance of calling for 
excessive controls which are not cost justified.
o External auditor internal control reviews should only be 
encouraged where there is no strong internal audit function or 
where a serious problem has already been identified. These 
reviews are very costly and should be used only when 
necessary. The report leaves the impression that managements 
that do not avail themselves of this service are somehow 
derelict in their duties.
o Establishing a new standard-setting body to give corporations 
guidance on internal controls is costly and unnecessary. Given 
the interaction between auditing procedures and adequate 
internal controls, an Auditing Standards Board, reconstituted 
along the lines recommended by the Commission, would be the 
appropriate standard-setting body to provide corporations with 
guidance on establishing proper internal controls.
o The Commission's Good Practices section for audit committees 
states that an audit committee "is the primary vehicle that the 
board of directors uses to discharge its responsibilities with 
respect to the company's financial reporting" and "an informed 
and vigilant audit committee represents one of the most 
effective influences for minimizing fraudulent financial 
reporting". We believe the Commission, in making these 
comments, has gone far beyond the appropriate oversight role 
for an audit committee and asks the committee to take on 
responsibilities and functions that are properly performed by 
management.
National Commission on Fraudulent
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o The recommendations that involve the audit committee 
approving financial results, open IRS audits, etc., and 
participating in other forms of management decision-making 
should be deleted as these activities are in conflict with the 
basic function of the audit committee, which is oversight. The 
proper role of the audit committee should be to review financial 
results with management and to review important accounting 
and auditing issues that could a ffect financial reporting 
throughout the year.
o Audit committees should not have to be involved in all instances 
where a second accounting opinion is obtained. The 
recommendation should be modified so that notification is 
required only if the external auditors are uncomfortable with 
the second opinion.
o The recommendation that the chief auditor report
administratively to the CEO should be modified. In most large 
organizations, it is not reasonable to expect a direct 
administrative reporting relationship between the chief auditor 
and the CEO. As long as there are open and direct lines of 
communication between the chief auditor, the CEO and the 
audit committee, it should be acceptable for the chief auditor 
to report administratively to a member of senior management 
who has broad responsibilities, which could include corporate 
financial affairs.
o With respect to the chief auditor's qualifications, an auditing 
background should not be a prerequisite to being a chief 
auditor. Having a seasoned business manager who has had 
extensive experience in management and the industry can 
broaden the perspective of an internal audit function staffed 
primarily with professional auditors.
o Companies that change external auditors should not be required 
to list all major accounting issues discussed with the outgoing 
auditors during the three-year period prior to change. We 
believe that the current SEC rules are sufficient. This 
recommendation is costly, could require companies to release 
proprietary information, and seems somewhat punitive rather 
than preventive.
N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on  F r a u d u le n t
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g
P a g e  4
Recommendations for External Auditors
o  W e  d i s a g r e e  w ith  th e  C o m m is s io n ’s r e c o m m e n d a t io n  t h a t  th e  
a u d it o r ’s r e p o r t  c o n ta in  a  s t a t e m e n t  th a t  th e  a u d it  p r o v id e s  
r e a s o n a b le  b u t  n o t  a b s o lu t e  a s s u r a n c e  th a t  th e  f in a n c ia l  
s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  f r e e  f r o m  m a t e r ia l  m is s t a t e m e n t  a s  a  r e s u lt  o f  
f r a u d  o r  e r r o r .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  in c lu s io n  o f  th is  s t a t e m e n t  w i l l  
e x a c e r b a t e  th e  " e x p e c t a t i o n  g a p "  r a t h e r  th a n  r e d u c e  it  an d  m a y  
e x p o s e  a u d it o r s  to  g r e a t e r  l e g a l  l i a b i l i t y .  E m p h a s is  sh o u ld  b e  
p la c e d  on  im p r o v in g  a u d it in g  s t a n d a rd s  an d  p r o c e d u r e s  t h a t  w i l l  
p r o v id e  r e a s o n a b le  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  m a t e r ia l  m is s t a t e m e n t s  w i l l  
b e  d e t e c t e d  th ro u g h  th e  a u d it in g  p r o c e s s .
*  *  *  *  *
W e  w o u ld  b e  p le a s e d  to  d is c u s s  o u r  v i e w s  f u r t h e r  i f  th e  C o m m is s io n  
w o u ld  f in d  it  h e lp fu l .
V e r y  t r u ly  y o u r s ,
T h e  B u s in e s s  R o u n d t a b le
192
Roger B. Smith
Chairman
John F. Akers
Cochairman
Theodore F. Brophy
Cochairman
Edmund T. Pratt, Jr.
Cochairman
NEW YORK
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166
(212) 682-6370
WILLIAM L. LURIE 
President
RICHARD W. ANTHONY
Executive Director-Public information
RICHARD F KIBBEN
Executive Director-Construction
WASHINGTON
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 872-1260
SAMUEL L. MAURY 
Executive Director
J u ly  8, 1987
M r. G. D ew ey A rn o ld , E x e c u tiv e  D ire c to r  
N a tio n a l C om m iss ion  on F ra u d u le n t 
F in a n c ia l R e p o rt in g  
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  A venue , N .W .
W ash ing ton , D .C . 20006
D ea r M r. A rn o ld :
The A c c o u n tin g  P r in c ip le s  Task F o rce  (th e  Task F o rce ) o f  th e  Business 
R o u n d ta b le  a p p re c ia te s  th is  o p p o r tu n ity  to  c o m m e n t on th e  d r a f t  R e p o rt o f 
th e  N a tio n a l C om m iss ion  on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rt in g . The Business 
R o u n d ta b le  is an o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  200 C h ie f E x e c u tiv e  O ff ic e rs  o f U.S. 
com pan ies  in  a l l  lin e s  o f  business.
The Task Force generally supports the findings and recommendations o f the 
Commission as they are, on the whole, consistent w ith  the good reporting 
and management practices fo llowed by most m ajor companies. We believe 
tha t these practices are im portan t fo r a ll companies, as improved 
corporate governance is in the in te res t o f shareholders, management and 
the U.S. economy. The Task Force is p a rticu la rly  supportive o f the 
Commission's recommendation to  the SEC to  reconsider its  opposition to 
corporate indem nifica tion  o f d irectors. L im ited  corporate indem nifica tion 
w ill help companies a ttra c t and reta in the qua lified  outside directors 
needed to  im plem ent the Commission's recommendations.
POLICY COMMITTEE:
Roger B. Smith, Chairman • John F. Akers, Cochairman • Theodore F. Brophy, Cochairman • Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., Cochairman 
H. Brewster Atwater • Stephen D. Bechtel, Jr. • Robert A Beck • William W. Boeschenstein • John F. Bookout • James E. Burke • John L. Clendenin 
William S. Cook • John J. Creedon • Robert F. Erburu • John B. Fery • Richard L. Gelb • Roberto C. Goizueta • Howard Goldfeder
Robert A. Hanson • Raymond A. Hay • Richard E. Heckert • William R. Howell • David T. Kearns • Robert D. Kilpatrick • William S. Lee
James T. Lynn • Richard J. Mahoney • Robert H. Malott • Hamish Maxwell • John F. McGillicuddy • Ruben F. Mettler • Richard M. Morrow • John D. Ong 
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While most of the recommendations represent reasonable and cost- 
effective means of reducing fraudulent financial reporting, there are 
several areas of concern that should be addressed by the Commission 
before issuance of the final report. These areas are outlined below.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  P U B L I C  C O M P A N I E S
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  F a c t o r s  L e a d i n g  t o  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
The Task Force is concerned that the Commission's recommendation that 
senior management must identify, understand and assess the factors that 
foster fraudulent financial reporting will be interpreted to mean that 
compliance requires a separate, extensive documentation effort similar to 
that performed by many companies in response to the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act. For companies that have adequate controls and procedures, 
a separate effort should not be required. The report should make clear that 
extensive documentation is not required or encouraged.
N e e d  f o r  E x t e r n a l  A u d i t o r  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  R e v i e w s
The report gives the impression that the Commission recommends that 
management engage its external auditors to periodically perform internal 
control reviews in addition to the work performed by the internal audit 
staff. While the Commission does not require these reviews, an inference 
can be made that managements that do not have external reviews 
performed are somehow not complying with the Commission's 
recommendations. External auditor internal control reviews are extremely 
costly and should only be entered into in situations where a problem has 
emerged or where there is no strong internal audit function.
C o n c e p t  o f  R e a s o n a b l e  A s s u r a n c e
The report should affirmatively state that reasonable assurance, rather 
than absolute assurance, is the standard for developing internal controls 
and procedures to detect and prevent fraudulent financial reporting 
practices. While the report makes this point in several places, this should 
be discussed in greater detail at the outset as the context for the report.
I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  S t a n d a r d - S e t t i n g  B o d y
The Task Force believes that establishing a new standard-setting board to 
deal solely with internal control issues is not necessary and would be 
extremely costly. The Auditing Standards Board, reconstituted as 
recommended by the Commission, would be the appropriate rule-making 
body to give companies guidance on internal controls.
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R o l e  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
O v e r s i g h t  F u n c t i o n :
In the Good Practices section for Audit Committees, the Commission 
indicates that the Audit Committee "is the primary vehicle that the board 
of directors uses to discharge its responsibility with respect to the 
company's financial reporting" and that an informed and vigilant Audit 
Committee plays a major role in minimizing fraudulent financial 
reporting. While the Task Force agrees that the Audit Committee is of 
great importance and should play a key oversight role, the Commission's 
concept of an Audit Committee goes far beyond the appropriate role for a 
conscientious Audit Committee in a major corporation. The Commission 
should not assign to the Committee responsibilities that duplicate those of 
management.
Many of the Commission's recommendations would in fact expand the role 
of the Audit Committee from an oversight role to that of an active 
participant in management functions. Requirements in the Good Practices 
section for Audit Committees should be reviewed, and functions that are 
more in the nature of management's responsibility, such as reviewing open 
IRS audits and approving financial results, should be deleted so as to keep 
the Audit Committee independent of management functions.
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g :
The recommendation that the audit committee approve quarterly financial 
results prior to release to the public is in conflict with the Audit 
Committee's oversight role. As discussed above, approving financial 
results, such as the quarterly reports, before issuance to the public is the 
responsibility of senior management, not the Audit Committee. The report 
should recommend that the appropriate role for the Audit Committee in 
the quarterly reporting process would be to review quarterly financial 
results with management and to keep abreast of important issues which 
could impact financial reporting throughout the year.
S e c o n d  O p i n i o n s  o n  A c c o u n t i n g  I s s u e s :
The Commission report recommends that the Audit Committee be informed 
in all cases if a second opinion is sought on a significant accounting issue.
Requiring management to notify the Audit Committee in all instances 
where a second opinion is sought on an accounting issue, even when the 
opinion obtained supports the current auditor's views, is an unnecessary use 
of an Audit Committee's limited time and resources. The recommendation 
should be modified so that notification is required only if the external 
auditors are uncomfortable with the second opinion.
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A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  C h a i r m a n ' s  L e t t e r s
The report recommends that annual reports include a letter signed by the 
Chairman of the Audit Committee describing the committee's role and 
activities. While this communication can be useful, we believe that 
corporations should have the flexibility to decide whether to include a 
letter of this type.
I s s u e s  R e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  C h i e f  A u d i t o r
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  R e p o r t i n g  L i n e s :
The Commission encourages an administrative reporting relationship in 
which the Chief Auditor reports directly to the CEO. The Task Force, 
which is composed exclusively of CEO's, believes that in most companies it 
is not practical to have the Chief Auditor report to the CEO. Instead, the 
recommendation should state that in situations where the Chief Auditor has 
free and direct access to the CEO and Audit Committee, the Chief Auditor 
should report administratively to a member of senior management with 
broad responsibilities which may include corporate financial affairs.
C h i e f  A u d i t o r  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s :
The report indicates that the qualifications to be a Chief Auditor should 
include experience as an auditor. While an auditing background adds an 
important dimension, the Task Force believes it is not an essential 
prerequisite to being an effective Chief Auditor. The selection of a Chief 
Auditor who has had significant relevant business experience can add to the 
effectiveness of a qualified and experienced audit staff.
C h a n g e  i n  A u d i t o r s
The report would require companies who change auditors to publicly 
disclose all major accounting or auditing issues discussed with its new and 
old auditors during the three-year period prior to the change.
We are concerned that giving the details of all significant accounting and 
auditing issues, even if satisfactorily resolved, could provide competitors 
with proprietary information and cause burdensome reporting requirements 
for companies whose activities happen to raise significant accounting 
issues. In addition, it will make the companies that have the most open 
relationships with their public accountants appear to the public to have the 
most suspect accounting practices.
The Task Force believes that the recommendation should be dropped. The 
current SEC rules regarding changes in auditors is sufficient and any 
expansion of the currently required disclosure could discourage companies 
from changing auditors for valid business reasons. If the Commission feels 
some disclosure is necessary, that requirement should focus only on areas 
of significant disagreement between mangement and the old auditor.
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R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  F O R  T H E  I N D E P E N D E N T  P U B L I C  A C C O U N T A N T  
A u d i t o r 's  S t a n d a r d  R e p o r t
The Commission has proposed changing the auditor’s standard report to 
state that the audit provides reasonable but not absolute assurance that the 
audited financial statements are free from material misstatements as a 
result of fraud or error.
The Task Force believes that this change may widen rather than reduce the 
"expectation gap." It would seem likely that such an expanded standard 
report would be taken as a blanket guarantee against material 
misstatement, despite the "reasonable but not absolute" wording, because it 
is likely that any audit that failed to detect a material misstatement would 
be judged to have been inadequate.
The Task Force believes that the short, standardized auditor's report 
cannot be expected to communicate the nuances of the auditor's role in 
detecting material misstatement due to fraud or error. Instead, the 
emphasis should be on the development of auditing standards that clearly 
delineate the auditor's role in detecting material misstatements and that 
contain the appropriate auditing procedures that should be followed in 
order to provide users of financial statements with reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements are free from material misstatements due to 
fraud or error.
* * * * *
We would be pleased to expand on our comments if the Commission would 
find it helpful.
 
Very truly yours,  
John S. Reed 
Chairman
Accounting Principles Task Force
cc: Roger B. Smith, Chairman, The Business Roundtable 
William L. Lurie, President, The Business Roundtable 
Accounting Principles Task Force Members 
Accounting Principles Task Force Staff Committee Members
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 V A LE R O
  E N E R G Y  C O R P O R A T IO N
Post Office Box 500 • San Antonio, Texas 78292-0500 • Telephone (512) 246-2131
Edward C. Benninger, Jr.
Senior Vice President 
Chief Financial Officer
J u ly  1 0 , 1987
N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20026
RE: R e p o rt o f  th e  N a t io n a l Com m ission on F ra u d u le n t
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  E xposu re  D r a f t  d a te d  A p r i l  1987
D ear S i r s :
V a le ro  Energy C o rpo ra tion  ( “ V a le ro ")  is  a p u b lic ly -h e ld  broad based 
energy concern headquartered in  San A n to n io , Texas. We a p p re c ia te  the  
o p p o r tu n ity  to  respond to  the  exposure d r a f t  prepared by the  N a tiona l 
Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  ("C om m iss ion").
We would l i k e  to  commend the  Commission and i t s  p a r t ic ip a n ts  on the 
p re p a ra tio n  o f  a comprehensive and w e ll prepared a n a ly s is  on past and p resen t 
fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  problems and p o te n t ia l s o lu t io n s .
We have concerns rega rd ing  the  suggested language to  be p a r t  o f  the 
Management Report on R e s p o n s ib il ity  f o r  F in a n c ia l R eporting  which is  to  be 
in c lud ed  in  the  Annual Report to  S hareho lders. V a le ro , l i k e  many o th e r 
companies, a lre a d y  in c lud es  in  i t s  annual re p o r t  a re p o r t  by management 
d e s c r ib in g  t h e i r  unde rtak ing  to  ensure the  in t e g r i t y  o f  the  f in a n c ia l 
s ta tem en ts . We b e lie v e  th a t  to  in c lu d e  a sta tem ent in  the  Management Report 
th a t  the  f in a n c ia l s tatem ents are n o t m iss ta te d  due to  m a te r ia l fra u d  o r 
e r ro r  is  unnecessary. The reader presumes th a t  the  f in a n c ia l statem ents they 
are rev iew in g  are reasonable in  the  c ircum stances and are no t m iss ta ted  due 
to  m a te r ia l fra u d  o r e r ro r .  We would suggest th a t  language o f  t h is  na tu re  be 
d e le te d  from  you r example.
There are fo u r  o th e r areas in  the  management re p o r t  which are inc luded  
in  the  proposed language which w i l l  be both new to  companies and which may 
c re a te  c e r ta in  problem s. F i r s t ,  a sta tem ent th a t  the company m a in ta ins  a 
system o f  in te rn a l c o n tro l ( " c o n t r o l"  more comprehensive than " in te rn a l 
accoun ting  c o n t ro ls " )  th a t  p rov ides reasonable assurance as to  the  p reven tion  
and d e te c tio n  o f  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  is  p la u s ib le .  We b e lie v e  
th a t  i t  w i l l  take tim e fo r  some companies to  ensure th a t  t h e i r  in te rn a l 
c o n t ro ls ,  in c lu d in g  in te rn a l accoun ting  c o n t ro ls ,  are p ro p e rly  in  p lace . 
Secondly, a sta tem ent th a t  the company m a in ta ins  a "s tro n g "  in te rn a l a u d it in g  
program is  s u b je c t iv e  a t  best and a m a tte r o f  o p in io n . A mere sta tem ent th a t  
the  company m a in ta ins  a n  in te rn a l a u d it  program to  ensure assets and records
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are safeguarded and that reviews internal accounting and operational 
controls, etc, is sufficient. A statement that such program is "strong" is 
too subjective to be credible and such language should be deleted. Thirdly, 
a statement that the auditors completed a study and evaluation of selected 
internal accounting controls is also unnecessary. Generally accepted 
auditing standards require the independent public accountant to perform a 
review of the existing system of internal accounting controls to the extent 
necessary to provide a basis for reliance thereon in determining the nature, 
timing and extent of audit tests to be performed. Unless the auditor's 
opinion, included in the annual report, states otherwise, the reader presumes 
the auditors have conducted an evaluation of internal control sufficient to 
provide reliance thereon in connection with the expression of their opinion 
on the financial statements. We do not believe that a statement by 
management detailing any of the specific tasks performed by the independent 
public accountant is necessary or meaningful. Fourthly, a statement that 
management assumes responsibility for fostering a strong ethical climate and 
that the affairs of the company are conducted according to the highest 
standards of personal and corporate conduct is inappropriate. We believe 
that it  is neither within the scope of the Commission's functions nor within 
its particular expertise to promulgate standards of ethical conduct for 
publicly held corporations. Any requirement that issuers state that they are 
"fostering a strong ethical climate" or that their affairs are "conducted 
according to the highest standards of personal and corporate conduct" places 
the Commission squarely into issues of corporate governance and conduct best 
left to the individual judgment of management, the Board of Directors and 
stockholders.
We do not believe that approval by the audit committee of quarterly 
earnings before their release adds a sufficiently greater level of 
reliability to the quarterly reporting process. It  is difficult to attempt 
to schedule audit committee meetings every quarter before earnings release. 
I f  all committee members are not available then earnings release must be 
postponed until such time as all are available. Stock market followers and 
analysts learn to expect companies to release earnings a certain number of
days after the end of a quarter. I f  this does not happen with a certain
consistency then the market will react negatively anticipating that the delay 
in the release of earnings is the result of poor operating results and not 
because of a scheduling conflict with the audit committee.
We believe that a more appropriate alternative to a quarterly review by 
the audit committee is to have a quarterly review by the company's
independent public accountant prior to the public release of quarterly 
results. We believe this provides more credibility to the quarterly
reporting process, helps to identify problems more readily ( i.e ., before 
year-end) and would result in a more detailed review than a review by the 
audit committee. In addition, i f  the auditor experiences unresolvable 
problems in connection with the performance of his quarterly review 
procedures he would contact the audit committee directly, communicate the 
problems encountered and seek appropriate resolution. We believe that most 
of the major public companies already have their quarterly results reviewed
VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION
Post Office Box 500 • San Antonio, Texas 78292
Telephone (512) 246-2000
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by their auditors prior to public release. We believe the benefits of a 
review by the auditor of the quarterly results outweighs the cost and should 
be incorporated into the Commission's recommendation. We believe that the 
audit committee should review the year-end earnings release prior to public 
release and only after meeting with the independent public accountant and the 
Board of Directors.
We do not believe that it  is appropriate or necessary in most cases for 
the audit committee to approve the hiring of the chief internal auditor. The 
hiring of employees, including the chief internal auditor, should continue to 
be a management function. The chief internal auditor should, however, be 
hired with the approval of the chief executive officer. We understand that 
in some companies the chief internal auditor reports directly to the chairman 
of the audit committee. In these situations it  is appropriate for the audit 
committee to hire, or approve the hiring of, the chief internal auditor.
We also do not believe that i t  is the Company's responsibility per se to 
ensure that the independent public accountant maintain its independence. 
Generally accepted auditing standards requires that the independent public 
accountant be independent from those that he serves both in fact and in 
appearance. Therefore, the auditor must be in compliance with this standard 
in order to express an opinion on the financial statements he is auditing. 
It  is the auditor's responsibility to maintain his independence and, as such, 
he must ensure that the maintenance of such is a top priority.
Regarding independence and the performance of management advisory 
services ("MAS"), the company's own independent public accounting firm is 
often in the best position to perform these services (assuming they have the 
expertise in the particular area of concern). The performance of MAS work 
should not impair the auditors' independence. However, as in any endeavor, 
judgment must be exercised and the possibility that independence might be 
impaired should be considered by any public accounting firm before MAS work 
is performed by it  for an audit client. Because it  is the responsibility of 
the auditor to maintain his independence, i t  is the auditor who must decide, 
based on his knowledge of generally accepted auditing standards, i f  a 
particular MAS engagement would impair his independence before he accepts 
such work. In view of this, we do not believe it  is necessary for the audit 
committee to review and approve all MAS engagements.
The Commission's report indicates that audit committee members need 
sufficient understanding of computers and information systems in order to 
exercise their oversight responsibilities. We believe some clarification 
should be provided in the final statement indicating the particular reasons 
why the commission believes that the audit committee members need a 
sufficient understanding of computers and information systems to be effective 
members of the audit committee. We believe that the members of the audit 
committee should have a high level understanding of the goals and methods of 
financial accounting and reporting, but it  is appropriate that they rely on
VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION
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the reports of experts in the details of computers and information systems to 
determine appropriate levels of systems security, rather than their own 
expertise and evaluation. The evaluation of computer systems security should 
be the responsibility of the internal audit department and/or the independent 
public accountant to a certain extent. The report resulting from their 
evaluation should be communicated to the audit committee.
We believe that the Commission's recommendations regarding a uniform 
corporate code of conduct, while well-intentioned, are i l l  advised. 
Arguably, corporate codes of conduct may be of some help in ensuring the 
accuracy of financial disclosure. Normal business practices will vary 
sharply from industry to industry and will also vary significantly from 
country to country i f  the issuer conducts international operations. Even 
within the United States, normal business practices will vary dramatically by 
geographical location and industry. The Commission's recommendation that all 
corporations certify compliance with the "highest standards of personal and 
corporate conduct" is not practical. It  would be impossible to define a 
uniform and universal set of standards, not to speak of trying to determine 
which of these standards are the highest. The world of business is based on 
seeking competitive advantage. Conduct that is not illegal, but yet fosters 
competition, may be regarded by some as "unethical" or not meeting the 
"highest moral and ethical standards." Adopting a corporate code of conduct 
may be appropriate but we believe that a company's ability to monitor 
adherence by all of its employees to a corporate code of conduct setting 
forth high standards is virtually an impossible task. So long as the issuer 
is maintaining the accounting controls necessary to detect and avoid 
financial fraud and is not engaged in illegal activities, i t  should not be a 
matter of regulatory concern and is certainly not a matter of regulatory 
expertise as to whether its ethics conform to the "highest standards," to 
"normal industry standards," to "normal international standards" or any other 
possible standards. We do not believe such disclosure, being, by nature, 
subjective, would be of value to investors. While the Commission has made 
various useful recommendations, we do not believe that this idea is a 
workable solution.
We believe that a stronger presence by the board of directors in the 
performance of their oversight responsibilities, particularly as to the tone 
set by top management for the corporate environment in which financial 
reporting occurs, may help reduce the likelihood of fraudulent financial 
reporting. Most of the publicized cases of fraudulent financial reporting 
have occurred in small to medium sized companies in which top management 
either actively participated in or consented to the fraud. In these cases, 
increased oversight by the board of directors, combined with the work of the 
independent auditors, would probably be more effective than a corporate code 
of conduct administered by subordinates of top management.
There have been instances of disruptions to financial markets from cases 
in which fraudulent financial reporting was involved, but there are 
safeguards which are more effective than those against fraudulent financial
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r e p o r t i n g .  Im proved r e g i s t r a t i o n  and m o n ito r in g  o f  s e c u r i t i e s  d e a le r s  and 
u n d e r w r i t e r s , im proved re v ie w s  by f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  r e g u l a to r s  and m arg in  
re q u ir e m e n ts  on m ark e t p o s i t i o n s  a r e  much more e f f e c t i v e  t o o l s  in  g u a rd in g  
a g a in s t  f i n a n c i a l  m a rk e t d i s r u p t i o n s .  We have to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  by and l a r g e  
th e  a r e a  o f  f i n a n c i a l  f r a u d  i s  an a r e a  o f  c o n c e rn  b u t  i s  n o t  a u n iv e r s a l  
p ro b lem .
The Com m ission recommends t h a t  th e  a u d i t  co m m ittee  re v ie w  a n n u a l ly  th e  
Com pany's r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  p ro c e s s  and m anagem en ts ' r e s p o n s e s  to  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i d e n t i f i e d  r i s k .  We b e l i e v e  t h a t  an exam ple o f  su ch  r e p o r t  c o n te m p la te d  by 
th e  Com m ission w ould be h e lp f u l  to  com panies in  t r y i n g  to  b e t t e r  com m unicate 
w ith  t h e i r  a u d i t  c o m m itte e s .
R eg a rd in g  th e  C o m m iss io n 's  recom m endation  t h a t  th e  an n u a l r e p o r t  c o n ta in  
a r e p o r t  from  th e  a u d i t  co m m ittee  d e s c r ib in g  th e  c o m m it te e 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
and d u t i e s ,  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  m anagem ent r e p o r t  may be a m ore a p p r o p r i a t e  
av enue  to  d i s c u s s  th e  r o l e  o f  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e . F u r th e rm o re , th e  
d i s c l o s u r e  in  th e  p roxy  s ta te m e n t  p ro v id e s  s u f f i c i e n t  d e t a i l  o f  th e  a u d i t  
c o m m it te e 's  a c t i v i t i e s  and th e  names o f  i t s  m em bers. A s e p a r a te  r e p o r t  
s ig n e d  by th e  a u d i t  co m m ittee  ch a irm an  w ould a p p e a r  to  be b o th  u n n e c e s s a ry  
and somewhat d u p l i c a t i v e .
We hope t h a t  o u r  comments and recom m endations w i l l  be h e lp f u l  t o  th e  
Com m ission in  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  on th e s e  i s s u e s .
Edward C. B e n n in g e r , J r .
VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION
Post Office Box 500 • San Antonio, Texas 78292 
Telephone (512) 246-2000
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N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
W ashington, DC 20006
Dear Sir:
We are pleased to have the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft of the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (April 1987).
Scott Paper Company is the world's leading manufacturer and marketer of sanitary tissue paper products with consolidated sales last year of $3.4 billion and total assets of $3.9 billion. As a public enterprise, it has long been our policy to conduct the Company's affairs in a manner designed to earn the respect of the public as a reputable and honest business firm.Accordingly, many of the practices recommended by the Commission are already in place at Scott.
Overall, Scott agrees with the Commission's recommendations aimed at reducing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. We believe that all of the participants involved in the financial reporting process have important roles to play in ensuring the full and fair disclosure of financial information. In recognizing this multidimensional responsibility, we feel that the Commission has developed a comprehensive approach to reducing the potential for fraudulentreporting.
Because our p e rsp e c tive  is  from  the  s ta n d p o in t o f  a p u b lic  company, most o f  the 
fo llo w in g  comments are d ire c te d  towards th is  area o f  the  Commission's Exposure 
D ra f t .  We do, however, have a few genera l obse rva tions  on the  recommendations 
fo r  independent p u b lic  accountants and educa tion . In  the  in te re s t  o f 
e f f ic ie n c y ,  we have l im ite d  our d iscuss io n  o n ly  to  those areas where we have 
s p e c if ic  o p in io n s , suggestions , o r questions th a t  we fe e l would be va luab le  to  
the  Commission.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
"The Tone at the Top"
S co tt s t ro n g ly  supports the  Commission's b e l ie f  th a t  the  tone se t by top 
management is  " the  most im po rtan t fa c to r  c o n tr ib u t in g  to  the  in t e g r i t y  o f  the 
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  p rocess ." Through i t s  le a d e rs h ip , support and top-down 
com munications, top  management can c rea te  a co rp o ra te  " c u ltu re "  th a t  encourages 
re sp o n s ib le  behavio r and reduces the  p o te n t ia l f o r  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l 
re p o r t in g .
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"Two Key Functions: Accounting and Internal Audit"
The Commission recommends that public companies maintain an internal audit 
function staffed with "an adequate number of qualified personnel appropriate to 
the size and nature of the company." While we acknowledge that the size of the 
internal audit function may vary depending upon facts and circumstances, we 
think it would be appropriate to establish more specific guidelines as to the 
funding or size of an internal audit staff. If  such guidelines could be 
developed and included in the Commission's recommendation, we believe that 
public companies would be in a better position to assess the effectiveness of 
their internal audit function in terms of detecting and preventing fraud.
These guidelines could be based on criteria such as dollar sales, business 
scope (domestic versus international), management structure (centralized versus 
decentralized), audit approach (more auditors may be required for operational 
auditing than for financial auditing), or a combination of factors that may be 
indicative of the potential for exposure to fraudulent reporting.
Objectivity of the Internal Audit Function
Although we agree with the Commission's conclusion that the organizational 
positioning of the internal audit function is one of the principal factors 
contributing to its independence and objectivity, we take exception with the 
generalization that the chief internal auditor should report to a "senior 
officer who is not directly responsible for preparing the company's financial 
statements."
In a decentralized company where division controllers report to line management 
and not to the corporate controller, having the chief internal auditor report 
to the corporate controller can be an important aspect of the company's overall 
system of internal accounting controls. The chief internal auditor can assist 
the corporate controller in fulfilling his fiduciary responsibilities by acting 
as his "eyes and ears" in evaluating internal controls and auditing financial 
statements prepared at the division and local operating levels throughout the 
company. Without this reporting relationship in a decentralized company, the 
corporate controller, who is responsible for the company's financial 
statements, would be limited in his ability to assess the accuracy and 
correctness of the data being consolidated. The independence of the chief 
internal auditor is not compromised because there is no direct reporting 
relationships to division or local controllers.
To ensure that there is no conflict of interest at the corporate level, the 
audit of the corporate financial statements (for which the corporate controller 
has responsibility) should be performed by the independent public accountants. 
Moreover, the chief internal auditor's direct and unrestricted access to both 
the CEO and the audit committee (as recommended by the Commission) would help 
to maintain further independence and objectivity at the corporate level.
Involvement at the Corporate Level
In discussing the audit of the entire financial reporting process, the 
Commission suggests that internal auditors should be involved at the corporate 
level (in a coordinated effort with the independent public accountants) and not 
just at the division, subsidiary, or other business component level.
- 3 -
194
B
We agree with this position but feel that there may be situations where such 
involvement is not always possible or desirable. For example, in order to 
opine on the financial statements, independent public accountants are required 
to do a minimum amount of audit testing. We question whether or not the 
independent public accountants could continue to remain "comfortable" in 
expressing their opinion if  a significant portion of this testing at the 
corporate level were performed by internal auditors. Also, as previously 
noted, extensive involvement of internal auditors at the corporate level could 
compromise their independence in companies where the chief internal auditor 
reports to the corporate controller.
Issues Related to Public Accountant's  Independence
The Commission recommends that the audit committee "approve in advance" the use 
of the independent public accountant for management advisory services.
We share the Commission's belief that the audit committee should oversee the 
use of management advisory services performed by the company's independent 
public accountant; however, we do not feel that it  is practical or necessary to 
obtain advance approval each time such services are engaged. Instead, we would 
suggest that a company's audit committee establish specific parameters for 
determining those situations in which prior approval is required. These 
parameters could include a percent of the base audit fee, a designated dollar 
value, the purpose for which the management advisory service is being obtained, 
or a combination of several criteria. If  management advisory services fall 
outside these parameters, then services could be engaged by the company without 
the audit committee's approval in advance.
While we favor eliminating the requirement for comprehensive prior approval, we 
recognize that procedures should be in place to permit the audit committee to 
fu lfill its responsibility as an overseer of management judgments relating to 
the independence of the public accountant. We therefore recommend that, at 
least one each year, all fees and services (both audit and non-audit) involving 
the company's independent public accountants be presented to the audit 
committee for their review.
Management Report and Audit Committee Chairman's Letter
Scott supports the Commission's recommendation that public companies should be 
required to include management reports in their annual reports to stockholders. 
We disagree, however, with the requirement that these management reports should 
be signed by the chief executive officer and chief accounting officer.
An Ad Hoc Committee (on "Reports By Management") commissioned by the American 
Bar Association concluded in its Discussion Paper (January 1981) that there may 
be legal liability implications associated with this practice "because of the 
potential for personal responsibility for the signing individuals separate and 
apart from their status as an officer or employee or their involvement in the 
preparation of financial statements." As a result, after several years of 
including such signatures on our management report, Scott discontinued this 
practice in 1981 on the advice of counsel. We would suggest that the same 
logic that applies to signing the management report would also apply to the 
audit committee chairman's letter.
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In our opinion, management has responsibility for all representations 
(financial and otherwise) included in the annual report to shareholders. 
Moreover, signatures of certain officers and directors are already included on 
the SEC Form 10-K. Additional signatures in the annual report and the 
inclusion of a letter from the chairman of the audit committee are redundant 
and could unnecessarily expose these individuals to legal actions.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
As a public company, we are concerned that the recommendations directed at the 
independent public accountants may entail a significant increase in audit fees. 
In particular, the potential for increased fees could result from the adoption 
of the Commission's recommendations dealing with:
• the use of analytical review procedures for detecting fraudulent 
financial reporting.
• the requirement for a review of quarterly financial data before 
public release. On this issue, we feel that the Commission should 
further define what constitutes "a review." If  the definition goes 
beyond the scope of the work that public independent accountants' 
currently perform for quarterly reporting to shareholders, then there 
is a high probability that the work could involve additional cost.
• the requirement to involve a concurring, or second partner, in both 
the planning and final review stage of an audit.
We believe that the Commission's recommendations in the aforementioned areas 
should be subject to the strict application of appropriate cost-benefit 
analysis. The recommendations should be adopted only if  it  can be demonstrated 
that the benefits associated with improving the auditor's ability to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting through these practices clearly outweigh the 
additional costs of the extra audit work.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION
Scott strongly endorses the Commission's recommendations concerning the role of 
education in preparing present and future participants in the financial 
reporting system. We feel that it  is vitally important to create an awareness 
of fraudulent financial reporting and expose students to proper ethical values 
before they enter the business world. While the curricula in undergraduate and 
graduate programs can form the first line of defense, we agree with the 
Commission that continuing professional education and initiatives taken by 
public companies can help to reinforce this knowledge throughout an 
individual's career.
In summary, Scott supports the work that has been done by the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. We believe that the Commission 
has developed a balanced set of recommendations that when implemented by all of 
the participants involved will help to reduce the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting.
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We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft and hope that 
the Commission will find our comments helpful in bringing its work to a 
conclusion.
Very truly yours,
Edward B. Betz
Vice President and Controller 
SCOTT PAPER COMPANY
/rac
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July 10, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue? N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006
RE: The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Gentlemen:
Washington Mutual Savings Bank is a stockho1der—owned savings bank, chartered by the State of Washington and headquartered in Seattle, Washington. The Bank and its affiliates comprise Washington Mutual Financial Group (WMFG). As of May 31, 1987,consolidated assets totaled $5.6 billion.
We would like to thank you for the opportunity to comment on your recent report on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. While we agree with many of the recommendations suggested by the Commission, we do not always agree on the methodology to achieve those results, Our experience has been that some of the recommended actions don’t always achieve the intended results.
Washington Mutual Financial Group agrees with the Commission that one of management’s primary responsibilities is to ensure that corporate information, including financial statements, is materially accurate. Consequently, we have in place, a number of the controls recommended by the Commission. We have developed and implemented systems of internal control which include controls over both operational tasks and the financial reporting process.We have also designed controls to prevent and detect unauthorized activity, as well as implemented follow-up procedures when unauthorized activity has been detected.
Both the internal and external auditors periodically review the systems of internal control to help determine that the controls are operating as intended. WMFG has placed reliance on the systems of controls, with the internal audit department as the check to determine that the controls are in place and functioning appropriately.
WMFG has a professional audit staff consisting of eighteen individuals, the majority of which are either certified (CPA,CISA, etc.) and/or have advanced degrees. In addition, WMFG is audited by one of the "big eight" CPA firms that has extensive thrift industry experience.
All of the recommendations made by the Commission deal with implementing and/or strengthening controls. We believe it is
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appropriate to formalize the standards that many well run 
corporations are following. However, we believe compliance with 
some of the recommendations will be very burdensome for most 
corporations. Several of the recommendations will be very time 
consuming and/or expensive to develop and implement. For example, 
having external auditors design tests to provide reasonable 
assurance of detecting fraud would be quite expensive. They would 
have to spend additional hours developing a detailed understanding 
of the business and the operations of the corporation. Extensive 
testing would be expensive and the corresponding probability would 
be low that fraud, if present, would be detected.
The Commission has responded to a growing concern in the business 
community, primarily users of corporate financial information, 
by providing recommendations designed to improve the adequacy and 
accuracy of information provided by public companies. While many 
corporations have already implemented most of the recommendations 
because they make good business sense, a few corporations have not 
and will not implement them. It appears that a few corporations’ 
actions are reflecting poorly upon the majority of responsible 
corporations.
It is our opinion that corporations intent on presenting 
information portraying a more positive picture than is appropriate 
will not follow the standards recommended by the commission. 
Consequently, making recommendations to cure potential fraudulent 
financial reporting by those few who will not comply with the 
standards does not appear to be the best interests of the 
remaining corporations.
There are several other recommendations in this section which we 
do not feel add positively to the control environment, nor does 
there appear to be a good cost benefit relationship.
The Committee has recommended that “the audit committee should 
approve in advance the types and the extent of management a d v i s o r y  
services that management plans to engage the company’s independent 
public accountant to perform."
The Audit Committee at WMFG feels that management should keep them 
apprised of all management advisory services provided by the 
external auditors or any other parties. They have stated that 
management advisory services, if not extensive, can be approved by 
management. Only extensive management services which might 
adversely affect the external auditors’ independence are reviewed 
by the audit committee prior to engagement of their services.
WMFG feels the recommendation would achieve the objective intended 
if it stated that the audit committee should be apprised of all 
management advisory services provided by the external auditors and 
set the criteria indicating who and under what circumstances 
management could obtain management advisory services without the 
audit committee’s prior consent.
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The Committee has recommended that "audit committees should 
increase their oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This 
oversight should include approving financial results prior to 
public release."
We are aware that other corporations and financial institutions 
have their audit committees review quarterly financial statements 
prior to issuance. At WMFG, we do not do this because our 
external auditors perform analytical review procedures, conduct 
discussions with management and perform limited audit procedures 
related to large or unusual transactions. If there are any 
significant unresolved issues, our external auditors would meet 
with the Audit Committee and discuss their concerns.
The Audit Committee understands the process involved in preparing 
quarterly statements and feels the level of review performed by 
the external auditors prior to the issuance of quarterly financial 
statements is appropriate.
WMFG feels that by revising the recommendation to allow for the 
flexibility required under differing circumstances without 
decreasing the positive control environment would be beneficial.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. We will be 
pleased to discuss any of the above issues or respond to questions 
you may have with respect to our comments.
Sincerely,
 Kerry Kil linger    
Senior Executive Vice President
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J A M E S E. B U R K E
CHAIRMAN OF THE B O A R D
Johnson & Johnson
NE W  B R U N S W I CK  N E W J E R S E Y
July 1, 1987
Mr. William M. Batten
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Dear Mel,
Thank you for your note and request for our thoughts. 
Unquestionably, the work of the Commission is to be applauded 
for its comprehensive effort to deal with society's concerns 
about fraudulent financial reporting.
We quite agree with the spirit of the principal recommendations 
of the Commission, much of which has been woven into the fabric 
of Johnson & Johnson culture for decades. Unquestionably, top 
management has to take responsibility for setting the tone for 
ethical business behavior.
 
However ,  within the framework of the commission's 
recommendations, we do have some concerns with the degree of 
specificity, which could add substantial costs in circumstances 
where they may not be warranted.
We are concerned about the degree of increased oversight 
expected of the Audit Committee (and implication that staff 
resources would be required) such as pre-approval of quarterly 
financial press releases. Of course, we do this at year-end, 
but do not feel that it is necessary for interim periods. Nor 
do we feel that the independent public accountants need to be 
involved prior to quarterly public releases. These 
recommendations would add considerably to cost and probably 
delay the timeliness of press releases.
We are concerned about some of the specifics with regard to 
Internal Auditing. Unencumbered access to the CEO and Audit 
Committee should be adequate; we do not agree with the need for 
peer reviews to assure objectivity; again, unnecessary cost, in 
our view. Furthermore, the internal controls objective should 
incorporate the concept of "reasonable assurance", which is 
really the practical limit of any cost-effective control 
process.
Cont'd....
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We have chosen not to comment on enforcement issues which are 
really the province of the courts, but in that regard we would 
certainly prefer to see guidelines which are more general and 
less specific, therefore better adaptable to given 
organizations.
In closing let me commend you and the Commission on a 
distinguished effort in the pursuit of improved financial 
reporting and with the hope that our comments may be of some 
consideration in your final deliberations.
Very truly yours
J. E. Burke
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PPG Industries, Inc. One PPG Place Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15272 (412) 434-2110
R. H. Mitchel
Vice President, Finance
July 10, 1987
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
PPG Industries, Inc. is pleased to submit comments expressing our 
views on the Exposure Draft of the Report of the National Commis­
sion on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. PPG Industries, Inc. is 
a United States based Fortune 100 corporation with annual sales 
of approximately $4.7 billion. PPG is among the world's leading 
manufacturers of glass, coatings and resins, and chemicals, with 
approximately 36,500 employees, operating 72 manufacturing loca­
tions worldwide, including 42 in the United States, and has ten 
research and development centers.
Overall, we believe that the report represents a good summary 
of procedures that are already in place at many well-managed com­
panies. However, we do take exception to a few specific statements 
and recommendations made in the report, and our comments follow.
The report states that "An audit committee consisting of indepen­
dent directors is the primary vehicle the board of directors uses 
to discharge its responsibility with respect to the company's 
financial reporting. An informed and vigilant audit committee 
represents one of the most effective influences for minimizing 
fraudulent financial reporting." We believe that these statements 
significantly overemphasize the role played by an audit committee. 
An undue burden would be placed on audit committees to fulfill the 
responsibilities described above, and companies would have a diffi­
cult time in obtaining qualified audit committee members because of 
the unwarranted additional liability implied in the report. While 
we believe that audit committees play an important role in the 
financial reporting process, we do not agree that they are the 
board of directors' primary vehicle to discharge their responsi­
bility in this area. Rather, a company's board of directors must 
rely on the company's overall system of financial reporting which 
includes the internal control system, internal and external audi­
tors, management, the financial accounting function and the board
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audit committee. We believe that the statements quoted above 
should be modified and put into proper perspective in order to 
more appropriately define an audit committee's role in the 
financial reporting process.
The report makes a recommendation that "The audit committee should 
approve in advance the types and the extent of management advisory 
services that management plans to engage the company's independent 
public accountant to perform." While we agree that the audit com­
mittee should critically review the nature and extent of management 
advisory services, we question the practicality of having such ser­
vices approved in advance. In a well-managed company, management 
must approve these types of services in advance, and they evaluate 
whether performance of the services might impair the independence 
of the public accountants. The audit committee would then review 
these services after the fact and ensure that management has 
effectively discharged its responsibilities. We believe that the 
recommendation should be modified to eliminate the requirement to 
approve the services "in advance." Many of the management advisory 
services are relatively insignificant to the overall operation and 
even in the aggregate would not constitute a concern over indepen­
dence. Perhaps some quantitative guideline would be appropriate.
The report recommends that "Audit committees should increase their 
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public 
release." Once again, we question the practicality of having the 
audit committee approve financial results prior to public release, 
and do not believe that the recommendation is cost justified. 
Compliance with the recommendation would require more frequent 
meetings of the audit committee at many companies, or the imple­
mentation of other additional procedures. Audit committees should 
rely on the company's financial reporting process as opposed to 
approving the financial results prior to public release. Through 
its normal meetings with management, independent accountants and 
internal auditors, the audit committee is effectively overseeing 
the financial reporting process, and can assure itself that the 
financial reporting process is functioning properly. We believe 
that the recommendation to approve financial results prior to 
public release should be eliminated from the report.
Thank you for the opportunity to express our views.
Sincerely
R. H. Mitchel
RHM/jw
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July 14, 1987
endevco, inc.
National Comision on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.Washington, D.C. 2006Dear Sirs:I am writing in response to the April, 1987 Exposure Draft of your report on fraudulent financial reporting. I would take exception to your recommendation in Chapter 2.III.B. that all public companies maintain an effective internal audit function. The necessity of the separate, internal audit function should be governed by the organizational structure and complexity of a reporting entity, not by the fact that its securities are traded publicly. There must be organizational benefits derived from the internal audit function that outweigh its costs.In a company whose management and reporting function are highly centralized, the benefits of the internal audit function would not appear to justify their costs. Top management gives personal attention to all operational phases and therefore is aware of any failure to protect assets or of any attempt to recognize inappropriate revenues or to defer expenses.The internal audit function can play an integral part in a system of internal accounting control. However, the decision to implement it should be based upon the same cost-benefit analysis that any other internal control is subject to. Man­dating the addition of costs to a public company, regardless of the need, will not be productive; to the contrary, it will be a waste of corporate assets and therefore a needless hin­drance to public capital markets.Yours truly,  
Twelfth Flor,
Lock Box 47 Richard N. Potts, CPA Controller
8080 N. Central RNP/vldExpresway 
Dalas, Texas
cc: William S. LeftwichEndevco, Inc. Audit Comite
75206
(214) 691-536
T H E  M ID L A N D  CO M PANY
111 E. FOURTH STREET 
P. O. BOX 1256
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45201
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J. P. HAYDEN, JR.
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
J u ly  14, 1987
N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear S irs :
As Chairman o f  the A u d it Committee o f  the Federal N a tiona l Mortgage 
A s s o c ia tio n , I have reviewed your A p r i l  1987 Exposure D ra ft  w ith  members 
o f  my committee and w ith  s e n io r management o f  the company. We compliment 
the Commission fo r  the thoroughness w ith  which i t  addressed i t s  assignment 
and fo r  the though t-p rovok ing  ideas expressed in  i t s  d r a f t  re p o r t.  We are 
in  agreement w ith  many o f  the Commission's recommendations. However, the re  
are severa l areas th a t  we b e lie v e  should be m o d ifie d .
W ith regard to  the "Issue  Related to  P u b lic  A ccountants ' Independence" 
on page 38 o f  the re p o r t ,  we d isagree  th a t  the A u d it Committee should 
approve in  advance the types and the  e x te n t o f  management a d v iso ry  se rv ices  
th a t  management p lans to  engage the  company's independent p u b lic  accountant 
to  perform . We agree w ith  the conc lus ion  th a t  the A u d it Committee should 
oversee management judgements re la t in g  to  the independence o f  the p u b lic  
accoun tan t, and th a t  i t  should cons ide r the  magnitude o f  such fees in  r e la ­
t io n  to  to ta l  fees pa id  to  the  independent p u b lic  accoun tan t. This ove r­
s ig h t  should be s u f f ic ie n t  to  ensure th a t  s ig n i f ic a n t  in d iv id u a l management 
a d v iso ry  se rv ice s  arrangements and the cum ula tive  e f fe c t  o f  a l l  such engage­
ments on the independence o f  the p u b lic  accountant re ce ive  c lose  s c ru t in y  
by the  A u d it Committee. We do no t agree, however, th a t  p r io r  approval o f 
the A u d it Committee should be re q u ire d  f o r  such engagements. To do so 
would, we b e lie v e , be an unnecessary and undes irab le  in tru s io n  on the 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  co rpo ra te  management.
We do no t agree w ith  the recommendation fo r  a separate re p o r t to  
s tockho lde rs  under the ca p tio n  "A u d it Committee Chairman's L e t te r "  on 
page 41 o f the re p o r t.  We b e lie v e  th is  requ irem ent can best be handled 
by in c lu d in g  in  the re p o r t  o f  management on the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  a p p ro p ria te  d is c lo s u re  o f  the membership and a c t iv i t ie s  
o f  the A u d it Committee. I t  is  im p ra c tic a b le  fo r  a u d it  com m ittees, as they 
are fo r  the  most p a r t e s ta b lis h e d  today, to  fu n c t io n  as o u t lin e d  in  your 
recommendation.
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National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
July 14, 1987 - Page 2_________
The most burde some and inappropriate recommendation in the report 
appears under the caption "Quarterly Reporting" on page 42. We do not 
believe that the Audit Committee should play an active role in the 
preparation and release of financial results to the public. The Com­
m ittee's responsib ility  should require i t  to determine that competent 
management is employed and that the organization structure provides 
effec tive  controls. Thereafter, its  role should be lim ited to those 
things that can e ffe c tiv e ly  be performed through oversight of the 
management process. From a practical standpoint, quarterly financial 
closings frequently do not correspond to scheduled Audit Committee or 
Board meetings. Therefore, a requirement fo r prior approval of pub­
lished financial results is impracticable as well as representing an 
unreasonable constraint on the management of the company.
We respectfu lly  request that these comments be considered by the 
Commission when i t  issues its  f in a l report.
Sincerely
J. P. Hayden, Jr.
Chairman, Audi t  Commi t tee
Federal National Mortgag e Association
JPHJR/l v
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Barbara Clark, City Auditor
1220 S.W. 5th, Rm. 202
Portland, Oregon 97204
(503) 248-4078
CITY O F
P O R T L A N D ,  O R E G O N
OFFICE O F CITY AUDITOR
J u ly  14, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  Avenue N.W.
W ash ington, D.C. 20006
I am w r i t in g  to  re q u e s t a d d it io n a l in fo rm a tio n  in  co n n e c tio n  w ith  th e  Treadway 
R eport exposure d r a f t .
I  was d is a p p o in te d  n o t to  f in d  in  th e  append ices a summary o f  f ra u d u le n t  
f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  cases such as E q u ity  Funding and Penn Square Bank, showing 
th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  f in a n c ia l  m is s ta te m e n t, how th e  i r r e g u la r i t i e s  were 
uncovered, and w h ich  a u d it in g  p rocedu res ( in c lu d in g  th e  proposed new SAS on 
i r r e g u la r i t i e s )  would have d is c lo s e d  th e  p rob lem . In  th e  absence o f  such a 
s y s te m a tic  s tu d y , we a re  ju d g in g  both  th e  Treadway R eport and th e  proposed SAS 
in  an in fo rm a tio n a l vacuum.
A long th e  same l in e s ,  th e  Oregon CPAs have t r i e d  to  o b ta in  d a ta  fro m  
m a lp ra c t ic e  c a r r ie r s  on cases o f  inadequa te  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  Our 
in q u ir ie s  were re b u f fe d ,  b u t a re q u e s t a t  th e  n a t io n a l le v e l would c a r r y  more 
c lo u t  and b r in g  o u t in fo rm a tio n  th a t  c o u ld  he lp  th e  CPA p ro fe s s io n  l i v e  up to  
th e  e x p e c ta t io n s  o f th e  p u b l ic .
A lthough  I concu r w ith  most o f  th e  Treadway R eport recom m endations, I  d isa g re e  
on th e  5 -y e a r e d u c a tio n  re q u ire m e n t. I  researched  t h i s  s u b je c t  in  d e ta i l  la s t  
y e a r w ith o u t  f in d in g  any dem onstra ted  q u a l i t y  c o r r e la t io n .  (See enc losed  
a r t i c l e . )  I f  you have lo c a te d  an o b je c t iv e  s tu d y  th a t  p ro v id e s  c o n v in c in g  
d a ta , I would l i k e  to  re c e iv e  a copy.
 
Society Staff Changes 
Announced
Rhonda Wolfinbarger
Several staff changes have taken 
p lace over the last four months at the 
 Society headquarters in Beaverton.
In September, Sue Buchanan was 
hired on a full time basis. She 
previously worked for the Society on a 
part time basis during the busy 
season. Sue is responsible for 
inventory/support services, which 
include taking and filling tax form 
orders, sending out CPE confirma­
tions and course materials to 
registrants, shipping and receiving, 
and inventory control. She also assists 
other departments with projects when 
needed.
Also in September, Janelle Graves, 
Assistant Manager, CPE, resigned.
Her responsibilities were taken over 
by Therese Mosher, and Michele 
Denton assumed Therese’s former 
responsibilities as CPE assistant.
In October, Rhonda Wolfinbarger 
joined the staff as membership 
assistant. She is responsible for 
maintaining and printing member 
records and assisting with Member­
ship Department projects, some of 
which include new member process­
ing, dues billings and the Client 
Referral Service. Rhonda covers for 
Sherri McPherson, Membership 
Services Coordinator, in her absence.
On behalf of the Society, a warm 
welcome to all those joining the staff.
Against 150-Hour 
Postbaccalaureate 
Requirement
by Barbara F. Clark
The November OSCPA newsletter 
contained an unsigned article on the merits 
of increasing education requirements for 
obtaining the CPA Certificate. I recognize 
the content as the AICPA’s official position 
on this issue. The 150-hour post­
baccalaureate has also been recommended 
by the recent report of the AICPA Special 
Committee on Standards of Professional 
Conduct.
The AICPA’s comments in favor of the 
increased requirement are most 
noteworthy for what they DO NOT say. 
Offhand I can think of several research 
projects to test the merits of a 5-year 
education program.
SUBSTANDARD REPORTING -T h e  
U.S. General Accounting Office has 
studied substandard audits at the national 
level, and the Oregon State Board of 
Accountancy has its own data from our 
positive enforcement program. If additional 
education prevents substandard reporting, 
we should expect a statistical correlation 
between “substandard” education and 
substandard reports. Research so far has 
been inconclusive.
MALPRACTICE SUITS -  Let’s look at 
the bright side of the increased number of 
malpractice suits: a lot of data is created 
for us to study! Any correlation between 
less education and more lawsuits? No 
insurance company statistics have been 
released.
AUDITORS IN THE NEWS -N ew s 
stories such as the Penn Square Bank 
failure remind us of the public’s 
expectation that audited financial 
statements will not be misleading because 
of fraud, error, or collusion. Do we find 
additional education providing auditors 
with better detection of possible client 
misstatements?
STATES WITH 5-YEAR 
REQUIREMENTS -  Florida, Hawaii, and 
Utah already require a year of education 
beyond the baccalaureate for new CPAs. 
What difference has it made? Preliminary 
reports indicate a higher percentage of 
candidates pass all parts of the CPA exam 
on the first try. However, for actual CPA 
performance, it’s “too soon to tell,’'  
according to the Florida board.
COMMUNITY RECOGNITION —Each 
CPA builds a reputation over the years for 
competence and integrity. An outstanding 
practitioner will be known by clients, 
banks, attorneys, the IRS, and CPA 
colleagues. Some outstanding CPAs have 
graduate degrees; some have only high 
school diplomas. An MBA makes more of 
a difference for the beginning accountant.
If the AICPA position is disseminated in 
its present form, the public may well 
regard it as the self-serving result of an 
alliance between accounting educators, 
who want to keep up demand for their 
services, and CPAs already in practice, 
who want to limit competition from new 
practitioners.
Oregon is unusual in allowing candidates 
with only a high school diploma and two 
years of public accounting experience to 
sit for the CPA Examination. As a practical 
matter, this rarely occurs (around 1% of 
Oregon applicants). The few individuals 
with the motivation and ability to become 
qualified by this route evidently go on to 
perform as competently as other CPAs.
I am pleased that a majority of OSCPA 
members responding to last year’s 
legislative policy poll oppose changing 
Oregon’s requirements for CPA candi­
dates. If practitioners with less than a 
bachelor’s degree seem to be causing no 
particular harm, and sometimes become 
front-ranking professionals, why should we 
exclude them? There’s plenty of work to 
be done, and a shortage of excellent 
practitioners.
I am in favor of education and have a 
master’s degree myself. However, I respect 
my colleagues whose advanced degrees 
are from the school of hard knocks. I 
believe we should be allowed to learn in 
our own ways, so long as we can demon­
strate competence. Also, I plan to pursue 
additional formal education in the future, 
and prefer not to have the program 
clogged with reluctant students who are 
satisfying minimum requirements.
No doubt the AICPA means well. It 
would do better to follow the advice of its 
own Education Executive Committee and 
broaden its social science background in 
order to find out what kind of training 
produces excellent practitioners.
1. Identify outstanding practitioners, 
using community reputation and 
quality review.
2. Study outstanding practitioners and 
experiment with ways to develop 
more of them.
3. Develop a training program with a 
demonstrable positive track record.
My experience with bad examples of 
CPA work suggests that technical 
ignorance is not the main problem. Too 
often, we see an elaborate technical 
solution imposed where common sense 
would have been preferable. Even more 
often, we see substandard work resulting 
from haste and carelessness.
Research on excellent CPAs may 
indicate that performance improves with 
commitment. CPAs with genuine concern 
for their clients’ welfare and the public 
interest may make fewer errors and be less 
likely to provoke a vindictive response if 
they are imperfect. In any event,
(Continued on page 10) 
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OCPA/PAC Report
by Lee Kell, CPA
The OCPA/PAC is now in a fund-raising 
mode to prepare for the 1987 Legislature 
and the 1988 elections. Each Society 
member is being asked to contribute at 
least $25.00. This is a very small price for 
the issues involved. 1986 will be the last 
year for the political contribution income 
tax credit. Watch for the fund-raising letter 
from your PAC and make your contribu­
tion before December 31.
Managing partners are encouraged to 
make the OCPA/PAC a 1986 office 
priority and encourage the $25.00 PAC 
contributions among all Society members 
in their firm.
The important CPA issues in the 1987 
Legislature are tort reform and 
reconnection of the Oregon income tax 
with the federal income tax. Part of the 
tort reform issue include special concerns 
such as privity and RICO (Racketeer, 
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act).
Privity legislation would avoid suits by 
third parties who rely on financial 
statements that were prepared solely for
I the client; it would require the CPA to be Notified in writing of the planned uses for financial statements in order to give third 
parties a cause of action against the CPA. 
The RICO amendment would require 
there be a criminal conviction before the 
CPA is liable for civil damages in a state 
RICO case.
The OCPA/PAC contributed $22,200.00 
to legislative candidates during the 1986 
primary and general election campaigns. 
Thirty-seven (82%) of these candidates 
won election, and eight lost. In addition, 
the PAC contributed to Norma Paulus for 
Governor. The fund balance of the PAC is 
$1,583.02.
Our legislative consultant, Rob Douglas, 
feels the arrangement of the Legislature 
continues to give the CPAs strong 
support. Both the House and Senate 
Chairmen of the Ways and Means 
Committee have been supportive of CPA 
issues in the past, and both understand the 
issues between the Board of Accountancy 
and the Department of Commerce. The 
leadership of both the House and the 
Senate also have been supportive of CPA 
issues.
Rob Douglas felt the Legislature will be 
l ooking to members of the Oregon Society 
a s  resource on the issue of income tax 
conformity with the Internal Revenue 
Code.
The work of OSCPA is a valuable 
resource for a Legislature struggling with an 
ever changing federal tax code.
A gainst 150-Hour 
P ostbacca lau rea te  R equirem ent 
(C o n tin u e d  fro m  p a g e  9)
professional performance is more 
accurately monitored by direct methods 
like a positive enforcement program than 
by indirect methods like a 5-year education 
requirement.
* * *
FURTHER READING 
James Fallows, “The Case Against
//
We have clients w hose receipts are a 
shambles and who don't balance 
their ledgers for months, but their 
payroll is handled impeccably."
They've got a Payroll Specialist."
More than 55,000 small businesses across the country rely on 
Paychex to take care of payroll and payroll tax returns. And their 
accountants love it. Because Paychex does it all: payroll plus all 
federal, state and local payroll tax returns and deposits for as little 
as $8.00 per pay period.
With Paychex, your clients are assigned a Payroll Specialist who's 
personally responsible for the company's payroll. So payroll is done 
for less. . .  and it's done right.
Fo r m ore in fo rm a tio n , c a ll u s at (503) 245-3025
PAYChEX
because it pays
9320 S. W. Barbur Blvd., Suite 135, Portland, O R  97219 
©  1986 Paychex, Inc.
Robert N. Bellah et al, Habits o f the 
Heart: Individualism and 
Com m itm ent in American Life,
University of California Press, 1985.
* * *
Barbara Clark has chaired the OSCPA 
Management of Accounting Practice and 
Consumer Complaint Committees, and 
currently serves on the Governmental 
Accounting and Auditing Committee.
Credentialism,” The Atlantic,
December, 1985, p. 49-67.
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AMERICAN PRESIDENT COMPANIES, LTD.
July 16, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
We concur with the objectives of the Commission to identify factors that cause fraud­ulent financial reporting and to recommend steps to reduce its incidence. In addition, we agree that the audit committee should be informed, vigilant and effective overseers of thefinancial reporting process and the company's internal controls. We believe, however, that the audit committee serves a function that is clearly distinct from that of management.
Part of the ongoing responsibility of management is to identify, understand and assessthe risk of fraudulent financial reporting as well as to minimize that risk. Top managementis directly responsible for the financial statements and should be held accountable for fraudulent financial reporting. The audit committee's role should be to assess theperformance of the company's management in minimizing the risk of fraudulent financialreporting. To be effective without assuming a burdensome level of responsibility, the audit committee must leave the day-to-day decision making on financial reporting matters tomanagement. This would enable them to direct their efforts to more important issues that require their objectivity.
The Commission recommends that the audit committee review top management's compliance with the company's code of conduct, ensure that the internal auditor’s in­volvement in the audit of the financial reporting is appropriate, oversee the company's internal controls and review the public accountant's independence. These are all recom­mendations which enable the audit committee to serve an oversight function and withwhich we concur. Diligent performance of these responsibilities on the part of the audit committee should enable them to ascertain the potential for fraudulent financial reporting.
In general, we disagree with those specific recommendations that obscure the roles of the audit committee and management. Specific recommendations that we feel place the audit committee in a management role and with which we disagree are as follows:
Recommendation: Audit committee’s should increase their oversight of thequarterly reporting process. This oversight should include approving financial results prior to public release.
Management should ensure that the audit committee is kept informed of significant matters affecting the company's quarterly financial reporting and the independent public accountant should communicate to the Audit Committee any problems they encounter during their quarterly review. However, the audit committee's involvement in the quarterly reporting process should not include their approval of the quarterly financial results prior to release to the public.Approving the earnings release should remain a responsibility of management.
1800 Harrison Street Oakland, California 94612 U.S.A.
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue 
Washington, D.C. 20006
Page 2
R ecom m endation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in
their annual reports to stockholders a letter, signed by the Chairman o f the audit
committee, describing the committee's responsibilities and activities during the year.
The annual report to stockholders is primarily a financial
document and its accuracy is the responsibility o f management. The report by the
independent public accountants and the report by management included therein 
provide su fficient assurance that the financial statements are fairly stated. 
Furthermore, the proxy is required to include information regarding the number of
committee meetings held during the last fiscal year and a description o f the functions
performed by each committee. We feel this document adequately describes the audit
committee's responsibilities and activities.
R ecom m endation: The audit committee should approve in advance the types and
extent o f  management advisory services that management plans to engage the
company's independent accountants to perform.
Rather than approve each type of management advisory service, 
we feel that it would be sufficient for the audit committee to set guidelines for the types 
and extent o f management advisory services and monitor compliance with those 
guidelines as part of their review of the independent accountant's independence.
We believe that the Commission should limit its recommendations regarding audit 
committees to those that would promote their role as objective overseers o f the financial 
reporting process rather than managers o f it.
S in cerely ,
AMERICAN PRESIDENT COMPANIES, LTD.
William J. Stuebgen 
Vice President, Controller, and 
Chief Accounting Officer
W. M. Ellinghaus 202
550 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10022 Phone (212) 605-7760
July 17, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
The preliminary report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting represents a good summary of the things that are already being done by the companies on whose boards I sit. I would like to call to your attention, however, one section that should be corrected:
The first two sentences contained in Appendix K on page 183 under the heading "Audit Committee Good Practice Guidelines," read as follows: "An audit committee consisting of independent directors is the primary vehicle which boards of directors use to dis­charge their responsibility with respect to the company's financial reporting. An informed and vigilant audit com­mittee represents one of the most effective influences for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting."
These two sentences overstate considerably the role played by audit committees — first of all, very few audit com­mittees meet more than three or four times a year and they rely almost solely on what is reported to them by management, internal audit representatives, and independent certified public accountants, all of whom spend full time performing their jobs and responsibilities. To state that audit committees, which cost the company "peanuts," represent the primary vehicle with regard to the company's financial reporting is wrong and would expose such committees to an unfair burden in litigation resulting from any fraudulent activities which might take place in the bowels of the company.
If these statements are not changed and put in proper perspective, those persons serving on audit committees will have the following options, either change the role of the committee by hiring its own full-time staff to fulfill the role as described above or get off the audit
2committee. I don't believe that any knowledgeable 
individual would want to serve on an audit committee 
and bear the responsibility as outlined by those two 
sentences without having a full-time staff to actually 
perform those functions. Further, if staffs were hired 
by the committee, it would precipitate a chaotic 
situation and divide responsibilities at a tremendous 
expense to the company. If these statements are not 
corrected, I believe companies will have a very diffi­
cult time in getting qualified people to serve on audit 
committees because of the unwarranted additional liability 
they would be assuming.
Thank you very much for your consideration.
Sincerely,
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A  combined response to the 
Exposure Draft Report o f the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
by the chief executives o f eight large CPA firms
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The Future Relevance, 
Reliability, and Credibility 
of Financial Information: 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Response to the Exposure Draft 
Report of the National Commission 
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
T h e  Commission’s exposure draft report makes a valuable contribution to the 
public dialogue on the reliability of financial reporting by America’s companies. We 
particularly commend the Commission's emphasis on the role of senior management in 
reducing fraudulent financial reporting. No recipe for controls or reviews can affect the 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting more than the “tone at the top,’’ which strongly 
influences the reporting process.
We believe the exposure draft report represents a significant step in the ongoing 
process of improving financial reporting. However, we recommend that the final report 
deal with the following additional matters:
• The role played by the legal profession, the investment banking community, and 
other business advisors in the financial reporting process— a subject not addressed 
in the report.
• The broad implications for corporate governance that arise from assigning audit 
committees a quasi-managerial role.
• The costs and benefits of the recommendations.
This response expresses our collective views about significant aspects of the report. 
Silence on any specific recommendation should not be taken as concurrence or 
disagreement— and certainly not a lack of appreciation for the efforts and achievements of 
the Commission and its staff.
Legal, Financial, and Business Advisors
We commend the Commission for broadly considering the roles of management, 
independent public accountants, the SEC and other regulatory agencies, and educators in 
combating fraudulent financial reporting. However, we believe there are others whose 
roles are too important to be overlooked. Lawyers, investment bankers, and other financial 
and business advisors can do much to influence the “tone at the top.” They can, for 
example, do much to reduce the fixation on short-term earnings and discourage the use of 
“cute accounting” and clever financial instruments and transactions designed to exploit 
ambiguity in accounting principles. Consequently, we urge the Commission to point out in
its final report the influence of legal, financial, and business advisors on the environment in 
which m anagem ent and public accountants operate, and to include specific 
recommendations aimed at strengthening their role in preventing fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Corporate Governance and Audit Committees
The accounting profession has a long record of support for audit committees, both 
contributing to their development and working with them in the interests of high quality 
financial reporting. We strongly support the idea of enhancing the role o f the audit 
committee in the financial reporting process. Implementation of such enhancements should 
nevertheless be carefully thought out, weighing not only immediate costs and benefits but 
also potential side-effects that could undermine worthy objectives.
The recommendations would significantly change the role of the audit committee 
and could enable the committee to act independently of the full board and to be responsible 
for a list o f matters so comprehensive as to call into question the committee' s capacity to 
perform them. As envisioned by the Commission, some of these responsibilities— for 
example, approving quarterly results prior to their release (which could create time delays 
damaging to effective quarterly reporting), reviewing compliance with the company’s code 
of conduct, and approving in advance management advisory services to be performed by 
the company’s independent accountant—are quasi-managerial and incompatible with the 
board’s traditional oversight role.
The effectiveness of the audit committee’s oversight of the financial reporting 
process would be diminished if  it assumed management responsibilities. In addition, each 
expansion of audit committee responsibilities increases both the demands on committee 
members* time and their exposure to potential liability. This, in turn, shrinks the pool of 
qualified independent directors who are willing to serve on audit committees.
As a result, we urge the Commission to limit its audit committee recommendations
to two:
• All public companies should have audit committees, implemented by an SEC rule if
necessary.
• Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective overseers.
Other recommendations for specific audit committee activities (for example, those 
relating to codes o f corporate conduct, reporting responsibilities in the annual report to 
stockholders, seeking a second opinion, and quarterly reporting), assuming they are 
formulated so that they do not overlap with management’s responsibilities, should be 
incorporated as options in the Appendix of audit committee good practice guidelines. An 
audit committee could then select on the basis of the company’s facts and circumstances the 
activities appropriate for i t
Audit Committee Approval of 
Management Advisory Services
We believe the Commission should withdraw its recommendation that audit 
committees approve, in advance, the types and extent of management advisory services
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(MAS) to be performed by the company’s auditors. The recommendation bears no relation 
to the prevention or detection of fraudulent financial reporting and would have serious 
negative consequences. Moreover, auditor-provided MAS is already communicated to 
audit committees annually, by type and total fee amount, under the membership 
requirements of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS). This existing mandatory SECPS 
procedure for all public companies provides audit committees the opportunity to carefully 
consider the nature of these services.
The Commission itself has noted that none of the studies of this subject—and there 
have been many of them—has identified a single instance where the performance of MAS 
has compromised audit independence. Similarly, there is no evidence that MAS have 
caused or contributed to either fraudulent financial reporting or the absence of timely 
discovery of fraudulent financial reporting.
The Commission bases its recommendation solely on two surveys of attitudes and 
perceptions about the relationship between MAS and audits. The surveys are of dubious 
value because the context and the questions induced the answers, a point supported by 
published academic research. We suggest that perceptions based upon inadequate 
knowledge are not an appropriate basis for imposing anti-competitive restraints on 
professional services.
Implementation of the recommendation would have serious negative consequences 
in that it would remove a source of audit effectiveness. Information about client operations 
gained in the course of rendering MAS can assist the auditor in recognizing problem areas 
and can complement the traditional sources of audit evidence.
Because there is no known case of audit independence compromised by the 
provision of MAS, there are no parameters for the audit committee to apply in reaching its 
decisions. The event described in the draft—“weighing carefully the possible advantages 
of such use against the possible effects it may have on the independence of the public 
accountant”—could be no more than weighing shadows, an exercise devoid of substance. 
It is predictable that the proposal would lead to curtailment of auditor-provided MAS, 
without any review in many cases. This is because management, faced with other demands 
on its time, would be inclined to eliminate the company’s independent auditor from 
consideration for MAS work rather than go through the trouble of rounding up audit 
committee members and pursuing the matter to conclusion. Furthermore, audit committees 
could avoid the task and the distraction from their traditional responsibilities by a blanket 
rule of no MAS engagements for the company’s auditors.
Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board
We agree with the Commission that the ASB’s standard-setting process should give 
appropriate weight to the interests of all parties affected by audits. Although we can 
understand and accept having some nonpractitioner representation on the ASB, we oppose 
the recommended revision of its structure that would reduce the size of the Board and put 
non-CPAs or nonpracticing CPAs in half its seats. The proposal is not related to 
preventing or detecting fraudulent financial reporting and loses sight of the fact that the 
ASB is working well, as the Commission acknowledges in its praise of the ASB’s 
performance. In addition, it underestimates the degree to which mechanisms already in 
place ensure attention to the interests of all parties affected by audits.
Nonpractitioners can participate in standard setting through the same process that
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serves practitioners who are not ASB members—attending meetings (which are open to the 
public), submitting comments, and writing articles. Whether or not they choose to 
participate in this way, their interests are served by the SEC’s active oversight and its 
communication o f its views and by the ASB’s liaison with organizations representing the 
users and preparers of financial statements. The auditing profession is also well aware of 
its responsibility to serve the interests of all principal users of financial statements. This 
awareness affects audit standard setting more than any other factor.
We disagree that a reorganization along the lines recommended by the Commission 
could achieve the desired objectives. Although nonpractitioners need not be standard 
setters in order to have their interests spoken for, making nonpractitioners standard setters 
is more likely to damage than to foster those interests. Technical knowledge and 
experience are prerequisites for contributing to the standard-setting process, as the failed 
experiment with the Auditing Standards Advisory Council demonstrates. No amount of 
staff support can relieve the standard setter from full responsibility for technical quality, 
and that responsibility cannot be met without technical expertise. It should be noted that 
audit standard-setting is very different from accounting standard-setting, in which there 
is—and should be—representation of preparers and users of financial statements. Auditing 
standards are applied only by practicing auditors.
We believe the appropriate policy at this time is to continue the current structure of 
the ASB, particularly in view of its current accomplishments and agenda. The board is 
now considering proposed standards on many o f the very subjects covered in the 
Commission's report It is also implementing structural refinements adopted in the summer 
of 1986— a change in the board's composition and strengthened staff support We support 
this structure and the Board's recent work.
The SEC and Peer Reviews
We strongly support a requirement for all accounting firms auditing public 
companies to be members o f a professional organization that has peer review and an 
independent oversight function and is approved by the SEC, such as that specified by the 
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA's Division for Firms. This view has been previously 
expressed by the signatories o f this statement, the Special Committee on Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants (Anderson Committee), and recently 
by the SEC. However, our support for the Commission's recommendation should not be 
interpreted as support for the SEC’s proposed rule on mandatory peer review (Release No. 
33-6695) and the Commission's other recommendation that the SEC institute 2(e) 
proceedings when a public accounting firm fails to comply with the profession's quality 
assurance programs. Neither proposal would further the peer review concept. Indeed, the 
punitive elements of the SEC proposals have a number of flaws:
• They provide no protection for client confidentiality or for an accountant's exposure 
to civil liability or to government enforcement
• They would destroy the candor and cooperative spirit that has made the SECPS 
program a success.
• The eagerness to improve professional practices would be replaced by anticipatory 
defenses against disciplinary proceedings.
The outcome would be counterproductive and not in the public interest
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We agree with the Commission's recommendation that SEC practice privileges be 
conditioned on satisfactory participation in a professional organization that has peer review 
and an independent oversight function. Mandatory participation in the program must be 
accompanied by a process which is credible and insures that discipline is imposed and 
enforced fairly.
Because disciplinary action imposed by the peer review organization could lead, in 
the worst case, to the denial of practice rights before the SEC, the SEC is the appropriate 
governmental body to insure that the process is credible. However, any exercise o f its 
authority should be designed to preserve those fundamental safeguards that should be built 
into any system of mandatory peer review. Such safeguards would include preservation of 
client confidences and prevention of prejudice to a reviewed firm 's defense of ongoing or 
threatened civil litigation as a result of the disclosure of information gleaned through the 
peer review process. There should also be clear separation of the SEC's disciplinary action 
against accountants under rule 2(e) for particular audit engagements from SEC oversight of 
systemic, firmwide, quality-control issues through a peer-review program.
Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
Although the draft report has generally distinguished carefully between those who 
may perpetrate fraudulent financial reporting and those, such as independent public 
accountants, who may fail to detect such reporting, the Commission's proposed additions 
to the SEC's enforcement remedies blur that distinction. Fines and cease and desist orders 
are appropriate remedies to use against those who pursue a course of “intentional or 
reckless conduct," which is part of the Commission's definition o f fraudulent financial 
reporting. Fines, which are intended in part to require disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, are 
particularly appropriate when fraudulent financial reporting is intended to enrich the 
perpetrators.
Neither of the proposed remedies, however, is well suited to failings— such as an 
independent accountant's failure to detect fraudulent reporting— that are not acts of 
perpetrators, but acts o f omission. Such failings are usually neither intentional nor reckless 
and usually involve neither ill-gotten gains that can be disgorged nor a course of conduct 
from which someone can cease and desist When in the rare case a public accountant does 
engage in “intentional or reckless conduct," the SEC already has adequate remedies. New 
ones are unnecessary.
We particularly object to the proposal to include “an unsound financial reporting 
practice" as a finding that would permit the SEC to issue a cease and desist order or impose 
fines. The term is impossibly vague and subjective. Deciding what is an “unsound 
financial reporting practice" when the professional literature is unclear or nonexistent 
usually comes down to nothing more than a difference of professional opinion.
Costs and Benefits
There are a total of 49 recommendations in the draft report, some supplemented by 
subordinate recommendations presented in the Commission's commentary. They would 
impose direct costs on corporations and their shareholders, on accounting firms, on the 
SEC and other governmental agencies, and on colleges and universities. The 
recommendations would also impose indirect costs that cannot easily be measured—costs
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for various controls that could reduce the efficiency o f American business at a time when 
increased productivity and renewed competitiveness are widely championed national goals.
Cost-benefit considerations are particularly important to the Com m ission’s report 
because the recommendations would apply so broadly. The Com m ission's scope is public 
companies, a population diverse in size, malting the burden of com pliance with certain 
recommendations more difficult for some than for others. The burden would fall most 
heavily on sm aller companies. Thus the different sizes and respective burdens should be 
considered in evaluating the costs. This important consideration should be addressed in the 
Com m ission's report
A g a in , we commend the Com m ission for its significant contribution to the 
ongoing process o f im proving financial reporting and decreasing the incidence o f 
fraudulent financial reporting. We are committed personally and through the resources o f 
our firm s to sustain and enhance the relevance, reliability, and credibility o f financial 
information.
Joseph E. Connor 
Price Waterhouse
Larry  D. Horner 
 Peat Marwick Main & Co.
J. Michael  Cook 
Deloi t t e  Haski n s  & Sells
Edward A. Kangas 
Touch Ross & Co.
W illiam L. Gladstone 
Arthur Young & Company
Duane R. Kullberg 
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Ray J. Groves 
Ernst & Whinney
Peter R. Scanlon 
Coopers Sc Lybrand
July 2 0 , 1987
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants121 Avenue of the Americas. New York. NY 10036-8775, Telephone 212 575 6200Telex: 70-3396, Telecopier 212 575 3846
AICPA 100A CENTURY OF PROGRES IN ACOUNTING 187-1987
July 20, 1987
N a t io n a l  C o m m iss io n  on  F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , N .W .Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
T he  A m e r ic a n  I n s t i t u t e  o f  C e r t i f i e d  P u b l i c  A c c o u n ta n ts  w e lco m e s  
t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r o v id e  com m ents on th e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  o f  
t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  f i n d i n g s ,  c o n c lu s io n s ,  and  re c o m m e n d a t io n s .  
N um bered  among t h e  2 5 0 ,0 0 0  m em bers o f  th e  I n s t i t u t e  a r e  th e  a u d i t o r s  
o f  t h e  v a s t  m a jo r i t y  o f  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  i n  t h e  U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  
f i n a n c i a l  e x e c u t iv e s ,  and  o t h e r s  in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
p r o c e s s .  CPAs h a ve  an  im p o r t a n t  s ta k e  i n  t h a t  p ro c e s s  a n d , as  
d e m o n s tra te d  b y  t h e  I n s t i t u t e ' s  a u d i t i n g  and  e t h i c a l  s ta n d a r d s ,  
e d u c a t io n a l  m a t e r ia ls  a nd  e n fo r c e m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  h a v e  c o n s i s t e n t l y  
fo c u s e d  on w ays t o  im p ro v e  th e  p r e v e n t io n  and  d e t e c t io n  o f  f r a u d .  
A p e r c e iv e d  in c r e a s e  i n  t h e  in c id e n c e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  f r a u d  le d  th e  
I n s t i t u t e ,  a lo n g  w i t h  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  t o  s p o n s o r  
a n d  fu n d  th e  C o m m is s io n  a n d  i t s  w o rk .  F i n a n c ia l  s ta te m e n t  
p r e p a r e r s ,  a u d i t o r s ,  and  u s e r s  a l l  h a ve  p r o v id e d  in p u t  t o  th e  
C o m m is s io n  and a l l  h a v e  a w a ite d  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  c o n c lu s io n s  w i t h  
i n t e r e s t .
T he  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  i s  a m e a n in g fu l  and  e f f e c t i v e  re s p o n s e  t o  th e  
C o m m is s io n 's  c h a rg e .  I t  r e p r e s e n t s  an  o u t s t a n d in g  e f f o r t  t o  d e a l 
w i t h  m any s u b s t a n t iv e  is s u e s  i n  a t i g h t  t im e  f r a m e .  As one o f  
t h e  s p o n s o r in g  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  we a r e  c o n f id e n t  t h a t  im p le m e n ta t io n  
o f  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i l l  e n h a n c e  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  p r e v e n t in g  and  d e t e c t in g  f i n a n c i a l  f r a u d .  We a r e  fo r m in g  an 
Im p le m e n ta t io n  M o n i t o r in g  C o m m it te e ,  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  
o f  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  and  th e  o t h e r  o r g a n iz a t io n s  t h a t  s p o n s o re d  th e  
C o m m is s io n , t o  m o n i t o r  a n d  e n c o u ra g e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  f i n a l  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s .
A l th o u g h  o u r  o v e r a l l  r e a c t io n  t o  t h e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  i s  f a v o r a b le ,  
we do h a ve  r e s e r v a t io n s  a b o u t  s e v e r a l  o f  i t s  re c o m m e n d a t io n s . 
We h a v e  t r i e d  t o  r e s t r i c t  t h e  r e s e r v a t io n s  we e x p r e s s ,  w h ic h  a re  
s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h e  a t ta c h e d  m em orandum , t o  m a jo r  i t e m s ,  r e c o g n iz in g
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In summary, we disagree with the recommendations to restructure 
the Auditing Standards Board and to require approval by audit 
committees in advance of the types and extent of management advisory 
services to be performed by the company's independent auditor. 
There are several reasons for our disagreement, but the major 
underlying reason in both cases is that the recommendations address 
perceived problems that we do not believe have a basis in fact. 
In addition, we question whether the Commission's recommendations 
can be cost-justified for all public companies, and we have comments 
on the recommendations on reporting auditor changes, on the SECPS 
concurring partner review requirement, and on accounting education.
We wish to thank the members of the Commission, its staff, and 
all who assisted in its work for their dedication to this important 
task. We look forward to the Commission's final report and stand 
ready to provide any assistance that might be requested.
Sincerely,
and agreeing with the Commission's view that "the importance of
evaluating its recommendations in their totality" cannot be
overemphasized.
J. Michael Cook, CPA 
Chairman
Board of Directors
Enclosure
MEMORANDUM OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
ON THE EXPOSURE DRAFT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
JULY 20, 1987
This memorandum supplements a letter of the same date from the 
chairman of the Board of Directors of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, which expresses the Institute's 
overall support for the recommendations in the Exposure Draft. 
The following paragraphs discuss in more detail the reservations 
and comments briefly referred to in that letter.
General Observations
The Exposure Draft makes it clear that there are no "final answers" 
because the environment in which financial reporting takes place 
is constantly changing and because financial accounting standards 
are designed to meet the changing and often conflicting needs 
of various social groups. We agree. Implementation of the 
Commission's recommendations should improve the prevention and 
detection of fraudulent financial reporting, but it will not put 
an end to all such fraud; indeed, we hope that the Commission's 
final report will put readers on notice about this stark reality 
in clear and unambiguous terms.
Because there are no "final answers," we are concerned about 
language in the Exposure Draft that strongly implies that each 
and every one of the Commission's recommendations should be accepted 
in its entirety. We do not believe it is desirable to introduce 
this element of rigidity into an evolutionary process that 
necessarily involves the exercise of balanced judgment. Those 
charged with implementing the Commission's recommendations will, 
we are certain, be presented with implementation problems that 
cannot be anticipated at this time and with requests for added 
guidance that will have to be resolved in a manner consistent 
with the concepts underlying the Commission's final report.
The Public Interest in Setting Auditing Standards
In Chapter Three of its Exposure Draft, the Commission asserts: 
"Meaningful participation on the ASB [Auditing Standards Board] 
by persons knowledgeable about auditing, but not engaged in public 
accounting practice, is necessary to assist the ASB to fulfill 
the public policy aspects of its role" (emphasis added). The 
recommended reorganization would presumably place the ASB in "a 
better position to balance the needs and the interests of the 
profession, the public company, and the users of financial 
information."
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The Institute objects strongly to this recommendation and urges 
the Commission to withdraw it. We object because:
• The ASB and its predecessor bodies have recognized the 
public policy aspects of their role in an effective 
manner. They have a history of encouraging public 
participation in the standard-setting process in 
recognition of the public interest in audited financial 
statements and they have produced a body of professional 
auditing standards that is unmatched anywhere else in 
the world.
• The most significant problem faced by the ASB is meeting 
on a timely basis the challenges posed by new forms 
of business transactions in a constantly changing economic 
environment. We believe that introducing to the Board 
a significant number of individuals who are not actively 
involved in auditing practice would impair both the 
efficiency of the process and the support given to the 
resulting standards by those who are bound by them.
The following paragraphs expand upon these points.
Evidence that the ASB recognizes the public interest in audited 
financial statements is found, first and foremost, in the recent 
issuance of ten exposure drafts of proposed auditing standards, 
which are designed to deal with changing public expectations in 
the face of a perceived increase in the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting. It is also evidenced by a host of 
pronouncements issued over the last ten years dealing with 
substantive matters; for example, communicating material weaknesses 
in internal accounting controls; planning and supervision; 
analytical review procedures; quality control in accounting firms; 
auditing and reporting on supplementary information; questions 
about the "going concern" assumption; reviews of interim financial 
statements; audit sampling; audit risk and materiality; and, of 
course, the 1977 Statements on Auditing Standards on errors and 
irregularities and illegal acts.
Some of these Statements are now being reconsidered. In our view, 
that is more evidence that the system is working. As society 
changes, the ASB has responded and will continue to respond with 
new or revised pronouncements designed to meet public expectations 
—  which is apparently what the Commission is recommending at 
the conclusion of its introductory chapter on page 6 of the Exposure 
Draft.
Additional assurance that the public interest is taken into account 
by the ASB is provided through its liaison meetings with various 
groups outside of the accounting profession, through the "sunshine"
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policies followed by the Board in the conduct of all ASB meetings 
involving standard-setting matters, and through the wide public 
exposure given to all proposed Statements. In. addition, 
representatives of the ASB meet periodically with representatives 
of the Special Investigations Committee of the SEC Practice Section 
of the Institute's Division for CPA Firms in the presence of the 
Section's independent Public Oversight Board to discuss comments 
and suggestions developed by that Committee on auditing matters. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, ASB representatives meet 
frequently with the Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and his views carry substantial weight within the Board.
It is at best arguable that an enhanced staff working with a
policy-level Board would be more effective than the present 
standard-setting structure. The function requires substantial, 
current, "on line" experience in order to avoid the "ivory tower" 
syndrome and to gain the support all "generally accepted auditing 
standards" need. Indeed, we think it is possible that some 
practitioners would strongly resist being required to follow
Statements developed by a paid staff under the control of a Board
half of whose members were not actively engaged in auditing 
practice. In any event, we doubt that a full-time staff could 
obtain and maintain the needed current practical as well as 
theoretical knowledge without an undue and uneconomic investment 
of time. Moreover, there is generally little interest on the
part of non-auditors in the auditing standard-setting process.
It is true that individuals who are not auditors often have a 
high degree of interest in the accounting standard-setting process, 
particularly when those standards affect them directly, and 
experience shows that some are willing to participate in that 
process in a meaningful way. However, while many who are not 
auditors are interested in audit quality, almost all, experience 
shows, are willing to rely on audit professionals to set the 
standards and suggest the procedures that quality audits require. 
We believe the record shows that this reliance is reasonable and 
justified.
Finally, the Institute believes that actual audit failures have 
usually involved a failure to comply with auditing standards, 
not a failure of the standards themselves.
These observations are confirmed by the Institute's experience 
with the previous Auditing Standards Advisory Council. The Council 
had been established to provide public input to the standard-setting 
process. After a few years' experience, the members of the Council 
agreed that they served a limited purpose at best. Upon the 
recommendation of another committee, the "Arnstein Committee,"
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th e  C o u n c i l  was d is b a n d e d  and  th e  ASB u n d e r to o k  t o  a g g r e s s iv e ly  
s e e k  p u b l i c  in p u t  th r o u g h  l i a i s o n  m e e t in g s  w i t h ,  f o r  e x a m p le , 
r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  o f  The R o b e r t  M o r r is  A s s o c ia te s  and  th e  F in a n c ia l  
E x e c u t iv e s  I n s t i t u t e .  T h is  d e c is io n  came a t  an  a p p r o p r ia t e  t im e ,  
b e c a u s e  th e  I n s t i t u t e  had  bee n  e x p e r ie n c in g  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f i c u l t y  
i n  a t t r a c t i n g  c a n d id a te s  t o  s e rv e  on  t h e  C o u n c i l .
The I n s t i t u t e ' s  s t r o n g  o b je c t io n s  t o  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a tio n  ca n  be 
s u m m a riz e d  as  f o l l o w s :  The re c o m m e n d a tio n  w o u ld  in c r e a s e  th e  
c o s t  o f  s e t t i n g  a u d i t i n g  s ta n d a r d s  and  w o u ld  re d u c e  th e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  p ro c e s s  and  th e  a c c e p ta n c e  and  s u p p o r t  a c c o rd e d  
th e  f i n a l  s ta n d a r d s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e a l w i t h  a c o n c e rn  t h a t  has  
a l r e a d y  b ee n  a d e q u a te ly  a d d re s s e d  i n  o t h e r ,  p ro v e n  w a y s .
M anagem ent A d v is o r y  S e r v ic e s
The I n s t i t u t e  a ls o  s t r o n g l y  o b je c t s  t o  th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n  t h a t  
a u d i t  c o m m itte e s  o f  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  " s h o u ld  a p p ro v e  i n  a d v a n c e  
t h e  ty p e s  and  th e  e x t e n t  o f  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s  t h a t  
m anagem ent p la n s  t o  e n g age  th e  c o m p a n y 's  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n ta n t  t o  p e r f o r m . "  I n  t o d a y 's  l i t i g i o u s  e n v ir o n m e n t ,  s u c h  
a r e q u ir e m e n t  c o u ld  c a u s e  m anagem ents  o r  a u d i t  c o m m itte e s  t o  
a r b i t r a r i l y  b a r  a l l  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s  b y  th e  e n t i t y ' s  
in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r  t o  a v o id  a n y  p o s s ib le  c r i t i c i s m .  T h is  w o u ld  
be c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  i n  q u a l i t y  a u d i t s  and  w o u ld  
u n f a i r l y  p e n a l iz e  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  a nd  t h e i r  a u d i t o r s .  T h is  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  u n re a s o n a b le  when s tu d y  a f t e r  s tu d y  h a s  f a i l e d  t o  
r e v e a l  "a n y  a c t u a l  c a s e  w h e re  in d e p e n d e n c e  was c o m p ro m is e d "  b y  
th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s .
We b e l ie v e  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  o f  a p u b l i c  com pany s h o u ld  
be f u l l y  in fo r m e d  a b o u t  a l l  s i g n i f i c a n t  s e r v ic e s  p e r fo rm e d  f o r  
th e  com pany b y  i t s  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t .  T h a t i s  why 
th e  SEC P r a c t ic e  S e c t io n  a l r e a d y  h a s  i n  p la c e  a r e q u ir e m e n t  f o r  
r e p o r t i n g  t h e  ty p e s  a nd  e x t e n t  o f  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s  
t o  th e  a u d i t  c o m m itte e s  o f  SEC c l i e n t s .  T h is  r e p o r t i n g  r e q u ir e m e n t  
r e c o g n iz e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e 's  r o l e  i s  one  o f  
o v e r s ig h t ,  n o t  m anag em e n t, and  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  a p p r o p r ia t e  t o  r e q u i r e  
a d v a n c e  a p p r o v a l  f ro m  an  o v e r s ig h t  b o d y  o f  e a c h  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  
s e r v ic e s  e n g a g e m e n t t h a t  m ig h t  be p e r fo rm e d  b y  th e  e n t i t y ' s  a u d i t o r .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  i s  im p r a c t i c a l  f o r  t h e  m anagem ents o f  la r g e  n a t io n a l  
o r  m u l t i - n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t io n s  t o  o b t a in  a u d i t  c o m m itte e  a p p r o v a l  
o f  s u c h  s e r v ic e s  i n  a d v a n c e .
M o s t im p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a tio n  c o u ld  h a ve  a 
c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t iv e ,  n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t  on  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  in d e p e n d e n t  
a u d i t s .  As a c k n o w le d g e d  b y  th e  S e c u r i t i e s  and  E xch ange  C o m m iss io n  
i n  A c c o u n t in g  S e r ie s  R e le a s e  N o. 2 6 4 , p e r f o r m in g  m anagem ent a d v is o r y  
s e r v ic e s  ca n  p r o v id e  th e  a u d i t o r  w i t h  a g r e a t e r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  
o f  t h e  c l i e n t ' s b u s in e s s  and  t h e r e b y  im p ro v e  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  th e
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audit. Indeed, as business becomes more complex and as business 
transactions and systems become more sophisticated, auditors will 
derive even greater benefit from the broader base of knowledge 
that comes from providing non-attest services.
Cost-Effectiveness and the Smaller Company
The recommendations in the Exposure Draft apply to all companies, 
regardless of their size, their business, and their past reporting 
practices. In their totality, they will certainly increase the 
cost of financial reporting in this country. In general, these 
added costs will have a relatively higher impact on smaller 
companies.
Smaller companies are more constrained in their human and financial 
resources, and their competitive position in the market place 
is adversely affected when too many of those resources are diverted 
from the primary objective of satisfying a market need for goods 
or services at a fair price that produces a reasonable profit. 
As the Commission and others recognize, small businesses create 
the most new jobs in the American economy, are often at the 
forefront of new technological developments, are important to 
the international trading position of the United States, and yet 
often have difficulty funding their activities through debt or 
equity offerings. Consequently, there is a need for a particularly 
careful balancing of cost-benefit considerations with respect 
to such businesses.
The Institute believes that there is reason for the Commission 
to reconsider its apparent position that all of its recommendations 
can be cost-justified for all public companies. Evaluating the 
steps that should be taken to protect investors must involve 
balancing the risks they have assumed in relation to the potential 
rewards they might obtain. It might well involve setting an 
arbitrary materiality threshold for the more costly recommendations.
Reporting Auditor Changes
The Commission recommends that when a public company changes 
independent public accountants, it should be required by SEC rule 
to disclose publicly the nature of any material accounting or 
auditing issues discussed with its old and new auditors during 
the three-year period preceding the change. The Institute supports 
the concept of public disclosure of material accounting and auditing 
disagreements when there has been a change of auditor. However, 
disclosing all "issues" discussed with old and new auditors without 
regard to the circumstances in which such discussions took place 
and without regard to how the issues were resolved is excessive.
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(The reasons given by the Commission to explain why management 
may seek a second opinion on a significant accounting issue fully 
explain why the public can only be confused —  or inundated with 
details —  by a requirement to disclose all such matters.) 
Moreover, the open range of disclosure that will evolve from such 
a requirement will deter managements from seeking second opinions 
on accounting or auditing issues when it would clearly be 
appropriate to do so.
Revision of the SECPS Concurring Partner Review Requirement
The Commission's recommendation will effectively preclude many 
smaller firms from serving SEC clients. Their smaller size will 
make it difficult for them to identify partners who meet all of 
the specific qualifications called for by the recommendations, 
and therefore could cause present and potential clients to question 
their capabilities. This would be inappropriate, because firms 
can implement alternative procedures to obtain the benefits of 
concurring partner review, and the SEC Practice Section specifically 
recognizes this in its requirements. Moreover, such a review 
is not required by generally accepted auditing standards or 
identified as an element of quality control. Accordingly, this 
recommendation should be reconsidered. At a minimum, the Commission 
should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of alternative 
procedures when the requirement cannot be met because of firm 
size.
Recommendations for Education
We strongly urge that the Commission explicitly state what is 
implicit in its observations throughout Chapter Five —  that the 
accounting curriculum can no longer be covered adequately in four 
years and should be increased to 150 semester hours of education, 
at an accredited college or university, including a baccalaureate 
degree or its equivalent. Additional education is more likely 
to produce graduates with the ability to meet the needs of the 
public.
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T I M K E N
THE TIMKEN COMPANY
GENERAL OFFICES J u ly  13, 1987
CANTON. OHIO. U.S.A. 44706 
TELEPHONE: (216) 438-3000
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Dear S ir s :
On b e h a lf o f  The Timken Company, I  would l i k e  to  comment on the  p re lim in a ry  
re p o r t o f  The N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t R epo rting .
I  would l i k e  to  c a l l  your a t te n t io n  to  one s e c tio n  th a t  should be co rre c te d . The 
f i r s t  two sentences con ta ined in  Appendix K on page 183 under th e  heading "A u d it 
Committee Good P ra c tic e  G u id e lin e s ,"  read as fo llo w s : "An a u d it  committee
c o n s is t in g  o f  independent d ire c to rs  i s  the  p rim ary v e h ic le  which boards o f  
d ire c to rs  use to  d ischarge t h e ir  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  w ith  respec t to  the  company's 
f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g .  An in form ed and v ig i la n t  a u d it  committee rep resen ts  one o f  
the  most e f fe c t iv e  in flu e n c e s  fo r  m in im iz ing  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g . "
These two sentences o v e rs ta te  cons ide rab ly  the  ro le  p layed by a u d it  com mittees. 
Most a u d it  committees meet on ly  two to  fo u r  tim es a yea r. In  perfo rm ing  t h e ir  
o v e rs ig h t r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s ,  they must r e ly  h e a v ily  on what i s  re p o rte d  to  them by 
management, in te rn a l a u d it  re p re s e n ta tiv e s , and independent c e r t i f ie d  p u b lic  
accountants , a l l  o f  whom spend f u l l  tim e pe rfo rm ing  t h e i r  jo bs  and 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .  To in d ic a te  th a t  a u d it  committees rep resen t the  prim ary 
v e h ic le  w ith  regard to  the  company's f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  is  an overstatem ent and 
would expose such committees to  an u n fa ir  burden in  l i t i g a t io n  re s u lt in g  from any 
fra u d u le n t a c t iv i t i e s  which m ight take  p lace in  the  company.
I f  these statem ents are no t changed and pu t in  proper p e rs p e c tiv e , those persons 
se rv in g  on a u d it  committees w i l l  have the  fo llo w in g  o p tio n s : e i th e r  change the  
ro le  o f  the  committee by h i r in g  i t s  own f u l l - t im e  s t a f f  to  f u l f i l l  the  ro le  as 
described above o r ge t o f f  th e  a u d it  com m ittee. I t  i s  in co n ce iva b le  th a t  any 
knowledgeable in d iv id u a l would want to  serve on an a u d it  committee and bear the  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  as o u t lin e d  by those two sentences w ith o u t having a f u l l  tim e  
s t a f f  to  a c tu a lly  perform  those fu n c t io n s . F u rth e r, i f  s ta f f s  were h ire d  by the 
com m ittee, i t  would p re c ip ita te  a c h a o tic  s itu a t io n  and d iv id e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  
a t a tremendous expense to  th e  company. I f  these statem ents are  no t c o rre c te d , 
companies w i l l  l i k e l y  have a very d i f f i c u l t  tim e  in  g e t t in g  qu a l i f ie d  people to  
serve on a u d it  committees because o f  th e  unwarranted a d d it io n a l l i a b i l i t y  they 
would be assuming.
A d d it io n a l comments may be subm itted  when we re ce ive  and have an o p p o rtu n ity  to  
rev iew  a complete copy o f  the  Commission's R eport.
S in c e re ly ,
S ecre ta ry  and Treasurer
R o b i n s o n  G r a n t  &  C o .  P . A .
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D ear M r. T readw ay:
The T e c h n ic a l S ta n d a rd s  C om m ittee o f  th e  S ou th  C a ro l in a  A s s o c ia t io n  o f  
C e r t i f i e d  P u b l ic  A c c o u n ta n ts  has been cha rged  w ith  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  
re s p o n d in g  t o  th e  A p r i l ,  1987 E xposure  D r a f t  on b e h a lf  o f  o u r 1800 member 
A s s o c ia t io n .  To d a te  we have been u n a b le  t o  o b ta in  a consensus o f  o p in io n  among 
o u r co m m itte e  members. T h e re fo re ,  we w is h  t o  r e la y  th e  v a r io u s  comments o f  ou r 
members f o r  y o u r  c o n s id e r a t io n .
Some members o f  ou r com m ittee  b e l ie v e  t h a t  p u b l ic  e x p e c t io n s  o f  th e  
a u d i t  f u n c t io n  in c lu d e  d e te c t io n  o f  f ra u d  and e r r o r s  and th a t  a l l  a u d its  s h o u ld  
be so d e s ig n e d  as t o  d e te c t  such ite m s .  They s u p p o r t  th e  p roposed  changes to  
e x is t in g  a u d i t  s ta n d a rd s  as o u t l in e d  in  th e  c u r r e n t  exposu re  d r a f t  o f  th e
A m e rica n  I n s i t i t u e  o f  C e r t i f i e d  P u b l ic  A c c o u n ta n ts  (AICPA) e n t i t l e d  The A u d i t o r 's  
R e s p o n s ib i l i t y  t o  D e te c t and R e p o rt E r r o r s  and I r r e g u l a r i t i e s . These p roposed 
s ta n d a rd s  appear t o  meet many o f  th e  recom m enda tions  in c lu d e d  in  C o m m iss ion 's  
e xp o su re  d r a f t .
The m a jo r i t y  o f  o u r members do n o t c o n cu r w i th  t h i s  d r a f t  w h ich  ch a rges  
th e  a u d i t o r  w i th  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  t o  " d e te c t " e r r o r s  and i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  as 
opposed t o  c u r r e n t  s ta n d a rd s  w h ich  r e q u ir e  th e  a u d i to r  t o  "s e a rc h "  f o r  th e s e  
a c t s .  I n  l i g h t  o f  th e  l i t i g i o u s  s o c ie ty  i n  w h ich  we p r a c t ic e ,  we b e l ie v e  t h is  
s ta n d a rd  w o u ld  p re c lu d e  th e  a u d i to r  from  is s u in g  a " c le a n "  o p in io n  on most
engagem ents . I n  m ost in s ta n c e s  th e  a u d i to r  w ou ld  n o t be a b le  t o  meet t h i s
re q u ire m e n t w i th o u t  e xa m in in g  e v e ry  t r a n s a c t io n  f o r  th e  com m iss ion  o f  e r r o r s .  
Even th e n ,  e r r o r s  o f  o m is s io n  c o u ld  go u n d e te c te d .
An a d d i t io n a l  AICPA exposu re  d r a f t  e n t i t l e d  The A u d i t o r 's  S ta n d a rd  
R e p o rt does n o t  recommend in c lu d in g  any re fe re n c e  t o  a ssu ra n ce s  t h a t  th e  a u d ite d  
f i n a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts  a re  f r e e  fro m  m a te r ia l  m is s ta te m e n ts  as a r e s u l t  o f  f ra u d  o r 
e r r o r ,  n o r does i t  in c lu d e  a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  re v ie w  o f  th e  in t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  
s y s te m . The m a jo r i t y  o f  our co m m itte e  members do n o t ag ree  w ith  th e  
recom m enda tions  o f  th e  C om m ission as to  p roposed  changes t o  th e  s ta n d a rd
a u d i t o r 's  r e p o r t .
Robinson Grant & Co., P.A.
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman
National Commission of Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
July 14, 1987 
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While our committee as a whole does not support all of the changes
proposed by the Commission's report, nor do we support all of the changes 
proposed by the AICPA Auditing Standards Board, we do firmly believe that better 
communication between auditors and the users of audited financial statements is 
required. We commend the Commission for its efforts and ask that you provide 
input to the AICPA Auditing Standards Board as they continue to issue improved 
standards for our profession.
Yours truly
Sheila B. Ogletree, CPA
SBO:plb
0022/treadway
cc: Mr. Austin Sheneen, CPA
Ms. Lollie Klemick
Members of the Technical Standards Committee
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CENTRAL LOUISIANA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC
J u ly  20, 1987
Chairman
N a tio n a l Commission on 
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R epo rting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D. C. 20006
Dear S ir :
I  r e a liz e  th a t  the  June 30 d ea d line  f o r  comments on the  Exposure D ra f t  o f your 
R eport o f  the  N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  is  ju s t  
p a s t. Having ju s t  rece ived  and reviewed a copy o f i t ,  I  hope i t  is  n o t to  la te  
f o r  my comments on Chapter Two to  be cons ide red .
My comments r e la te  o n ly  to  S e c tion  I I I  B o f Chapter Two.
1. On page 33, the R eport endorses the  I n s t i t u t e  o f In te rn a l A u d ito r 's  
Q u a lity  Assurance Standard th a t  c a l ls  f o r  e x te rn a l (p e e r) review s o f the 
in te r n a l a u d it  fu n c t io n .  As an in te r n a l a u d it  manager, I  take excep tion  
to  the need f o r  th is  requ irem en t.
a . I t  is  s im p ly  a p a r ro t in g  o f the AICPA peer rev iew  program. That 
program has n o t ,  to  my knowledge, worked w e ll enough to  a f fe c t  
f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g .
b . U n lik e  p u b lic  accoun tan ts , in te r n a l a u d ito rs  cannot be expected to  be 
c o n s is te n t as to  jo b  d u t ie s ,  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s ta tu s  o r 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  from  company to  company. We must serve the 
p a r t ic u la r  needs o f our managements, which are  d i f f e r e n t  and d iv e rs e  
from  company to  company.
c .  The main goa l o f  in te r n a l a u d ito rs  should be to  be as e f fe c t iv e  as 
p o s s ib le  w ith in  t h e ir  o rg a n iz a t io n s . To do so may ve ry  w e ll mean 
s h o r t c u t t in g  o r  ig n o r in g  I IA  s tandards. There is  n o th in g  wrong w ith  
th a t .
d . P a rt o f  the  I IA 's  m o tiv a tio n  in  th is  a re  is  p r o f i t .
Mandatory e x te rn a l (p e e r) review s would tend to  fo rc e  in te r n a l a u d it  fu n c tio n s  
to  grow more a l ik e .  That may n o t serve w e ll t h e ir  e ffe c tiv e n e s s  to  serve th e ir  
management.
2. In  the second f u l l  paragraphed on page 34, you say two th in g s : The c h ie f
in te r n a l a u d ito r  should have the necessary business acumen to  work w e ll 
w ith  fe l lo w  s e n io r  o f f ic e r s ;  and, he/she should occupy a p o s it io n  o f h igh  
s ta tu re  w ith in  the o rg a n iz a t io n .
2030 Donahue Ferry Road, P. O. Box 5000, Pineville, LA 71361-5000, Telephone 318-484-7400
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The terms "fellow senior officers" and "high stature" are, I think, 
inappropriate. They imply that the chief internal auditor must be an 
officer of the company and, therefore, seem to be dictating the 
organizational alignment of the function.
I would like to be an officer of my company, but I am not. However, I do 
not think officer status should be implied by your report or dictated by 
the SEC. this would provide only artificial status and, quite probably, 
detract from internal audit effectiveness.
If internal audit is to achieve officer status, it should do so on its 
merits. A regulatory requirement, actual or implied, is not the proper 
tact.
Sincerely,
T. J. Gauthier 
Manager Internal Audit & 
Management Consulting
/djw
15500978.tg
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Ronald L Bell, CIA
Chairman of the Board
 
T h e  In s t itu te  o f  In te rn a l A u d ito rs
J u ly  20 , 1987
Director of Audit 
General Motors Corporation 
3044 General Motors Boulevard 
Room 8-238
Detroit, Ml 48202 
(313) 556-2321
The N a t io n a l C om m ission on
F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  Avenue, NW 
W a sh in g to n , D .C . 20006
D ear S i r s :
The In s t i t u te  o f  In te rn a l A u d ito rs  ( I I A ) ,  as one o f  the  sponsoring 
o rg a n iz a tio n s , commends the  N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l 
R epo rting  on i t s  e f fo r t s  in  addressing  a ve ry  complex issu e . The I IA  
con tinues to  b e lie v e  th a t  the  Commission has taken a thorough and o rd e r ly  
approach in  a n a lyz in g  the broad pe rspe c tives  o f  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l 
re p o r t in g .  The Commission has produced a balanced s e r ie s  o f  recommendations 
th a t should r e s u lt  in  improvements in  the  o v e ra l l re p o r t in g  and c o n tro l 
process.
The views o f  in te rn a l a u d ito rs  have been presented to  the  Commission and i t s  
s t a f f  th roughout the  p e rio d  o f  d e l ib e ra t io n ,  and the I IA  is  pleased w ith  the 
support g iven  to  the  in te rn a l a u d it  fu n c t io n  by the  Commission. The I IA  
w i l l  con tinue  to  support the  Commission's e f fo r t s  in  the fu tu re .  On more 
than one occasion , the  I IA  has in d ic a te d  to  Congressman D in g e ll and 
Congressman Wyden i t s  support fo r  the  Commission's e f fo r t s  and has 
encouraged the  d e fe r ra l o f  any le g is la t io n  u n t i l  the  re s u lts  o f  the 
Commission cou ld  be cons idered . In  August, seve ra l execu tives  o f  the I IA  
w i l l  t e s t i f y  be fo re  the  House Subcommittee on O ve rs igh t and In v e s t ig a t io n s  
o f  the  Committee on Energy and Commerce. A t th a t tim e we w i l l  aga in  express 
our support f o r  the Commission's recommendations. The I IA  a lso  is  
co n s id e rin g  jo in in g  w ith  the  AICPA and the  o th e r sponsoring o rg a n iz a tio n s  in  
fo rm ing a committee to  m o n ito r and re p o r t on the im p lem entation o f  the 
Commission's recommendations. F in a l ly ,  the  I IA  would a lso  p a r t ic ip a te  in  a 
separate commission to  set standards fo r  c o n tro l.
The I IA  is  a lso  pleased w ith  the  s tron g  acknowledgment o f  the im portan t ro le  
performed by the  a u d it  committee and the  need fo r  the a u d it  committee and 
in te rn a l a u d it in g  to  work e f fe c t iv e ly  to g e th e r. Toward th is  o b je c t iv e ,  the 
I IA  has developed a pamphlet " In te rn a l A u d it in g  and the  A u d it Committee: 
W orking Together Toward Common Goals" (copy a tta c h e d ).
international Headquarters: 249 Maitland Avenue, Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701
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The National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting -  2 - July 16, 1987
The IIA has several comments regarding certain specific recommendations 
and/or appendices, and those are discussed on Attachment 1. These comments 
are offered in a constructive manner and are not meant to detract in any way 
from the Commission's work.
The IIA looks forward to continuing its involvement in the effort to deter 
and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
Yours truly
Ronald L. Bell 
Certified Internal Auditor
Attachments
4845M
ATTACHMENT 1
COMMENTS REGARDING
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
OF FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
208B
1. Recommendation - For the top management of a public company to
discharge its obligation to oversee the financial reporting process, 
it must identify, understand, and assess the factors that may cause 
the company's financial statements to be fraudulently misstated.
Discussion: This recommendation introduces Appendix H "The Good
Practices Guidelines for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting." The IIA fully supports the assessment of risk as an audit 
planning technique. In fact, in an IIA-sponsored research project 
prepared for the Commission, "Control and Internal Auditing" a 
strategy for assessing control was presented. However, the IIA 
believes there is danger of a literal interpretation of Appendix H, 
and what is intended as a guide and not a "cookbook" could become a 
very detailed, costly and time consuming process with a focus on 
individuals (CEO, CFO, auditors, external and internal) rather than 
the system. It is suggested, therefore, that the Commission's Report 
strongly emphasize that the assessment of the environment should be a
cost effective exercise
2. Recommendation - Public companies should maintain internal controls 
that are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
Discussion: The Commission has recognized that there are many
definitions and concepts of "internal control" and specifically takes 
the terminology from "internal accounting control" to internal 
control. The Institute of Internal Auditors in its "Statement on 
Internal Auditing Standards No. 1 (SIAS No. 1) Control: Concepts and
Responsibilities" has broadened the definition and has chosen to use 
the term "control" rather than more specific or limiting terms. 
Attachment 2 is an extract from SIAS No. 1. (The Commission Staff has 
a complete set of IIA Standards as well as a research project entitled 
"Control and Internal Auditing.") The IIA recommends that the 
Commission modify its use of the term "internal control" to the 
broader term "control" or "system of control."
3. Recommendation - The financial institution regulatory agencies should 
provide for the exchange of information between the regulatory 
examiner and the independent public accountant.
Discussion: The IIA believes that unhindered exchange of information
between the external auditor and the regulatory examiner could 
eventually have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness and quality 
of the external audit process. While the concept of sharing 
information is encouraged, free access to undefined audit work 
products could lead to misunderstandings that would eventually stymie 
the free flow of information between client and auditor. Further, the
208
c
external auditor may be put in the position of disclosing, through an 
exchange of working papers, items that have not been of enough 
significance to report to senior management or the audit committee.
The IIA would have similar concerns if carte blanche access to 
internal audit work was being recommended.
It is recognized that the intent of this recommendation is to prevent 
a "United American Bank" situation. We suggest, however, that further 
clarification or elaboration be provided or that the recommendation be 
withdrawen for further study.
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Internal Auditing and the Audit Committee:
WORKING TOGETHER 
TOWARD 
COMMON GOALS
 
  The Institute of Internal Auditors
I N T E R N A L  A U D I T I N G  A N D  T H E  A U D I T  C O M M I T T E E :  
W O R K I N G  t o g e t h e r  t o w a r d  c o m m o n  g o A L s
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In tro d u c tio n
In the past several years, cases of corporate  
im propriety , m anagem ent fraud, and bank 
failures have received w idespread  publicity. 
T he public, the U nited States Congress, the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Com m ission, and 
legislative bodies of o ther countries have 
expressed great concern about the issue of 
corporate  accountability.
T he result has been an erosion of confidence 
in the process of internal control and financial 
reporting. In turn, this has p laced  greater 
dem and  on corporate  m anagem ent for 
increased responsibility and  accountability.
Achieving this requires a cooperative effort 
w ithin the corpora te  structure — from  the 
board  of directors, to senior m anagem ent, to 
all those involved in the organization’s 
financial reporting  process.
In particular, the ability of the audit
com m ittee and internal auditing to w ork well 
together significantly im pacts how  effectively 
the audit com m ittee can fulfill its responsibility 
to the board  of directors, shareholders, and 
other outside parties.
For this reason, T he Institute of Internal 
Auditors has issued a position statem ent on the 
relationship be tw een  the  aud it com m ittee  and
internal auditing, heposam
addresses 
tw o groups
m utual cooperation. __ _
The purpose o f th is b rochure  is  to  take  a   
closer look at T h e  IIA's Position on Audit
Committees in term s of responsibilities, 
structure, and  relationships. T he  Institute 
believes that internal auditing has the 
capability  to  prov ide m aterial assistance to 
audit com m ittees in the  discharge of their 
d uties.  
T H E  IN S T IT U T E  O F  I N T E R N A L  A U D I T O R S 'P O S I T I O N  O N  A U D I T  C O M M I T T E E S
P u r p o s e
T h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r s  r e c o g n i z e s  
t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  
h a v e  c o m m o n  g o a l s .  A  g o o d  w o r k i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  c a n  a s s i s t  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i n  f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
t o  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s ,  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  a n d  
o t h e r  o u t s i d e  p a r t i e s .  T h i s  p o s i t i o n  s t a t e m e n t  
s u m m a r i z e s  T h e  I n s t i t u t e ’s  v i e w s  c o n c e r n i n g  
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g .  T h e  I n s t i t u t e  
a c k n o w l e d g e s  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  e n c o m p a s s  a c t i v i t i e s  w h i c h  a r e  
b e y o n d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  a n d  i n  n o  
w a y  i n t e n d s  it t o  b e  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
S t a t e m e n t
T h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r s  
r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  e v e r y  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  h a v e  
a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o r g a n i z e d  a s  a  s t a n d i n g  
c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .  T h e  
I n s t i t u t e  a l s o  e n c o u r a g e s  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  i n  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  n o t - f o r - p r o f i t  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t a l
b o d i e s .  T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  c o n s i s t  
s o l e l y  o f  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  
m a n a g e m e n t .
T h e  p r i m a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  i n v o l v e  a s s i s t i n g  t h e  b o a r d  
o f  d i r e c t o r s  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e i r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a s  t h e y  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ’s  a c c o u n t i n g  p o l i c i e s ,  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l ,  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r a c t i c e s .  T h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  e s t a b l i s h  a n d  m a i n t a i n  
l i n e s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  b o a r d  a n d  
t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s ,  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t o r s ,  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t .
T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  e x p e c t  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t i n g  t o  e x a m i n e  a n d  e v a l u a t e  t h e  a d e q u a c y  
a n d  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ’s  s y s t e m  
o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  a n d  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  
p e r f o r m a n c e  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  a s s i g n e d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  I n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  m a y  b e  u s e d  
a s  a  s o u r c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  o n  m a j o r  f r a u d s  o r  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  a s  
w e l l  a s  c o m p a n y  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  l a w s  a n d  
r e g u l a t i o n s .
A U D I T  C O M M I T T E E  R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S
I n  g e n e r a l ,  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  e x e r c i s e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h r e e  i m p o r t a n t  a r e a s :
•  F i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
•  C o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e .
•  C o r p o r a t e  c o n t r o l .
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
T h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  i n  t h e  
a r e a  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  
a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  d i s c l o s u r e s  m a d e  b y  
m a n a g e m e n t  r e a s o n a b l y  p o r t r a y  t h e  
c o m p a n y ’s: 1 )  f i n a n c i a l  c o n d i t i o n ;  2 )  r e s u l t s  o f  
o p e r a t i o n s ;  a n d  3 )  p l a n s  a n d  l o n g - t e r m  
c o m m i t m e n t s .
T h e  s p e c i f i c  s t e p s  i n v o l v e d  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  
t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n c l u d e :
•  R e c o m m e n d i n g  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
a c c o u n t a n t s .
•  O v e r s e e i n g  t h e  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t  c o v e r a g e ,  
i n c l u d i n g :
—  A u d i t o r  e n g a g e m e n t  l e t t e r s .
—  E s t i m a t e d  f e e s .
—  T i m i n g  o f  a u d i t o r  v i s i t s .
—  C o o r d i n a t i o n  w i t h  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g .
—  M o n i t o r i n g  o f  a u d i t  r e s u l t s .
—  R e v i e w  o f  a u d i t o r  p e r f o r m a n c e .
—  R e v i e w  o f  n o n - a u d i t  s e r v i c e s .
•  R e v i e w i n g  a c c o u n t i n g  p o l i c i e s  a n d  p o l i c y  
d e c i s i o n s .
•  E x a m i n i n g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  
i n c l u d i n g :
—  I n t e r i m  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .
—  A n n u a l  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  a u d i t o r s ’ 
o p i n i o n ,  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  l e t t e r s .
—  O t h e r  r e p o r t s  r e q u i r i n g  a p p r o v a l  b y  
t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  p r i o r  t o  
s u b m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  a n d  
E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  o r  o t h e r  
g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c i e s .
W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  r e v i e w  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  
p o l i c i e s  a n d  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s ,  a  u s e f u l  
a p p r o a c h  w o u l d  b e  t o  r e q u i r e  f r o m  t h e  c h i e f  
a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r  a  c o n c i s e  s u m m a r y  o f  a l l  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  p o l i c i e s  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  T h i s  s u m m a r y  s h o u l d  b e  
u p d a t e d  a s  n e c e s s a r y  a n d  r e v i e w e d  b y  b o t h  
t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  a n d  t h e  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t o r .
C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  
T h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  i n  t h e  
a r e a  o f  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  i s  t o  p r o v i d e
assurance that the corporation is in reasonable 
compliance with pertinent laws and 
regulations, is conducting its affairs ethically, 
and is maintaining e ffective controls against 
em ployee con flict o f interest and fraud.
The specific steps involved in carrying out 
this responsibility include:
•  Review ing corporate policies relating to 
compliance with laws and regulations, 
ethics, conflict o f interest, and the 
investigation o f misconduct and fraud. 
Review ing current/pending litigation or
i n w h ich the  
  cases o f em ployee
______ ____ m isconduct, or fraud.
Requiring the internal auditor to report in 
writing  annually  the scope o f the reviews 
of corporate gove rnance and any
significant findings.
Corporate Control
The responsibility o f audit committees for 
corporate control includes an understanding o f 
the company’s key financial reporting risk 
areas and system o f internal control. The 
com mittee should monitor the control process
through internal auditing.
According to the IIA’s Standards for the 
Professional Practice o f  Internal Auditing 
(Standard 300 — “  Scope o f W ork” ), “ The 
scope o f the internal audit should encompass 
the examination and evaluation o f the 
adequacy and effectiveness o f the 
organization’s system o f internal control and 
the quality o f perform ance in carrying out 
assigned responsibilities.”
T h e Standards require internal auditing to: 
•  R eview  the  reliab ility  and integrity o f
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•  R eview  the syst e m  t o  e n s u re 
compliance w ith t h o s e  p o l i c i e s
procedures, laws, and regulations which 
could have a significant impact on 
operations and reports.
•  R eview  the means o f safeguarding assets 
and, as appropriate, verify  the existence o f 
such assets.
•  Appraise the economy and efficiency with 
which resources are em ployed.
•  R eview  operations or programs to ascertain 
whether results are consistent w ith
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  S t a n d a r d  3 0 0 ,  T h e  I I A  
p r o v i d e s  f u r t h e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  
c o n t r o l  i n  i t s  S t a t e m e n t  o n  Internal A u d i t i n g  
S t a n d a r d s  N o .  1 , “ C o n t r o l :  C o n c e p t s  a n d  
R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . ”  T h i s  s t a t e m e n t  n o t e s  t h a t :  
I n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  e x a m i n e s  a n d
established objectives and goals andwhether the operations or programs arebeing carried out as planned.
evaluates the planning, organizing, and directing processes to determine whether reasonable assurance exists that 
o b j e c t i v e s  a n d  g o a l s  w i l l  b e  a c h i e v e d .  
A l l  s y s t e m s ,  p r o c e s s e s ,  o p e r a t i o n s ,  
f u n c t i o n s ,  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t i n g ’s  e v a l u a t i o n s .
A U D I T  C O M M I T T E E  S T R U C T U R E
T h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
s h o u l d  b e  s p e c i f i e d  i n  a  f o r m a l ,  w r i t t e n  
c h a r t e r  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  f u l l  b o a r d  o f  
d i r e c t o r s .
T h e  I I A ’s  Position o n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e s  
r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  b e  
m a d e  u p  s o l e l y  o f  d i r e c t o r s  f r o m  o u t s i d e  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .
O n e  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  i s  t o  
e n s u r e  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  p e r s p e c t i v e  o n  r e p o r t s  
a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  m a d e  t o  t h e  c o m m i t t e e .
F o r  e x a m p l e ,  d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e i r  
w o r k  w i t h  b o t h  p u b l i c -  a n d  p r i v a t e - s e c t o r  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  m a y  b r i n g  t o  
l i g h t  e r r o r s  o r  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  A n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
c o m p r i s e d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  f r o m  w i t h i n  t h e
o r g a n i z a t i o n  m a y  b e  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e i r  d i r e c t  
i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  d i e  p r o b l e m  a r e a s .
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
m a d e  u p  o f  “ o u t s i d e ”  d i r e c t o r s  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  
a p t  t o  b e  i m p a r t i a l  a n d  o b j e c t i v e  i n  s u c h  
m a t t e r s  a n d  b e  a b l e  t o  b r i n g  a  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  
e x p e r i e n c e  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .
T h e  n u m b e r  o f  m e m b e r s  o n  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  s i z e  
o f  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  a n d  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  T h r e e  t o  f i v e  m e m b e r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
i s  u s u a l l y  i d e a l .
T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  w i l l  n o r m a l l y  f i n d  it 
n e c e s s a r y  t o  m e e t  t h r e e  t o  f o u r  t i m e s  a n n u a l l y  
i n  o r d e r  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
T H E  R E L A T I O N S H I P  B E T W E E N  I N T E R N A L  A U D I T I N G  
A N D  T H E  A U D I T  C O M M I T T E E
T he IIA’s Position on Audit Committees 
views internal auditing as a co rpora te  resource, 
supporting  the audit com m ittee. This 
relationship enhances the stature and 
independence of the internal auditing function 
and  its ability to contribu te to corporate  
success.
In ternal auditing m ust b e  trusted  by  and 
w ork effectively w ith all levels of 
m anagem ent, keeping in m ind the best 
interests o f the organization as a whole.
T he relationship betw een  aud it com m ittees 
and  internal auditing encom passes reporting  
relationships and  oversight relationships.
Reporting Relationships
To be  effective, internal auditing m ust 
organizational status 
sufficient to  ensure a
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R e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  M a n a g e m e n t  
I n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  a d e q u a t e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  
a n d  o b j e c t i v i t y  i n  a l l  o f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t i n g  m u s t  h a v e  a  r e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  a t  t h e  s e n i o r  l e v e l .  I t  w i l l  b e  
e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  b e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r  t o  
e n s u r e  o b j e c t i v e  r e v i e w s  o f  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  
c o n t r o l  a n d  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  
R e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  
E f f e c t i v e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  m a t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g ,  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e ,  a n d  c o r p o r a t e  
c o n t r o l  w i l l  a l s o  r e q u i r e  a  r e p o r t i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  b o a r d  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  
O n l y  i f  s u c h  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t s  d o e s  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t i n g  h a v e  a n y  r e c o u r s e  i n  c a s e s  o f  
m i s c o n d u c t  o r  f r a u d  i n v o l v i n g  s e n i o r  
m a n a g e m e n t  i t s e l f .
O v e r s i g h t  R e l a t i o n s h i p s  
T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  e x e r c i s e  a n
b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  a u d i t  c o v e r a g e  a n d  a d e q u a t e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  its f i n d i n g s  a n d
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
active oversight role with respect to the internal audit function. Oversight activities should include:
• Reviewing a nd Approving the Internal Audit Charter
T h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  c h a r t e r  p r o v i d e s  t h e  
f u n c t i o n a l  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k  
w i t h i n  w h i c h  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  p r o v i d e s  
s e r v i c e s  t o  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t o  t h e  b o a r d  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e .  I t  d e f i n e s  t h e  p u r p o s e ,  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  a u t h o r i t y ,  a n d  r e p o r t i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n .
• Concurring in the Appointment or R e m o v a l  of the Director of Internal Auditing
T h i s  w i l l  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  i n  m a t t e r s  f a l l i n g  u n d e r  
t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  b o a r d  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .
• Reviewing Plans a n d  Budgets
T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m u s t  s a t i s f y  i t s e l f  t h a t  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o b j e c t i v e s  a n d  g o a l s ,  s t a f f i n g  
p l a n s ,  f i n a n c i a l  b u d g e t s ,  a n d  a u d i t  s c h e d u l e s  
p r o v i d e  f o r  a d e q u a t e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e
committee’s own goals and objectives.
The audit committee should ensure that its 
review of internal audit plans and budgets do 
not impede or inhibit management’s use of the 
internal audit function in the pursuit of 
operational goals and objectives. Since 
management’s use of the audit function often 
takes the form of unplanned requests for 
audits or special studies, management should 
not be expected to specify its need for internal 
audit resources in detail. •
•  Review ing Audit Results
The director of internal auditing should be 
required to provide summary information 
concerning the results of reviews of financial 
reporting, corporate governance, and corporate 
control. Specific findings and 
recommendations of a significant nature may 
also be reported.
•  Requesting Audit Projects
The audit committee may request internal 
auditing to perform special studies, 
investigations or other services in matters of 
interest or concern to the committee. Such 
projects could include:
— Investigation of potential or suspected 
fraud or other irregularities.
— Company compliance with laws and 
regulations.
— Evaluation of external auditors.
•  Requesting Quality Assurance Reviews 
The Institute of Internal Auditors
recommends that quality assurance reviews of 
the internal audit function be performed on a 
regular basis approximately every three years.
Regular quality assurance reviews will 
provide assurance to the audit committee and 
to management that internal auditing activities 
conform to The IIA’s Standards fo r the 
Professional Practice o f  Internal Auditing.
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C O N C L U S I O N
T h e  t a s k s ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  a n d  g o a l s  o f  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  a r e  c l o s e l y  
i n t e r t w i n e d  i n  m a n y  w a y s .
C e r t a i n l y ,  a s  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  t h e  
“ c o r p o r a t e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ”  i s s u e  i n c r e a s e s ,  s o  
d o e s  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g /  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  h a s  a  m a j o r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  a s s u r i n g  t h a t  t h e  m e c h a n i s m s
f o r  c o r p o r a t e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  a r e  i n  p l a c e  a n d  
f u n c t i o n i n g .  C l e a r l y ,  o n e  o f  t h e s e  m e c h a n i s m s  
i s  a  s o l i d ,  w e l l - o r c h e s t r a t e d ,  c o o p e r a t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g .
T h e  Institute o f  Internal A u d i t o r s ' Position 
o n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e s  i s  a  s t e p  t o w a r d    
p r o m o t i n g  t h a t  t y p e  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  —  h e l p i n g  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  w o r k  
t o g e t h e r  t o w a r d  c o m m o n  g o a l s .
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July 23, 1987 FannieMae
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006
Dear Sirs:
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) is a federally-chartered corporation that is entirely funded by private capital. It has approximately 82 million shares of common stock outstanding which are publicly traded on the New York, Pacific and Midwest stock exchanges. Although securities issued by the corporation are exempt securities within the meaning of laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the corporation maintains it's accounts in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, has regular annual examinations by independent public accountants, and voluntarily complies with the financial reporting standards of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
We have reviewed carefully the exposure draft on Fraudulent Financial Reporting dated April 1987. We commend the Commission for its thorough and penetrating analysis of the very important issues surrounding financial reporting by public companies. Many of the recommendations of the Commission should be adopted. This letter addresses several recommendations which we believe require modification because they fail to distinguish between the governing responsibility of the Board of Directors and the management responsibility of corporate officers.
The first such recommendation would require that the Audit Committee approve in advance the types and extent of management advisory services that management plans to engage the company's independent public accountant to perform. While we do not disagree with the Commission's conclusion that the Audit Committee should oversee management judgements relating to the independence of the public accountant, we do not agree that this oversight should be exercised by direct participation in the management process. It would be equally
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting - 2-
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effective and less disruptive to accomplish this objective 
through periodic reports by management to the Audit Committee 
describing the scope and cost of all services performed by 
the independent public accountant.
The second recommendation we find objectionable is the 
proposal that all public companies should be required to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter 
signed by the Chairman of the Audit Committee describing the 
Committee's responsibilities and activities during the year. 
Earlier in Chapter V of the draft report, the Commission 
recommends a broader form of management report than what is 
presently published by many public companies. We agree with 
that recommendation, however, we also believe that the 
management report should be expanded further to describe the 
composition and activities of the Audit Committee and the 
role it plays in the corporation's system of internal 
control. We do not believe that it is practicable or 
desirable to include a separate report from the Chairman of 
the Audit Committee. Again, our objection is based on our 
belief that the Audit Committee's proper role should be one 
of oversight not involving active participation in the 
management process or preemption of what we believe are 
appropriate management responsibilities.
The third and most serious objection we have to the 
Commission's draft report relates to the recommendation that 
the Audit Committee should approve quarterly financial 
results prior to public release. We believe this 
recommendation, if adopted, would place the Audit Committee 
in the untenable position of having to acquire detailed 
knowledge of day-to-day financial operations. Because most 
audit committees consist entirely of outside directors (and 
the Commission would require that this be so), it is 
impracticable to expect the committee members to be in a 
position to exercise this responsibility without serious 
disruption of operations and delay of the publication of 
important financial information. We believe this 
recommendation should be stricken from the Commission's final 
report.
I hope that the Commission will view these comments as 
helpful and that they will be considered in the final report.
Yours very truly, \
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J .S .P arker  
3135 Easton Tpk. 
F a irfie ld , Conn. 06431
J u ly  21, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, DC 20006
Gentlemen:
I  w r ite  because I  fe e l th a t  your in te n t  is  to  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  o ve rp la y  
the  ro le  o f  an a u d it  committee o f  the  board o f  d ire c to rs  o f  an American 
company. There is  no way th a t  the a u d it  committee can s ta y  abreast o f  the  
d e ta i ls  o f  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  such as you suggest. T h is  would re q u ire  a 
s t a f f  th e  s iz e  o f  th a t  o f  th e  c o m p tro lle r  and f a r  g re a te r  knowledge o f  the  
in n e r w ork ings o f  the  e n te rp r is e  than the in d iv id u a l members o f  the committee 
a re  in  a p o s it io n  to  possess.
The va lue  o f  th e  a u d it  committee o f  th e  board o f  d ire c to rs  is  in  i t s  
be ing  a v e h ic le  to  which the  o u ts id e  independent accountants can re p o r t  in  
confidence and to  whom the  in s id e  a u d ito rs  can r e fe r  w ith o u t in te rn a l 
management p a r t ic ip a t io n .  The purpose o f  an a u d it  committee is  to  a s c e r ta in , 
to  the  e x te n t w ith in  t h e ir  reach , th a t  the  methods o f accoun ting  and re p o r t in g  
adhered to  by the company and the p o l ic ie s  p e r ta in in g  to  accoun ting  la id  down 
by th e  company's management a re  in  keeping w ith  the  b es t accepted p ra c t ic e s  as 
viewed bo th  by the in te rn a l a u d ito rs  and the e x te rn a l accounting  f i r m  engaged 
to  oversee and a t te s t  to  the  company's accounts.
To accept the  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  im p lie d  in  you r Appendix K on Page 133 
under th e  heading "A u d it  Committee Good P ra c t ic e  G u id e lin e s " is  beyond the  
c a p a b i l i t y  o f  any reasonable a u d it  committee to  meet. I t  must always be ke p t 
in  mind th a t  the  board o f  d ire c to r s  o f  any company is  in  p lace  to  rep resen t 
share owner in te re s ts  w ith  regard  to  company p o l ic y  and d ir e c t io n ,  and is  n o t 
concerned w ith  the  d e ta ile d  o p e ra tio n  o f th e  company’ s bus iness . Should th a t 
o p e ra tio n  prove to  be u n s a t is fa c to ry ,  i t  is  then the d u ty  o f  the  board to  see 
th a t  a p p ro p ria te  management is  pu t in to  p lace  to  r e c t i f y  th e  s i tu a t io n .
I  hope you w i l l  re co n s id e r the  language you c u r re n t ly  have in  p lace 
and i t s  im p lic a t io n s .
JSP/pd
S in c e re ly ,
 
u s - H o m e U.S. HOME CORPORATION
1800 West Loop South Box 2863 Houston, Texas 77252-2863
2 1 1
(713) 877-2361
CHESTER P. SADOWSKI
Controller
J u l y  2 3 ,  1 9 8 7
 
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1701 P e n n s y l v a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W . 
W a s h in g t o n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 0 6
G e n t l e m e n :
Y o u  a r e  t o  b e  c o m p le m e n te d  o n  t h e  t h o r o u g h n e s s  a n d  c o m p le t e ­
n e s s  o f  y o u r  d r a f t  r e p o r t  i s s u e d  M ay 1 ,  1 9 8 7 .
We f in d  m a n y  o f  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  t o  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n d  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  p u b l i c l y  h e l d  c o m p a n ie s .  I n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  t h e  k e y ­
s t o n e  o f  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  F o r  t h e  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  i s  t h e  t o n e  
s e t  a t  t h e  t o p .  W i t h o u t  t h i s ,  t h e  o t h e r  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  c a n  n o t  
b e  e F F e c t i v e l y  im p le m e n te d .  S in c e  t h e  " t o n e  o F  s e t  a t  t h e  t o p ”  
i s  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o F  a  c o m p a n y 's  s e n i o r  m a n a g e m e n t i t  c a n  n o t  b e  
im p le m e n te d  b y  r u l e  o r  o t h e r  m e a n s .  B e c a u s e  o F  t h i s  y o u  m a y  w a n t  
t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  t h e  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  h a s  r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y  t o  m o n i t o r  a n d  e v a l u a t e  t h e  t o n e  s e t  a t  t h e  t o p .
E s t a b l i s h i n g  e F F e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  i s  a  ju d g e m e n t  p r o ­
c e s s  t h a t  e a c h  c o m p a n y  m u s t  p e r F o r m  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  i t s  A u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  a n d  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s .  E F F e c t i v e  c o n t r o l s  a r e  g o in g  
t o  v a r y  F ro m  i n d u s t r y  t o  i n d u s t r y  a n d  F ro m  c o m p a n y  t o  c o m p a n y  
w i t h i n  e a c h  i n d u s t r y .  U n t i l  i t s  s c o p e  i s  d e f i n e d ,  w e i n i t i a l l y  
d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  a  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  b o d y  c o u l d  e F F e c t i v e l y  p r o v i d e  
F u t u r e  g u id a n c e  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  I n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  e x i s t i n g  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o F  A c c o u n t a n t s ,  
a n d  t h e  A m e r ic a n  I n s t i t u t e  o F  C e r t i f i e d  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s  a n d  
t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o F  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r s  s h o u ld  b e  a b l e  t o  p r o v i d e  s u c h  
g u i d a n c e .
S i n c e r e l y
C h e s t e r  P .  S a d o w s k i
C P S /m l
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
HARRISON J. GOLDIN
COMptroller
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J u l y  2 3 ,  1 9 8 7
M r .  J a m e s  C .  T r e a d w a y ,  J r .
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  M r .  T r e a d w a y :
I  r e v i e w e d  y o u r  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  R e p o r t  o f  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  R e p o r t i n g ,
A p r i l  1 9 8 7  a n d  o f f e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o m m e n t s .
A l t h o u g h  t h e  R e p o r t  f o c u s e s  o n  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s ,  
m a n y  o f  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a r e  e q u a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  
t o  g o v e r n m e n t a l  e n t i t i e s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  
" t o n e  a t  t h e  t o p , "  w h i c h  s e t s  t h e  o v e r a l l  e n v i r o n m e n t  
i n  w h i c h  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  t a k e s  p l a c e ,  i s  
n o  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  e n t i t i e s  t h a n  
i n  c o m m e r c i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s .  I  s u g g e s t  t h a t  l a n g u a g e  
b e  a d d e d  t o  y o u r  f i n a l  d r a f t  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  
m a n y  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a r e  
r e l e v a n t  t o  o t h e r  t h a n  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
g o v e r n m e n t s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e s e  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  i m p l e m e n t i n g  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e i r  t y p e  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
F o r  t h e  C i t y  o f  N e w  Y o r k  I  h a v e  i s s u e d  a n  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  d i r e c t i v e  c a l l e d  t h e  " C i t y  M a n a g e r  
F i n a n c i a l  I n t e g r i t y  D i r e c t i v e . "  I t  f i x e s  w i t h  
C o m m i s s i o n e r s  a n d  a g e n c y  m a n a g e r s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  a d e q u a t e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
A n  a n n u a l  r e v i e w  a n d  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  ( o p i n i o n )  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  i n  
t h a t  a g e n c y  i s  r e q u i r e d  f r o m  t h e  C o m m is s io n e r  
o r  h e a d  o f  e a c h  m u n i c i p a l  a g e n c y .  T h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  
c o m b in e d  w i t h  e x t e n s i v e  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  t r a i n i n g ,  
e s t a b l i s h e s  t h a t  a g e n c y  m a n a g e r s  a r e  i n  f a c t  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a d e q u a t e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l .  T h i s  
h e l p s  s e t  t h e  p r o p e r  " t o n e  a t  t h e  t o p . "
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Effective accounting and internal audit 
functions are crucial to ensure the accountability 
of public officials and proper administration 
of government programs. I have a staff of more 
than three hundred auditors. Because I am separately 
elected, independently of the Mayor, the City's 
internal audit function reports independently 
of the Mayor, enhancing its effectiveness and 
objectivity.
We have also found an independent audit 
committee an effective tool in focusing management's 
attention on internal control and financial reporting 
concerns and monitoring and helping to ensure 
the quality of audits by independent CPAs. New 
York City's Audit Committee is comprised of seven 
members, four independent members and three City 
officials, ex-officio. The independent members 
are outstanding individuals in their own corporate 
and academic lives. Committee meetings are public 
and an annual operations report is issued.
I hope you will find the New York City example 
useful and can incorporate the substance of the 
ideas I have outlined in a narrative relating 
to non-profit entities. Please feel free to 
call upon me for more information or at any time 
that you may think there is some way in which 
I can be helpful.
Sincerely,
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I N T E R N A T I O N A L  P A P E R  C O M P A N Y
TWO MANHATTANVILLE ROAD, PURCHASE, NEW YORK 10577
JOHN T. LEYDEN PHONE (914) 397-1644
Vice President - Accounting and Tax
J u l y  2 8 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h in g t o n ,  D .C .
R e : R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  On F r a u d u l e n t
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g ,  E x p e n s e  D r a f t ,  A p r i l  1 9 8 7
G e n t le m e n :
We r e s p e c t f u l l y  w i s h  t o  c o m m e n t o n  t h e  f i r s t  tw o  s e n t e n c e s  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  A p p e n d ix  K o n  p a g e  1 8 3  u n d e r  t h e  h e a d in g  " A u d i t  
C o m m it t e e  G o o d  P r a c t i c e  G u i d e l i n e s " ,  w h ic h  r e a d s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
"A n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  in d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  i s  
t h e  p r i m a r y  v e h i c l e  w h ic h  b o a r d s  o f  d i r e c t o r s  u s e  t o  
d i s c h a r g e  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A n  in f o r m e d  a n d  v i g i l a n t  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  r e p r e s e n t s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  i n f l u e n c e s  
f o r  m i n i m i z i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g " .
T h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  h a s  
p r i m a r y  o v e r s i g h t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
c o m p a n y 's  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ;  h o w e v e r ,  w e a r e  c o n c e r n e d  
t h a t  t h e  a b o v e  r e f e r e n c e d  la n g u a g e  c a n  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  
a l t e r  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e 's  r o l e  f r o m  a n  o v e r s i g h t  o n e  t o  a 
p a r t i c i p a t o r y  o n e ,  t h e r e b y  im p o s in g  a n  u n r e a l i s t i c  b u r d e n  o n  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e rs .  I n  f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  a n d  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  h a v e  b o t h  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  
r e v i e w ,  c o m m e n t o n ,  a n d  u l t i m a t e l y  r e l y  o n  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
c o m p e te n c y  a n d  a d e q u a c y  o f  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t s ,  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  d e p a r t m e n t ,  s e n i o r  
f i n a n c i a l ,  o p e r a t i n g  a n d  e x e c u t i v e  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  
s y s te m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a n  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  i s  n o r m a l l y  c h a r g e d  w i t h  p u r s u i n g  a n y  o t h e r  m a t t e r  
w h ic h  t h e  c o m m i t t e e  d e e m s  r e l e v a n t  t o  i t s  e f f e c t i v e  
o p e r a t i o n .
National Commission 
July 28, 1987 
Page 2
To recharacterize the role of an audit committee from 
oversight to participatory will ultimately result in the 
hiring of separate staffs as well as a number of other 
duplicative and counter-productive efforts, and ultimately 
would lead to the ineffective use of the resources already 
available to such committees, such as the independent public 
accountants and the internal audit department.
We respectfully request that the above referenced language 
be clarified by inserting the word "oversight" before  
"responsibility".
Respectfully submitted,
John T. Leyden
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
Merrill Lynch
Ju ly  27, 1987
One Liberty Plaza
165 Broadway
New York, New York 10080
212 637 3656
C o u rtn e y  F. Jo n e s
Executive Vice President 
Chief Financial Officer
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C o m m issio n ers  
N a tio n a l C om m ission  on 
F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P e n n sy lv an ia  A venue, N. W. 
W ashington , D .C . 20006
D e ar Sirs:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
- EXPOSURE DRAFT -
We a p p re c ia te  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  co m m e n t on th is  E xposure  D ra f t  and  th a n k  e a c h  of 
th e  C o m m issio n ers  fo r  p a r tic ip a tin g  in  th is  v ita lly  im p o r ta n t p ro je c t and  p rov id ing  such  a  
fa r - re a c h in g  re p o r t .  S ince  we a re  firm ly  c o m m itte d  to  th e  p rev en tio n  and  d e te r e n c e  of 
fra u d u le n t fin an c ia l re p o rtin g , w e fu lly  a g re e  w ith  th e  E xposu re  D r a f f s  in te n t  and  
o b se rv a tio n s  and  b e liev e  th is  e f fo r t  w ill re s u lt  in  en h an ced  re p o rtin g  a c c u ra c y  and  
s to c k h o ld e r  p ro te c tio n . H ow ever, w e have serious  co n ce rn s  w ith  re s p e c t to :
th e  p o te n tia l c re a tio n  of new  and  s ig n if ic a n t p ro fess io n a l, le g a l , a n d  fin a n c ia l
bu rdens on d ire c to rs , a u d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e rs , an d  sen io r m a n a g e m e n t.
th e  la c k  o f  c le a r ,  q u a n ti ta t iv e  s tan d a rd s  a g a in s t w hich to  m e asu re  th e  a d eq u a c y  of
c u r re n t  and  fu tu re  m an ag em en t in v o lv em en t in , and  a u d it c o m m itte e  o v e rs ig h t o f,
th e  in te rn a l  c o n tro l system  and  th e  fin a n c ia l re p o r tin g  p ro cess .
th e  p roposed  expansion  in th e  o v e rs ig h t ro le  of a u d it  c o m m itte e s .
th e  la c k  o f c le a r  in c re m e n ta l b e n e f it  of im p lem en tin g  s e le c te d  re c o m m en d a tio n s .
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Even if these recommendations are fully implemented, it must be dearly understood 
that this is not a panacea or "cure all"; fraudulent financial reporting, an inherent risk in 
all businesses, can still occur. For convenience throughout this letter, The National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting will be referred to as the "Commission."
The details of our concerns follow:
Chapter Two: Recommendations for the Public Company
II. Tone at the Top
Commission Recommendation: For the top management of a public company to discharge 
its obligation to oversee the financial reporting process, it must identify, understand, and 
assess the factors that may cause the company's financial statements to be fraudulently 
misstated.
Merrill Lynch Response: While the proper "Tone at the Top" is essential to reduc ng the 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting, this recommendation implies that traditional, 
prudent management practices do not give appropriate recognition to the risks of, or 
controls over, fraudulent financial reporting. In fact, most companies do conduct reviews 
and assessments of this nature as part of the normal management process.
This recommendation appears to establish a higher measure of senior-management 
involvement in the day-to-day functioning of the internal control system without dearly 
defining standards to evaluate the adequacy of that involvement. While Appendix H does 
provide selected factors for consideration, the matters discussed there are highly 
subjective and, in spite of comments to the contrary, appear to require a highly 
structured, formal risk-assessment, monitoring, and evaluation program. The net value 
added of a costly program of this nature, in spite of its laudable intent, is not dear.
In any event, annual audit committee review of this process is dearly excessive for 
appropriate committee oversight and much closer committee participation in the day-to- 
day functioning of the company and its system of internal controls will be required. In 
addition, a substantial, additional time commitment from already pressed and hard-to-find
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IV. Audit Committee of the Board of Directors
Informed, Vigilant, and E ffective Audit Committees
Commission Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and
effective overseers of the financial reporting process and the company's internal controls.
and retain audit committee members would be necessary. Finally, as with the
management program discussed above, the criteria are unclear for conducting this review,
i.e., what is adequate. As such, audit committees could be subjected to criticism and
additional legal, professional and financial liability.
Merrill Lynch Response: We agree that vigorous, involved audit committees can 
significantly enhance the corporate control environment. However, while the "Audit 
Committee Good Practice Guidelines" enumerated in Appendix K contain many useful 
suggestions, they do not contain the clearly defined, quantitative standards for measuring 
effective oversight.
This recommendation recognizes the pure oversight responsibilities of an effective 
audit committee and even states that they "...must, of course, avoid unnecessary or 
inappropriate intervention with the prerogatives of corporate management..." We agree. 
However, some of the other recommendations made in this report appear to require a 
much higher level of audit committee involvement which could actually create an 
intrusion into the day-to-day operation and management of the company. We suggest that 
greater recognition be given to the oversight nature of the audit committee's role 
throughout this entire report.
Issue Related to Public Accountant's Independence
Commission Recommendation: The audit committee should approve in advance the types 
and the extent of management advisory services that management plans to engage the 
company's independent public accountant to perform.
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Merrill Lynch Response: We certainly concur that audit committees should approve the 
types and extent of management advisory services performed by the company's auditors, 
but we believe that the requirement for approval in advance should be related to a 
standard of materiality (i.e., a dollar or percentage threshold). We also believe that there 
should be a provision for the ratification of these activities in recognition of the practical 
difficulties of convening audit committee meetings on short notice coupled with the need 
to start selected projects in a timely fashion.
V. Reporting to the Public on Management and Audit Committee Responsibilities
Management Report
Commission Recommendation: A ll public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders management reports signed by the chief 
executive o fficer and chief accounting officer. The management report should acknow­
ledge management's responsibilities for the financial statements and internal control, 
discuss how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide management's assessment of 
the effectiveness of the company's internal controls.
Audit Committee Chairman's Letter
Commission Recommendations A ll public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by the chairman of the audit 
committee describing the committee’s responsibilities and activities during the year.
Merrill Lynch Response: The first recommendation clearly increases the legal,
professional, and financial burdens on directors and senior management and may not 
necessarily enhance investor knowlege or protection. It lacks, moreover, defined, 
quantitative standards specifying that which constitutes an effective, adequate internal 
control environment. Such standards are necessary to enable the CEO and CFO to 
determine if the required attestations are valid and supportable. Additionally, we are 
concerned that CEO and CFO annual report sign-off may appear to provide stockholders 
with greater assurances than intended or warranted.
The second recommendation adds annual-report disclosure already substantially 
provided in the proxy statement. Accordingly, we believe this disclosure to be redundant.
-4-
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VI. Two Additional Recommendations 
Seeking a Second Opinion
Commission Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee when it 
seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
Merrill Lynch Response; While we recognize the intent of the Commission on this 
particular issue, we suggest that this recommendation be modified to address only those 
instances when management seeks to implement a second opinion without the concurrence 
of its independent auditor, or when there is disagreement among senior management.
Quarterly Reporting
Commission Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight of the 
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include approving financial results prior 
to public release.
Merrill Lynch Response: We recognize that investor decisions are influenced by quarterly 
results, and increased audit committee oversight of the quarterly reporting process is 
certainly beneficial. However, the primary, and most appropriate, financial reporting 
period continues to be the year. Prior audit committee approval of quarterly results 
would place significant additional, and inappropriate emphasis on quarterly, rather than 
annual, results and diminish the fundamental distinction between annual and quarterly 
results. As such, selected investors may unwittingly place the same degree of reliance on 
quarterly results as they would on annual audited financial statements.
Moreover, obtaining prior audit committee approval of these results could 
significantly inhibit the prompt and timely issuance of quarterly reports. Delaying the 
release of quarterly results after they have become known internally creates opportunities 
for abuse of "insider" information. Prior approval would therefore create inappropriate 
audit committee interference in the normal management reporting process.
The significant issue here is prior audit committee review; of course the committee 
can and should review the quarterly results, but after public release. Adequate oversight 
can be achieved through ongoing, current audit committee notification by management of
-5-
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material, unusual events or transactions and discussions with the independent accountant 
about the results of their quarterly, pre-issuance reviews. The independent accountant 
has a direct reporting relationship to the audit committee in which they must advise the 
committee if the quarterly data contained any material misstatements or errors.
VII. Setting Standards for Internal Control
Commission Recommendation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations should
establish a body to guide public companies on internal controls.
Merrill Lynch Response: We agree that clearly defined, objective, quantitative, and
measurable standards would be helpful in guiding public companies on internal controls, 
however, we question the need to establish another body to do so. We believe that the 
Commission should recommend one of the currently existing bodies to assume this 
responsibility. Once this body defines internal control standards, each company should 
specifically incorporate these standards into their own formal Accounting and Control 
Policy Manual. This manual would then be subject to both internal and external audits for 
both adequacy and compliance.
Chapter Three: Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant
II. Recognizing Responsibility for Detecting Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Commission Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise standards to 
restate the independent public accountant's responsibility for detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting, requiring the independent public accountant to (1) take affirmative 
steps in each audit to assess the potential for such reporting and (2) design tests to 
provide reasonable assurance of detection. Revised standards should include guidance for 
assessing risks and pursuing detection when risks are identified.
Merrill Lynch Response: We agree with the need for vigilant auditing by independent 
auditors which includes testing for incidents of material fraudulent financial reporting. 
However, we also believe that reputable public accounting firms already recognize this 
responsibility and are currently performing these tasks. The recommendation for
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additional work in this area translates into higher audit fees and additional audit-related 
disruptions without commensurate benefits to investors or companies.
Chapter Four: Recommendations for the SEC and Others to Improve the Regulatory and 
_______________ Legal Environment_________________________________________________________
II. Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
C. Bars or Suspensions From Serving as Corporate O fficer or Director
Commission Recommendation: The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to bar or 
suspend corporate officers and directors involved in fraudulent financial reporting from 
future service in that capacity in a public company.
III. Increased Criminal Prosecution
Commission Recommendation: Criminal prosecution o f fraudulent financial reporting
cases should become a higher priority. The SEC should conduct an affirmative program to 
promote increased criminal prosecution of fraudulent financial reporting cases by 
educating and assisting government officials with criminal prosecution powers.
V. SEC Resources
Commission Recommendation: The SEC must be given adequate resources to perform 
existing and additional functions that help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Merrill Lynch Response: We wholeheartedly support the recommendations that the SEC 
be given adequate resources to fulfill its statutory mandate and that there be increased 
criminal prosecution of violations of financial reporting requirements in appropriate 
cases. In addition, the recommendation that corporate officers and directors involved in 
fraudulent financial reporting be barred or suspended from future service in that capacity 
with a public company is appropriate. We believe that any recommendation relating to 
increased enforcement remedies for the SEC should be le ft to its discretion. If that 
agency believes that it needs additional remedies, it should go to Congress and request it.
-7-
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VII. Current Legal Climate
Reconsidering Corporate Indemnification
Commission Recommendation: The SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that 
the corporate indemnification of directors for liabilities that arise under the Securities 
Act of 1933 is against public policy and therefore unenforceable.
Merrill Lynch Response: We support this recommendation. Traditionally, state
corporation laws have recognized the need to protect directors against liabilities. First, 
they have permitted corporations to indemnify directors in certain circumstances. But 
for the SEC prohibition on indemnification, corporations could indemnify directors with 
respect to certain federal securities law violations. Second, such laws have permitted 
corporations to purchase directors' liability insurance, including insurance for liabilities 
arising out of violations of the federal securities laws. In recent years, it has become 
very difficult and often impossible for many corporations to obtain insurance. See, e.g. 
The New York Times, "Director Insurance Drying Up," March 7, 1986.
This insurance crisis poses a threat to the quality and stability of the governance of 
many public companies because of the unwillingness of qualified individuals to serve as 
directors without the traditional protections. Moreover, this situation would adversely 
impact the makeup of the boards of public companies, especially key committees such as 
audit committees whose members are made up of independent, non-employee directors. 
Under such circumstances, these persons have even less reason to serve as directors than 
do persons who are employed full time by the corporation. By rescinding its prohibition on 
indemnification, the SEC would help restore an environment in which corporations could 
readily attract highly qualified independent directors.
Chapter Five: Recommendations for Education
V. Continuing Professional Education
Commission Recommendation: As part of their continuing professional education,
independent public accountants, internal auditors, and corporate accountants should study
-8-
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the forces and opportunities that contribute to fraudulent financial reporting, the risk 
factors that may indicate its occurrence, and the relevant ethical and technical standards.
Merrill Lynch Response: We agree with this recommendation. We suggest that you also 
consider adding senior executive management to the list of participants.
* * * * *
While this response has the full concurrence of Merrill Lynch Senior Executive 
Management and the majority of the members of the Audit Committee, one Audit 
Committee member has taken issue with it and I believe that he may provide a separate 
response on his own.
Once again, we thank you for the opportunity to comment on this forward-looking 
report and truly appreciate the outstanding effort required to produce it. We 
wholeheartedly agree with the Draft's objectives and would be pleased to discuss our 
response further with you.
-9-
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T H E  D O W  C H E M I C A L  C O M P A N Y
BENNETT BUILDING 
2030 DOW CENTER
MIDLAND, MICHIGAN 48640
M r. James C . T re a d w a y , J r . ,  C hairm an
N a tiona l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F inanc ia l R e p o rtin g
1701 P e nnsy lvan ia  A v e . ,  N . W.
W ash ing ton, D .C . 20006
Dear M r. T readw ay :
We have rev iew ed  th e  re c e n t exposu re  d r a f t  o f the  re p o r t  o f the  
N a tiona l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F inanc ia l R e p o rtin g , and w h ile  the  
dead line  fo r  responses has passed, we w anted  you  to  know  th a t we, 
too , s t ro n g ly  s u p p o rt y o u r  recom m endations as the  most re a lis t ic  and 
sensib le  se t o f im provem ents th a t cou ld  be made to  re s to re  p u b lic  
con fidence  in  f in a n c ia l r e p o r t in g .  O u r Com pany’s p ra c tic e s  and  p ro ce ­
d u re s  on fin a n c ia l r e p o r t in g  a re  in  com pliance in  a ll m a te ria l aspects 
w ith  th e  recom m endations o u tlin e d  in  the  T readw ay  Commission d ra f t .
We w ou ld  have o n ly  a few  d is s e n tin g  comments, m a in ly  w ith  th e  e x te n t 
o f some o f th e  re g u la tio n s , th o u g h  n o t w ith  th e  s p ir i t  o r  in te n t .
C h a p te r Tw o, V I -  Q u a r te r ly  R e p o rtin g
" A u d it  Com m ittees. . .  o v e rs ig h t shou ld  in c lu d e  a p p ro v in g  f in a n c ia l 
re s u lts  p r io r  to  p u b lic  re le a s e ."
We d isag ree  w ith  th e  su g g es tion  th a t  the  a u d it  committee " a p p ro ve " the  
q u a r te r ly  re s u lts .  T h is  takes them  beyond  o v e rs ig h t and  in to  the  
c r it ic a l p a th  and  d ire c t  re s p o n s ib ility  fo r  re p o r t in g .
We be lieve  th a t th e  a u d it  committee shou ld  have o v e rs ig h t re s p o n s ib ili­
t ie s  b u t shou ld  n o t take  o v e r th is  re s p o n s ib ility  o f management. 
R e p o rtin g  is  a p rim e  management re s p o n s ib ility ,  as you  s ta te d  in  
C h a p te r Tw o, V . The  fu r th e r  sugg es tion  th a t th e  a u d it  committee 
"a p p ro v e ” the  re p o r t in g  w ou ld  d ilu te  th is  re s p o n s ib ility .
C u r re n t ly  a t Dow, we ho ld  a te lephone con fe rence  ca ll w ith  th e  a u d it 
committee when th e  q u a r te r ly  re p o r t  has a n y  item  o f m a te r ia lity  o r  
a cco u n tin g  change in v o lv e d . The  con fe rence  ca ll is  p laced in  the  
presence o f the  engagem ent p a r tn e r  o f the  in d e p e n d e n t a u d ito r  and the  
c h ie f in te rn a l a u d ito r .  The  cha irm an is  in fo rm e d , has in p u t ,  b u t  does 
n o t have re s p o n s ib ility  f o r  a p p ro v in g  the  re p o r t  in  d e ta il.  We see th is  
as th e  a p p ro p ria te  le v e l o f in vo lve m en t o f an a u d it  com m ittee.
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Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr. 2 . July 24, 1987
Chapter Three, III Review of Quarterly Financial Data
At face value, w e  have no disagreement with you r  recommendation. W e  
believe the independent public accountants should review quarterly 
data on a timely basis during the year, a n d  our public accountants in 
fact do a post-closing review each quarter after earnings are publicly 
released. In addition, prior to the earnings release, w e  verbally 
review the quarter results with the engagement partner, including all 
material changes a n d  adjustments for his concurrence.
W e  are concerned that some would like to see this formalized, via a 
statement b y  the accountants in the quarterly report, or b y  other 
formal or written means. W e  do not believe further steps can be 
cost-benefit justified, in either expense, or more importantly, in timely 
reporting to the public.
W e  appreciate the chance to comment, a n d  would be h a p p y  to discuss 
a n y  points further, at y o u r  convenience.
Sincerely yours,
R o g e r L. K e s seler
Vice President a n d  Controller
m m
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C O N T I N E N T A L  I L L I N O I S  C O R P O R A T I O N
231 SOUTH LA SALLE STREET • CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60697
JOHN J. HIGGINS
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 
AND CONTROLLER 
(312) 828-1614
J u l y  2 8 ,  1 98 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 0 6
S u b je c t :  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t in g
C o n t i n e n t a l  I l l i n o i s  C o r p o r a t i o n  (C IC )  a p p r e c ia t e s  t h i s  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o m m e n t o n  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t ,  " R e p o r t  
o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g . "
C IC  s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t s  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  f u n d a m e n ta l  o b j e c t i v e s  
o f  m in im iz i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  e n h a n c in g  t h e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  We com m end t h e  C o m m is s io n  
f o r  i t s  o u t s t a n d in g  e f f o r t  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  c a u s e s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  d e v e lo p in g  a  s e t  o f  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  
d e s ig n e d  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  i t s  o c c u r r e n c e  a n d  p r o v id e  
r e a s o n a b le  a s s u r a n c e  o f  d e t e c t i o n  w h e n  i t  d o e s  o c c u r .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  
we b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  a r e  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  s h o u ld  b e  
r e l a t i v e l y  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  i n  t h e i r  im p le m e n t a t io n .
We a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  C o m m is s io n  t h a t  f o r  t h e  m o s t  p a r t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  w o r k s  v e r y  w e l l  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  o v e r s e e in g  t h e  p r o c e s s  d o  a  c o m m e n d a b le  j o b .  We 
f i r m l y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p r i v a t e - s e c t o r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  p la c e  a r e  
t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n d  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  m e a ns  o f  a d d r e s s in g  t h i s  
i s s u e  a n d  m e e t in g  t h e  n e e d s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c .  We d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
new  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  n e e d e d  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .
We c o n c u r  t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  s h o u ld  b e  v ie w e d  a s  a 
" p a c k a g e , "  s in c e  n o  o n e  s i n g l e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n  w i l l  a c h ie v e  t h e  
d e s i r e d  o b j e c t i v e .  C e r t a i n  o f  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  h o w e v e r ,  s h o u ld  
b e  a m e n d e d  a n d  c e r t a i n  o t h e r s  r e q u i r e  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  a s  d is c u s s e d  
b e lo w .
O u r  r e s p o n s e  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  f o u r  s e c t i o n s  a s  f o l l o w s :  P u b l i c  
C o m p a n y , I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t ,  R e g u la t o r y  a n d  L e g a l  
E n v i r o n m e n t ,  a n d  E d u c a t io n .  F o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  c l a r i t y ,  e a c h  
re c o m m e n d a t io n  f o r  w h ic h  we h a v e  a co m m e n t h a s  b e e n  r e p e a t e d  
f o l l o w e d  b y  o u r  r e s p o n s e .
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A
P u b l i c  Company
O v e r a l l ,  we s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  m a jo r i t y  o f  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  made 
b y  t h e  C o m m is s io n  f o r  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s .  We c o n c u r  w i t h  th o s e  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w h ic h  fo c u s  a t t e n t i o n  o n  t h e  to n e  s e t  f o r t h  b y  t o p  
m anagem en t a n d  s t r e n g t h e n in g  t h e  a c c o u n t in g  a n d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
f u n c t i o n s .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w h ic h  e n h a n c e  t h e  r e v ie w  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  s h o u ld  h a v e  a b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t  on  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .
The  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  w i l l  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a d d re s s  th o s e  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w h ic h  we b e l ie v e  r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t io n  
b y  t h e  C o m m is s io n .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : P u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  d e v e lo p  a n d  e n fo r c e
w r i t t e n  c o d e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n d u c t .  C odes o f  c o n d u c t  s h o u ld  
f o s t e r  a s t r o n g  e t h i c a l  c l im a t e  a n d  o p e n  c h a n n e ls  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n  
t o  h e lp  p r o t e c t  a g a in s t  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A com­
p a n y 's  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  s h o u ld  r e v ie w  c o m p lia n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o d e  
a n n u a l ly ,  i n c lu d in g  c o m p lia n c e  b y  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t, a n d  r e p o r t  
t h e r e o n  t o  t h e  b o a rd  o f  d i r e c t o r s .
R e s p o n s e : We c o n c u r  w i t h  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  r e g a r d ­
in g  a c o d e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n d u c t .  C o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  h a v e  a w r i t t e n  
c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t  a n d  a l l  e m p lo y e e s ,  e s p e c ia l l y  t o p  m a nag em e n t, 
s h o u ld  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s ig n  a d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  c o m p lia n c e  w i t h  t h e  
c o d e . We a ls o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e 's  m o n i t o r in g  r o l e  
r e g a r d in g  c o m p lia n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t  s h o u ld  b e  an  o n g o in g  
p a r t  o f  i t s  p r o c e s s  o f  a s s e s s in g  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  s y s te m  
o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  w o rd  " a n n u a l l y "  s h o u ld  be  
r e p la c e d  b y  t h e  p h r a s e  " p e r i o d i c a l l y  b u t  a t  l e a s t  a n n u a l l y . "
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : A u d i t  c o m m it te e s  s h o u ld  b e  in fo r m e d ,  v i g i l a n t ,
a n d  e f f e c t i v e  o v e r s e e r s  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a nd  t h e  
c o m p a n y 's  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
R e s p o n s e : We a g r e e ,  h o w e v e r ,  we a r e  c o n c e rn e d  t h a t  some a u d i t
c o m m it te e s  w i l l  i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n  a s  a n  a s s ig n m e n t  o f  
m anagem en t a p p r o v a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  T h is  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  p r e m is e  t h a t  m anagem ent i s  u l t i m a t e l y  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  f i n a n ­
c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  We recom m end t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  c l a r i f y  t h e  
p h ra s e  " e f f e c t i v e  o v e r s e e r "  b y  i n d i c a t i n g  i t  d o e s  n o t  im p ly  t h a t  
a u d i t  c o m m it te e s  r e p la c e  m anagem ent a s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  a p p r o v e r  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : A u d i t  c o m m it te e s  s h o u ld  h a v e  a d e q u a te  r e s o u r c e s
a n d  a u t h o r i t y  t o  d is c h a r g e  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
R e s p o n s e : We a g re e  w i t h  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n  b u t
f i n d  t h a t  t h e  la n g u a g e  i s  u n c le a r .  A g a in ,  o u r  m a jo r  c o n c e rn  
i s  t h a t  t h e  te rm  " a d e q u a te  a u t h o r i t y "  may b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  b y  some
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to mean that the audit committee should assume certain responsi­
bilities presently held by management. We suggest the Commission 
provide further guidance as indicated in our response to the 
previous recommendation.
With regard to the term "adequate resources", we do not believe 
that a separate audit committee staff is required. We suggest 
that the Commission specifically identify a corporation's internal 
audit department as the resource available to the audit committee.
Recommendation: The audit committee should review management's
evaluation of factors related to the independence of the company's 
public accountant. Both the audit committee and management should 
assist the public accountant in preserving his independence.
Response: We agree it would be beneficial if management and the
audit committee assisted the public accountant in preserving his 
independence. However, it is not clear to us how this would be 
accomplished. Accordingly, the Commission should provide specific 
guidance in this regard.
Additionally, we believe the Commission should stress that public 
accountants are primarily responsible for preserving their own 
independence.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC
rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter 
signed by the chairman of the audit committee describing the 
committee's responsibilities and activities during the year.
Response: We fail to see the benefit of this recommendation other
than providing publicity to the audit committee. Most annual 
reports contain a management report which deals with internal 
controls. The Management Report normally includes a reference to 
the audit committee and its responsibilities. If the audit 
committee has an appropriate charter, is effectively staffed, and 
has adequate resources available to it, we think the needs of the 
public are satisfied.
Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee when
it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
Response: We agree that the audit committee should be aware of
second opinions, but only when a difference of opinion exists with 
the company's independent public accountant. Such an approach 
would limit the audit committee's review to those material 
situations which are most likely to result in inappropriate or 
fraudulent accounting.
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The pursuit of a second opinion is not always initiated as a 
result of disagreement with the company's independent public 
accountant. For these situations we believe the guidance in 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 50, "Reports on the 
Application of Accounting Principles," to be sufficient to ensure 
sound financial reporting. SAS No. 50 also provides guidance to 
independent public accountants on disagreement situations which 
serves as an additional safeguard against "commercial pressures" 
influencing financial reporting.
Recommendation: When a public company changes independent public
accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to disclose 
publicly the nature of any material accounting or auditing issues 
discussed with its old and new auditors during the three-year 
period preceding the change.
Response: We agree that when a public company changes its inde­
pendent public accountant a disclosure should be made indicating 
the reason for the change. However, disclosure of material audit 
and accounting issues should only be made when they were the 
subject of a disagreement between the public company and its 
former independent public accountant and was the reason that 
caused the change. In these cases, disclosure should be limited 
to those issues in which a disagreement existed. We do not 
believe it would serve any useful purpose to have discussions of 
issues, upon which agreement was reached, listed for three years 
in an annual report. Such a listing would attach a stigma to a 
change of independent public accountants which took place for 
valid business reasons and might inhibit a company from making a 
change where one was clearly warranted? for example, when a "fresh 
perspective" was the reason for the change or when the independent 
public accountants failed to provide quality service.
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight
of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include 
approving financial results prior to public release.
Response: We agree that audit committees should increase their
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. We strongly dis­
agree with the Commission's recommendation to involve the audit 
committee in the approval process. Nor do we agree that the audit 
committee should be required to review the report prior to issu­
ance. The recommendation is in direct conflict with the premise 
that management is responsible for financial reporting and its 
adoption would unnecessarily delay the release of financial 
information.
We recommend that the Commission direct the audit committee to 
periodically meet with the person responsible for financial 
reporting, the internal auditor, and the independent public 
accountant to discuss and assess the quarterly reporting process,
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including the process for resolving disagreements on accounting 
issues between management and the independent public accountant. 
Based upon such a review, recommendations designed to improve the 
process should be directed to management.
Recommendation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations should
establish a body to guide public companies on internal controls.
Response: We strongly disagree with the recommendation of
establishing another interdisciplinary body. We believe that 
the addition of another organization would only result in more 
confusion between independent public accountants, management, 
and internal auditors. Instead, we believe the Commission's 
sponsoring organizations should encourage existing groups such 
as the Auditing Standards Board and the Institute of Internal 
Auditors to work together to integrate the varying interpretations 
and methods for establishing internal control systems. Such a 
project should result in the publication of uniform and compre­
hensive guidelines for public companies.
Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant
We believe that the Commission's recommendations pertaining to the 
improvement of audit quality should result in more consistent 
application of quality assurance measures by independent public 
accountants. We agree with the Commission's findings on the self 
regulatory organization issue. Additionally, the measures 
recommended for a second partner review of the independent public 
accountant's audit report would help to mitigate the risk that an 
audit is not performed in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards.
The remainder of this section will specifically address those 
recommendations that we believe require additional consideration 
by the Commission.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise
standards to restate the independent public accountant's responsi­
bility for detection of fraudulent financial reporting, requiring 
the independent public accountant to (1) take affirmative steps 
in each audit to assess the potential for such reporting and
(2) design tests to provide reasonable assurance of detection. 
Revised standards should include guidance for assessing risks and 
pursuing detection when risks are identified.
Response: The Commission acknowledges that the independent public
accountant has accepted the responsibility to design his audit to 
detect material errors in financial statements, but that the 
degree of responsibility for designing the audit to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting has been controversial. Clearly,
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the principal reason that fraud detection has been controversial 
is that it may be impossible to detect in an environment where 
there is careful concealment through forgery or collusion.
In such an environment the independent public accountant could 
test every transaction and still not be able to detect fraud. 
Accordingly, the Commission's recommendation to the independent 
public accountant to "...design tests to provide reasonable 
assurance of detection" may create an unrealistic expectation that 
the independent public accountant is able to design and perform 
tests that will always detect/prevent fraud.
We are concerned that the term "reasonable assurance" may be too 
subjective a standard for independent public accountants to be 
measured against and is subject to varied interpretation. The 
recommendation simply puts the independent public accountant at 
risk to design tests which must meet the user's definition of 
"reasonable assurance." Based on these concerns, we suggest the 
Commission amend its recommendation to request that the Auditing 
Standards Board provide guidance on audit tests designed to aid in 
the detection of fraud and that such tests be developed to provide 
reasonable assurance of fraud detection. The Commission should 
recognize in its recommendation that such tests will not provide 
absolute assurance of fraud detection.
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public 
accountants to review quarterly financial data of public companies 
before release to the public.
Response: We concur that the timely involvement of the indepen­
dent public accountant with the quarterly financial data may 
improve the reliability of quarterly reporting and serve to 
increase the likelihood that the independent public accountant 
will detect fraudulent financial reporting. However, we are 
concerned that the perceived benefit created by having the 
quarterly financial data reviewed is not cost justified for all 
companies. For smaller companies, the cost of having the 
quarterly financial data reviewed by the independent public 
accountant may frequently exceed the related benefit. Therefore, 
we believe that public companies should be encouraged, but not, 
required, to have its independent public accountant review 
quarterly financial data.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the
auditor's standard report to describe the extent to which the 
independent public accountant has reviewed and evaluated the 
system of internal accounting control. The Auditing Standards 
Board also should provide explicit guidance to address the 
situation where, as a result of his knowledge of the company's 
internal accounting controls, the independent public accountant 
disagrees with management's assessment as stated in the proposed 
management's report.
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Response: The Commission points out that an independent public
accountant is required to perform a preliminary review of the 
system of internal accounting control, but that after such prelim­
inary review the independent public accountants involvement with 
the system varies. The principal purpose of such a preliminary 
review is to determine the extent to which the independent public 
accountant will rely on an internal control system in establishing 
his audit scope.
As a result, if an independent public accountant were to describe 
the extent to which the system of internal accounting control has 
been reviewed and evaluated, such reports would vary as much as 
the scope of the independent public accountant's work. Such 
varied disclosure by accountants would reduce consistency and only 
confuse the financial statement user.
The Commission also recommends that disagreements between manage­
ment and the independent public accountant regarding internal 
controls should be disclosed. We believe this recommendation may 
place the independent public accountant in the role o f  enforcing 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and potentially incriminating 
his client. This situation may create an adversarial rather than 
cooperative client relationship. In addition, until standardized 
policies and procedures are developed to guide independent public 
accountants in the scope of their review of internal controls, we 
think this area is too subjective and varied to be meaningful when 
a disagreement exists. Therefore, we strongly recommend that the 
Commission drop this recommendation.
Recommendation: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing 
Standards Board to afford a full participatory role in the 
standard-setting process to knowledgeable persons who are affected 
by and interested in auditing standards but who either are not 
CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public practice.
Response: We agree with the Commission and the Cohen Commission
and believe that the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) standard­
setting process has worked reasonably well. The accounting 
profession is responsive to its proposals and has provided timely 
guidance when necessary. Insomuch as we believe the ASB is 
working successfully, we do not perceive the need to make major 
changes to the organization.
We agree with the Commission that representatives of management 
and/or audit committees may be able to provide insights about the 
financial reporting process that could facilitate the detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting. However, we believe those in the 
profession should have majority representation on the board as a 
result of their experience and technical training.
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R e g u la to r y  a n d  L e g a l E n v ir o n m e n t
We s u p p o r t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  
r e g a r d in g  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  a nd  l e g a l  e n v ir o n m e n t .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we 
s u p p o r t  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  t h a t  in v o lv e  in c r e a s e d  
c r im in a l  p r o s e c u t io n ,  im p ro v e d  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t in g  
p r o f e s s io n ,  a d e q u a te  SEC r e s o u r c e s ,  t h e  e x c h a n g e  o f  in f o r m a t i o n  
b e tw e e n  r e g u l a t o r y  e x a m in e rs  a n d  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n ta n t s ,  a n d  t h e  r e c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  c o r p o r a t e  in d e m n i f i c a t i o n .
T he  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  w i l l  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a d d re s s  th o s e  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  t h a t  we b e l ie v e  r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s id e r a t io n  
b y  t h e  C o m m is s io n .
R e c o m m e n d a tio n : The  SEC s h o u ld  r e c o n s id e r  i t s  lo n g - s t a n d in g
p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t o r s  f o r  
l i a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  a r i s e  u n d e r  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  A c t  o f  1933 i s  a g a in s t  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  u n e n fo r c e a b le .
R e s p o n s e : We a g re e  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's
re c o m m e n d a t io n  r e g a r d in g  c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n .  H o w e v e r, we 
b e l i e v e  t h e  C o m m is s io n  s h o u ld  t a k e  a s t r o n g e r  s t a n d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  in c r e a s e d  r o l e  t h e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  recom m ended  f o r  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e .  We b e l ie v e  t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  s h o u ld  e x p a n d  
t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n  b y  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  
l e g a l  m e a s u re s  b e  ta k e n  t o  l i m i t  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  d i r e c t o r s  a nd  
t o  b ro a d e n  t h e  in d e m n i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  a c o r p o r a t io n  may o f f e r  i t s  
d i r e c t o r s .  We b e l ie v e  t h a t  t h e  o n ly  w ay t o  r e c r u i t  a n d / o r  r e t a i n  
q u a l i f i e d  in d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  i s  t o  p r o v id e  a g r e a t e r  l e v e l  o f  
c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n .  I f  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  i s  n o t  p e r m i t t e d ,  
a d i r e c t o r ' s  c o n c e rn  a b o u t  p e r s o n a l  l i a b i l i t y  w o u ld  p r o b a b ly  
d im in is h  t h e  d e s i r e  t o  s e r v e  a s  a d i r e c t o r  a n d  m em ber o f  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m it te e  a n d  c o u ld  h a v e  a n  a d v e rs e  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .
E d u c a t io n
We a g re e  w i t h  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  e d u c a t io n  c a n  i n ­
f lu e n c e  p r e s e n t  a n d  f u t u r e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
s y s te m  b y  p r o v id in g  k n o w le d g e ,  s k i l l s ,  a n d  e t h i c a l  v a lu e s  t h a t  
p o t e n t i a l l y  may h e lp  p r e v e n t ,  d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  We s u p p o r t  a n d  e n c o u ra g e  a n y  e d u c a t io n  
i n i t i a t i v e s  to w a r d s  t h i s  e n d . The  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  
a p p e a r  t o  p r o v id e  a s o u n d  b a s is  f o r  i n i t i a t i n g  s u c h  e f f o r t s .
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CIC appreciates the opportunity to comment to the Commission on 
its Exposure Draft and would be pleased to discuss these comments 
with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,
Copies to: Chairman James C. Treadway
Commissioners William M. Batten 
William S. Kanaga 
Hugh L. Marsh, Jr. 
Thomas I . Storrs 
Donald H. Trautlein
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July 8, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
This letter is intended to comment on that portion 
of your preliminary report which deals with "Audit 
Committee Good Practice Guidelines".
In my opinion, the language in Appendix K is too 
strong and will make it all the more difficult to obtain 
qualified members to serve on audit committees of 
corporate boards. We all recognize the important role
that an audit committee plays in a sound corporate 
structure, but it is important that we be realistic about 
the amount of responsibility that can properly be 
attached to the members of such a committee.
Very truly yours,
1251 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10020
Telephone 212 489 8900
2 1 8
P r i c e  W a t e r h o u s e
J u ly  2 0 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C om m iss ion  o n  F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W.
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
R e: A p r i l  1987 E x p o s u re  D r a f t  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e
N a t io n a l  C om m iss ion  o n  F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g
G e n tle m e n :
A lth o u g h  we h a ve  jo in e d  w i t h  o t h e r  f i r m s  i n  a  com b ined  re s p o n s e  t o  
t h e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  o f  y o u r  r e p o r t ,  we a r e  w r i t i n g  t h i s  l e t t e r  t o  
e m p h a s ize  o u r  p o s i t io n s  o n  s e v e r a l is s u e s  a d d re s s e d  i n  t h e  j o i n t  
re s p o n s e  and  t o  com m un ica te  o u r  th o u g h ts  o n  a d d i t io n a l  is s u e s .
Two o f  t h e  c o n c lu s io n s  o f  t h e  C om m iss ion , i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  h a ve  o u r  
u n q u a l i f i e d  s u p p o r t .
o  F i r s t ,  r e c o g n i t io n  t h a t  a n  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  e n v iro n m e n t i s  
c r i t i c a l  t o  r e s p o n s ib le  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  —  a  c o n c e p t t h a t  
u n d e r l ie s  s e p a ra te  reco m m e n d a tio n s  a p p l ic a b le  t o  m anagem ent and  
t o  a u d i t o r s .  We a g re e  t h a t  " t h e  to n e  s e t  b y  t o p  m anagem ent" i s  
a l l - im p o r t a n t  and  t h a t  a u d i t o r  e v a lu a t io n  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  
e n v iro n m e n t s h o u ld  b e  r e q u ir e d .
o  S econd, we c o n c u r  w i t h  y o u r  re co m m e n d a tio n  t h a t  a u d i t in g  
s ta n d a rd s  b e  r e v is e d  t o  r e s t a t e  a u d i t o r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
d e te c t io n  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t in g  and  t o  r e q u i r e  
" a f f i r m a t i v e  s te p s "  t o  t h a t  e n d .
We a dvance d  th e s e  same c o n c e p ts  i n  a  w h i te  p a p e r  is s u e d  i n  l a t e  1985 
a n d , s in c e  th e n ,  t h e  A u d i t in g  S ta n d a rd s  B o a rd  h a s  r e le a s e d  p ro p o s a ls  
t h a t  te n d  t o  p a r a l l e l  much o f  y o u r  t h in k in g  and  o u rs  o n  th e s e  
im p o r ta n t  is s u e s .  A lth o u g h  many i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t in g  com m un ity  
re c o g n iz e  th e  need  f o r  change , we b e l ie v e  y o u r  e n d o rse m e n t w i l l  h e lp  
t o  e n s u re  t h a t  lo n g -n e e d e d  r e v is io n s  a r e  made.
I n  g e n e r a l,  we s u p p o r t  t h e  c o n c e p ts  u n d e r ly in g  many o f  y o u r  o th e r  
re co m m e n d a tio n s . We a g re e , f o r  e xa m p le , t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  a u d i t  
c o m m itte e s  —  in t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  —  in t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  sys te m s  —  e t h ic s  
co d e s  —  and  s k i l l e d  e x te r n a l  a u d i t in g  c o n t r ib u t e  im p o r t a n t ly  t o  th e  
m in im iz a t io n  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  We d o  n o t  a g re e  i n  
e v e ry  c a s e , h o w e ve r, w i t h  t h e  m e thods  recommended f o r  a c h ie v in g  th o s e  
r e s u l t s .
One is s u e  a d d re s s e d  i n  y o u r  r e p o r t  i s  o f  c r i t i c a l  im p o r ta n c e  t o  th e  
f u t u r e  o f  t h e  a c c o u n t in g  p r o fe s s io n .  F o r  t h e  re a s o n s  s t a te d  b e lo w , 
we a r e  u n a l t e r a b ly  opposed  t o  reco m m e n d a tio n s  w h ic h  w o u ld  h ig h te n  
g o v e rn m e n ta l r e g u la t io n  o f  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t in g  f i r m s  a s  opposed  t o  
a d d i t io n a l  s e l f - r e g u la t i o n .
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Other sections of this letter contain our comments about 
recommendations we consider irrelevant to fraud minimization and 
those where we question suggested implementation methods. The final 
section deals with an issue that should be clarified and with 
subjects that your report fails to address in sufficient depth.
A faulty conclusion
Your recommendations for regulation of public accounting firms, if 
adopted as proposed would end self-regulation and be replaced by 
government regulation by the SEC.
You recommend that: (1) the SEC require all public accounting firms 
that audit public companies to be members of an SEC-approved 
professional organization having a peer review program, and (2) the 
SEC take enforcement action when a firm fails to remedy 
quality-control-related deficiencies.
We support mandatory peer review for auditors of public companies? we 
also support a more credible disciplinary process. We recognize that 
greater SEC oversight is a quid pro quo for mandatory participation 
linked to SEC practice privileges. We also note that your 
recommendations closely parallel a recent SEC rulemaking proposal.
The glaring omission in your recommendations —  and in the SEC's 
proposal —  is failure to provide any mechanism to protect accounting 
firms and accounting firm clients from SEC overreach. From the 
beginning, Price Waterhouse has conditioned support for any type of 
peer review program on the presence in that program of mechanisms to 
protect the confidentiality of client information. Professional 
firms also have a legitimate interest in assurance that information 
gleaned in the peer review process will not be used to their 
disadvantage in litigation unrelated to the systemwide objectives of 
that process. Failure to address this vital area leaves an open road 
for SEC's enforcement authorities to conduct fishing expeditions 
unrelated to quality control into firm and client affairs —  an 
obviously unfair but predictable result.
Preservation of self-regulation and the potential for providing 
safeguards in the enabling legislation were among our reasons for 
advancing a self-regulatory organization which incorporates such 
important safeguards.
Page 67 of your report discusses your conclusion that "improving the 
existing framework offers the best alternative for effective 
regulation." We do not consider the unabridged SEC access to the 
peer review process that adoption of your recommendation would 
promote to be an "improvement." We do not consider disciplinary 
action initiated by the SEC to be an "improvement." Yes, the SEC 
should exercise oversight. But it should neither direct nor initiate
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action. Those responsibilities should be exercised by the 
private-sector, operating within a framework designed to protect the 
interests of the public, clients and the profession.
Before issuing your final report, we strongly urge that you 
reconsider your recommendations for regulating the accounting 
profession. The interests of both the public and the profession 
demand a structure that incorporates the following elements: a
creditable self-regulatory process, an SEC role appropriately limited 
to oversight, and adequate safeguards for those directly or 
indirectly affected by the peer review process and the resultant 
disciplinary follow through.
Questionable recommendations
The following recommendations have little, if any, bearing on fraud 
minimization. Particularly in view of your emphasis on considering 
your recommendations as a package rather than individually, they 
should be omitted from your final report.
o Reporting requirements for auditors, for managements and for 
audit committee chairmen.
The purpose of the audit report is to relate audit findings, 
not to communicate unrelated messages which could obscure 
facts important to the reader. The suggested reference to 
material misstatements would inject a defensive, negative 
tone and raise unwarranted concerns about the integrity of 
management. The suggested reference to audit-related 
control evaluations would be meaningless.
We support the well-established practice of issuing 
management reports but that practice is not germane to the 
issue at hand.
We see little benefit to be derived from a separate report 
by the audit committee chairman. On the contrary, there is 
a potential danger of misinforming the public on the limited 
parameters of the audit committee's oversight role. If 
communication in this area is considered desirable, a brief 
statement in the management report would suffice.
o Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board with 50% of its 
membership drawn from outside the practicing profession. We are 
unaware of any rationale supporting your apparent belief that the 
participation of outsiders in this highly technical process —  
the results of which are used solely by auditors —  would result 
in improved standards. Auditing standards should be set by the 
best-qualified individuals available, the clear majority of whom 
should be drawn from current professional practice.
o Advance audit committee approval of auditor-provided management 
services. Inclusion of this irrelevant recommendation serves to 
perpetuate the myth that the provision of management services 
somehow affects audit independence. As your report acknowledges, 
no evidence to that effect exists. In our view, adoption of your 
recommendation would result, in the preponderance of cases, in a
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flat prohibition on auditor-provided management services. Both 
managements and audit committees would avoid the issue as overly 
burdensome. Fairness and the public interest demand that 
procurement of management services be based on prudent purchasing 
criteria —  qualifications, experience, price and timing —  not 
on artificial restrictions that have no basis in fact.
o Increased audit committee and auditor involvement in the 
quarterly reporting process. The characteristics of the 
quarterly reporting process, unlike a full audit, seldom permit 
investigations in the depth necessary to uncover more than 
transparent instances of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Therefore, the potentially substantial costs may not be justified 
by the benefits.
Questionable implementation
Although we support the concepts underlying the following 
recommendations, we question the suggested methodology.
o Audit committee role. We agree that an informed, effective audit 
committee is a positive force for responsible financial 
reporting. We are concerned, however, that your audit-committee 
recommendations, taken together, come dangerously close to 
crossing the line between appropriate oversight and improper 
assumption of management and external auditor responsibilities. 
Recommendations intended to foster more effective audit 
committees should not disturb the present model of corporate 
governance by creating a new component —  a financial reporting 
czar, functioning independently of the board of directors of 
which it is a part.
o Composition of audit committees. We agree that audit committees 
should be mandated for all public companies but believe that 
assignment to the committee of a majority of outside directors, 
including the chairman, would be sufficient to meet the objective 
of committee independence. Smaller companies, in particular, 
would be burdened unnecessarily by a requirement to establish an 
audit committee composed entirely of outside directors.
o Internal audit. We agree that an effective internal audit 
function usually is desirable but suggest that the formally 
structured group implied by your recommendations may not be cost 
justified in many smaller organizations.
We also agree that appropriate measures should be employed to 
ensure internal audit objectivity. We suggest, however, that the 
recommendation in that area be confined to stating the objective 
without attempting to specify rigid guidelines in such areas as 
the reporting chain, qualifications of the chief auditor and 
frequency of meetings. Such decisions should be tailored to the 
highly variable circumstances of individual companies.
o Control system standards. Although we support efforts to 
emphasize the importance of control systems, we disagree with 
your recommendation that an interdisciplinary body be formed to
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develop control system standards. Given the diversity of U.S. 
corporate business, no such standards are possible.
o Analytical review procedures. Such procedures are useful in 
numerous circumstances but we believe that the audit engagement 
team is in the best position to judge exactly which of numerous 
audit procedures, including analytical review, should be employed 
on an individual engagement. No generic variety should be 
mandated for use in all circumstances.
o Concurring partner review. The role of the concurring partner is 
important to promoting audit quality but we believe existing 
SECPS requirements provide adequate guidance for both partner 
assignment and conduct of the review.
Clarification/ insufficient coverage
We endorse your conclusion that the tone set by top management is 
critical to responsible financial reporting. Although the 
accompanying text appears to suggest the implementation of an action 
program geared to individual company circumstances, that thought 
disappears in recommendations phrased as statements of the obvious.
If your intent is to inspire positive action in this important area, 
the recommendations should be clarified in your final report.
Given the emphasis in recent Congressional investigations on the need 
for an "early warning system" to protect the public from sudden 
shocks, we were surprised to find no mention of the subject in your 
report. Certainly, a desire to disguise the hard fact that a 
business is on the brink of failure stands high on the list of 
motives for issuing fraudulent financial statements. Accordingly, 
the subject appears to fall within the parameters of your charge. We 
urge you to consider addressing the topic in your final report.
Your report acknowledges the existence of the liability and insurance 
crisis facing the profession but takes no position on specific 
proposals for tort reform. Since litigation exposure has the 
potential for affecting audit quality and thus, the audit role in 
fraud minimization, it is difficult for us to accept that the subject 
lies outside your group's mandate. We believe the topic should be 
addressed in greater depth in your final report.
*****
Should you desire elaboration of our positions, we shall be pleased 
to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours,
UNITED VIRGINIA BANKSHARES INC. 919 E. MAIN STREET, P.O. BOX 26665, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261
U n i t e d  V i r g in ia
Bankshares
2 1 9
J u ly  3 1, 1987
Jam es C . T re a d w a y , J r .
C h a irm a n
The National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20006
D ear M r. T readw ay :
This le tte r sets fo rth  the comments o f United V irg in ia  Bankshares Incorporated on the 
recommendations o f the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the 
Commission).
W ith respect to the Commission's recommendations fo r public companies and independent 
public accountants, we believe th a t i t  would be im practica l and could possibly hinder the 
tim e ly  flow  o f in form ation fo r the aud it com m ittee  to  approve in advance the release o f 
quarte rly  financia l in form ation. We are in agreement w ith  the Commission's 
recommendation tha t the audit com m ittee  should satis fy  itse lf that contro ls over the 
quarte rly  reporting process are adequate. However, we believe th a t the audit com m ittee 
is in the best position to  determ ine how to  meet th is ob jective. While United V irg in ia  
Bankshares relies upon its  independent public accountants to  provide a measure o f qua lity  
assurance on a quarte rly  basis, we are not convinced tha t th is approach is necessarily 
best fo r all companies. Therefore, we do not believe tha t such a review  should be 
required. Notw ithstanding this view, we have believed tha t a quarterly review by the 
independent CPA was valuable to both management and the audit com m ittee  and helped 
to ensure tha t quarte rly  reporting process contro ls are adequate.
W ith respect to  the Commission's recommendations to  the SEC and others to  improve the 
regu la tory and legal environment, we do not believe the SEC should require public 
disclosure o f m ate ria l accounting or auditing issues discussed w ith  its  old or new auditors 
during the three year period preceding a public company's change in public accountants. 
We believe tha t SEC's current rules under Form 8-K requiring disclosure o f any 
disagreements w ith  a form er accountant on specified issues, including both those 
resolved to  the form er accountant's sa tis faction  and those not resolved to  the fo rm er 
accountant's satis faction, is a su ffic ie n t deterrent to opinion shopping and fraudulent 
financia l reporting.
United V irg in ia  Bankshares appreciates this opportun ity  to comment on the Commission's 
recommendations to  prevent and detect fraudulent financia l reporting.
P a tr ic k  D . G ib lin
V ice  C h a irm a n  and C h ie f F in a n c ia l O f f ic e r
P D G :ln
Y E L L O W  F R E I G H T  S Y S T E M ,  I N C .  O F  D E L A W A R E
P.O . BOX 7563 • 10990 ROE AVENUE •  OVERLAND PARK, KANSAS 66207
TELEPHONE: AREA CODE 913 345-1020
A u g u s t  5 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N . W .
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6
G e n t l e m e n :
W e  a r e  w r i t i n g  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t ,  " R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  R e p o r t i n g " ,  d a t e d  A p r i l ,  1 9 8 7 .
W e  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  e x p r e s s  o u r  c o n c e r n  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  a s s e s s m e n t  a n d  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o n  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  f i n d i n g s  
o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s e e m  t o  h a v e  o v e r l o o k e d  t h e  m a i n  p u r p o s e  o f  r u n n i n g  a  
b u s i n e s s ,  a n d  t h a t  i s  t o  m a k e  a  p r o f i t ,  n o t  t o  c o m p l y  w i t h  m o u n d s  o f  
r e g u l a t i o n s .  I t  w o u l d  s e e m  t h a t  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  f r a u d - r e l a t e d  c a s e s  h a s  t o  b e  
m i n o r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  b u s i n e s s  t r a n s a c t i o n s  t h a t  g o  o n  o v e r  t i m e  
a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  s u c h  s t r o n g  m e a s u r e s  a s  o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  w o u l d  
i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  b u s i n e s s  p e o p l e  a r e  u n e t h i c a l  o r  c r i m i n a l s .  T h e  
r e a l  p r o b l e m s  d i s c u s s e d  a r e  p e o p l e  p r o b l e m s ,  n o t  r e p o r t i n g  p r o b l e m s .  I f  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  i n v o l v e d  a t  t h e  t o p  o f  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a r e  n o t  o f  s t r i c t  a n d  h i g h  
m o r a l  e t h i c s ,  n o  a m o u n t  o f  r e p o r t i n g ,  a u d i t i n g  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  w i l l  c o r r e c t  o r  
e l i m i n a t e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i v i t i e s .
O v e r a l l ,  w e  q u e s t i o n  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d o  n o t  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
I n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  
b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s ,  w e  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c o n s i s t i n g  
s o l e l y  o f  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s .  W e  t a k e  e x c e p t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t o  a n y  e f f o r t s  t o  
e x p a n d  t h e  s c o p e  a n d  n a t u r e  o f  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  I n  t h e  p r e s e n t  
o p e r a t i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  c o m p a n i e s  a l r e a d y  f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a t t r a c t  
q u a l i f i e d  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s  w i t h  t h e  t y p e  o f  b o a r d  b u s i n e s s  e x p e r i e n c e  d e e m e d  
n e c e s s a r y .  T o  e x p a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w o u l d  c r i p p l e  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  o b t a i n  
s u c h  d i r e c t o r s .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  s e e m  t o  p l a c e  s p e c i f i c  
d u t i e s  u p o n  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s ,  s u c h  a s  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  t h e m  t o  m a k e  " m a n a g e r i a l "  d e c i s i o n s .
I n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  r e p o r t s  o n  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t o  b e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t ,  w e  
c o n s i d e r  t h e i r  n e e d  e x t r e m e l y  q u e s t i o n a b l e .  S u c h  r e p o r t s  w o u l d  c o n t a i n  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a l r e a d y  i n h e r e n t  i n  e a c h  a n d  e v e r y  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  t o  
s h a r e h o l d e r s .  T o  i n c l u d e  s u c h  r e p o r t s  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e  t h o u s a n d s  o f  a n n u a l  
r e p o r t s  p r o d u c e d  f o r  t h e  i n v e s t i n g  p u b l i c  e a c h  y e a r  w o u l d  b e  r e d u n d a n t ,  c o s t l y  
a n d  u n n e c e s s a r y .  M o s t  p e o p l e  d o  n o t  r e a d  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s ,  a n d  p u t t i n g  m o r e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  r e p o r t s  w o u l d  n o t  s o l v e  a n y  p r o b l e m s .
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We all have read of the horror stories of companies who "opinion shop" 
with the audit fee in hand until a satisfactory opinion is found. What we 
need to recall is the healthy, responsible need to discuss accounting issues 
with all available expert advisors. We believe this process is key to 
reaching appropriate conclusions. Any recommendations that would constrain 
efforts to seek second opinions will increase the likelihood of conclusions 
reached on accounting issues that will lead to lower quality financial 
reporting. For management to be required to confer with the audit committee 
upon any significant opinion seeking occurrence again places the audit 
committee in a managerial role. To require three years of second opinion 
efforts to be disclosed to the public upon a change in auditors is to provide 
the public with useless information. What is key to a change in auditors is 
what accounting issue, if any, was key to the change itself. This disclosure 
is already required under SEC regulations for public companies.
Further recommendations include involvement by both the audit committee 
and outside auditors in the quarterly reporting process. We believe these 
recommendations would have a more detrimental effect on timeliness than they 
would assist quality. Let's remember that for information to be useful it 
must be disseminated in a timely manner. The addition of two review steps in 
the quarterly reporting process would slow this dissemination significantly. 
The benefit of such a high level review by the audit committee of information 
submitted to them by management is questionable and, as stated before, places 
the audit committee in a managerial position. The benefit derived by a 
"review" by outside auditors is similarly questionable.
We would also like to comment on the recommendation to give the SEC 
authority to impose civil penalties. We believe that if the monetary 
penalties are going to deter fraudulent conduct, they will have to be 
substantial. If, however, monetary penalties are substantial, then the 
conduct or acts should be viewed as criminal violations and not civil 
violations so that defendants are afforded all the appropriate safeguards and 
protection of the criminal law rather than being subjected to criminal 
penalties masquerading as civil fines.
Finally, we would like to state once more that we question the need for 
recommendations of the magnitude as presented by the Commission. We would 
further specifically request that the Commission give consideration to the 
comments and exceptions noted above.
Very truly yours
Gail A. Parris
Vice President - Controller
P A T R I C K  J .  F .  G R A T T O N
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N a tio n a l Commission on F ra d u le n t S u b je c t:
F in a n c ia l R eporting
1701 Pennsylvan ia  Avenue, N.W. F i le :
W ashington, D.C. 20006
A t tn :  J . C. Treadway, J r ,
Dear Jim :
I  am aware the comments r e la t iv e  to  the  Commission’ s exposure d r a f t  were p re ­
fe r re d  to  be in  hand a few days ago. However, from  your remarks be fo re  the 
D a lla s  Chapter o f the  NACD I  sensed some c o n s id e ra tio n  would be g iven  s l ig h t ly  
la te  comments, so the  fo llo w in g .
As an o u ts id e  d ire c to r  o f  a m edium -sized, A S E -lis te d  company I  was in s tru m e n ta l 
in  g e t t in g  them to  adopt a s tro n g  c h a rte r  fo r  t h e ir  A u d it Committee. I  b e lie v e  
t h is  was a ve ry  va lu a b le  move and n a tu r a l ly  I  support the Commission's p o s it io n  
in  th is  re g a rd . My added recommendation: th a t  the  A u d it Committee (AC) c a n 't  
conduct business w ith o u t a l l  members p re s e n t. Th is  increases the  l ik e l ih o o d  
th a t the AC w i l l  do a b e t te r  jo b  h e lp in g  the BOD p ro te c t s to ckh o ld e r in te re s ts .
O ther recommendations re g a rd in g  the  AC in c lu d in g  a statem ent signed by the c h a ir  
o f the  AC in  the  annual re p o r t is  a good one.
G e n e ra lly  I  found the  Commission's o th e r recommendations to  be h ig h ly  d e s ire d .
As I  p o in te d  ou t in  D a lla s , hwoever, d ire c to rs  need to  meet b a s ic  q u a l i f ic a t io n s .  
There are d ire c to rs  who m iss many m eetings, are m a rg ina l in  t h e ir  BOD work and 
some c a n 't  even read (much le s s  e x p la in )  a f in a n c ia l  s ta tem en t. T h is  seems so 
fundam ental y e t I  d o n 't  see any language in  the  exposure d r a f t  addressing the 
bas ic  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f d ire c to r s .
Perhaps the  Commission w i l l  cons ide r t h is  p o in t  be fo re  a f in a l  d r a f t  is  issued . 
S in c e re ly ,
xc : LeGrand C. K irb y
A rth u r Young & Company 
2121 San J a c in to , S u ite  700 
D a lla s , Texas 75201
Warner-Lambert Company 
201 Tabor Road
Morns Plains. New Jersey 07950
201 540-2000
Cable Address: Warnlam morrislan s 
Telex 136424 . .warerlam mcps 
W A R N E R
L A M B E R T July 27, 1987
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N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t 
F inancial R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
W a sh in g to n , D.C. 20006
Re: R ecom m endations o f  th e  Commission
W e app rec ia te  th is  o p p o rtu n ity  to  com m ent on the  Commission's Exposure D ra ft o f 
R ecom m endations on F raudu len t Financial R eporting .
W arne r-La m b e rt Com pany is a le a d in g  w o r ld w id e  d e v e lo p e r and m a rk e te r o f  
hea lth  care and consum er p roducts . The C om pany 's  d iv e rs ifie d  p ro d u c t lines 
inc lude  e th ica l and non -p rescrip tion  hea lth  care products as w e ll con fec tion e ry  and 
o th e r  consum er products.
W e have rev iew ed th e  recom m endations and eva lua ted  th e m  in th e ir  to ta lity .  
O vera ll, w e  agree w ith  th e  recom m endations m ade by th e  Commission in each o f 
th e  fo u r  areas: th e  Public Com pany, the  Indepe nden t Public A ccoun tan t, th e  SEC, 
and Education .
W e w o u ld  like  to  suggest some change in specific recom m endations w h ich  w e fee l 
w il l im prove  o r c la rify  th e  proposals, pa rticu la rly  in th e  areas o f  th e  Public Com pany 
and th e  In d e p e n d e n t Public A ccountan t.
Public C om pany
W e agree w ith  th e  Comm ission's s ta tem en t th a t the  fo u n d a tio n  fo r  th e  p reven tion  
and d e te c tio n  o f fra u d u le n t finan c ia l re p o rtin g  starts w ith  th e  e n tity  p repa ring  th e  
fin a n c ia l s ta tem ents - -the  pub lic  com pany.
Tone a t th e  Top - Senior m anagem ent is responsible fo r  th e  cu ltu re  in w h ich  th e  
business and fin a n c ia l re p o rtin g  operates. In fact, W arner-Lam bert Com pany has 
had m any o f  th e  Comm ission's recom m endations in place fo r  years. O ur code o f 
co n d u c t is com m un ica ted  and enforced th ro u g h o u t the  Com pany. In a d d itio n , w e  
recen tly  in s titu te d  a co rpo ra te  creed w h ich  describes o u r co m m itm e n t to  customers, 
shareholders, em ployees, suppliers, and society. The creed has been com m unica ted  
to  a ll levels w ith in  th e  Com pany. W e also believe o u r system o f  in te rn a l con tro ls  is 
ade qua te  in today 's  e n v iro n m e n t considering a cos t/bene fit re la tionsh ip .
In th e  area o f  in te rn a l contro ls , w e  suggest th e  Com m ission revise th e  second 
recom m en da tion  w h ich  reads "P ub lic  com panies shou ld  m a in ta in  in te rn a l con tro ls  
th a t  are adequa te  to  p reven t and de tec t fra u d u le n t finan c ia l re p o r t in g "  to  "P ub lic  
com pan ies shou ld  m a in ta in  in te rn a l con tro ls  th a t are adequa te  to  d e te r fra u d u le n t 
f in a n c ia l re p o r tin g ."
The prevention of fraudulent financial reporting is an idealistic goal. W e  believe a 
good system of internal controls can deter fraud, not totally prevent it. The system 
should be designed to provide prudent cost effective steps for detering fraud.
Accounting and Internal Audit Function - W e  agree with the Commission on the 
recommendations that public companies maintain effective accounting and internal 
audit functions since the primary responsibility for the financial statements rests 
with the Chief Accounting Officer.
W e  also support the Commission's recommendations with respect to the internal 
audit function. W e  believe our internal audit function fulfills each of the 
Commission's recommendations in this area. In addition, w e  communicate the role 
of the Internal Audit function throughout the Company and senior management 
affirms its responsibility for establishing and maintaining the system of internal 
controls throughout the organization. W e  suggest that the Commission 
recommend that the role of the internal audit function be communicated to all 
within the Company so that its role is viewed positively as a corporate service which 
assists management in achieving its overall business objectives.
The Commission recommends that all public companies be required by the SEC to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders, a letter signed by the chairman of 
the Audit Committee describing the Committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year. W e  do not see the value of including this letter in the annual 
report wh en this information is already provided in the proxy statements. W e  
suggest that the recommendation to include the letter from the chairman of the 
audit committee be dropped from the final draft.
O n  quarterly reporting, the Commission recommends that the audit committee 
increase its oversight of the quarterly reporting process. W e  disagree. The review 
the Commission is suggesting would require an excessive amount of time by the 
audit committee. Our quarterly data is presently reviewed by the independent 
auditors w h o  are trained in reviewing the statements. The audit committee is not in 
a position to m a k e  such a review and w e  question the value of such a 
recommendation.
The Commission also recommends the creation of a separate body to provide 
guidelines on internal control. W e  disagree since the financial community already 
has sufficient organizations providing guidelines on different areas of financial 
reporting. W e  believe such guidelines can be provided by existing organizations 
such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the AICPA, etc.
Independent Public Accountant
Although w e  are not prepared to respond on behalf of the auditing profession, w e  
would like to contribute our opinion in this area.
The Commission recommends that the Auditing Standards Board revise the 
auditor's standard report to include a description of the evaluation of the system of 
internal controls and that guidance be provided in the situation where the auditor 
disagrees with management's assessment of internal controls. W e  believe this 
recommendation needs clarification. The evaluation of internal controls is a 
fundamental requisite to the audit of financial statements. Should there be a 
disagreement or negative evaluation in the system of internal controls, this would 
be reflected in the audit.
W e  support the recommendations to reorganize the Auditing Standards Board. The 
Board's number of members should be reduced and the chairman and vice chairman 
should be full time members. W e  believe this will provide the auditing profession 
with more timely guidance and also enable the members to better focus on policy.
SRM/jp.2
W e  disagree with the recommendation to expand participation on the Board to 
sectors other than public accounting. W e  believe that to adequately guide the 
auditing profession through the financial process prospective Board members 
should have experience in public accounting.
SEC and Education
W e  agree with the SEC recommendations but would infer that legislation is 
required to enable the SEC to enforce the recommendations. Regarding the 
Commission's recommendations on education, although w e  do not know h o w  these 
ideas will be implemented and enforced, w e  agree with the recommendations.
In conclusion, except as noted above, w e  support the Commission's work and 
recommendations in the area of fraudulent financial reporting. Again, w e  
appreciate this opportunity to offer our views to the Commission.
Sincerely,
WARNER-LAMBERT COMPANY
W. F. Gilroy 
Vice President and ControllerSRM/jp
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PACIFIC TELESIS
Group
F.V. Spiller
V«re President 
and Comptroller
140 New Montgomery Street 
San Francisco, California 94105 
(415) 542-3004
August 7, 1987
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N . W .  
W a s h i n g t o n .  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6
R e g a r d i n g :  C o m m e n t s  o n  t h e  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  R e p o r t  o f  T h e  N a t i o n a l
C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  t h a n k  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  t o  
c o m m e n t  o n  t h e  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  ( " E x p o s u r e  D r a f t " ) .  P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  f e e l s  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ’s  w o r k  is a n  i m p o r t a n t  s t e p  t o w a r d  i m p r o v i n g  t h e  a l r e a d y  h i g h  q u a l i t y  
o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y ’s  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  a n d  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y  t o w a r d  i m p r o v i n g  p u b l i c  
c o n f i d e n c e  i n  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  s u p p o r t s  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  b e h i n d  e a c h  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  d o  f e e l  t h a t  s o m e  c h a n g e s  t o  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  a r e  
a d v i s a b l e  t o  a s s u r e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  a r e  w o r k a b l e  a n d  d o  n o t  
p r e c i p i t a t e  u n i n t e n d e d  s i d e  e f f e c t s .
P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  a g r e e s  t h a t  h a v i n g  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c o m p o s e d  e n t i r e l y  o f  q u a l i f i e d  
i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  is a n  a d v i s a b l e  c o n t r o l  f o r  a n y  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y .  W e  a l s o  f e e l  
t h a t  a n  e f f e c t i v e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  is  s u f f i c i e n t l y  i m p o r t a n t  t o  s u p p o r t  
t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  " T h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  
r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  c o m p r i s e d  s o l e l y  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  
d i r e c t o r s " .  H o w e v e r ,  w i t h  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h a t  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  w e  s e e  n o  n e e d  
f o r  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  " a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  
i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  a  l e t t e r  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  c o m m i t t e e ’s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  
y e a r " .  W e  f e e l  t h a t  a c k n o w l e d g m e n t  s o m e w h e r e  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  ( p e r h a p s  a s  p a r t  
o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d e d  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t )  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  a n d  a c t i v i t y  l e v e l  o f  s u c h  a  
c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  m e e t  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t  u s e r s ’ n e e d s .
P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  a g r e e s  t h e r e  i s  v a l u e  t o  h a v i n g  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a  
m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t  t h a t  a c k n o w l e d g e s  m a n a g e m e n t ’s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  a n d  d i s c u s s e s  h o w  t h o s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w e r e  
f u l f i l l e d  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t ’s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  d o  n o t  f e e l  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  r e q u i r i n g  s u c h  
a  r e p o r t  s h o u l d  s t i p u l a t e  w h o  s h o u l d  s i g n  s u c h  a  r e p o r t .  E a c h  c o m p a n y  is  i n  t h e  b e s t  
p o s i t i o n  t o  d e c i d e  w h o  i n  i t s  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  h a s  p r i m a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e  m a t t e r s  b e i n g  r e p o r t e d ,  a n d  w h o  s h o u l d  s i g n  s u c h  a  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t .
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P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  a g r e e s  t h a t  p u r c h a s i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  f r o m  o n e ’s 
a u d i t i n g  f i r m  c o u l d  i n  s o m e  i n s t a n c e s  l e a d  t o  a t  l e a s t  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  a  l o s s  o f  
i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o v e r s i g h t .  
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  w e  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  " t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  t y p e s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m " .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w o r d i n g  i n  
t h e  p e n u l t i m a t e  p a r a g r a p h  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t :  " T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
t h e r e f o r e  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e v i e w  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  p r o p o s e d  u s e
o f  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  f o r  m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s , . ". T h i s
w o r d i n g  s e e m s  t o  i m p l y  a d v a n c e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v a l  o f  s p e c i f i c  e n g a g e m e n t s ;  
w e  f e e l  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h i s  l e v e l  o f  d e t a i l  r e g a r d i n g  c o m p a n y  
o p e r a t i o n s  w o u l d  i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  d i v e r t  r e s o u r c e s  a w a y  f r o m  m o r e  p r o d u c t i v e  p o l i c y  
l e v e l  o v e r s i g h t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a n d  w e  s u g g e s t  a m e n d i n g  t h i s  w o r d i n g  t o  c l a r i f y  
C o m m i s s i o n  i n t e n t .
P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  r e a l i z e s  t h a t  a  c h a n g e  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  m a y  
s o m e t i m e  r e s u l t  f r o m  o p i n i o n  s h o p p i n g .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  f e e l  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  " w h e n  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  c h a n g e s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t s ,  it s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  d i s c l o s e  p u b l i c l y  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n y  
m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t i n g  o r  a u d i t i n g  i s s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  i t s  o l d  a n d  n e w  a u d i t o r s  d u r i n g  
t h e  t h r e e - y e a r  p e r i o d  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  c h a n g e "  is t o o  b r o a d  a n d  w i l l  l e a d  t o  u n d e s i r a b l e  
s i d e  e f f e c t s .  M a n y  i s s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  a  c o m p a n y ’s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  
a r e  s e n s i t i v e ;  t h i s  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  m a y  r e s u l t  i n  c o m p a n i e s  r e t a i n i n g  
t h e i r  c u r r e n t  a u d i t  f i r m  t o  a v o i d  d i s c l o s i n g  s u c h  i s s u e s ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  a n o t h e r  f i r m  
m a y  h a v e  b e e n  i d e n t i f i e d  t h a t  is m o r e  q u a l i f i e d  t o  h a n d l e  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  a u d i t ,  a n d  
i s  c o u n t e r  t o  t h e  c o u n t r y ’s  p h i l o s o p h y  t h a t  c o m p e t i t i o n  e n c o u r a g e s  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t h e  
e c o n o m y .  W e  f e e l  t h i s  w o r d i n g  s h o u l d  b e  r e v i s e d  t o  r e q u i r e  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  o p i n i o n  
s h o p p i n g  l e a d i n g  t o  a  c h a n g e  o f  a u d i t o r s  (i.e., d i s a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  t h e  o l d  a u d i t o r  t h a t  
w e r e  a l s o  d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  t h e  n e w  a u d i t o r ) .
P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  " a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  
s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s " .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  f e e l  
t h e  f u r t h e r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  " t h i s  o v e r s i g h t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e "  i s  n o t  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  w o u l d  u n n e c e s s a r i l y  d e l a y  t h e  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  i m p o r t a n t  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  i n v e s t i n g  p u b l i c .  W e  f e e l  t h i s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  c h a n g e d  t o  s u g g e s t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v a l  o f  q u a r t e r l y  
r e p o r t s  o n  F o r m  1 0 - Q  p r i o r  t o  f i l i n g  w i t h  t h e  S E C .
I n  c l o s i n g ,  P a c i f i c  T e l e s i s  w o u l d  a g a i n  l i k e  t o  t h a n k  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o m m e n t  o n  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t .  W e  s u p p o r t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’s  
a c t i v i t y  a n d  h o p e  o u r  c o m m e n t s  o n  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  a r e  h e l p f u l .
S i n c e r e l y ,
F .  V .  S p i l l e r
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  &  C o m p t r o l l e r
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D e a r  M r .  C h a i r m a n :
W e  s h a r e  t h e  c o n c e r n s  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t h a t  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  i s  a  s e r i o u s  p r o b l e m  t h a t  h a s  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  l i v e s  o f  m a n y  A m e r i c a n s ,  a n d  t h a t  
e f f o r t s  c a n  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  t o  r e d u c e  i t s  i n c i d e n c e .  W e  
a p p l a u d  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  c a u s a l  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  c a n  l e a d  t o  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  i n  
m a k i n g  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s ,  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  r e g u l a t o r y  a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  
a g e n c i e s ,  a n d  e d u c a t o r s .  E a c h  o f  t h e s e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  r o l e s ,  a s  y o u  h a v e  i d e n t i f i e d ,  h a s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
t o  d e t e r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  r e l i a b l e  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  r e s i d e s  f i r s t  a n d  f o r e m o s t  a t  t h e  
c o r p o r a t e  l e v e l  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .
W e  a g r e e  t h a t  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  m u s t  s e t  t h e  t o n e  a n d  f r a m e w o r k  
w i t h i n  t h e  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  r i s k  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  Y o u r  f o c u s  o n  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a d e q u a t e  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t ’ s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  b o t h  
e s t a b l i s h  t h e m  a n d  t o  r e p o r t  o n  t h e m  i s ,  w e  b e l i e v e ,  w e l l  
f o u n d e d .
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  a l s o  p l a y s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  
i n  h e l p i n g  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  r i s k  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .  W e  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  p l a n  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  
o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  t o  p r o v i d e  r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  
t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  n o t  m a t e r i a l l y  m i s s t a t e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  
f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
R e g u l a t o r y  a n d  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  a g e n c i e s ,  a t  b o t h  t h e  f e d e r a l  
a n d  s t a t e  l e v e l s ,  a r e  a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  f o r c e s  i n  r e d u c i n g  t h e  
o c c u r r e n c e  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A s  y o u  h a v e  
r e c o g n i z e d ,  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  f u n c t i o n  c a n  a l s o  b e  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  
t h r o u g h  i m p r o v e d  o v e r s i g h t  c a p a b i l i t y  a n d  p o s i t i v e  e n f o r c e m e n t  
e f f o r t s .  F i n a l l y ,  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  f u t u r e  a c c o u n t a n t s  a n d
a u d i t o r s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  c a n  h a v e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  i n f l u e n c e  o n  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  s y s t e m ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  a d d r e s s e s  a  s e t  
o f  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  e d u c a t o r s .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  n o t e s ,  a n d  w e  
a g r e e ,  t h a t  f u t u r e  m a n a g e r s  s h o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  i n f o r m e d  a b o u t  
f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  b e t t e r  p r e p a r e d  t o  p r e v e n t ,  
d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r  i t .
I n  s u m m a r y ,  w e  s u p p o r t  t h e  t h r u s t  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  w o r k  a n d  
i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  w i t h  a  f e w  m i n o r  e x c e p t i o n s  d i s c u s s e d  
l a t e r  i n  t h i s  l e t t e r .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  i s  o n e  i m p o r t a n t  a r e a —  
c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s — w e  b e l i e v e  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  s h o u l d  a d d r e s s  i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t .  W e  w o u l d  l i k e  
t o  d i s c u s s  t h i s  m a t t e r  b e f o r e  o f f e r i n g  c o m m e n t s  o n  s p e c i f i c  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
C O M P L I A N C E  W I T H  L A W S  A N D  R E G U L A T I O N S
T h e  i s s u e  o f  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  i s  a  m a j o r  
c o n c e r n  t o  c o r p o r a t e  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  i t s  a t t o r n e y s ,  a n d  a n  
i m p o r t a n t  m a t t e r  t h e  a u d i t o r  m u s t  b e  a w a r e  o f  i n  e x a m i n i n g  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  N o n c o m p l i a n c e  c a n  r e s u l t  i n  s e r i o u s  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  s u c h  a s  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  b u s i n e s s  
f a i l u r e s ,  a n d  l i t i g a t i o n s .  W e  b e l i e v e  y o u r  r e p o r t  s h o u l d  
a d d r e s s  t h i s  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e .
M a n a g e m e n t  o f  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s ,  I  b e l i e v e ,  h a s  a  p r i m a r y  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  a n d  i t s  a t t o r n e y s  p l a y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e ,  i n  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t o  e n s u r e  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  l a w s  
a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s .  I  a l s o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t o r ,  a s  p a r t  o f  
t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  s h o u l d  d e t e r m i n e  t h a t  
a  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  h a s  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  p r e v e n t  
a n d  d e t e c t  n o n c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h o s e  m a j o r  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  
t h a t  c o u l d  m a t e r i a l l y  a f f e c t  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  o p e r a t i o n s .
F e d e r a l  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  t h r o u g h  
c o n t r a c t  p r o v i s i o n s ,  i m p a c t  m a n y  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  m a y  m a t e r i a l l y  
a f f e c t  a n  e n t i t y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  i t s  b u s i n e s s  
o p e r a t i o n s  o r  m i s s i o n .  F o r  e x a m p l e :
—  M e d i c a r e  a n d  M e d i c a i d  p r o g r a m s ,  w h i c h  a r e  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
p o r t i o n  o f  h e a l t h - c a r e  i n d u s t r y  r e v e n u e s ,  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  
m a j o r  s t a t u t o r y  a n d  r e g u l a t o r y  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  t h e  t y p e  o f  
s e r v i c e s  c o v e r e d  a n d  c o s t s  a l l o w e d .
—  R e v e n u e s  f r o m  d e f e n s e  c o n t r a c t s  i m p a c t  m a j o r  s e g m e n t s  o f  
t h e  A m e r i c a n  c o r p o r a t e  w o r l d .  C o n t r a c t o r s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
f o l l o w  f e d e r a l  p r o c u r e m e n t  r e g u l a t i o n s  c o v e r i n g  a l l o w a b l e  
c o s t s ,  s u b c o n t r a c t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s ,  p r i c i n g ,  a n d  a  h o s t  o f  
o t h e r  f a c t o r s .
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—  T h e  s e c u r i t i e s  i n d u s t r y  r a i s e s  h u n d r e d s  o f  b i l l i o n s  o f  
d o l l a r s  e a c h  y e a r  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  T h e  S e c u r i t i e s  
a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  e s t a b l i s h e s  r u l e s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  
d e s i g n e d  t o  e n s u r e  f a i r ,  o r d e r l y ,  a n d  e f f i c i e n t  o p e r a t i o n  
o f  t h e s e  m a r k e t s  a n d  t o  r e g u l a t e  b r o k e r s ,  d e a l e r s ,  a n d  
o t h e r  m a r k e t  p a r t i c i p a n t s .
—  T h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  t h o u s a n d s  o f  f e d e r a l l y  i n s u r e d  
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  g o v e r n e d  b y  n u m e r o u s  r e g u l a t i o n s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t o r s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  F e d e r a l  
D e p o s i t  I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  t h e  F e d e r a l  S a v i n g s  a n d  L o a n  
I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e .
S t a t e s  a l s o  r e g u l a t e  m a n y  i n d u s t r i e s ,  s u c h  a s  h e a l t h ,  
s e c u r i t i e s ,  i n s u r a n c e ,  b a n k i n g ,  m i n i n g ,  a n d  f o o d  p r o c e s s i n g .
G i v e n  t h e  e n o r m o u s  d i r e c t  f i n a n c i a l  i m p a c t  o f  m a n y  o f  t h e s e  
l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  t h e i r  l e g a l  c o m p l e x i t y ,  a n d  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  n o n c o m p l i a n c e  c a n  h a v e  a  m a t e r i a l  i m p a c t  o n  o p e r a t i o n s  
a n d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  c o m p a n i e s ,  w e  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  
i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  i t s  a t t o r n e y s  e s t a b l i s h  a n d  
i m p l e m e n t  a  c o m p l i a n c e  p r o g r a m .  A s  p a r t  o f  t h a t  p r o g r a m ,  t h e y  
s h o u l d  i d e n t i f y  t h e  m a j o r  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  
f u n d a m e n t a l  t o  t h e  b u s i n e s s  t h a t ,  i f  v i o l a t e d ,  c o u l d  
m a t e r i a l l y  a f f e c t  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  o p e r a t i o n s  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s .  T h e y  s h o u l d  a l s o  e s t a b l i s h  a n d  m a i n t a i n  a  s y s t e m  
o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t o  p r e v e n t  a n d  d e t e c t  n o n c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  
t h o s e  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s .  I n  i d e n t i f y i n g  l e g a l  a n d  
r e g u l a t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
a n d  o p e r a t i o n s ,  m a n a g e m e n t  n e e d s  t o  b e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
n o n c o m p l i a n c e  t h a t  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  m a t e r i a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  o r  a  
m a t e r i a l  l o s s  o f  i n c o m e .  T h e  a u d i t o r ' s  r o l e  s h o u l d  b e  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  i s  
m a i n t a i n i n g  a  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  n o t e s  t h a t  a  c o r p o r a t e  p o l i c y  o f  c o m p l i a n c e  
w i t h  d o m e s t i c  a n d  f o r e i g n  l a w s  s h o u l d  b e  a  p a r t  o f  a  w r i t t e n  
c o r p o r a t e  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t .  W e  a g r e e  a n d  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  
p o l i c y  s h o u l d  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  t h r o u g h  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t h a t  
h e l p  p r e v e n t  n o n c o m p l i a n c e .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  a l s o  r e c o m m e n d s  
t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  r e p o r t  a n n u a l l y  t o  t h e i r  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  o n  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  a s  t h e y  
r e l a t e  t o  m i n i m i z i n g  t h e  r i s k  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .  W e  b e l i e v e  s u c h  a  r e p o r t  s h o u l d  a l s o  i n c l u d e  a  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  c o m p l i a n c e  p r o g r a m  a s  s t a t e d  a b o v e .  
I f  s u c h  a  r e p o r t  i s  m a d e ,  t h e  a u d i t o r ,  w h e n  e x a m i n i n g  t h e  
e n t i t y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  w o u l d  c o n s i d e r  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
a s s e s s m e n t  a s  a  p a r t  o f  p l a n n i n g  f i e l d  w o r k  a n d  m a k i n g  
i n q u i r i e s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  i t s  a t t o r n e y s  c o n c e r n i n g  
c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  a n d  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t o  p r e v e n t  a n d  d e t e c t  n o n c o m p l i a n c e .  I n  
s o m e  i n s t a n c e s ,  d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e i r  i m p o r t a n c e ,  d i r e c t  t e s t i n g
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o f  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h o s e  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  m i g h t  w e l l  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  b y  t h e  a u d i t o r .  T h e  a u d i t o r  s h o u l d  a l s o  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t  o f  a n y  n o n c o m p l i a n c e  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  
w e a k n e s s e s  o n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  o n  h i s  r e p o r t .  T h e  
a u d i t o r  s h o u l d  a d v i s e  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o f  
m a t e r i a l  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  w e a k n e s s e s  a n d  o f  a n y  n o n c o m p l i a n c e ,  
u n l e s s  i t  i s  c l e a r l y  i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l .
T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d ' s  p r o p o s e d  s t a t e m e n t  o n  a u d i t i n g  
s t a n d a r d s ,  I l l e g a l  A c t s  b y  C l i e n t s , a d d r e s s e s  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  d e t e c t i n g  i l l e g a l  a c t s .  I t  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  
t h e  a u d i t o r  s h o u l d  b e  a w a r e  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i l l e g a l  
a c t s  m a y  h a v e  o c c u r r e d ,  a n d  p r o v i d e s  g u i d a n c e  t o  t h e  a u d i t o r  
i f  a  p o s s i b l e  i l l e g a l  a c t  c o m e s  t o  h i s  a t t e n t i o n .  I n  o u r  
r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  o n  t h i s  e x p o s u r e  
d r a f t ,  w e  w i l l  s u g g e s t  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a t t o r n e y s ,  a n d  t h e  
a u d i t o r s  a l l  p l a y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  e n s u r i n g  
c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  m a t e r i a l  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s .  R e c o g n i z i n g  
t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w o u l d  c l a r i f y  t h e  o f t e n  m i s u n d e r s t o o d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  a u d i t o r  f o r  d e t e c t i n g  i l l e g a l  a c t s  
d u r i n g  a n  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  m a y  
s t i m u l a t e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  m a n a g e m e n t ,  i t s  a t t o r n e y s ,  a n d  
t h e  a u d i t o r s  o n  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t o  
p r o v i d e  a  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s .
I  w o u l d  n o w  l i k e  t o  o f f e r  c o m m e n t s  o n  s o m e  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
M A N A G E M E N T  O F  P U B L I C  C O M P A N I E S
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  ( 1 )  i d e n t i f y  
a n d  a s s e s s  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  m a y  c r e a t e  a  r i s k  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  ( 2 )  m a i n t a i n  a d e q u a t e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  
a n d  a n  e f f e c t i v e  a c c o u n t i n g  f u n c t i o n  t o  m i n i m i z e  t h e  
i d e n t i f i e d  r i s k ,  a n d  ( 3 )  r e p o r t  p u b l i c l y  o n  i t s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  
t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  i n  a n  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  
t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  W e  s u p p o r t  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  
s y s t e m s  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  k e y  d e t e r r e n t s  t o  f r a u d u l e n t  o r  
e r r o n e o u s  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  G A O  c o n t i n u e s  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  
a d e q u a c y  o f  t h e s e  s y s t e m s  i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  W e  
s u p p o r t e d  p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  M a n a g e r s '  F i n a n c i a l  I n t e g r i t y  
A c t  o f  1 9 8 2 ,  w h i c h  r e q u i r e s  f e d e r a l  m a n a g e r s  t o  a n n u a l l y  
e v a l u a t e  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m s ,  a n d  t o  
p u b l i c l y  r e p o r t  o n  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  c o m p l e t e d  a n d  p l a n n e d  
i m p r o v e m e n t s .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  p u b l i c  r e p o r t i n g  s u c h  a s  y o u  
p r o p o s e  e n h a n c e s  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  
s o u n d  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
A l s o ,  i n  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s t r e s s e s  t h a t  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  
s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  
c o m p r i s e d  s o l e l y  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n
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further recommends that audit committees should be vigilant 
and effective overseers of the financial reporting process and 
the company's internal controls. We support the idea of audit 
committees for public companies and believe that audit 
committees can also be beneficial in the government sector to 
help prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting. We 
share your belief that all members of the audit committee 
should be independent and maintain an appearance of 
independence to provide truly effective oversight of the 
company's financial reporting process.
Along with maintaining an oversight role over the financial 
reporting process and internal controls, we also suggest that 
the audit committee have access to the company's attorneys and 
become involved in overseeing management's compliance with 
major laws and regulations that can have a material impact on 
the financial statements and business operations.
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
The Commission, in formulating its recommendations, addresses 
the area of fraudulent financial reporting, which is defined 
as "intentional or reckless conduct, whether act or omission, 
that results in materially misleading financial statements."
We agree with the Commission that auditing standards should be 
revised to require the auditor to design tests to provide 
reasonable assurance of detecting fraudulent financial 
reporting that materially affects the financial statements.
We are in agreement with the Commission's recommendations to 
require mandatory peer review for all firms that audit public 
companies to improve audit quality. In our proposed revisions 
to our auditing standards, we include a requirement that audit 
organizations should have an internal quality control system 
in place and should participate in an external quality control 
review program. We also strongly support the SEC's recently 
released draft proposal to establish mandatory peer review for 
accountants who certify statements included in filings with 
the SEC.
SEC AND OTHER REGULATORY BODIES
The Commission recommends that the SEC be given more resources 
to perform existing and additional functions that help 
prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting. We 
agree that the SEC should be provided additional resources. 
There has been enormous growth in recent years in the 
securities industry as well as mounting concern over the 
efficiency and fairness of the financial markets. At the same 
time, the SEC's resource levels have remained relatively 
constant. The appropriate level of resources for the SEC to 
accomplish its regulatory objectives is a matter that needs
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f u r t h e r  a t t e n t i o n .  F o r  t h e  l a s t  s e v e r a l  y e a r s , S E C  b u d g e t  
d o c u m e n t s  h a v e  n o t  p r e s e n t e d  l o n g - t e r m  o v e r s i g h t  g o a l s  a n d  
o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  S E C ' s  m a j o r  p r o g r a m s .  T o  a n s w e r  t h e  
l o n g e r - t e r m  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h a t  l e v e l  o f  r e s o u r c e s  t h e  S E C  n e e d s  
t o  a c c o m p l i s h  i t s  r e g u l a t o r y  m i s s i o n ,  t h e  S E C  s h o u l d  l i n k  i t s  
r e s o u r c e  r e q u e s t s  w i t h  l o n g - r a n g e  g o a l s  a n d  o b j e c t i v e s .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s ,  w e  a r e  i n  a g r e e m e n t  t h a t  
t h e s e  a g e n c i e s  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  e x c h a n g e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  e x a m i n e r  a n d  t h e  a u d i t o r .  S o m e  
e x c h a n g e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r e s e n t l y  e x i s t s ,  a n d  w e  b e l i e v e  t h e  
p r a c t i c e  s h o u l d  b e c o m e  r o u t i n e .  I n f o r m a t i o n  s h a r i n g  c a n  h a v e  
p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  
t h e i r  e n f o r c e m e n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  f o r  t h e  a u d i t o r  i n  
p l a n n i n g  a n d  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s .
W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  s t a t e  b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  t h e y  i m p l e m e n t  p o s i t i v e  e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  
t o  p e r i o d i c a l l y  r e v i e w  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d  b y  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  t h e y  l i c e n s e .  W e  h a v e  f o u n d ,  
t h r o u g h  o u r  r e f e r r a l  o f  p o o r  q u a l i t y  a u d i t s  t o  t h e  s t a t e  
b o a r d s ,  t h a t  s o m e  h a v e ,  a n d  o t h e r s  a r e  m o v i n g  t o w a r d ,  p o s i t i v e  
e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s .  W e  s u p p o r t  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  a n d  h o p e  t h a t  
o t h e r s  w i l l  m o v e  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .
I n  c o n c l u d i n g ,  I  a g a i n  c o m m e n d  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  a n  
i n f o r m a t i v e  r e p o r t  t h a t  h a s  i d e n t i f i e d  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  s t e p s  
t h a t  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n  b y  a l l  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
p r o c e s s  t o  d e t e r  a n d  r e d u c e  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
W e  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  d r a f t  r e p o r t  d o e s  n o t  a d d r e s s  
h o w  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w i l l  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d .  A s  w e  h a v e  
c o m m e n t e d  t o  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  p r e v i o u s l y ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a  
f o l l o w  o n  g r o u p  t o  w o r k  t o w a r d  a n d  t o  p e r i o d i c a l l y  r e p o r t  o n  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a l  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w o u l d  b e  i m p o r t a n t  
i n  e n s u r i n g  t h e i r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  T h e  C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  A I C P A ,  
i n  t e s t i m o n y  o n  J u l y  2 2 ,  1 9 8 7 ,  b e f o r e  t h e  S u b c o m m i t t e e  o n  
O v e r s i g h t  a n d  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  H o u s e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  E n e r g y  a n d  
C o m m e r c e ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  a  n e w l y  f o r m e d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  c o m m i t t e e .  
W e  a r e  e n c o u r a g e d  b y  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h i s  g r o u p  a n d  h o p e  t h a t  
i t  p r o v i d e s  o v e r s i g h t  f o r  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  
t h e  f i n a l  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
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M y  s t a f f  a n d  I  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  s h o u l d  y o u  w i s h  t o  d i s c u s s  o u r  
c o m m e n t s .  P l e a s e  c o n t a c t  t h e  D i r e c t o r ,  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  
F i n a n c i a l  M a n a g e m e n t  D i v i s i o n ,  F r e d e r i c k  D .  W o l f ,  a t  ( 2 0 2 )  
2 7 5 - 9 4 6 1 .
S i n c e r e l y  y o u r s ,
C h a r l e s  A .  B o w s h e r  
C o m p t r o l l e r  G e n e r a l  
o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
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A u g u s t  1 0 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N . W .
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6
G e n t l e m e n :
W e  c o n c u r  w i t h  m a n y  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
d r a f t  r e p o r t .  M a n y  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t s  e x p r e s s e d  a r e  v i r t u e s  t h a t  
r a n k  w i t h  G o d ,  t h e  F l a g ,  M o t h e r h o o d ,  h o t  d o g s ,  a p p l e  p i e ,  a n d  
C h e v r o l e t !  O n e  c o u l d  h a r d l y  b e  a g a i n s t  e f f e c t i v e  a u d i t  c o m ­
m i t t e e s ,  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  e t h i c s  c o d e s ,  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s .
I M C  i s  a m o n g  w h a t  m u s t  b e  c o u n t l e s s  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  f o l l o w  
s o u n d  b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e s  t o  p r e v e n t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e ­
p o r t i n g .  T h e s e  p r a c t i c e s  h a v e  b e e n  i n  p l a c e  f o r  m a n y  y e a r s ,  
m o d i f i e d  o v e r  t i m e  t o  f i t  c h a n g i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  n e w  
l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s .
W e  f i n d  s o m e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t r o u b l e s o m e .  M o s t l y ,  i t  i s  t h o s e  
t h a t  r e l a t e  t o  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
W e  f i r m l y  b e l i e v e  i n  a n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  t h a t  p r o v i d e s  a n  
e f f e c t i v e  o v e r s i g h t  r o l e  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  
T h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  m o v e  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  e v e r  s o  
c l o s e ,  i f  n o t  o v e r ,  t h e  l i n e  s e p a r a t i n g  o v e r s i g h t  f r o m  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  T h e s e  t w o  r o l e s  c o n f l i c t  a t  t h e  l e a s t  
a n d  c r e a t e  a  s u p e r  p o w e r  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  
a t  t h e  m o s t .  M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  w o u l d  b e  s a d d l e d  
w i t h  a n  u n r e a l i s t i c  b u r d e n .  V e r y  l i k e l y  d i r e c t o r s  w o u l d  b e  
d i s c o u r a g e d  f r o m  s e r v i n g  o n  t h a t  c o m m i t t e e .
C o m m e n t s  a b o u t  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
1 .  C o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v a l  o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  
p r i o r  t o  r e l e a s e  t o  p u b l i c  w o u l d  b e  c u m b e r s o m e  a n d  
c o u l d  c r e a t e  u n f o r t u n a t e  s i t u a t i o n s  b r o u g h t  o n  b y  
t i m e  d e l a y  i n  p u b l i c  r e p o r t i n g .
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2. Advance approval by the Committee of management 
advisory services to be performed by the company's 
auditors bears no relation to prevention and detec­
tion of fraudulent financial reporting. Existing 
requirements for reporting of non-audit services 
provide the Committee with the information needed 
to judge independence.
3. Adding another report to the annual report to share­
holders in which the Audit Committee describes its 
responsibilities and activities adds to the clutter. 
No useful purpose is served.
4. Requiring management to inform the Audit Committee 
when "opinion shopping" should be limited to in­
stances where the second opinion differs from that 
of the company's auditors and management relied on 
that second opinion to support an accounting treat­
ment that the auditor's disagreed with. In some 
cases opinion shopping by management could be deemed 
the responsible thing to do, rather than the infer­
ence suggested by this recommendation.
In closing, we must question how much tinkering with the 
present system is really necessary. The number of instances 
that could be described as fraudulent reporting has to be 
miniscule. Those few make good press and help to sell news­
papers, magazines, and television time. On balance, though, 
American business abides by the rules of the game. We must 
guard against establishing impractical and stifling regula­
tions that hamper good practice.
Yours very truly
John F. Sonderegger
Vice President and ControllerJFS/jfb
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B R IS T O L -M Y E R S  C O M P A N Y
34 5  Park Avenue 
N e w  York, N.Y. 10154
VICE PRESIDENT and CONTROLLER
A u g u s t  1 1 ,  1 9 8 7
N A T I O N A L  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  F R A U D U L E N T  F I N A N C I A L  R E P O R T I N G  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N W  
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C  2 0 0 0 6
G e n t l e m e n :
T h e  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  e n t i t l e d ,  " R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g , "  i s  
a n  e x c e l l e n t  d o c u m e n t  a n d  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  d e s e r v e s  t o  b e  
c o n g r a t u l a t e d .  T h e r e  i s  n o  d o u b t  a s  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s t a t e d  
t h a t  " t h e  t o n e  s e t  b y  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t "  i s  c r i t i c a l  i n  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  f o r  s t r o n g  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  
a n d  r e s p o n s i b l e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  W e  f e e l  v e r y  s t r o n g l y  
a b o u t  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  a r e  d e e p l y  
c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  r e c e n t  p u b l i c  d i s c l o s u r e s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  W e  h o p e  t h a t  y o u r  r e p o r t  a n d  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t h e r e i n  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  n o t  o n l y  i m p r o v e d  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  b u t  a  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  p e r c e p t i o n  
a b o u t  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .
W i t h o u t  d e t r a c t i n g  f r o m  t h e  o v e r a l l  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  r e p o r t ,  w e  d o  h a v e  o n e  g e n e r a l  a n d  o n e  s p e c i f i c  
c o n c e r n  t h a t  w e  w o u l d  l i k e  c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  y o u r  
f i n a l  r e p o r t .
F i r s t ,  m a n y  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  r e p o r t  t e n d  t o  
s h i f t  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  f r o m  a n  o v e r s i g h t  
f u n c t i o n  t o  a n  o p e r a t i o n a l  g r o u p  a s s i g n e d  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  a u d i t i n g .  W e  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  e m p h a s i s  a n d  p e r s p e c t i v e  i s  n o t  
a p p r o p r i a t e  a s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
a n d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  a r e  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  
m a n a g e m e n t .  I t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
a s s u m e s  a l m o s t  i n d e p e n d e n t  e x i s t e n c e ,  s e p a r a t e  a n d  a p a r t  
f r o m  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s ;  t h i s  w o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s .  W e  
h a v e  a t t a c h e d  a d d i t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c  c o m m e n t s  t o  s u p p o r t  o u r  
p o s i t i o n  o n  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e .
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Second, with reference to your recommendation on "opinion 
shopping", we believe that there are sometimes very good, 
legitimate business reasons to seek second or third 
opinions on a significant accounting issue, especially from 
public accountants with expertise in specialized areas. A 
recent review of comment letters to the FASB and SEC would 
show that the Big Eight firms are not monolithic in their 
approach to accounting issues. With any new or complex 
accounting issue, a consensus position supported by a 
number of public accounting firms would be more acceptable 
to management than a single position, which has a risk of 
being incorrect. Management is responsible for the 
financial statements and the determination of appropriate 
accounting concepts is obviously very important.
As previously stated, we commend the Commission on its 
thorough report and fully support their objectives to 
improve financial reporting.
Very truly yours,
S t even B. Ratoff 
 
A t t c h :
Audit Committee Recommendations
C o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  A u d i t o r s  -  M a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  
p r o v i d e  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  w i t h  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
p l a n  t o  i n v o l v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  i n  t h e  e n t i r e  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  i t  s h o u l d  b e  
c o o r d i n a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s .  T h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  c a n  t h e n  f u l f i l l  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  c a p a c i t y  
t h a t  t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  h a s  o c c u r r e d .  E n s u r i n g  t h a t  
i n v o l v e m e n t  a n d  c o o r d i n a t i o n  i s  a  m a n a g e m e n t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  n o t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ’ s .
I n d e p e n d e n t  D i r e c t o r s  -  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  n o t  
e s t a b l i s h  r u l e s  o r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s h i p .  T h i s  c o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  
w e a k e n i n g  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  b e c a u s e  m a n y  q u a l i f i e d  
d i r e c t o r s  w h o  c o u l d  p r o v i d e  a  b r o a d  p e r s p e c t i v e  
w o u l d  b e  d e n i e d  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s h i p .
R e s o u r c e s  a n d  A u t h o r i t y  -  P r o v i d i n g  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  w i t h  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  a u t h o r i t y  t o  d i s c h a r g e  
t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  p r o p o s e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o s t e r s  a n  
o p e r a t i n g  s t a t u s  a n d  h i n d e r s  a n  o v e r s i g h t  
f u n c t i o n .  T h e  o v e r s i g h t  f u n c t i o n  i s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  
b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e m a i n i n g  c o m p l e t e l y  
i n d e p e n d e n t  f r o m  m a n a g e m e n t  o r  o p e r a t i o n s .
R e p o r t  t o  S t o c k h o l d e r s  -  S i n c e  a l l  c o m p a n i e s  
i n c l u d e  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  r e p o r t  a n d  m o s t  
c o m p a n i e s  i n c l u d e  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s  a c k n o w l e d g i n g  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s ,  a  
s e p a r a t e  r e p o r t  f r o m  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  i s  r e d u n d a n t .  F u r t h e r  t h e  d i r e c t o r s  d o  
s i g n  t h e  F o r m  1 0 - K  i s s u e d  t o  t h e  S E C  a n d  m a n y  
c o m p a n i e s  f i l e  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  a n d  
10-K.
A p p r o v e  F i n a n c i a l  R e s u l t s  -  T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
m e m b e r s  a r e  c o n s t i t u e n t s  o f  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  
a n d  a r e  r e g u l a r l y  a p p r i s e d  a b o u t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  o u t l o o k  f o r  t h e  c o m p a n y .  A p p r o v a l  
o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  b y  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  w o u l d  u s u r p  m a n a g e m e n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
a n d  e l i m i n a t e  o v e r s i g h t .  A p p r o v a l  a n d  o v e r s i g h t ,  
b y  d e f i n i t i o n ,  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  p e r f o r m e d  b y  t h e  s a m e  
b o d y .
L i a b i l i t y  I n s u r a n c e  -  I n  o r d e r  t o  a t t r a c t  h i g h  
c a l i b e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  t h e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  a n d  
t o  s e r v e  o n  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  
f o r  a  c o m p a n y  t o  p r o v i d e  l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  f o r  
d i r e c t o r s .
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F I F T H  T H I R D  B A N C O R P
August 18, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on 
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I  am c u r re n t ly  se rv in g  as Chairman o f the  A u d it Committee o f F i f t h  
T h ird  Bancorp, a h ig h ly  su cce ss fu l re g io n a l bank h o ld in g  company. 
The banking in d u s try  is  ve ry  dependent on f in a n c ia l  re p o r ts  and 
in fo rm a tio n  on which i t  bases m ajor lo a n , investm ent and business 
d e c is io n s . My fe llo w  committee members, and our management team, 
s tro n g ly  endorse any and a l l  p r a c t ic a l measures designed to  ensure 
the  in t e g r i t y  o f  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g .  However, fo llo w in g  our rev iew  
o f the  Commission's recommendations rega rd in g  a u d it  committees and 
a u d it  a c t iv i t i e s ,  we f e l t  o b lig a te d  to  express our views and 
concerns in  se ve ra l areas as fo llo w s :
Recommendation: "P u b lic  companies should develop and en fo rce
w r it te n  codes o f  co rp o ra te  conduct. Codes o f conduct should
fo s te r  a s tro n g  e th ic a l c lim a te  and open channels o f 
communication to  he lp  p ro te c t  a g a in s t f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  
re p o r t in g .  A company's a u d it  committee should rev iew  compliance 
w ith  the  code a n n u a lly , in c lu d in g  com pliance by top  management, 
and re p o r t  the reon  to  the  board o f d ir e c to r s . "
Comment: A lthough  we agree w ith  the  Commission's views on the
im portance o f  a w r i t te n  code o f co rp o ra te  conduct, we d isagree  
w ith  the  recommendation th a t  a u d it  committees should be d i r e c t ly  
in vo lve d  in  re v ie w in g  com pliance w ith  the  code. We b e lie v e  
a u d it  committees should be in vo lve d  in  an o v e rs ig h t c a p a c ity .
Recommendation: "The a u d it  committee should approve in  advance 
th e  types and the  e x te n t o f  management a d v is o ry  se rv ice s  th a t  
management p lans to  engage the  company's independent p u b lic  
accountant to  p e rfo rm ."
Comment: We p r im a r i ly  o b je c t to  the  advance approva l re q u ire ­
ment which we fe e l cou ld  r e s t r i c t  our management group in  making 
qu ick  d e c is io n s .
Recommendation: " A l l  p u b lic  companies should be re q u ire d  by SEC
ru le  to  in c lu d e  in  t h e i r  annual re p o r ts  to  s tockho lde rs  a le t t e r  
signed by the  chairman o f  the  a u d it  committee d e s c r ib in g  the  
com m ittee 's r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and a c t iv i t i e s  d u rin g  the  y e a r ."
38 Fountain Square Plaza Cincinnati. Ohio 45263, 513-579-5300
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Comment: We do not feel that such a letter would add any
substantive value to the annual report. We consider the 
disclosures required by existing proxy requirements sufficient.
Recommendation: "Audit committees should increase their
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public 
release."
Comment: We do not agree that audit committees should be
required to approve quarterly financial results prior to public 
release. Our objection is twofold. First, we do not consider 
the requirement to be practical and would inhibit the timely 
release of information. Secondly, approval of the results would 
remove the audit committee from an oversight role to one of 
direct involvement in the reporting process, which we consider a 
direct responsibility of management.
We hope our comments will benefit the Commission in formulating 
their final recommendations.
Sincerely,
NOLAN W. CARSON
Audit Committee Chairman
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B r i e r c r o f t
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION  
Austin Office
12710 Research Boulevard 
P.O. Box 200850 
Austin, Texas 78720 
(512) 250-0311
August 18, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Commissioners:
I have read your exposure draft on fraudulent financial reporting. I commend 
you on your e ffort to improve the financial reporting of publicly owned com­
panies. The recommendations presented in the exposure draft are welcomed and i f  
implemented w ill help in obtaining your (our) goals and objectives. I want to 
offer recommendations that I feel you should incorporate in your final report.
The area affected is IV. Audit Committee of the Board of Directors.
The draft report states that the chief internal auditor should report adminis­
tratively to a senior officer and preferably to the CEO. I t  implies that the 
chief internal auditor should report functionally to the board of directors 
through the audit committee. Therefore, i t  is my strong belief that one of the 
responsibilities of the audit committee is to insure that the internal auditor 
has adequate resources to discharge his responsibilities to the board of directors.
Recommendation: The annual internal audit budget (both expense and personnel)
should be reviewed and approved by the audit committee.
In my opinion, the approving of the budget is not an administrative function 
responsibility. The audit function is responsible f ir s t  to the board of direc­
tors and second to management. Therefore, the audit committee must be held 
accountable in providing the necessary resources to the internal auditor so that 
the duties and responsibilities as defined in the committee's written charter 
are obtainable.
Observation: Because the position of internal auditor is a sensitive position
within any organization and independence of the function has to be "in fact" and 
not just "in appearance", the audit committee must take responsibility for 
insuring complete independence of the function.
TX 1-800-222-6894 /  U.S. 1-800-225-8872
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Recommendation: The a u d it committee should be responsib le  fo r  h ir in g  and
discharg ing  the c h ie f in te rn a l a u d ito r .
The a u d it committee should seek counsel from executive management regarding the 
h ir in g  and d ischarg ing o f the c h ie f in te rn a l a u d ito r ; however, the u ltim a te  
re s p o n s ib il ity  l ie s  w ith in  the committee.
I re s p e c tfu lly  request th a t you consider in c lu d in g  these recommendations in  your 
f in a l re p o rt. This would give most in te rn a l a u d ito rs  the needed s e lf  assurance 
th a t:  (1) the a u d it committee takes i t s  corporate  re s p o n s ib il it ie s  se rio u s ly
and (2) " in  fa c t"  the in te rn a l fu n c tio n  is  u lt im a te ly  responsib le  to  them.
Yours t r u ly ,
J e rry  D. Chatham, CPA
JDC/lb
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U n i t e d  W a t e r  R e s o u r c e s
200 Old Hook Road • Harrington Park, New Jersey 07640 • (201) 784-9434
A u g u s t 31 , 1987
James C. T readw ay J r . , C ha irm an  
N a t io n a l  C om m iss ion  o n  F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue NW 
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
RE: E x p o s u re  D r a f t  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  C om m iss ion  on
F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g
G e n tle m e n :
We a r e  i n  r e c e n t  r e c e ip t  o f  y o u r  E xp o su re  D r a f t  d a te d  May 1 , 1987 w h ic h  
p r e s e n ts  t h e  f in d in g s ,  c o n c lu s io n s ,  and  re co m m e n d a tio n s  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  
C om m iss ion  o n  F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .  We w o u ld  l i k e  t o  comment on 
C h a p te r  Two: R ecom m endations f o r  t h e  P u b l ic  Company.
U n ite d  W a te r  R e so u rce s  i s  a  h o ld in g  company w hose b u s in e s s  a c t i v i t i e s  in c lu d e  
p u b l i c  w a te r  s u p p ly ,  r e a l  e s ta te  d e v e lo p m e n t and  w a te r  r e la t e d  s e r v ic e s .  
U n ite d  W a te r 's  common s to c k  i s  t r a d e d  o n  t h e  New Y o rk  S to c k  Exchange u n d e r  th e  
t r a d in g  sym b o l UWR. The com pany h a s  p a id  c o n s e c u t iv e  c a s h  d iv id e n d s  o n  i t s  
common s to c k  s in c e  1886 . The C om pany's p r i n c i p a l  s u b s id ia r ie s  h a ve  been  
p r o v id e r s  o f  p u b l i c  w a te r  s u p p ly  s e r v ic e  f o r  116 and  92 y e a r s ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly  t o  
a n  e c o n o m ic a l ly  r o b u s t  and  g ro w in g  r e g io n  o f  n o r th e a s te r n  New J e rs e y  and 
s o u th e a s te rn  New Y o rk .
We c o n c u r  w i t h  a  m a jo r i t y  o f  t h e  re co m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  t h e  P u b l ic  Company 
m e n tio n e d  i n  C h a p te r  Two. We a g re e  t h a t  t h e  to n e  s e t  b y  t o p  m anagement s e ts  an 
exa m p le  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  com pany and  in f lu e n c e s  t h e  a c t io n  o f  o t h e r  s e n io r - le v e l  
m a n a g e rs . The Company h a s  d e m o n s tra te d  i t s  c o n c u r re n c e  w i t h  th e s e  
re co m m e n d a tio n s  o v e r  t h e  y e a rs  b y  h a v in g  e s ta b l is h e d  and  c o n s ta n t ly  re v ie w in g  
i t s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o ls ;  a n  e f f e c t i v e  a c c o u n t in g  f u n c t io n  m e e t in g  th e  f i n a n c ia l  
d is c lo s u r e  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  t h e  SEC, FASB, and  th e  s t a t e  r e g u la t o r y  co m m is s io n s ; 
a n n u a l c o n f i r m a t io n  i n  w r i t i n g  o f  a l l  m anagement p e r s o n n e l 's  c o m p lia n c e  w i t h  
o u r  w r i t t e n  Code o f  E t h ic s ;  and  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  r e v ie w s  o f  o u r  o p e r a t io n  a t  
a l l  l e v e ls  b y  a n  o b je c t iv e  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  f u n c t io n  w h ic h  r e p o r t s  t o  and  m eets  
w i t h  t h e  A u d i t  C om m ittee  s e v e r a l  t im e s  a  y e a r .
N o t w i th s ta n d in g  th e s e  p a s t  a c t io n s  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  
C om m iss ion  r e p o r t ,  t h e  company m u s t e x p re s s  c o n c e rn  w i t h  tw o  o f  th e  
re co m m e n d a tio n s  i n  C h a p te r  Two.
Principal Subsidiaries • Hackensack Water Company • Spring Valley Water Company
o  " A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  
a n n u a l  r e p o r t  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  a  l e t t e r  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  A u d i t  
C o m m i t t e e  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  c o m m i t t e e ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  
d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r " .
o  " A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r e i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  o v e r s i g h t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e " .
T h e  p r i m a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  i s  r e c i t e d  i n  o u r  P r o x y  
S t a t e m e n t  f o r  t h e  A n n u a l  M e e t i n g  o f  S h a r e h o l d e r s .  T h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  f o r  t h e  y e a r  a r e  d e t a i l e d  i n  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  w h i c h  i s  i n  t h e  
A n n u a l  R e p o r t .  T h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  a  s e p a r a t e  l e t t e r  f r o m  t h e  C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  r e i t e r a t i n g  t h e  s a m e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  u n n e c e s s a r y .  I t  
m i g h t  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  t h e  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  O f f i c e r  o r  t h e  C h i e f  F i n a n c i a l  
O f f i c e r  t o  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s i g n  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  i n  t h e  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  
r a t h e r  t h a n  h a v e  a  s e p a r a t e  s i g n e d  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  C h a i r m a n .
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  p e r f o r m s  a  l i m i t e d  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  
r e s u l t s  o f  o u r  c o m p a n y  b e f o r e  t h e y  a r e  r e l e a s e d  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h i s  
i s  a d e q u a t e  w i t h o u t  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  a s s e m b l i n g  t o  p e r f o r m  
t h i s  s a m e  r e v i e w .  T h e  C o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  b y  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  a r e  
o p e r a t i n g  a n d  e f f e c t i v e l y  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  t h e i r  q u e s t i o n i n g  a n d  d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  
t h e  m a n a g e m e n t ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  a n d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  d u r i n g  t h e i r  
p e r i o d i c  m e e t i n g s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  y e a r .  M a n a g e m e n t  k e e p s  t h e  e n t i r e  B o a r d  o f  
D i r e c t o r s  a d v i s e d  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  m a t t e r s  t h a t  e f f e c t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
c o m p a n y  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  a t  t h e  m o n t h l y  B o a r d  m e e t i n g s .  
M a n a g e m e n t  h a s  t h e  p r i m e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  r e p o r t  o n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  o f  
t h e  c o m p a n y .  T h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  i n  t h i s  p r o c e s s  p l a c e s  t h e m  
i n  a  m a n a g e m e n t  r o l e  w h i c h  i s  n o t  d e s i r a b l e ,  a n d  p o t e n t i a l l y  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e i r  r o l e  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  B o a r d  m e m b e r s .
I f  w e  c a n  b e  o f  f u r t h e r  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  y o u r  e n d e a v o r s  t o  i n h i b i t  f r a u d u l e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  p l e a s e  a d v i s e .
S i n c e r e l y  y o u r s ,
D o n a l d  L .  C o r n e l l
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  -  T r e a s u r e r
a n d  C h i e f  F i n a n c i a l  O f f i c e r
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John V. Thornton
Vice Chairman of the Board
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. 
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003 
Telephone (212) 460-4324
September 2, 1987
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Commissioners:
After receiving a report on the Commission's Exposure 
Draft and on the comments thereon by the Big Eight firms, 
the Audit Committee of our Board of Trustees requested that 
I, as Vice Chairman of the Board and chief financial 
officer, submit comments on recommendations of the Draft 
with respect to Audit Committees.
Consolidated Edison Company is a utility company 
providing electric service to New York City and Westchester 
County and gas and steam service to various parts of that 
area. For many years it has been a widely held public 
company whose securities are listed and traded on the New 
York, Midwest, Pacific and Amsterdam Stock Exchanges. For 
many years its Board of Trustees has maintained an Audit 
Committee to assist the Board in its oversight of the 
Company's financial reporting process, and the Committee 
and the Board have a continuing goal of keeping their 
operations in accord with the best practices, whether or 
not required by law or regulation. It is in the light of 
this experience and commitment that the Company urges the 
Commission to reconsider what we believe to be an incorrect 
and indeed dangerous conception of the nature and function 
of an Audit Committee. While we take issue with a number 
of the Exposure Draft's specific recommendations concerning 
the activities of the Audit Committee, our most serious 
concern is with the Exposure Draft's implicit premise that 
the Audit Committee should go beyond the corporate 
director's traditional oversight role, to one which would 
assume responsibility for active management of a corporate 
function. In our view, such an active managerial role is 
not only impractical and inconsistent with the nature of a 
committee of directors, but will undermine the very 
objectivity and independence that are the greatest 
contributions an outside director can bring to a public 
company.
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T h e  P r o p e r  R o l e  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
A n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  is, i t  m u s t  b e  r e m e m b e r e d ,  a 
c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  B o a r d . A s  such, it c a n n o t  a s s u m e  a r o l e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  of, m u c h  l e s s  in c o n f l i c t  w i t h ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  
t h e  c o r p o r a t e  d i r e c t o r .  U n d e r  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  c o r p o r a t e  
g o v e r n a n c e  p r e v a i l i n g  in t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o d a y  b y  l a w  a n d  
c u s t o m ,  t h e  d i r e c t o r ' s  f u n c t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  in n o r m a l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  is n o t  t o  m a n a g e ,  b u t  t o  see t h a t  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n  is m a n a g e d  p r o p e r l y .  I n  e m e r g e n c i e s ,  t h e  
d i r e c t o r s ,  i n d i v i d u a l l y  a n d  as a b o a r d ,  o r  a b o a r d  
c o m m i t t e e ,  m a y  b e  f o r c e d  t o  t a k e  a m o r e  a c t i v e  rol e ,  b u t  it 
is c o m m o n  w i s d o m  t h a t  it w o u l d  b e  u n s o u n d  t o  a d o p t  t h i s  as 
a n o r m a l  o p e r a t i n g  m o d e .  T h i s  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  for 
o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s ,  s u c h  as t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  a n  A u d i t  
C o m m i t t e e ,  f o r  t w o  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  l i m i t e d  t i m e  w h i c h  
t h e  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r  c a n  d e v o t e  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
a f f a i r s  p r e c l u d e s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  
d a y - t o - d a y  m a n a g e m e n t .  S e c o n d ,  p e r s o n a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  
m a n a g e m e n t  p r o c e s s  w i l l  c o m p r o m i s e  t h e  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r ' s  
o b j e c t i v i t y .
T h u s ,  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f u n c t i o n  o f  a n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  is 
to a s s i s t  t h e  B o a r d  i n  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  r o l e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to 
m a n a g e m e n t 's p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
f u n c t i o n .  T h e  C o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  k e e p  i t s e l f  i n f o r m e d  a b o u t  
s u c h  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  m a k e  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n q u i r i e s ,  e v a l u a t e  s u c h  
p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  r e p o r t  s u c h  e v a l u a t i o n s  t o  t h e  B o a r d ,  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  for i m p r o v e m e n t  and, w h e r e  
n e c e s s a r y  a n d  a p p r o p r i a t e ,  f o r  c o r r e c t i o n  o f  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  
T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  n o t  p u r p o r t  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  
B o a r d ,  o r  t o  a s s u m e  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  r o l e ,  i n  t h e  o v e r s i g h t  
o f  t h e  m a n a g e r i a l  f u n c t i o n .  N e i t h e r  s h o u l d  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  
i t s e l f  u n d e r t a k e  a n  a c t i v e  m a n a g e r i a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  o r  b e c o m e  p a r t  o f  t h a t  p r o c e s s .
In c o n t r a s t  t o  t h i s  a l m o s t  s e l f - e v i d e n t  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h a t  
d i r e c t o r s  s h o u l d  o v e r s e e  a n d  n o t  m a n a g e ,  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  
s e e m s  t o  c o n t e m p l a t e  i n t i m a t e  d a y - t o - d a y  i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  t h e  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  i n  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  f u n c t i o n .  W h i l e  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  a c k n o w l e d g e s ,  
o n  p a g e  36, t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  "must, o f  c o u r s e ,  
a v o i d  u n n e c e s s a r y  o r  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
p r e r o g a t i v e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  m a n a g e m e n t , "  t h e  o v e r a l l  t o n e  o f  
t h e  D r a f t  is t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  is t o  b e c o m e  
v i r t u a l l y  t h e  p r i m a r y  a g e n c y  r e s p o n s i b l e  for t h e  p r o p e r  
f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  i n d e e d  
a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h a t  p r o c e s s .  T h u s ,  o n  p a g e  28 t h e  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  is d e s c r i b e d  as a " c r i t i c a l  c o m p o n e n t  in 
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s " ;  o n  p a g e  31 i t  is p r o p o s e d  
t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  b e  m a d e  r e s p o n s i b l e  for
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"monitoring compliance" with the code of conduct; on 
page 33 it is stated that the Audit Committee "should adopt 
... formally" a written description of the responsibilities 
of the internal audit function; on page 34 it is proposed 
that this internal audit function should serve as the 
"staff" of the Audit Committee —  a theme that is returned 
to on page 38 in the discussion of the Committee's need for 
"in-house staff and administrative support"; on page 34 the 
Audit Committee is directed to "review" the appointment and 
dismissal of the chief internal auditor; on the same page 
it is stated that "management and the audit committee 
should ensure"* appropriate and coordinated involvement of 
the internal auditors; on page 39 it is proposed that the 
Audit Committee "review in advance" the engagement of the 
outside auditor for management advisory services; on page 
41 it is proposed that the Audit Committee report directly 
to stockholders on its activities —  and in this report, it 
is suggested, at page 191, that the Committee describe 
itself as "the primary vehicle to which the board of 
directors has delegated its responsibility to oversee the 
company's financial reporting process"*; on page 42 it is 
recommended that "management should advise the audit 
committee when it seeks a second opinion on a significant 
accounting issue"; and finally on page 42 it is proposed 
that the Audit Committee "approve" quarterly financial 
statements in advance of their release to the public. 
Considered individually, some of these prescriptions might 
seem unexceptional as only a small enlargement upon 
traditional oversight, but cumulatively they depict such an 
active managing posture that, as stated on page 43, the 
Audit Committee's "oversight role within the financial 
reporting process" will indeed "be ongoing and visible 
throughout the company."*
We cannot agree that it would be healthy or even 
feasible for the Audit Committee to assume the essentially 
managerial role suggested by the Exposure Draft or to, in 
effect, assume to direct on virtually a day-to-day basis 
the operations of the Internal Audit Department which, in 
our Company as in many other large companies, is a major 
operating unit with a substantial staff working in close 
liaison with the Chief Executive Officer of the Company.
As the Audit Committee became part of the financial 
reporting process and assumed increasing responsibility for 
the actual operation of the system, as the Commission seems 
to envision, it would necessarily lose its objectivity, 
since it would in effect become the overseer of its own 
activity.
*Emphasis added.
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M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  h e a v y  b u r d e n s ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t i m e ,  d u t i e s  
a n d  l i a b i l i t y  e x p o s u r e ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  i m p o s e d  o n  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  b y  t h i s  n e w  " a c t i v i s t "  r o l e ,  w o u l d  n e c e s s a r i l y  
e x a c e r b a t e  t h e  p r o b l e m s  ( a c k n o w l e d g e d  a t  p a g e s  3 6  a n d  3 7 )  
w h i c h  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  a r e  e x p e r i e n c i n g  i n  r e c r u i t i n g  a n d  
r e t a i n i n g  q u a l i f i e d  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s .  F i n a l l y ,  w e  
q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  i t  w o u l d  e v e n  b e  f e a s i b l e  f o r  t h e  A u d i t  
C o m m i t t e e  t o  a s s u m e  t h e  s c o p e  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  s u g g e s t e d  
b y  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t ,  g i v e n  t h e  i n h e r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  
t i m e  a n d  r e s o u r c e s ,  t o  s a y  n o t h i n g  o f  t h e  s p e c i a l  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  e x p e r t i s e  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d .
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  w e  u r g e  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ,  i n  i t s  f i n a l  
r e p o r t ,  m a k e  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  n o n e  o f  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a r e  
i n t e n d e d  t o  a l t e r  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e ' s  m i s s i o n  f r o m  o n e  o f  
a s s i s t i n g  t h e  B o a r d  i n  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
p e r f o r m a n c e ,  a n d  t h a t  n o t h i n g  i n  t h e  r e p o r t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  a s s u m e  a c t i v e  m a n a g e r i a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r ,  o r  b e c o m e  p a r t  o f ,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  f u n c t i o n .  D e l e t i o n  o f  a t  l e a s t  t w o  o f  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t ,  d i s c u s s e d  
b e l o w ,  w i l l  b e  e s s e n t i a l  t o  c o n v e y  t h a t  m e s s a g e .
1 .  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  R e p o r t  t o  S t o c k h o l d e r s
T h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  
C o m m i t t e e  s u b m i t  a n  a n n u a l  r e p o r t ,  s i g n e d  b y  i t s  c h a i r m a n ,  
d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  s t o c k h o l d e r s  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n y ' s  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s .  W e  u r g e  t h a t  t h i s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  b e  d e l e t e d .  S u c h  a  r e p o r t  w o u l d  c o n f u s e  a n d  
m i s l e a d  s t o c k h o l d e r s  a s  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  a n d  r o l e  o f  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  a n d  w o u l d  s e r v e  n o  u s e f u l  p u r p o s e .  I n f o r m a t i o n  
a s  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e ,  m e m b e r s h i p ,  f u n c t i o n s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  i s  a l r e a d y  r e q u i r e d  b y  l a w  t o  b e  
c o m m u n i c a t e d  t o  t h e  s t o c k h o l d e r s  i n  t h e  p r o x y  s t a t e m e n t .  
( S e e  I t e m  7 ( e )  o f  S c h e d u l e  1 4 A  o f  t h e  S E C ' s  P r o x y  R u l e s . )  
T h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  a n  e s s e n t i a l l y  d u p l i c a t i v e ,  a n d  s i g n e d ,  
r e p o r t  f r o m  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  w o u l d  
l e a d  m a n y  s t o c k h o l d e r s  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  i s  
a  s e p a r a t e l y  f u n c t i o n i n g  e n t i t y ,  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  t h e  B o a r d  
a n d  w i t h  s e p a r a t e  p o w e r s  a n d  d u t i e s .  M o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  r e p o r t  w o u l d  b e  m i s u n d e r s t o o d  t o  b e  s o m e  
s o r t  o f  w a r r a n t y  o r  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  a s  t o  c o r r e c t n e s s  o r  
a d e q u a c y  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  I t  w o u l d  
b e  u n f a i r  t o  i n d u c e  s u c h  m i s t a k e n  r e l i a n c e  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  
t h e  s t o c k h o l d e r ,  a n d  u n f a i r  t o  e x p o s e  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  t o  t h e  
l i a b i l i t y  w h i c h  m i g h t  f o l l o w  u p o n  s u c h  r e l i a n c e .  U n l i k e  
t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t ' s  c e r t i f i c a t e ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  n o  
b o d y  o f  l a w  o r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  l i t e r a t u r e  b y  w h i c h  t h e  
p r o p r i e t y  o r  f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  r e p o r t  c o u l d  
b e  j u d g e d  —  t h e r e  a r e  n o  " g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  p r i n c i p l e s  o f
5a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  p r a c t i c e . "  W h i l e  t h e  s u g g e s t e d  f o r m  o f  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  r e p o r t  c o n t a i n e d  i n  A p p e n d i x  M  t o  t h e  
E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  m e r e l y  r e c i t e s  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  c e r t a i n  
p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  c o n t a i n s  n o  e x p r e s s  o p i n i o n  o r  c o n c l u s i o n  a s  
t o  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  t h e s e  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  
p u r p o s e ,  a  c o u r t  m i g h t  w e l l  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  s u c h  a n  o p i n i o n  
a n d  c o n c l u s i o n  w e r e  i m p l i e d .  G r a t u i t o u s  e x p o s u r e  o f  t h e  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  t o  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  s u c h  i m p l i e d  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  w o u l d  b e  i n t o l e r a b l e .
2 .  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  " A p p r o v a l "  o f  Q u a r t e r l y  R e s u l t s
T h e  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  q u a r t e r l y  
r e s u l t s  b e  " a p p r o v e d "  b y  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  b e f o r e  t h e y  
a r e  r e l e a s e d  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  I t  i s  l e f t  u n s t a t e d  w h a t  w o u l d  
c o n s t i t u t e  s u c h  a p p r o v a l ,  o r  w h a t  i t  w o u l d  s i g n i f y .  A t  a  
m i n i m u m ,  i f  t h e  a p p r o v a l  i s  t o  b e  t h e  a c t  o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e ,  
i t  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  a  C o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g ,  o r  t h e  l e g a l  
e q u i v a l e n t ,  a n d  a  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  b y  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  t h a t  t h e  
q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  m e e t  s o m e  s t a n d a r d .  B u t  
w h a t  s t a n d a r d ,  a n d  h o w  w o u l d  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  b e  a b l e  t o  m a k e  
t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  a n d  w o u l d  t h e r e  b e  t i m e  t o  h o l d  t h e  
m e e t i n g  w i t h o u t  d e l a y i n g  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l s ?  I t  i s  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
p r o c e s s  f o r  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  m u s t  b e  r e l e a s e d  p r o m p t l y .  T h e r e  i s  a  l e g a l  
d u t y  o f  p r o m p t  d i s c l o s u r e ,  t h e  f i l i n g  d e a d l i n e s  f o r  
q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t s  t o  t h e  S E C  a r e  c r i t i c a l l y  s h o r t ,  a n d  t h e  
r i s k  o f  " l e a k s "  i s  e s c a l a t e d  w h e n  r e l e a s e  o f  s u c h  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  d e l a y e d .  T h u s ,  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A u d i t  
C o m m i t t e e  c o u l d  b e  g i v e n  v e r y  l i t t l e  t i m e ,  a  f e w  d a y s  a t  
b e s t ,  t o  r e v i e w  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  m a k e  i n q u i r i e s ,  
d e l i b e r a t e  a n d  " a p p r o v e "  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s .  W h a t  c o u l d  s u c h  
" a p p r o v a l "  s i g n i f y ?  A t  m o s t  i t  w o u l d  b e  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  
f a c e  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  s i n c e  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  w o u l d  
h a v e  n e i t h e r  t h e  t i m e  n o r  t h e  m e a n s  t o  l o o k  b e h i n d  t h e  
n u m b e r s  p r e s e n t e d .  O n l y  i f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  h a d  a n  
o n g o i n g  m a n a g e r i a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  —  o r  t h e  t i m e  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
r e s o u r c e s  c o m p a r a b l e  t o  t h o s e  d e p l o y e d  i n  a  f u l l - b l o w n  
a u d i t  —  w o u l d  i t  h a v e  a n  a d e q u a t e  b a s i s  f o r  " a p p r o v i n g "  
t h e  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  i n  a n y  m o r e  m e a n i n g f u l  
s e n s e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e r e  i s  a  v e r y  s e r i o u s  r i s k  t h a t  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e ' s  " a p p r o v a l "  w o u l d  b e  t a k e n  t o  i m p l y  a  f a r  m o r e  
s e a r c h i n g  i n v o l v e m e n t  w i t h ,  a n d  e n d o r s e m e n t  o f ,  t h e  
q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  a n d  a n  i m p l i e d  w a r r a n t y  a s  
t o  t h e i r  a c c u r a c y  a n d  f a i r n e s s .  S i n c e  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  
c o u l d  h a v e  n o  a d e q u a t e  b a s i s  f o r  m a k i n g  s u c h  a  w a r r a n t y ,  i t  
w o u l d  b e  u n f a i r  t o  a l l ,  i f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  w e r e  f o r c e d  t o  
m a k e  o n e ,  o r  a p p e a r  t o  d o  s o .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  d e n y  t h a t  i t  
w o u l d  b e  a  h e a l t h y  p r a c t i c e ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  i n h e r e n t  t i m e
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constraint, to afford the members of the Audit Committee -- 
and indeed the entire Board —  an opportunity to review 
relevant financial data in at least a general way prior to 
release to the public. Indeed, it is our Company's 
practice to submit monthly and other period financials to 
the entire Board and to keep Board members currently 
advised as to accounting and financial reporting questions 
which may arise. This, however, is a far cry from 
prepublication "approval" of the quarterly financials.
Very truly yours,
John V. Thornton
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September 17, 1987
National Commission onFraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, DC 20006
Gentlemen:
After reviewing the April 1987 exposure draft Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, we decided to study the recommendations which relate to the responsibilities of audit committees of boards of directors. As the initial step of the study, we have sought the reactions of key persons involved in implementation of these recommendations, i.e., the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the corporation, and the Audit Committee Chairperson (ACC). Their reactions are based on questions which directly relate to each recommendation. See Questions to Discuss with Audit Committee Chairs and Questions to Discuss with Chief Executive Officers attached as exhibits.
Our initial sample primarily consists of directors of corporations whose CEOs or COOs are members of the Business Advisory Council to the College of Commerce and Business Administration of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This sample was chosen because we believed they would favorably respond to our request for interviews in time for us to report initial reactions to the Commission before it issued the final report. We expect to enlarge the sample to include other directors of other corporations.
Five CEOs or COOs have been interviewed, also five ACCs. The CEOs and COOs represent three corporations which are listed on the NYSE, two on the OTC market. One interview was by pre-arranged telephone call, the others were made in person. Four were made jointly by both of us, six by only one of us. We believe the questions were asked objectively, and we believe that we did not prejudice answers.
2E a c h  o f  t h e  t h r e e  p e r s o n s  w h o  c h a i r s  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
f o r  a  N Y S E  c o m p a n y  a l s o  c h a i r s  o t h e r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s .  T h e y  b e l i e v e  
t h e y  c u r r e n t l y  s a t i s f y  m o s t  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n ’s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  
H o w e v e r ,  a l l  t e n d  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  f u l l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w o u l d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  
t h e i r  p o s i t i o n .  E s t i m a t e s  b y  t h e  A C C s  o f  t h e  t i m e  c u r r e n t l y  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  A C C  a c t i v i t y  r a n g e s  f r o m  6  t o  4 0  h o u r s  p e r  y e a r .
T h e y  d e s c r i b e  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  " a u d i t "  a c t i v i t y  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  
t h a t  i t  c o u l d  b e  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  p e r f o r m i n g  a n a l y t i c a l  r e v i e w  p r o c e d u r e s .  
T h e y  t e n d  t o  a n a l y z e  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  o t h e r  r e p o r t s ,  a n d  a s k  f o r  a n s w e r s  
t o  t h e i r  q u e s t i o n s  f r o m  c o r p o r a t e  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s .  A s  
a  g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  t h e y  s e e k  e v i d e n c e  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o n l y  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  t h e y  h o l d  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  v a r i o u s  p e o p l e .  T h e y  b e l i e v e  t h e y  a r e  
o n e  o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  l i n k s  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  o b j e c t i v e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e y  m a y  r e d u c e  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  b y  
t h e  e x a m p l e  t h e y  s e t  a n d  b y  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  t h e y  a s k .
A l l  t h e  A C C s  w o u l d  e l i m i n a t e  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l  o f  q u a r t e r l y  
e a r n i n g s  r e l e a s e s  b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  T h e y  w o u l d  a l s o  e l i m i n a t e  
t h e  s e p a r a t e  l e t t e r  f r o m  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c h a i r p e r s o n  i n  t h e  
c o m p a n y ’s  a n n u a l  r e p o r t .  S o m e  w o u l d  e l i m i n a t e  p r i o r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
a p p r o v a l  t o  h i r e  a u d i t o r s  t o  p e r f o r m  M A S  w o r k .  M o s t  a p p a r e n t l y  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  s o c i e t a l  c o s t s  o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  t h e  a u d i t - c o m m i t t e e - r e l a t e d  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  w o u l d  e x c e e d  s o c i e t a l  b e n e f i t s .
T h o s e  w h o  f e e l  t h e y  c u r r e n t l y  c o m p l y  w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a r e  
m o r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  f e e l  b e n e f i t s  e x c e e d  c o s t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l  
o f  q u a r t e r l y  e a r n i n g s  r e l e a s e s  i s  e l i m i n a t e d .
A C C s  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  i n c r e a s e d  d e m a n d  f o r  
t h e i r  t i m e .  S o m e  w a n t  t o  o v e r s e e  t h e  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n ,  n o t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  f u n c t i o n .  O n e  s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  t h e  t e r m  " o v e r s e e "  n o t  b e  
c o n f u s e d  w i t h  " i m p l e m e n t . "  O n e  c h a i r m a n  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  
" a u d i t "  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w o u l d  d i s c o u r a g e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  d u t y  b y  
q u a l i f i e d  p e o p l e ,  a  n o n - q u a n t i f i a b l e  c o s t  t o  s o c i e t y .  M o s t  a p p a r e n t l y  d o  
n o t  w a n t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t o  b e  v i e w e d  a s  a n  e n t i t y  s e p a r a t e  f r o m  
t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .
C E O s  a n d  C O O s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g  w o u l d  
c o n t i n u e  b y  s o m e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  a d d e d  p r e c a u t i o n s .  T h e y  
p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e  c o s t s  w o u l d  b e  u n f a i r l y  a d d e d  t o  t h e  a p p r o x i m a t e  
9 9 %  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  w h i c h  d o  n o t  r e p o r t  f r a u d u l e n t l y .  T h e y  t e n d  
t o  a p p r o v e  s t r o n g  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o v e r s i g h t  o v e r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  b u t  d o  n o t  w a n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t o  b e  i n v o l v e d  i n  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  C E O s  a n d  C O O s  t e n d  t o  b e l i e v e  t h e  s e p a r a t e  l e t t e r  b y  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c h a i r m a n  w o u l d  b e c o m e  b o i l e r - p l a t e .  M o s t  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  s o c i e t a l  c o s t s  w o u l d  e x c e e d  s o c i e t a l  b e n e f i t s  i f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
r e l a t e d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  w e r e  a d o p t e d .
3C E O s  a n d  t h e  A C C s  o f  t h e  s m a l l e r  c o m p a n i e s  r e a c t  m o r e  
u n f a v o r a b l y  t o  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t h a n  d o  t h e i r  l a r g e  c o m p a n y  
c o u n t e r p a r t s .  D i r e c t o r s  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  c o m p a n i e s  t e n d  t o  f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  
c o r p o r a t i o n  a l r e a d y  i n c u r s  m o s t  o f  t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
r e l a t e d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  n o t  n e e d  t o  m a k e  
m a n y  c h a n g e s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  d i r e c t o r s  o f  s m a l l e r  c o m p a n i e s  t e n d  t o  s e e  
t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a s  a n o t h e r  l a y e r  o f  u n p r o d u c t i v e  o v e r h e a d  c o s t s .
W e  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  t h a t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a s  c u r r e n t l y  
p r e s e n t e d  m a y  c r e a t e  u n r e a l i s t i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  o n  
t h e  p a r t  o f  o u t s i d e  p a r t i e s  u n l e s s  s o m e  o f  t h e  t e r m s  i n  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ’s  r e p o r t  a r e  m o r e  c a r e f u l l y  d e f i n e d .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  
c h a r g e  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  b e  i n f o r m e d ,  v i g i l a n t ,  e f f e c t i v e  o v e r s e e r s  
o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  
l e a v e s  m u c h  r o o m  f o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  M a n y  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  
m a y  f e e l  t h e y  c u r r e n t l y  c o m p l y  w i t h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  b y  a s k i n g  t h e  
e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  a n d  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  w h e t h e r  t h e y  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  b o t h  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  O t h e r s  m a y  
f e e l  t h a t  t h i s  r e q u i r e s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  t o  b e  i n i t i a t e d  a n d  d i r e c t e d  b y  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  c o m m i t t e e  i n t o  s p e c i f i c  a r e a s .
W e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s h o u l d  d o  a t  l e a s t  t w o  
t h i n g s  b e f o r e  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  i s  i s s u e d .  F i r s t ,  w e  s t r o n g l y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  
y o u  a t t e m p t  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  a m b i g u i t i e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  b y  
p r o v i d i n g  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t h e  t e r m s  i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t .
S e c o n d ,  w e  r e c o m m e n d  t h a t  y o u  r e c o n s i d e r  t h e  c o n c e r n s  e x p r e s s e d  b y  
t h o s e  w h o  w i l l  b e  c h a r g e d  w i t h  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
s i g n i f i c a n t  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  t i m e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  o n l y  w i t h  t h e  c o n s e n t  a n d  
a p p r o v a l  o f  t h o s e  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d .
R e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b m i t t e d ,
F l o r e n c e  S h a r p
A s s i s t a n t  P r o f e s s o r  
o f  A c c o u n t a n c y
I v a n  B u l l
P r o f e s s o r  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y
A t t a c h m e n t s
F S : I B : l d a
Audit Committee Research Project 
Summer 1987
Florence Sharp and Ivan Bull 
Questions to Discuss with Chief Executive Officers
Discussion topics emanate from the April 1987 Exposure Draft 
of the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting. The commission takes the position that "An audit com­
mittee consisting of independent directors is the primary vehicle 
that the board of directors uses to discharge its responsibility 
with respect to the company's financial reporting. An informed and 
vigilant audit committee represents one of the most effective 
influences for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting."
I. Public companies should develop and enforce written codes of 
corporate conduct. Codes of conduct should foster a strong e t h i c a l 
climate and open channels of communication to help protect against 
fraudulent financial reporting. A company's audit committee should 
review compliance with the code annually, including compliance by 
top management, and report thereon to the board of directors.
1. To what extent does your audit committee presently carry
out this recommendation?
2. In what ways, if any, do you expect your audit c o m m i ttee
to change the manner or extent to which this recommend­
ation is carried out within the next year or two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
II. Management and the audit committee should ensure that the 
internal auditors' involvement in the audit of the entire financial 
reporting process is appropriate and properly coordinated with the 
independent public accountant.
1. To what extent do you believe your audit committee
presently carries out this recommendation?
2. In what ways, if any, do you expect your audit committee
to change the manner or extent to which this recomme n d­
ation is carried out within the next year or two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
III. The board of directors of all public companies should be 
required by SEC rule to establish audit committees comprised soley 
of independent directors.
1. Are present members of your audit committee independent 
according to the NYSE definition?
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2. Do you expect the number of independent directors on the
audit committee to change within the next year or tw o ?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
IV. Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective 
overseers of the financial reporting process and the company's 
internal controls.
1. To what extent do you agree with this role for your audit 
commit t ee?
V. All public companies should develop a written charter setting 
forth the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee. the 
board of directors should approve the charter, review it at least 
annually, and modify it as necessary.
1. To what extent do you believe your board of directors
presently carries out this recommendation?
2. In what ways, if any, do you expect your audit committ e e
to change the manner or extent to which this recommend­
ation is carried out within the next year or two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
VI. Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority 
to discharge their responsibilities.
1. Does your audit committee have an separate staff reporting
only to the committee?
2. If not currently, do you expect them to have a separate
staff within the next year or two?
3. What person or persons presently perform the work which is
requested to be done by your audit committee?
4. How do you react to this recommendation?
VII. The audit committee should review management's evaluation of 
factors related to the independence of the company's public ac­
countant. Both the audit committee and management should assist 
the public accountant in preserving his independence.
1. To what extent do you believe your audit committee
presently carries out this recommendation?
2. In what ways, if any, do you expect your audit committ e e
to change the manner or extent to which this recommend­
ation is carried out within the next year or two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
VIII. Th e a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  in a d v a n c e  the t y p e s  a n d  
e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  to 
e n g a g e  the c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  to p e r f o r m .
1. To what extent does your audit committee presently carry
out this recommendation?
2. In what ways, if any, do you expect your audit committee
to change the manner or extent to which this recommend­
ation is carried out within the next year or two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
IX. A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  be r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  to i n c l u d e  
in t h e i r  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  to s t o c k h o l d e r s  a l e t t e r  s i g n e d  b y  the 
c h a i r m a n  o f  t he  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  d e s c r i b i n g  t he  c o m m i t t e e ’s r e s p o n ­
s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  the y e a r .
1. How do you react to this recommendation?
X . A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  o f  the q u a r ­
t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  o v e r s i g h t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  to p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .
1. To what extent does your audit committee approve quarterly
earnings reports before they are released?
2. In what ways, if any, do you expect your audit committee
to change the manner or extent to which this recommend­
ation is carried out within the next year or two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
Following are transcripts from, or summaries of, the Commission's 
Audit Committee Good Practice Guidelines. Please give your 
observations about each following general guideline:
1. An audit committee normally should consist of not fewer 
than three independent directors. Terms of appointment should 
be arranged to maintain continuity while bringing fresh per­
spectives to the work of the committee.
2. The committee should meet on a regular basis, with special 
meetings as needed. The committee should meet privately with 
the internal auditor and the independent public accountant.
3. The full board should be kept informed of the committee's 
activities on a current basis.
4. Audit committee members should systematically expand their 
knowledge of company operations.
5. The committee should meet regularly with the company's 
general legal counsel.
6. The committee should review with the chief internal audi­
tor and the public accountant their annual audit plans, in­
cluding the degree of coordination. They should inquire as to 
the extent that the planned audit can be relied on to detect 
fraud and weaknesses in internal controls.
7. The committee should discuss with the internal auditor and 
the public accountant what steps are planned for a review of 
the company's electronic data processing procedures and con­
trols, and inquire as to security programs to protect against 
computer fraud or misuse.
8. The committee should inquire as to the extent which public 
accountants other than the principal auditor are to be used 
and why.
9. The committee should review in-house policies and pro­
cedures for regular review of officers' expenses and per­
quisites, and, if appropriate, review a summarization.
10. The committee should instruct the public accountant and 
the internal auditor that the committee expects to be advised 
if there are any areas that require its special attention.
Please give your observations about each following guideline 
regarding selection of an Independent Public. Accountant:
1. Selecting the CPA firm should be the primary responsi­
bility of the audit committee.
2. In the selection of a firm, the committee should consider:
Opinions of management and internal auditor
Proposed fee and the engagement letter
Expected participation by level of experience, also 
rotation policy of staff
If a new firm, the transition steps
The firm's latest peer review report
Significant litigation or disciplinary problems
Credentials and reputation in the same industry and 
geographical area
Please give your observations about each following Post-Audit 
Review guideline:
1. The committee should obtain from management explanations 
for all significant variations in the financial statements 
between years. They should also consider whether data are 
consistent with Management's Discussion and Analysis.
2. The committee should request an explanation of changes in 
accounting standards or rules which have an effect on the 
financial statements.
3. The committee should inquire about the existence and 
substance of any significant accruals, reserves, or estimates 
that had a material impact on the financial statements.
4. The committee should inquire of management and the public 
accountant if there were any significant financial reporting 
issues discussed during the accounting period, and if so how 
they were resolved.
5. The committee should meet privately with the public 
accountant to request his opinion on various matters including 
the quality of financial and accounting personnel and the 
internal audit staff.
6. The committee should ask the public accountant what his 
greatest concerns were and if he believes anything else sho u ld 
be discussed with the committee that has not been raised or 
covered elsewhere.
7. The committee should review the letter of management 
representations given to the public accountant and inquire 
whether he encountered any difficulties in obtaining the 
letter or any specific representations contained within.
8. The committee should discuss with management and the 
public accountant the substance of any significant issues 
raised by in-house and outside counsel concerning litigation, 
contingencies, claims or assessments. The committee should 
understand how such matters are reflected in the financial 
statements.
9. The committee should determine open years on federal 
income tax returns and how any significant tax matters are 
reflected in financial statements.
10. The committee should inquire of the public accountant i f  
the Management Discussion and Analysis and other sections of 
the annual report are consistent with financial statements.
11. The committee and the board of directors should consider 
whether the public accountant should meet with the full boa r d 
for any purpose.
Overall Summary Questions for CEOs
1. To what extent, if any, do you believe these audit committee 
related recommendations would reduce fraudulent financial 
reporting?
2. What changes, if any, would you suggest?
3. Considering these audit committee related recommendations as a 
group, do you believe that from the viewpoint of society:
Benefits would probably exceed costs, or
Benefits would approximately equal costs, or
Costs would probably exceed benfits?
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A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  R e s e a r c h  P r o j e c t  
I v a n  B u l l  a n d  F l o r e n c e  S h a r p
Q u e s t i o n s  t o  D i s c u s s  w i t h  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  C h a i r s
T h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t o p i c s  b e l o w  e m a n a t e  f r o m  t h e  A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  o f  t h e  
R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g .  I t  t a k e s  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  t h a t ,  " A n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  i s  t h e  p r i m a r y  
v e h i c l e  a  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  u s e s  t o  d i s c h a r g e  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
c o m p a n y ’s  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A n  i n f o r m e d  a n d  v i g i l a n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e p r e s e n t s  
o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  i n f l u e n c e s  f o r  m i n i m i z i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g . "
I. P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a n d  e n f o r c e  w r i t t e n  c o d e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n d u c t .  
C o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t  s h o u l d  f o s t e r  a  s t r o n g  e t h i c a l  c l i m a t e  a n d  o p e n  c h a n n e l s  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t o  h e l p  p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A  c o m p a n y ’s  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o d e  a n n u a l l y ,  i n c l u d i n g  
c o m p l i a n c e  b y  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  r e p o r t  t h e r e o n  t o  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .
1. T o  w h a t  e x t e n t  d o e s  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  p r e s e n t l y  c a r r y  o u t  t h i s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
2 .  I n  w h a t  w a y s ,  i f  a n y ,  d o  y o u  e x p e c t  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  m a n n e r  
o r  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  y e a r  o r  
t w o ?
3 .  H o w  d o  y o u  r e a c t  t o  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
I L  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s ’
i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  a u d i t  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n d  
p r o p e r l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  w i t h  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .
1 . T o  w h a t  e x t e n t  d o e s  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  p r e s e n t l y  c a r r y  o u t  t h i s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
2 .  I n  w h a t  w a y s ,  i f  a n y ,  d o  y o u  e x p e c t  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  m a n n e r  
o r  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  y e a r  o r  
t w o ?
3 .  H o w  d o  y o u  r e a c t  t o  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
I I I .  T h e  b o a r d s  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  c o m p r i s e d  s o l e l y  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s .
1. H o w  m a n y  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  m e m b e r s  o f  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  N Y S E  d e f i n i t i o n ?
2 .  D o  y o u  e x p e c t  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  o n  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t o  
c h a n g e  w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  y e a r  o r  t w o ?
3 .  H o w  d o  y o u  r e a c t  t o  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
I V .  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  b e  i n f o r m e d ,  v i g i l a n t ,  a n d  e f f e c t i v e  o v e r s e e r s  o f  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
1. D o e s  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c u r r e n t l y  o v e r s e e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s ?  I f  
s o ,  w h a t  a r e  t h e  p r i m a r y  m e a n s  b y  w h i c h  t h i s  o v e r s e e i n g  i s  a c h i e v e d ?
2 .  I n  w h a t  w a y s ,  i f  a n y ,  d o  y o u  e x p e c t  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  m a n n e r  
o r  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  y e a r  o r  
t w o ?
3 .  D o e s  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c u r r e n t l y  o v e r s e e  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s ?
I f  s o ,  w h a t  a r e  t h e  p r i m a r y  m e a n s  b y  w h i c h  t h i s  o v e r s e e i n g  i s  a c h i e v e d ?
4 .  I n  w h a t  w a y s ,  i f  a n y ,  d o  y o u  e x p e c t  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  m a n n e r  
o r  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  y e a r  o r  
t w o ?
5 .  H o w  d o  y o u  r e a c t  t o  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
V .  A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a  w r i t t e n  c h a r t e r  s e t t i n g  f o r t h  t h e  d u t i e s  a n d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  t h e
c h a r t e r ,  r e v i e w  i t  a t  l e a s t  a n n u a l l y ,  a n d  m o d i f y  i t  a s  n e c e s s a r y .
1. T o  w h a t  e x t e n t  d o e s  y o u r  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  p r e s e n t l y  c a r r y  o u t  t h i s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
2 . I n  w h a t  w a y s ,  i f  a n y ,  d o  y o u  e x p e c t  y o u r  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  t o  c h a n g e  t h e
m a n n e r  o r  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  
y e a r  o r  t w o ?
3 .  H o w  d o  y o u  r e a c t  t o  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
V I. A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  a d e q u a t e  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  a u t h o r i t y  t o  d i s c h a r g e  t h e i r
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
1. W h a t  p e r s o n s  o r  d e p a r t m e n t s  p r e s e n t l y  p e r f o r m  t h e  w o r k  r e q u e s t e d  b y  y o u r  
c o m m i t t e e ?
2  W h a t  a p p r o v a l  i s  n e c e s s a r y  b e f o r e  w o r k  r e q u e s t e d  b y  t h e  c o m m i t t e e  i s  c a r r i e d  
o u t ?  W h a t  p r i o r i t y  i s  t h i s  w o r k  g i v e n ?
3 .  D o e s  y o u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  h a v e  a  s e p a r a t e  s t a f f  r e p o r t i n g  o n l y  t o  t h e  
c o m m i t t e e ?
4 .  I n  w h a t  w a y s ,  i f  a n y ,  d o  y o u  e x p e c t  y o u r  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  
m a n n e r  o r  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  
y e a r  o r  t w o ?
5 .  H o w  d o  y o u  r e a c t  t o  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ?
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VII. The audit committee should review m anagem ent’s evaluation of factors related to
the independence of the company’s public accountant. Both the audit committee and
m anagem ent should assist the public accountant in preserving has independence.
1. To what extent does your audit committee presently carry out this 
recommendation?
2. In what ways, if any, do you expect your audit committee to change the m anner 
or extent to which this recom m endation is carried out within the next year or 
two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
V III. The audit committee should approve in advance the types and extent of management 
advisory services that m anagem ent plans to engage the company’s independent public 
accountant to perform .
1. To what extent does your audit committee presently carry out this 
recommendation?
2. In  w hat ways, if any, do you expect your audit committee to change the m anner 
or extent to which this recom m endation is carried out w ithin the next year or 
two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
IX. All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in their annual 
reports to stockholders a letter signed by the chairm an of the audit committee 
describing the com m ittee’s responsibilities and activities during the year. (Example 
attached)
1. How do you react to this recommendation?
2. W hat impact, if any, do you feel that such a letter has on the legal liability of 
the audit committee chair and members?
3. In  w riting such a letter, would you report on special investigations undertaken 
by the committee? W ould you report on the outcome of such investigations?
X. A udit committees should increase their oversight of the quarterly reporting process. 
This oversight should include approving financial results prior to public release.
1. Does your audit committee currently oversee the quarterly reporting process?
If so, what are the prim ary means by which this overseeing is achieved?
2. In  w hat ways, if any, do you expect your audit committee to change the m anner 
or extent to which this recom m endation is carried out w ithin the next year or 
two?
3. How do you react to this recommendation?
Following are transcripts from, or summaries of, the Commission’s A udit Committee
Good Practices Guidelines. Please Give your observations about each general guideline.
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1. A n audit comm ittee normally should consist of not fewer than three independent
directors. Terms of appointm ent should be arranged to m aintain continuity
while bringing fresh perspectives to the work of the committee.
2. The committee should meet on a regular basis, with special meetings as needed. 
The committee should meet privately with the internal auditor and the 
independent public accountant.
3. The full board should be kept informed of the committee’s activities on a 
current basis.
4. A udit committee members should systematically expand their knowledge of 
com pany operations.
5. The comm ittee should meet regularly with the company’s general legal counsel.
6. The comm ittee should review with the chief internal auditor and the public 
accountant their annual audit plans, including the degree of coordination. They 
should inquire as to the extent that the planned audit can be relied on to 
detect fraud and weaknesses in internal controls.
7. The comm ittee should discuss with the internal auditor and the public 
accountant w hat steps are planned for a review of the com pany’s electronic 
data processing procedures and controls, and inquire as to security programs to 
protect against com puter fraud or misuse.
8. The comm ittee should inquire as to the extent which public accountants other 
than the principal auditor are to be used and why.
9. The committee should review in-house policies and procedures for regular review 
of officers’ expenses and perquisites, and, if appropriate, review a 
summarization.
10. The comm ittee should instruct the public accountant and the internal auditor 
that the committee expects to be advised if there are any areas that require its 
special attention.
Please give your observations about each of the following guidelines regarding selection 
of an Independent Public Accountant.
1. Selecting the CPA  firm  should be the prim ary responsibility of the audit 
committee. In  the selection of a firm, the committee should consider:
A. Opinions of m anagem ent and internal auditor
B. Proposed fee and the engagement letter
C. Expected participation by level of experience, also rotation policy of staff
D. If a new firm, the transition steps
E. The firm ’s latest peer review report
2 3 1 M
F. S ignificant litiga tion  o r d iscip linary  problem s
G. C redentials and repu ta tion  in the  sam e industry  and geographical area
Please give your observations abou t each follow ing Post-A udit R eview  G uidelines.
1 . T he com m ittee should ob ta in  from  m anagem ent exp lanations fo r all s ign ifican t 
varia tions in the  financial statem ents betw een years. T hey  should also consider 
w hether da ta  are  consisten t w ith M anagem ent’s D iscussion and Analysis.
2. T he com m ittee  should request an  exp lanation  of changes in accounting  standards 
o r rules w hich have an  e ffec t on the  financ ial statem ents.
3. T he com m ittee should inqu ire  about the  existence and substance o f any 
sign ifican t accruals, reserves, o r estim ates th a t had  a m ateria l im pact on the 
financ ial statem ents.
4. T he  com m ittee  should inqu ire  o f m anagem ent and  the public accoun tan t if there  
w ere any sign ifican t financ ia l reporting  issues discussed during  the  accounting  
period, and if so, how they  w ere resolved.
5. T he com m ittee  should m eet privately  w ith  the public accoun tan t to  request his 
op in ion  on  various m atters including the  quality  o f financ ia l and accounting  
personnel and  the  in te rna l audit staff.
6. T he com m ittee  should ask the  public accoun tan t w hat his greatest concerns 
w ere and  if he believes any  th ing  else should be discussed w ith  the  com m ittee 
th a t has no t been raised o r covered elsewhere.
7. T he com m ittee  should review  the le tte r of m anagem ent rep resen ta tions given to 
the  public accoun tan t and inquire  w hether he encountered  any  d ifficu lties in 
ob ta in ing  the  le tte r o r any  specific rep resen ta tions con tained  w ithin.
8 .  T he com m ittee  should discuss w ith m anagem ent and  the  public accoun tan t the 
substance o f any  sign ifican t issues raised by in-house and  outside counsel 
concern ing  litigation, contingencies, claims, o r assessm ents. T he  com m ittee  
should understand  how such m atters a re  reflected  in  the  financ ial statem ents.
9. T he com m ittee  should determ ine  open years on  federal incom e tax  re tu rn s  and 
how  any  sign ifican t tax  m atters are  reflected  in financ ial statem ents.
10. T he com m ittee should inqu ire  o f the  public accoun tan t if the  M anagem ent 
D iscussion and  A nalysis and o the r sections o f the  annual rep o rt a re  consisten t 
w ith  financ ia l statem ents.
11. T he com m ittee  and  the  board  o f d irectors should consider w hether the  public 
accoun tan t should m eet w ith  the fu ll board  fo r any purpose.
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Summary Questions for A udit Committee Chair
1. To w hat extent, if any, do you believe these recommendations for audit committees 
would reduce fraudulent financial reporting?
2. W hat changes, if any, would you suggest?
3. Considering these recom m endations for audit committees as a whole, do you believe
A. benefits to society would probably exceed costs, or
B. benefits would to society approxim ately equal costs, or
C. costs to society would probably exceed benefits?
4. To w hat extent do you think the Treadway Commission recommendations, if adopted, 
will change the liability exposure of audit committee members?
A dditional Inform ation - A udit Committee Chair 
1. How long have you served on the audit committee of this corporation?
2  On which o ther audit committees, if any, do you serve?
3. How were audit committee members selected and recruited?
4. How have the demands on your committee changed in the last three years?
5. How often did your audit committee meet last year?
Regularly scheduled meetings___
Special meetings___
6. W hat is the approxim ate time required for your audit committee responsibilities 
during the past year?
7. W ho prepares the agenda for a committee meeting? To what extent is background 
m aterial provided before the meeting?
8. How would you classify your own background and training?
9. If you were to agree to serve on the board of directors of another company, would 
you ask to be assigned to the audit committee?
10. How much additional compensation, if any, do you receive for serving as a member 
of the audit committee of the board of directors?
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A p p e n d ix  M
G O O D  P R A C T I C E  G U I D E L I N E S  F O R  A U D I T  
C O M M I T T E E  C H A I R M A N ’ S  L E T T E R
Audit committees play an important role in overseeing the financial reporting process and the establishment 
and maintenance of strong internal controls. The Commission recommends that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission require all annual reports to stockholders to include a letter from the chairman of the audit 
committee describing the committee’s responsibilities and activities.
 
Among other subjects, the audit committee chairman’s letter could discuss:
•  The composition o f the audit committee
•  The identity o f each audit committee member, unless disclosed elsewhere
•  The audit committee’s purpose, objectives, and responsibilities
•  The activities o f the audit committee during the past year including matters such as the number of 
meetings held and the significant topics discussed with management, internal auditors, and independent 
public accountants.
The following is an example o f a letter by the chairman o f an audit committee. This illustrative letter does 
not contain the precise wording that the audit committee chairman should use or in any way lim it the 
selection of topics the chairman may wish to discuss.
A U D IT  C O M M IT T E E  C H A IR M A N ’ S L E T T E R
The audit committee o f the board of directors is comprised o f ____  independent directors. The
members of the audit committee are: John Doe, Chairman, ____________________  , and
___________________ _ The committee held ____  meetings during fiscal year_______ .
The audit committee is the primary vehicle to which the board of directors has delegated its 
responsibility to oversee the company’s financial reporting process. In fulfilling its responsi­
b ility, the committee recommended to the board of directors, subject to shareholder approval, 
the selection of the company’s independent public accountant. The audit committee discussed 
with the internal auditor and the independent public accountant the overall scope and specific 
plans for their respective audits. The committee also discussed the company’s consolidated 
financial statements and the adequacy of the company’s internal controls. The committee met 
regularly with the company’s internal auditor and independent public accountant, without 
management present, to discuss the results o f their examinations, their evaluations of the 
company’s internal controls, and the overall quality o f the company’s financial reporting. The 
meetings also were designed to facilitate any private communication with the committee desired 
by the internal auditor or independent public accountant.
John Doe, Chairman 
Audit Committee
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the SEC with the authority to displace state law on this corporate governance 
issue or that the recommended rule is necessary to achieve the purposes of the 
Act, we believe the SEC lacks authority to assert Federal rulemaking authority 
in this area.
While we have previously acknowledged our support in principle for the concept 
of an audit committee comprised of independent directors, we feel that the 
mandating of such a practice is appropriately left to the states. We would, 
therefore, suggest that the recommendation instead be rephrased to read: "It 
is suggested that the Board of Directors of all public companies establish 
audit committees comprised solely of independent Directors absent an express 
pre-emption exacted by Congress to permit this to be included on the SEC's 
rulemaking authority."
Vice President and Comptroller
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U .S . H ouse of Representatives
 Subcommittee on Oversight and I nvestigations 
of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce
W ashington, DC 20515
September 8, 1987
The Honorable Charles A. Bowsher 
Comptroller General of the United States 
U. S. General Accounting Office 
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20548
Dear Mr. Bowsher:
Over the past two years, the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations has held over twenty hearings on the adequacy of 
accounting and auditing for publicly-owned corporations. You and 
your staff have provided valuable assistance during the course of  
this effort, including your testimony, testimony by Fred Wolf,
and your report on "Federal Accounting and Auditing Standards 
Affecting the Private Sector." The Subcommittee appreciates your 
assistance in this area.
As a result of these hearings, the accounting profession, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treadway Commission 
and others have come forward with a number of positive proposals.
I believe it is important that implementation of these proposals 
take place and that progress on implementation be followed 
closely. I am, therefore, requesting that the GAO monitor the 
implementation of changes in the accounting profession for a 
one-year period. At the end of that year, I would like a report 
on the status of the implementation of each of the major 
proposals that have been set forth and any recommendations which 
you might have as to issues which the Subcommittee should pursue.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
John. D. Dingell 
Chairman 
Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
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N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N . W .  
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6
G e n t l e m e n :
N o  o n e  c a n  q u a r r e l  w i t h  t h e  m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  t o  " i d e n t i f y  c a s u a l  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  c a n  l e a d  t o  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  
r e c o m m e n d  s t e p s  t o  r e d u c e  i t s  i n c i d e n t s " .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s h o u l d  
b e  c o m m e n d e d  o n  i t s  o b j e c t i v e .
M a n y  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  r e p o r t  a r e  
f u l l y  s u p p o r t e d  a n d  a l r e a d y  p r a c t i c e d  b y  t h e  W m .  W r i g l e y  J r .  
C o m p a n y  a n d  n o  d o u b t  a r e  s i m i l a r l y  s u p p o r t e d  a n d  p r a c t i c e d  b y  
t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  p u b l i c l y  h e l d  c o m p a n i e s .  H o w e v e r ,  s e v e r a l  o f  
t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  w e  b e l i e v e ,  c o u l d  b e  c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e  t o  
t h e  o v e r a l l  o b j e c t i v e .  T h o s e  t h a t  r a i s e  a  l e v e l  o f  c o n c e r n  i n  
o u r  m i n d s  p e r t a i n  p r i n c i p a l l y  t o  t h e  o v e r l a p  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  w o u l d  i n c u r .
W e  s t r o n g l y  a g r e e  t h a t  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  c o m p r i s e d  s o l e l y  o f  
o u t s i d e  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  a n d  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
s h o u l d  b e  a c t i v e ,  i n f o r m e d ,  a n d  v i g i l a n t .  H o w e v e r ,  t o  p e r f o r m  
e f f e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  f u n c t i o n  a s  a n  a r m  o f  
t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  i n  t h e  r o l e  o f  a n  o v e r s e e r  a n d  n o t  t a k e  
o n  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  d a y - t o - d a y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  F u r t h e r ,  w e  
q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  m a n y  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  w o u l d  b e  w i l l i n g  t o  
s e r v e  o n  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  t h a t  r e q u i r e d  e x t e n s i v e  t i m e  d e v o t e d  
t o  r e v i e w i n g  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  a n d  t h e  e f f e c t  s u c h  
i n v o l v e m e n t  m i g h t  h a v e  o n  t h e i r  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t h a t  t r o u b l e  u s  a r e  a s  
f o l l o w s :
1 .  " A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r ­
s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  
o v e r s i g h t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  
p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e . "
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
O c t o b e r  6 ,  1 9 8 7  
P a g e  2
Wm. WRIGLEY Jr. Company
M e m b e r s  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t e n d  t o  b e  s e a s o n e d  
e x e c u t i v e s .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  t h e i r  t a l e n t s  a r e  p u t  t o  
b e s t  u s e  i n  a n  o v e r s i g h t  r o l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t r y i n g  t o  
d u p l i c a t e  t h e  r o l e  o f  a n  a u d i t o r .  W e  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e v i e w  a n d  
a p p r o v e  n o n a u d i t e d  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  r e l e a s e .  O u r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e v i e w s  
t h e  y e a r - e n d  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  
a n d  t h e  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s ,  a n d  t h e s e  y e a r - e n d  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  i n c l u d e  q u a r t e r l y  e a r n i n g s  
d a t a .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t s  
p r i v a t e l y  w i t h  t h e  o u t s i d e  a u d i t o r s ,  g i v i n g  a m p l e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d i s c u s s  p r o b l e m s ,  i n c l u d i n g  q u a r t e r l y  
e a r n i n g s  p r o b l e m s ,  s h o u l d  t h e y  e x i s t .  F u r t h e r ,  a s  
a t  m a n y  c o m p a n i e s ,  o u r  m a n a g e m e n t  r e v i e w s  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  w i t h  t h e  o u t s i d e  a u d i t o r s  p r i o r  
t o  r e l e a s e .  T h e s e  a c t i o n s ,  i n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  a r e  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  g u a r d  a g a i n s t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  o f  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s .
2 .  " A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C
r u l e  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k ­
h o l d e r s  a  l e t t e r  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  c o m m i t t e e ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i ­
t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r . "
W e ,  l i k e  m a n y  c o m p a n i e s ,  a l r e a d y  i n c l u d e  i n  o u r  
p r o x y  d a t a  s e n t  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  s u f f i c i e n t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  a s s u r e  t h e m  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  a n d  a c t i v e .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h i s  i s  
a d e q u a t e  d i s c l o s u r e ,  a n d  w e  d o  n o t  f e e l  s u c h  a  
l e t t e r  w o u l d  a d d  a n y t h i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  c u r r e n t  
d i s c l o s u r e .
3 .  " T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e
t h e  t y p e s  a n d  e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  
t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m . "
W e  a r e  n o t  a w a r e  o f  a n y  i n s t a n c e  a t  t h e  
W m .  W r i g l e y  J r .  C o m p a n y  o f  n o n - a u d i t  m a n a g e m e n t  
a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  p e r f o r m e d  b y  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  
t h a t  h a v e  i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .  I n  s o m e  c a s e s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  
k n o w l e d g e  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ,  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m  m i g h t  b e  t h e  b e s t  
q u a l i f i e d  c o n s u l t a n t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h i s  
r e q u i r e m e n t  m i g h t  e n c o u r a g e  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  s e e k  
a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  f r o m  o t h e r  c o n s u l t i n g  f i r m s  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .  W e  v i e w  t h i s  a s
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
O c t o b e r  6 ,  1 9 8 7  
P a g e  3
Wm. WRIGLEY Jr. Company
c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e  t o  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
a s  a n  o v e r s e e r  a n d  p o s s i b l y  m o r e  c o s t l y .  W e  d o  
c o n d u c t  a n  a f t e r - t h e - f a c t  r e v i e w  w i t h  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e s  p e r f o r m e d ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  
c o m m i t t e e  c a n  m a k e  i t s  o w n  j u d g m e n t  o n  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
A s  a  f i n a l  p o i n t ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
c a r e f u l l y  a d d r e s s  t h e  c o s t  o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  
I m p o s i n g  a d d e d  c o s t s  o n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t  a l r e a d y  h a v e  
e f f i c i e n t  a n d  t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m s  m a y  b e  
c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e .  T h e  e r r o r s  o f  a  f e w  s h o u l d  n o t  f o r c e  a d d e d  
c o s t  b u r d e n s  o n  t h e  o v e r w h e l m i n g  m a j o r i t y  o f  p u b l i c l y  h e l d  
c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  a l r e a d y  t a k e  p r i d e  i n  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e i r  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  h a v e  n o  h i s t o r y  o f  t a i n t e d  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .
Y o u r s  v e r y  t r u l y ,
W M .  W R I G L E Y  J R .  C O M P A N Y
E .  R .  Meyer
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t - F i n a n c e
E R M / c h
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and Director of Auditing
December 1, 1987
N a tiona l Commission on 
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. 
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Attached is  the  JCPenney Company's response to  Report o f 
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R epo rting .
We acknowledge th e  Commission's accomplishments re la te d  to  
t h is  im p o rtan t issue bu t we d isag ree  w ith  two recommendations 
as s ta te d  in  ou r response.
CLB:ca
A tta c h :
J. C. Penney Company. Inc. 1301 Avenue of the Americas. New York. New York 10019
JCPenney Company, Inc. 
Response to 
Report of
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting
The JCPenney Company is pleased to acknowledge the Commission's 
accomplishments in achieving its mission related to this important 
issue.
We agree that the implementation of the Commission's recommendations 
will greatly enhance the reliability of financial reporting by many of 
America's companies. Also, we agree that implementing the recommendations 
in financial reporting by some companies will require little or even no 
change from current practices.
The Penney Company agrees with all the recommendations in your final 
report issued in October 1987 except the two below:
1. "Recommendation: All public companies should be required by
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders 
a letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
describing the committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year".
Such a letter would be redundant because the information in 
the suggested audit committee chairman's letter is or can be 
included by reference in management's report in the annual 
report to stockholders. The responsibilities of significant 
committees of the board of directors such as the audit 
committee are already included in many companies' annual 
reports to stockholders and proxy statements.
2. "Recommendation: When a public company changes independent
public accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to 
disclose the nature of any material accounting or auditing 
issue discussed with both its old and new auditor during the 
three year period preceding the change".
Considering the positive impact of the other recommendations 
and the SEC's current requirements (Form 8K) for reporting 
changes in independent public accountants, this recommendation 
seems unnecessary.
Again, we congratulate the Commission on the significant contributions it 
has made toward reducing the potential for fraudulent financial reporting.
